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Abstract
The Panel of Independent Forecasters was formed after the UK government left the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992. Its terms of reference 
required the Panel members to report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the current 
and future prospects for the UK economy and to make policy recommendations. This 
thesis is based on the meetings of this Panel during 1993. Applying theories and 
techniques developed in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), it analyses 
econometric modelling and forecasting at a series of levels ranging from the individual 
regression equation to the forecasts and recommendations made by the Panel members. 
The common theme running throughout is the relative roles of econometrics and 
expertise in the modelling and forecasting process. For example, it is shown how, in 
both estimation and use, econometric models are shot through with the expertise and 
judgement of economic forecasters. Similarly, it is shown how the skill and 
interpretative abilities of economists are necessary to turn ‘general’ economic stories, 
such as a ‘devaluation’, into a plausible forecast for the economic outcome of a 
particular set of circumstances. By highlighting the interpretative flexibility found in 
- economic modelling and forecasting the thesis not only accounts for the diversity of the 
discipline but also forces a re-evaluation of its claims to influence. In this way, it 
contributes not only the development of SSK, by extending it to previously neglected 
social sciences, but also to policy making. In particular, by showing how econometric 
models and data are unable to distinguish between economic theories with different 
moral, and political implications, the need for alternative policy structures, within which 
orthodoxy is not uncritically re-presented as truth, is emphasised. In short, the thesis 

















Economic forecasting is big business. It is supported by governments, City firms, banks 
and other financial institutions, as well as commercial organisations and corporations of 
every shape and size. Every single minute of every single day the fortunes of 
individuals and whole nations are gambled on forecasts for the prices of anything from 
coffee beans to money itself.
Because of their importance for the nation, and the impact of economic affairs 
on the life of every individual citizen, the way in which these forecasts are produced 
should be a topic of great interest. Strangely this is not the case, at least as far as 
sociology has been concerned. In fact, with the sole exception of Ashmore, Mulkay and 
Pinch’s-study of health economics1, the sociology of economics has scarcely begun. 
This thesis begins to fill this gap by providing a sociological account of the practices 
and methods used by one of the most important groups of economic forecasters - those 
chosen to advise the government on matters of policy.
It is worth noting at the outset that the economic forecasters on which this study 
focuses are not intended to be representative of all economic forecasters. For example, 
some forecasters, known as ‘chartists’, study graphs of price time series for a particular 
product or commodity, looking for telltale patterns which can be used to predict future 
price movements. Others use state of the art data visualisation and statistical software to 
carry out sophisticated multivariate analysis of price series. Others use concepts from 
theoretical physics and number theory. From this diversity of forecasting 
methodologies, two quite distinct groupings emerge. There are those who make 
forecasts on the basis of a ‘technical’ analysis of patterns in the data series, and those 
who analyse the economic ‘fundamentals’ of the underlying situation. The first group 
corresponds to profit orientated traders, the second to policy orientated economists 
(although some traders will also use a fundamental analysis). A technical forecaster will 
typically analyse a particular price series in great depth but, because the analysis focuses 
on just a few variables, nothing can be inferred from it about the behaviour o f the 
economy as a whole. In contrast, a fundamental analysis will use a wider range of 
inputs and will generally provide a narrative for the whole economy.
Another important difference between the two types of forecast is the 
representation of the economy which they imply. The forecasts based on physics or 
mathematics treat the economy as if it were an autonomous, natural system, the
fundamental analysis as if it were a social one. To give a simple example, a technical 
forecast for the exchange rate could be derived from an analysis based on chaos theory 
and fractals in which patterns identified within daily price movements can also be found 
in longer scale price series2. On the other hand, a fundamental analysis would 
concentrate on things like the level of activity within the two economies, their 
respective inflation and interest rates, as well as governments’ policies. In other words, 
the fractal based forecast treats the exchange rate as something determined by a set of 
non-social rules, the fundamental analysis sees it as the outcome of a social process. 
For the fractal forecast the outcome is deterministic, for the economic forecast it is 
contingent on certain social and political events occurring. Although each approach has 
its merits, and (as noted) large financial institutions will typically employ both sorts of 
forecaster, I am primarily interested in the second group. The reasons for this are 
outlined below.
The Chancellor’s Panel of Independent Forecasters were chosen from this 
diversity of approaches because they are unusual in one very important respect - they 
actually use economics to produce forecasts for the economy. Other forecasters, 
particularly the technical ones, are really only concerned with the ‘bottom line’ and any 
method which gives an advantage in the market place will be used. With this in mind, a 
sociological analysis which showed that the reading of charts depended on 
interpretation, negotiation and was hard to replicate would not be particularly 
interesting. For example, it could easily be dismissed as a ‘soft’ case study (in that it is 
not even clear that any ‘science’ is involved) and would add little new to the wider 
corpus of SSK3. The Chancellor’s Wise Men represent a ‘harder’ case sociologically 
because they are explicitly using economic science and its attendant techniques to derive 
a theoretically informed and empirically validated understanding of the economy.
This thesis documents how the scientific process of economic forecasting is 
invested with the skill and judgement of the forecasters. The thesis is not critical of 
economic modellers, but it is rather sceptical of econometric models. The basic 
argument which is advanced is that it is not the economic models which produce the 
forecasts. Nevertheless the models are important because it is through estimating, 
updating and using econometric models that economic forecasters acquire the expertise 
necessary to make economic forecasts. It is in this sense that economic models support 
forecasting activity.
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The thesis is structured in such a way as to mirror my own learning process and 
to illustrate the qualitative research methodology which underpins it. The remainder of 
this chapter outlines the sociological theory and research which inform the project and 
also provides a brief introduction to the development of macro-econometric modelling 
in the UK. Next, because a key part of the research methodology involved 
understanding economic modelling from the ‘bottom up’, chapters 2 and 3 are devoted 
to the explanation and analysis of the methods and techniques used by economic 
modellers. As a result economists will be familiar with much of the material covered in 
the early chapters, although sociologists will find it new. However, the chapters are 
more than a recapitulation of standard econometric texts and the material is always 
analysed through the lens of sociology. As such, they blend econometrics with 
sociological commentary and thus, I hope, economists will also find the discussion 
interesting.
Chapter 2 begins this process by discussing the building blocks o f econometric 
modelling in some detail and introduces some of the more important concepts and 
techniques used by econometric modellers. The focus is thus on National Income 
Accounts, the estimation of regression equations and different types of forecast tests.
~ One interesting feature which is highlighted in this chapter is the ambiguity of 
econometric testing and the need for economic modellers to have strong prior beliefs if 
the Experimenters’ Regress is to be avoided. In other words, it is shown that 
econometric testing only seems convincing in those cases where the economics 
community has already agreed what the correct answer should be. The next chapter, 
Chapter 3, develops these themes by illustrating how an economic forecast is produced 
and examining the relative importance of econometrics and judgement in this process. 
The chapter shows how a forecast produced by an econometric model can be ‘fine 
tuned’ to the average of recently published forecasts through the use of residual 
adjustments. It is argued that the average of recent forecasts is an important reference 
point for economic forecasters, and further suggested that they use this consensus 
measure as a way of minimising the Regress caused by the fact that no-one can know 
what the ‘correct’ forecast is. The conclusion drawn is that economic forecasts are not 
extrapolations based on the past, but considered judgements based on expectations 
about the future.
Taken together, chapters 2 and 3 thus highlight expertise and skill which make 
economic modelling and forecasting possible. Having thus examined the uncertain
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foundations of economic modelling, the next 4 chapters shift the focus to economic 
forecasting and examine how plausible forecasts can be produced and defended. The 
argument made in Chapter 4 is that, although estimating econometric equations will not 
produce a model of the economy which can be used for forecasting, the process is 
nevertheless an important one. The reason is that it is by estimating, using and updating 
macro-econometric models that economic forecasters acquire their expertise. It is this 
expertise which, in the final analysis, determines what the published forecast actually is.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 develop these themes in more detail by examining the 
forecasts produced by the Treasury’s Panel of Independent Forecasters at each of their 
three meetings in 1993. In contrast to Chapter 3, which showed how judgements can be 
used to reduce controversy by bringing an individual forecast closer to the average, 
these chapters show how controversy is created and maintained by judgements which 
take the forecast away from the consensus and establish more distinctive and individual 
forecast positions.
Finally, in Chapter 8, the conclusions are drawn. The first part of this chapter 
lets the forecasters reflect on their performance in 1993 and analyses the ways in which 
their forecasts might have been improved. This chapter thus offers some insights into 
the continuing success of macro-econometric modellers to secure funding despite their 
apparent failure to produce accurate forecasts. Following this, the thesis concludes by 
examining the lessons which SSK can draw from the thesis and returns to the themes of 
symmetry, neutrality and commitment which are raised in the next section.
Sociology of Science and Economics
Sociology of Science
The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) is a diverse field which uses qualitative 
methods to examine the methods by which scientific knowledge claims are made, 
supported and assessed. Although there are several distinct schools and methods within 
the sociology of science, a principal claim of all is that scientific knowledge can be 
understood as a social phenomenon. Thus, there are some sociologists of science who 
would argue that scientific knowledge can be explained in terms of the social interests 
of its proponents4; there are others who draw on the traditions of ethnomethodology to 
show how knowledge claims are constructed and sustained in the everyday practices of 
scientists;5 there are others who see the scientist as trying to enrol other social and 
natural ‘actants’ into a network of beliefs and practices6; and there are still others who
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use a micro-sociological analysis of scientists’ interactions and day-to-day practices to 
highlight the interpretative flexibility of empirical science and thus open the space 
within which social factors impinge upon scientific knowledge7. However, despite 
these differences, all would agree that social practices and factors of one form or another 
are an important constituent of scientific knowledge.
This thesis draws upon the strand of science studies which concerns itself with 
the empirical working through of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein8. In the 
Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein rejects the logical positivism which formed 
the basis of his first major work, the Tractatus, and argues that it is the use of a concept 
within a form-of-life which gives it its meaning. The sociology of scientific knowledge 
uses this insight as the basis for analysing knowledge claims as social phenomena. The 
four cardinal tenets of this approach were given by David Bloor in the first book length 
treatment of the subject9. The tenets are
1. [SSK] would be causal, that is concerned with the conditions which bring about 
beliefs or states of knowledge.
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth or falsity, rationality or irrationality, 
success or failure.
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of explanation 
would explain both true and false beliefs.
4. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be 
applicable to sociology itself.
These requirements of causality, impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity are the basis of 
the ‘Strong Programme’ in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. The aim of the 
Strong Programme was (and is) to demonstrate that the perceived objectivity of 
scientific knowledge is actually a function of the social processes which make up and 
define scientific activity. The slogan of the movement was ‘interpretative flexibility’10 
and its targets the ‘hard’ cases of prestigious sciences such as mathematics11 and 
physics12
The aim of this original research was to demonstrate the potential of a 
sociological analysis in the most significant way possible. This step was important 
because it was generally believed that although a sociology of scientific error was 
possible, a sociology of scientific knowledge itself was not. Earlier sociologists of
science, such as Merton, had not thought it appropriate to analyse scientific knowledge 
claims as social phenomena; mistakes on the other hand, were clearly the result o f social 
‘contaminants’. Breaking with this belief that scientific knowledge was asocial and did 
not admit to a sociological analysis was therefore a vital first step for the proponents of 
the Strong Programme. However, although they wanted to change sociology, and quite 
possibly society, it is not the case that sociologists of scientific knowledge necessarily 
wanted to change science itself. Rather, what some wanted to achieve was a situation in 
which the epistemic supremacy granted to science would be withdrawn as it became 
clear that scientists’ expertise was grounded in their everyday practices and was not the 
result of a privileged method of discovering the truth.13 In this new world, scientists 
would behave in the same way as they had in the old one, and their expertise would be 
respected as before. The change would be in the relationships between these experts 
and other social agents. Scientists’ expertise would be on a par with other experts and 
not reified as a transcendent truth. The appearance of transcendence resulted from a 
misapprehension of scientific knowledge’s means of production.
Once the Strong Programme had been shown to be feasible, there followed a 
period within which science studies expanded rapidly and the techniques developed by 
the first generation of SSK researchers were applied to a variety of scientific 
controversies. However, after this initial flurry of activity, the science studies field as a 
whole rather lost its way and the critical edge which characterised much of the early 
work became dulled. In particular, once the sociological studies of esoteric natural 
sciences had appeared, together with studies of applied sciences such as the forensic and 
medical sciences, the enterprise seems to have lost its unity. Various authors have 
attempted to differentiate themselves and their research through the writing of 
prescriptive methodological statements14.
One issue which came to dominate these discussions concerned the extent to 
which Bloor’s fourth tenet of reflexivity should be put into practice. The reflexivity 
issue, however, was just one part of a wider ranging debate concerning what should be 
‘taken for granted’ by the sociologist and what needed to be ‘explained’. The arguments 
thus turned on how relativist social studies of science should be and were eventually 
construed in terms of whether social studies of science should be philosophically or 
politically radical. The debate was therefore an argument about what SSK was actually 
for.
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The proponents of reflexivity argued that because the sociology of science could 
itself be examined sociologically, then it should be the topic for the social studies of 
science. The reflexive sociologists wanted to problematise the idea of representation 
and hence the very accounts upon which SSK depended. This desire to relativise the 
production of sociological accounts led the reflexive sociologists to develop so-called 
‘New Literary Forms’ in which different typographical and narrative conventions, 
together with multiple voices and characters were used to reflect the contested and 
constructed nature of the SSK account.
However, there were also other social scientists who wanted to be more 
philosophically radical than this. Unlike the reflexive sociologists, who merely wanted 
to increase the critical self-awareness of sociologists of science, this second group, 
championed by Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, wanted to dissolve the dichotomy of 
‘nature’ and ‘society’ upon which SSK had originally been founded. Callon and Latour 
argued that although it may once have been expedient to accept and use ‘natural’ and 
‘social’ as unproblematic categories, this was no longer the case. With science studies 
now established as a mature intellectual discipline, the way forward, they said, was to 
apply its techniques to the hitherto taken-for-granted categories of ‘Nature’ and 
- ‘Society’. Thus, just as scientific facts are socially constructed, so too is the division 
between natural things and social things and so these categories cannot be uncritically 
imported into sociological analysis. Callon and Latour developed Actant-Network 
Analysis to remove this Nature-Society distinction and to treat all nodes in the Network, 
be they social, natural or mechanical agents, as undifferentiated Actants.15
The philosophical radicals believed that the proponents of so-called Classical 
SSK were being unnecessarily conservative. The practicality and utility of a 
sociological analysis of scientific knowledge had been established for all to see. The 
time had come, so they said, to build upon this foundational work with a new research 
Programme which would explode the taken-for-granted categories of Classical SSK in 
much the same way as it had, in its day, exploded the taken-for-granted categories of 
mathematics and physics.
In response to these challenges, the proponents of Classical SSK argued that just 
because something could be done, this did not mean that it ought to be done. Thus the 
conservative Classicals argued that philosophical radicalism, although intellectually 
consistent, was not the best way for SSK, as a socio-political activity, to proceed. The
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conservatives refuse to accept the premise of Callon and Latour’s argument (i.e. that the 
point of Classical SSK has been well made) and, on the contrary, believed that there is 
still much to be done before sociological analyses of science are uncontroversial. In 
particular, they fear that philosophically radical research will be deleterious for the 
wider interests of SSK because granting equal explanatory status to the natural and 
social in their accounts actually undermines Classical SSK, which was distinguished by 
its advocacy of the ‘social’ as a determinant of scientific knowledge. Thus, 
philosophically radical SSK is politically conservative as it acts to reinforce the reified 
and canonical model of science which the Classicals thought they had dislodged16. 
Unlike the controversies studied by SSK, which invariably come to some sort of 
closure, this one is still very much unresolved with both polar positions enjoying 
support.
This thesis is located most comfortably within the Classical pole of SSK 
research. The reason is that although, where necessary, the distinction between model 
and modeller, mechanical agent and social agent is held as unproblematic, the natural 
world does not enter into the analysis to any great extent. Economics is a social science 
and deals with a social world - nature does not really enter into it at all. It is in this 
sense that the Nature-Society distinction is held unproblematically.
However, the focus of the thesis on a social science, as opposed to a natural one, 
does bring with it certain problems. Unlike the methodological angst described in the 
preceding paragraphs, the problems which arise with the sociological study of a social 
science do not relate to Bloor’s fourth tenet, but to the third - that of symmetry.
Symmetry, Neutrality and the Analytic Critique of Science
The virtue of a symmetrical analysis is that it ensures that social researchers remain 
even-handed in their analysis of scientific controversies. The alternative is to reserve 
social explanations for just one side (inevitably the ‘losers’) and natural-empirical ones 
for the other (inevitably the ‘winners’). The ‘symmetry’ principle ensures that 
sociologists of science do not become sociologists of error and promotes a professional
17agnosticism with regard to the outcome of the science being studied .
However, there are in fact two dimensions to the symmetry principle. The first 
is that the same kind of explanations are to be used to explain both success and failure, 
truth and falsehood. The second is that this sort of analysis is neutral, even-handed and 
disinterested. It turns out that this second dimension is quite distinct from the first and,
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moreover, that its accomplishment poses special problems. The reason is that, despite 
the protestations of the sociologist, a symmetrical analysis is not always perceived as 
neutral by the participants in the science being studied. In other words neutrality is 
something which has to be accomplished and is not intrinsic to the analysis itself.
The ‘symmetry’ debate has thus tended to centre around the capture of the 
sociological account by one side in an on-going controversy and the subsequent 
deployment of the sociologist as a discursive resource in that controversy. The initial 
belief was that sociologists would always be captured by the ‘underdog’, and that this 
was more or less inevitable. The issue was what sociologists should do about this. The 
positions ranged from only doing research on controversies in which one’s personal 
sympathies lay with the ‘underdog’ to arguments that the sociologist qua sociologist 
was committed to neutrality in their professional life, no matter what their beliefs or 
actions as an individual citizen. As is often the case in SSK, the more the categories 
‘symmetrical’, ‘neutral’ and ‘underdog’ were analysed and debated, the more 
complicated things became.
When the dust finally settled, it seemed that the symmetry tenet did necessarily
imply neutrality. Thus, in cases where the underdog was of a particularly low status, the
sociologist would have to work extra hard to deconstruct the orthodoxy and make the
unorthodox credible - such an endeavour would not be neutral, but it would bo 
18symmetrical . Similarly, there will be other instances where sociologists of science 
will wish to draw upon sociological insights and research to intervene in areas where 
science and policy meet. In these circumstances, SSK informs an Analytic Critique of 
Science which is not neutral, as it is clearly intended to influence practice, but which 
remains symmetrical, in as much as no particular knowledge claim is supported19.
Unfortunately, these are not quite the ways in which neutrality and symmetry are 
problematic in the sociological study of economic modelling. Clearly, the Analytic 
Critique of Science is helpful because it can legitimate the sociological critique of 
econometric modelling as a policy science. Thus it can move beyond a symmetrical and
neutral analysis of econometric modelling, similar to that which has already been
20accomplished for health economics , and address the important questions relating to the 
ways in which economic models can be used in policy making. However, it is not clear 
that this is all that is at stake. In particular, there is an additional complication which
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arises from the implicit separation within the Analytic Critique of Science of the 
sociologist’s expertise and that of the scientists and policy makers.
The problem is that the sociologist and the economist are both social scientists, 
and therefore share a common object of study. However, they also have 
incommensurable paradigms. Thus, a neutral sociological investigation of economic 
modelling is problematic because the sociologist of science and the economist have 
different ontologies. Because of this they have very different views about what a social 
science is, what it can achieve and how it should be done. Basically the problem is the 
different conceptions of ‘society’ with which the sociologist of science and economist 
work.
For the sociologist of science, the central idea is that of a ‘form of life’, in which 
it is the language shared by the community which gives meaning to the actions of the 
group and its members. Different forms of life imply different norms, conventions and 
languages which in turn imply that different behaviours will be rational in different 
contexts. This relativist approach (whether it be held ontologically or merely 
methodologically) means that the sociologist interprets the world as a social flux, 
shaped and constrained by social forces.
The economist, on the other hand, invariably holds a rather different view of the 
world. Insofar as macro-econometric modelling is concerned, the principal difference is 
not the economist’s preoccupation with the idea of an individual agent maximising his 
or her utility, as these sort of considerations tend to get lost in the aggregation. Of 
course, macro-economic models ought to make sense as economics, but, as we shall see, 
the extent to which this means being based on the rational optimising choices of 
individual economic agents is a moot point.
In fact, the most important difference between the economists’ perspective and 
that of the sociologist is the former’s belief that there are laws governing economic 
behaviour which statistical analysis can uncover. The sociologist, whilst not denying 
that there are undoubtedly regularities in behaviours which can be discerned, and 
perhaps even modelled mathematically, would be reluctant to go any further and ascribe 
any higher ontological status to these regularities.
The difference is thus one of the meaning attached to the statistical regularities 
identified by econometric analysis. To the strict neo-classical economist or 
econometrician, they are the result of economic agents acting according to laws of
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rationality or supply and demand. Thus, in principle, the future ought to be predictable, 
at least in a probabilistic sense. Given a set of initial conditions and the appropriate 
relationships, the future of the economy can be modelled, extrapolated and forecast in 
much the same way as any system. To the sociologist, however, these regularities are 
simply patterns of behaviour which have been repeated and institutionalised in the past 
and might continue to be so in the future. To caricature slightly, for sociologists, 
behaviour is primarily normative and context sensitive, for economists it is primarily 
rational and maximising. Because of this basic difference in viewpoint, it is difficult for 
a sociologist to accept that, on its own, macro-econometric modelling is likely to reveal 
much in the way of economic laws.
This difference in world-view seems to bring about a position in which the 
sociological analysis is now neither symmetric nor neutral. Is it now just polemic? I 
believe the answer to this is no; the research presented in this thesis is a sociological 
account of economic modelling which respects its scientific content. However, because 
of things which I know by virtue of being a sociological analyst, this thesis is also an 
account of economic modelling which is critical of its methods.
SSK with Attitude
In their study of health economics, Ashmore et al recognise that there is a fundamental 
difference between sociology and economics which makes it difficult to carry out a 
neutral analysis. However, although they recognise the issue as important, they choose 
not to tackle it directly but, instead, re-affirm their commitment to neutrality:
As symmetrical analysts in the sociology of scientific knowledge tradition 
(see Bloor, 1976; Collins 1985; Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983; Ashmore 
1989) we refuse, on principle to evaluate the epistemological status of the 
knowledge claims we analyse. However, as applied sociologists of 
expertise we find that to avoid all evaluation of health economics is as 
unsatisfactory as it is impossible ... it’s not the epistemological status of 
applied economics in any abstract sense that concerns us but rather the 
specific moral and political implications of its underlying assumptions. 
This leads us to be critical of the culture of economic evaluation in almost 
all spheres and not least in health. But simply to get involved in writing an 
academic critique cum political tract, and thus damning the lot of you - no 
offence intended - would be to play the game you health economists play. 
For example we would then become involved in offering our own solutions
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for the problems of health care provision, which is something that is not our 
task as analysts of health economics. Furthermore, if we were to list the 
‘ills of health economics’ in precisely the same way that you specify those 
of the NHS, it would be difficult for us to create any radically new approach 
to applied social science21.
The problem with this approach, as I see it, is that they leave health economics exactly 
as they found it. This would be alright if the methods of health economists were 
appropriate to the subject matter of their discipline, but they are not. And what is more 
Ashmore et al, by virtue of their sociological training and expertise, ought to know this. 
By adhering to a particular version of SSK (i.e. symmetrical and neutral, albeit 
reflexive) Ashmore et al voluntarily deprive themselves of the capacity to make a 
constructive contribution to the allocation of health provision in the UK. While they 
may choose to defend their position on the grounds that they are only ‘applied 
sociologists of expertise’ struggling to develop a ‘radically new approach to social 
science’ this has a rather sad quality about it. To be sure they are doing SSK, but it 
seems as if the means of SSK have become its end.
By this I mean that a typical sociological analysis of science (any science) will 
usually highlight the interpretative flexibility of the empirical data the scientists are 
working with. Of course, the aim is not to show that scientists are cheats and charlatans, 
fudging and forging their results, but to show what exactly it is that makes doing science 
difficult. Thus, the analysis will highlight the capriciousness of experiments, their 
sensitivity to all sorts of seemingly unimportant conditions and the tacit knowledge and 
craft skills of the scientists themselves.
Experience has shown that this approach will work well, so long as the interests 
of the research scientists are orthogonal to those of the sociologist. Thus, whether or not 
high fluxes of gravity waves, cold fusion or solar neutrinos are believed to exist by the 
scientific community has little impact on the professional or personal lives of social 
scientists. Consequently the sociologist has little interest in changing the practice of 
these scientists. It is usually this sort of science which sociologists have in mind when 
they set out their pro-science credentials. Even when the topic of sociological study is 
an applied science, the distinction between being an ‘analyst’ as opposed to an ‘activist’ 
can be maintained, although it may be harder to do so. Thus, for example, science 
policy analysts such as Bryan Wynne or Sheila Jasanoff use their sociological analyses
12
of the ways various institutions deal with science to argue for alternative systems which 
would, they believe, do a better job.22
The point to note here is that in each case the subject of sociological scrutiny is a 
natural, not a social, science. In the case of Bryan Wynne it is environmental risk 
assessment and in the case of Sheila Jasanoff it is the regulation of drugs by the Federal 
Health Authority in the USA. However, when the topic of sociological analysis is a 
social science unique problems occur because now the sociologist not only has an 
expertise of their own with regard to the institutional arrangements within which science 
is conducted, the sociologist also has expertise about the substantive issues which 
concern the scientists in question. The problem is that the sociologist’s expertise tells 
them that the other scientists are wrong!
If the level of analysis is concerned solely with theory choice in economics, and 
the ways in which the ambiguities of econometrics are discussed and resolved then an 
analysis which is both symmetrical and neutral in the Classic traditions of SSK can be 
fairly easily accomplished. In fact, much of the following analysis, in which the 
interpretative flexibility of a economics is foregrounded, is typical of this sort of SSK 
research . In fact, to the extent that skill and judgement are important in the natural 
sciences, then the thesis can be read as supporting the scientific credentials of macro­
econometric modelling. If one chooses to stop here, as Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch- 
did, then there is no problem. However, one is also left wondering if there was any 
point.
The reason of course is that, at a higher level of abstraction, sociologists of 
science believe that the social order is not made up through the aggregation of atomised 
utility maximising economic agents.24 On the contrary, they believe that social relations 
are created in the nexus of ideas and action, of power and knowledge, and that these 
relations are not reproduced through-Taws of sociology’ but through the daily rituals 
and norms of social interaction. Once these propositions have been accepted, the whole 
idea of modelling a society as if it were a collection of rational agents seems a rather 
peculiar thing to want to do. What is more, there are good sociological reasons for 
thinking that the enterprise can never deliver all that appears to be hoped of it. Surely if
2Sthe sociologists know anything, they know that they ought to point this out. The 
question is how?
13
One solution would be to follow the example set by Collins when writing about 
artificial intelligence. In Artificial Experts, Collins explicitly stops doing SSK and 
invents something called ‘Knowledge Science’ as a vehicle for his non-neutral though 
sociologically-based critique of artificial intelligence. However, and for just this reason, 
this approach is not a wholly appropriate model for this thesis - what sort of science 
would have to be invented in order to frame a sociological critique of econometric 
modelling? Like Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch’s self-gagging, it is an option, but not the 
best.
It seems that what is needed is a new form of SSK research, one in which the 
detailed empirical research which distinguished the first and second generations of SSK 
research is combined with a more distinctive evaluative stance. In other words a non­
neutral form of SSK. In a review published in 1993 Trevor Pinch argues that the move 
towards this sort of politically and morally active sort of SSK has already begun. There 
is, he believes already a third generation of SSK research in which the tenet of
symmetry is interpreted in new ways, so as not to imply neutrality. This third
generation SSK research is exemplified by Eveleen Richards’ study of Vitamin C and 
cancer. Reviewing her book, Pinch writes as follows:
...[The Vitamin C] debate, unlike many of the rather esoteric areas of 
science studied in second generation SSK, has consequences for us all.
In such circumstances, one can understand Richards’ concern to intervene in 
this debate. The issue of neutrality clearly becomes more germane for 
studies of knowledge which impact upon a much wider community than the 
producers of that knowledge. Whether and how many solar neutrinos exist, 
and whether the analyst should back one theory of the sun or another , are 
not likely to be of much significance to the person on the Clapham omnibus.
However, medicine and cancer are something that potentially affect us all in
obvious ways. If Richards is led to conclude that the randomised control 
trial is an inappropriate way to assess therapies which involve different 
regimes of care and embody different ethical standards, then why should she 
not be allowed to say this? It would be a tragedy if SSK was not able to 
contribute to some of the most importance political debates about science of 
our times.
The difficulty with Richards’ conclusion is, of course, that it seems prima 
facie to go against symmetry. It seems as if she is siding with Cameron and 
Pauling against the medical orthodoxy ... However, it is not clear that she is
saying this. Rather she explicitly talks about abandoning neutral analysis. 
Ashmore and [Pinch] have argued elsewhere that symmetrical and neutral 
analysis are not the same things26. One can reject neutrality but still be 
symmetrical.
However, there is a further issue to consider. If neutrality is abandoned 
does it make sense to continue with the even-handed style of narrative so 
typical of second and third generation SSK? In other words, is the narrative 
of even-handedness necessarily the best narrative for an explicit non­
neutrality? The odd thing about Richards’ narrative is that most of it reads 
like a typical second generation controversy study; the author labours 
diligently to show the social constitution of both sides’ arguments. Finally 
we get the sting in the ‘tale’ in which Richards challenges the standard use 
of the clinical trial. Given Richards’ goal, why not put the abandonment of 
neutrality up front and make the argument a straightforward one about the 
abolition of clinical trials? SSK would figure as a resource in this argument, 
but the narrative structure and the audience might be very different. 
However, by using the narrative style of second generation SSK studies, 
Richards runs the risk of irritating SSK aficionados who expect ‘business as 
usual’, and at the same time may weaken the force of her political 
intervention.
In other words, I [Pinch] am with Richards in her abandonment of 
neutrality, but I wanted her to go further in making her narrative less closely
27wedded to second generation SSK .
Thus he ends the review with a call for a fourth generation of SSK research, one in 
which symmetrical analyses are not so bound to the conventions of second generation 
research and which is able to integrate the empirical and evaluative aspects of its 
arguments. This thesis is a response to that call. Using concepts from sociology I argue 
that econometric modelling is, at-best, a dubious enterprise. Because of what 
sociologists know about ideas and actions, there are good reasons for thinking that
observed regularities in economic behaviour are likely to be influenced by relatively
28local and short lived constellations of beliefs which a community comes to share . It is 
this view of the social, which is not shared by the economists, which makes it difficult 
for a sociologist to accept that macro-econometric modelling is likely to reveal much in 
the way of economic laws. This thesis examines this claim in some detail and uses the
techniques and insights of SSK to not only argue that this scepticism is justified, but 
that it is also recognised a legitimate concern by economic forecasters themselves.
Macro Modelling in the UK
This section provides a brief outline of the development of economic forecasting in the 
United Kingdom, from its inception shortly after the Second World War to the present 
day. The focus is principally on academic macro-econometric modelling and other 
government sponsored research teams. The section concludes with a brief survey of 
some comparative research, conducted by economists, which aims to give some insights 
into what the research described has actually achieved.
Historical Overview29
Macro economic forecasting began in the United Kingdom after the Second World War 
when Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) began preparing qualitative assessments of 
economic prospects. Initially, these forecasts were not derived from a formal 
econometric model but were based on the judgement and intuition of Treasury 
economists. With this practice established, the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research (NIESR) was charged with providing an independent set of forecasts 
against which the Treasury's assessments could be compared. The first National 
Institute forecasts were produced in 1959, and like those of the Treasury, relied mainly 
on the judgement of the economists who prepared them. By 1961, as the original 
judgmental relationships were gradually replaced with estimated equations, the initially 
qualitative assessments of the Treasury and National Institute had become quantitative 
projections. It was during this period that the first quarterly model of any national 
economy was estimated. The economy modelled was the UK30 and the data ran from 
1948-56.
In 1965, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) was directed to allocate 
public funds to macro-econometric research. The first grants were awarded to the 
National Institute (NIESR), the London Business School (LBS), the Cambridge 
Economic Policy Group (CEPG), the Cambridge Growth Project (CGP) and 
Southampton University. The London Business School produced its first forecasts in 
1966 using a fully computerised 16 equation model. This move to computer technology 
was formally followed by the National Institute in 1969 and the Treasury in 1971, 
although both had already produced experimental computer based forecasts31. The 
Bank of England began producing its own economic forecasts in 1973. More generally,
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the 1970s saw a marked growth in the number of organisations producing 
macroeconomic forecasts and by the end of the decade it was estimated that 99 
organisations were producing economic forecasts for the UK32.
Throughout the 1970s and 80s the SSRC (which changed its name to the ESRC 
during this time) reviewed its funding at regular intervals. The outcome of these 
reviews has been that Southampton University, the Cambridge Growth Project and the 
Cambridge Economic Policy Group have all lost their funding. Grants to the National 
Institute and London Business School have been cut, and new grants were awarded to, 
and subsequently withdrawn from, Liverpool University and City University Business 
School. In the latest (1995) funding round the ESRC, in addition to maintaining the 
Macromodelling Bureau at the University of Warwick, and supporting on-going 
research at the National Institute, the London Business School and the University of 
Exeter, awarded several new grants. These new grants went to researchers at the 
London Business School and the Universities of Cambridge, Liverpool, Oxford, 
Sheffield and Warwick33.
Apart from the regular funding reviews carried out by the ESRC, other 
interesting changes in the institutional arrangements for UK macro-modelling have been 
the sustained growth in privately funded forecasting34, and the setting up by the 
Government of a Panel of Independent Forecasters in November 1992. The panel,- 
quickly dubbed the ‘Seven Wise Men’, met for the first time in February 1993 and its 
terms of reference require it to comment on economic policy and to make 
recommendations to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Panel’s membership was 
reduced to six in December 1993, when Andrew Sentance resigned following his 
appointment to the London Business School, an institute already represented by David 
Currie. In November 1994 the Panel’s membership and terms of reference were 
reviewed by the Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke. As a result of this review, the terms of 
reference were altered, so that the Panel now meet only twice a year, rather than the 
three meetings originally required. In addition, it was announced that the Panel 
members would be replaced after three years. However, in order to ensure some 
continuity, David Currie and Wynne Godley will leave the Panel at the end of 1995, the 
other four will remain until the end of 1996, when further changes will be made.
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Model Development
As described in the previous section, the first economic forecasts were largely 
judgmental affairs. Although some econometric work was available, the forecasts 
themselves were prepared on the basis of an informal model of the economy, which may 
not necessarily even have been written down. All calculations were carried out by hand 
using equations which had not (usually) been formally estimated. The majority of 
coefficients were therefore imposed by the forecaster.
The criticisms made (at the time) of these forecasts were that the policy advice 
produced was invariably too late and of the wrong magnitude. The response of the
forecasters was to move towards more formal modelling techniques. They did not
however change the basic structure of the models which persists to this day, as can be 
seen from the following quote:
It is rather striking that one can look back to the first quarterly model of the
United Kingdom economy estimated by Klein, Ball, Hazlewood and
Vandome, using data for the period 1948 to 1956, and find there a basic 
structure not unlike the models used by their successors in such places as 
Cambridge, the London Business School, the Treasury, the Bank of England 
and the National Institute. The treatment of the consumption function, the 
trade equations, the determination of prices, of unemployment all show a 
high degree of continuity and stability from one generation to the another. 
But this is alongside a record of relative uncertainty and instability 
associated with some other relationships such as those determining fixed 
investment, stockbuilding, interest rates and now the exchange rate.35
Because of this continuity it is worth outlining briefly the main features of the income- 
expenditure model. G. Worswick, a former National Institute research officer, describes 
the NIESR ‘model’ circa 1959 as follows36:
1. Real average wages were inversely related to unemployment (i.e. a Phillips 
Curve)
2. Employment, and hence unemployment, was determined by past movements in 
GDP
3. Average wages multiplied by the number of people employed gave the total wage 
income
4. Wage income plus other income less taxes gave total personal disposable income
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5. Real disposable income was calculated by dividing the nominal value obtained 
for total personal disposable income by a forecast for consumer prices.
6. Consumer prices were forecast from past wages and import prices.
7. Real consumer expenditure was forecast from current and past real disposable 
income and the availability of credit through hire purchase controls
8. Stocks and Investment were determined by an accelerator model driven by the 
rate of change of output
9. Exports were determined by world trade and a measure of the UK's 
competitiveness.
lO.Since the exchange rate was fixed, competitiveness was determined by 
movements in relative labour costs
11.Government spending was taken to be exogenous.
12.Total domestic demand was thus the sum of consumers' expenditure, investment 
(including stocks), exports and public expenditure
13.Imports were determined by the total domestic demand
14.Given imports, GDP was determined by the identity: (14) = (12) - (13)
15.Given GDP, unemployment could be calculated from step (2).
...and Change
In what follows I focus on the differences which have emerged as this basic structure 
has been developed by the different research groups. It will be seen that most of the 
changes come about through attempts to model the exchange rate. However, possibly 
the most significant development, the increasing use of the Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis, occurs not as a pragmatie response to a modelling problem, but as the result 
of developments within economic theory. The following discussion introduces the 
current generation of models and gives some idea of the ‘state of the art’. The models 
discussed are, in alphabetical order, CEPG, LBS, Liverpool, NIESR.
Cambridge Economic Policy Group
The Cambridge Economic Policy Group differs from the other research groups in that it 
has always placed considerable emphasis on the properties of the model as a whole. In 
addition to this holistic orientation, the CEPG also criticised the excessive complexity
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of the other models, arguing that there was no need for such a large number of 
equations.
Recent information concerning the specification of the CEPG model is sparse, 
partly as a result of the ESRC's decision to withdraw its grant in 1983. In the early 
1980s, however the model was estimated on annual data and contained 38 behavioural 
equations. Theoretically the model took a strong Keynesian approach, containing no 
expectational variables and no way for the money supply to affect output.
37More recently, Professor Godley has suggested that early versions of the model
38have underestimated the extent to which supply side factors can constrain output . It 
seems reasonable to suppose that some alterations have been made to the specification 
of the model in the light of this. The model has also been re-estimated since the UK left 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992.
The London Business School
Between 1975 and 1977 the London Business School made extensive alterations to the 
structure and specification of its UK model. The theoretical underpinning of this 
revision was ‘International Monetarism’, according to which a rise in the UK money 
supply relative to that overseas causes an immediate proportional fall in the UK 
exchange rate (measured as the value of sterling relative to other currencies).39
The introduction of this international monetarist orientation necessitated the 
specification of new wage and price equations. These were needed in order to ensure 
that the falls in the exchange rate (brought about by the growth in the money supply) 
were matched by proportionate changes in the domestic price level. The process is:
• a rise in the money stock leads to an instant fall in the exchange rate;
• this fall in the exchange rate produces gains in competitiveness and hence output;
• the rise in the money supply simultaneously raises prices and wages;
• rises in prices and wages cancel out the gains in competitiveness and output - the 
economy is now back where it started but with a higher price level40.
Thus, according to international monetarism a devaluation has no long run effect on 
output. This differs from the conventional income-expenditure approach, according to 
which the gain in competitiveness is not completely cancelled out by the rise in 
domestic prices and wages. This monetarist specification was originally implemented
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by taking the money supply as an exogenous policy variable, but later versions of the 
model endogenised this by letting money supply be determined by government 
borrowing (PSBR)41.
In addition to this theoretical realignment other changes were also made during 
the 1970s. The consumption function was augmented by including inflation as an 
explanatory variable. The inverse relationship between consumption and inflation was 
supposed to model the way in which, as inflation rises, people save more in order to 
preserve the value of their financial assets. This change in specification is now common 
to almost all UK models and has the effect that, depending on the influence of inflation, 
the expansionary effects of higher government spending can be cancelled out by 
increased consumer saving as a result of the inflation created. In this way, the model 
can explain how the fiscal expansion of the 70s produced higher inflation but no gains 
in output.
During the 1980s the LBS model was revised once more. The international 
monetarist flavour was retained, and the revisions mainly took the form of the addition 
of a detailed financial sector. The aim of this was to improve the modelling of the 
exchange rate. In the new LBS model the exchange rate was modelled as a market 
clearing price determined in the financial sector under the assumption of rational 
expectations. Other alterations made included an improved treatment of the labour 
market and the explicit inclusion of wealth effects in the consumption function. In the 
third ESRC review, Wallis et al summarise the 1985 LBS model as:
[an] aggregate quarterly model covering 770 variables (of which 70 are 
exogenous), with a little over 100 behavioural equations42. The model has a 
separate financial sector containing 1/3 of the total number of variables. It 
is based around the income-expenditure framework, but is often referred to 
as an ‘international monetarist model ... Forward consistent expectations 
are assumed in the financial markets.43
More recently the LBS model has once again been revised substantially. In particular 
the assumption of rational expectations has now been dropped and replaced by a model 
of learning based on a ‘reduced, reduced form’44 model of the economy which economic 
agents are assumed to know, use and modify45.
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Liverpool University Research Group in Macroeconomics
The Liverpool model was first used for forecasting in 1980, and incorporated several (if 
not all) the recent developments in economic theory. The model was a ‘new classical’ 
computable general equilibrium model, solved using a rational expectations algorithm 
which forces expectational variables to take values which are consistent with the 
computed outturn values. Unlike the LBS and NI the Liverpool model includes rational 
expectations in all markets. The model is monetarist in the sense that higher monetary 
growth directly increases inflation. Structurally however the model was not very 
different to the mainstream models - the main differences were that it was estimated on 
annual rather than quarterly data and that the dynamic specifications were relatively 
simple.
What particularly distinguished the Liverpool model from its peers was that 
factors affecting the supply of labour, in particular the level of unemployment benefit, 
were treated in much more detail than in the demand oriented mainstream models46. 
Also, an explicit allowance for the impact of changes in wealth on consumption was 
made, and private expenditure decisions were not related to income as in the other 
models47. Government spending is determined endogenously on the basis of a constant 
PSBR/GDP ratio and an assumption about the average tax rate. This contrasts with the 
majority of other models which typically take government spending as an exogenous 
policy variable.
The exchange rate is modelled using the theory of ‘uncovered interest parity’ 
according to which any expected appreciation in the exchange rate must be matched by 
UK interest rates being lower than foreign ones by exactly the size of the expected rise. 
Finally, exports and imports are modelled jointly as a function of world trade, domestic 
income and the actual and expected exchange rates. This contrasts with the majority of 
other models which have separate import and export functions.
The Liverpool model has remained relatively unchanged during the last decade 
or so. However, the model is now run using quarterly and not annual data.
The National Institute for Economic and Social Research
The National Institute model, like the LBS model was also modified throughout the 
1970s and 80s, although unlike the LBS it did not undergo any major theoretical re­
alignment. It thus remains in the Keynesian income-expenditure tradition, and can be 
viewed as a quantity adjustment model, driven more by expenditures than by prices48.
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In 1977 the National Institute introduced a simple financial system to the model 
and, in conjunction with this, modelled the exchange rate according to the theory of 
long run purchasing power parity. In the NIESR the exchange rate was determined by 
UK prices relative to overseas prices, the visible trade balance and the covered interest 
rate differential between UK and US interest rates49.
Like the LBS, the National Institute also introduced the rational expectations 
hypothesis into its model during the 1980s. By 1985, NIESR had forward looking 
behaviour in the equations for employment, stockbuilding, wages, exchange rate, and 
the demand for narrow money (Ml). However, the exchange rate equation remained 
problematic for some considerable time, with the forecast rate being highly dependent 
on the terminal conditions set for the expected exchange rate. In practice the exchange 
rate is therefore exogenous in the NIESR model (of 1985).
More recent revisions50 of the model (now Version 11.4) are:
• key price and wage equations are both forward looking, and are based on explicit 
theories of dynamic adjustment;
• the real interest rate, working through the cost of stockbuilding, plays an 
important role in influencing prices. In the longer run, real interest rates 
influence the model's NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate o f 
Unemployment) in the same way;
• new disaggregation of output by sector and vintage production technology 
expanded to cover distribution and business services;
• unemployment is now modelled according to claimant status, rather than part of a 
labour supply decision. Unemployment is no longer therefore the most useful 
measure of excess supply in the labour market when it comes to explaining 
earnings;
• the addition of a detailed set of equations for the capital account, with 
relationships for direct and portfolio investment inflows and outflows and net 
overseas liabilities for domestic banks.
Summary
The preceding discussion has highlighted the similarities and differences between some 
of the macro modelling groups in the UK. It has described how, starting from the
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income-expenditure model of the 1950s macro models in the UK have developed. 
However, despite their common heritage, the contemporary macro-econometric models 
do differ from each other in several important respects.
The most significant differences are ones of theoretical orientation: CEPG 
adopted a strong Keynesian perspective; NIESR a more eclectic Keynesianism; the LBS 
a short run Keynesianism, tempered by a long run international monetarism; Liverpool a 
new classical, monetarism51. The treatment of expectations, and in particular the use of 
the rational expectations hypothesis can also be used to discriminate between the 
models. CEPG has no role for expectations at all; the LBS used rational expectations 
for a while but subsequently abandoned them; NIESR although slower than the LBS to 
adopt rational expectations now uses them quite extensively52; Liverpool has always had 
rational expectations throughout. Thus, although the income-expenditure framework is 
basic to all the models, there is no common specification. For example, some models 
are specified in such as way that increases in UK money supply lead directly to 
increases in wages and prices. In others however no such linkage occurs.
The problem is that all the models pass the appropriate sets of tests for statistical 
significance, and are all equally ‘good’ explanations of economic events. The first 
question my research seeks to answer is thus what persuades economists which, of this 
set of statistically satisfactory models, can be rejected. One solution to the possible 
conundrum might be to ask if models can be ranked according to their ability to 
generate accurate forecasts of economic events. In the rest of this introduction I 
consider the extent to which forecasting accuracy can guide us in choosing a macro­
econometric model. To pre-empt the conclusion slightly I will argue that, on the basis 
of ex ante forecasts, no model is unambiguously superior to the rest.
Comparative Research
The following discussion focuses on the accuracy of forecasts produced during the 
1980s. It is intended to be illustrative, and does not claim to represent a full survey of 
the literature. Initially short-term forecasts made in 1979 and 1980 are considered, after 
this forecasts made in 1983 are examined. The analysis concludes by considering long 
term projections made in 1986, and considers the success with which forecasters were 
able to predict the boom of the late 1980s and the subsequent recession.
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Short-term Forecasting: 1979-80
The following is based on Holden's53 summary of a comparative study originally 
published by Barker54. Barker compared the forecasts produced by Cambridge 
Econometrics, Cambridge Economic Policy Group, Liverpool University Research 
Group, London Business School and the National Institute in 1979 (1980 in the case of 
Liverpool) for the following 3 years. The forecasts for the growth of GDP are shown in 
Table 1 below:
Table I: Forecasts fo r  GDP growth (% change p. a.)5 5
forecaster forecast date 1979 1980 1981 1982
CE March 1979 0.8 1.8 2.3 1.9
June 1979 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 0.2
LBS Feb. 1979 2.4 3.0 2.0 0.2
July 1979 1.6 i o 1.7 3.4
NIESR May 1979 1.6 2.1 - -
Aug. 1979 0.5 0.5 - -
CEPG April 1979 3.0 1.6 0.2 0.9
April 1980 1.1 -6.1 -3.6 -1.3
LPOOL March 1980 - 0.0 1.6 2.9
Outturn 2.5 -2.8 -2.3 1.0
The study is interesting because it compares forecasts made before and after the 
election of the Conservative Government in 1979. By comparing forecasts made before 
the now famous budget of June 197956 with those made afterwards it is possible to see 
how well the forecasters managed to predict the effects of the new policies.
A preliminary inspection suggests that the forecasters correctly anticipated the 
contractionary effects of the government’s policies, with all the groups revising the 
forecasts down after the June budget. However it is clear that there was very little 
consensus on the severity of this effect. In addition, none of the groups appear 
particularly close to the actual outcomes. Liverpool and the National Institute both 
failed to predict the recession at all, with NIESR even suggesting that output would rise 
by 0.5% in 1980 when in fact it contracted by 2.5%
Of the others, CE forecast the onset of recession a year early and underestimated 
its depth, and suggested the economic situation would improve between 1979 and 1980 
when the rate of growth actually fell by over 5%. The LBS correctly forecast the onset 
of recession in 1980, but underestimated its depth and duration. CEPG correctly 
forecast the onset and duration of the recession but overestimated its severity,
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forecasting a contraction of 6.1%, against an outcome of -2.8%. The conclusions drawn 
by Barker were:
1. the best forecasts for GDP were produced by Cambridge Econometrics, for 
unemployment by CEPG and for inflation by Liverpool;
2. none of the forecasters were able to predict the recession of 1980-81 with any 
accuracy.
Short-term Forecasting: 1983-4
In 1987 the ESRC Macromodelling Bureau at Warwick published its third review of the 
UK macroeconomic models57. Chapter 4 of this edition contains a detailed ex post 
analysis of 1 and 2 year ahead forecasts made in the autumn of 1983. The forecasts and 
the outturn data for GDP growth, inflation and unemployment are shown in Table 2. 
These forecasts are particularly interesting as March 1984 saw the beginning of the 
miners strike, which lasted approximately 12 months. The miners’ strike, in contrast to 
the reform Programme of the Thatcher government is an example of an unexpected 
shock to the economy of which the forecasters had no knowledge and which could not 
be allowed for when the forecasts were prepared. Official figures suggest that the direct 
effect of the miners strike was to reduce output growth by 1% in 1984 and to increase it 
by the same amount in 1985.
Inspection of Table 2 (overleaf) however reveals that although the miners strike 
was a common source of error for all forecasters, it does not seem to help explain the 
forecasts. All the forecasters, with the single exception of Liverpool’s forecast for the 
1984 growth rate of GDP (expenditure measure), underestimate the actual growth rate. 
The National Institute, once again, seems to be the furthest away from the actual 
outcome, predicting a sustained slow down in GDP (output measure) growth, during a 
period in which the growth rate grew from 3 to 3.4%. The performance of the LBS is 
more difficult to assess, as it depends on whether one uses the output or expenditure 
measure of GDP. The expenditure forecast is the numerically more accurate, but the 
output measure suggests a steady, if not spectacular, growth in output. In contrast to the 
LBS and NIESR, the Liverpool group are rather optimistic, predicting growth over 3%
58for the entire penod .
With regard to inflation, the LBS and NIESR seem over pessimistic, with 
Liverpool, in contrast, relatively optimistic. In the case of unemployment, NIESR's 
prediction of a sustained slow down in GDP led to an over prediction of about 200 000
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by the end of 1985. LBS and Liverpool on the other under predicted the final total by 
400 000 and 800 000 respectively. As unemployment actually rose throughout the 
entire period, the NT’s pessimism on GDP, which led it to forecast that unemployment 
would rise steadily throughout the period in question now seems more warranted59.
Table 2: Autumn 1983forecasts and outturns60
1983 1984 1985
GDP Growth1 LBS 1.8 2.4 2.4
NIESR 2.2 2.0 1.0
Outturn 3.0 3.1 3.4
GDP Growth2 LBS 2.5 1.9 2.4
LPOOL 3.6 3.5 3.0
Outturn 3.7 1.7 3.3
Inflation'5 LBS 5.6 5.9 6.3
NIESR 5.8 5.8 6.1
LPOOL 4.6 3.3 2.1
Outturn 5.2 4.6 5.4
Unemployment4 LBS 2.9 3.0 2.8
NIESR 2.9 3.1 3.4
LPOOL 2.9 2.7 2.4
Outturn 2.9 3.0 3.2
1 output measure, % change p.a. 2 expenditure measure, % change p.a.
3 % p.a. 4 millions
The more general conclusions drawn by Wallis et al are that Liverpool and LBS 
produce the most accurate forecasts for the level of GDP, with LBS producing the more 
accurate forecasts for the growth of GDP. LBS and NIESR produce the best forecasts 
for inflation, but tend to over predict. Liverpool on the other hand tends to under 
predict, and by a bigger margin. Although NIESR and LBS forecast the number of 
unemployed more accurately they make large mistakes in forecasting the number of 
people actually in work. Liverpool, although wayward in their estimates of 
unemployment make broadly ‘equal and opposite’ mistakes forecasting employment.
In a paper published in 199161 Wallis and Whitley repeat this analysis for
62forecasts published during the period 1984-88 . The conclusions they reach are rather 
similar to those for 1983 forecasts. Wallis and Whitley find that all the groups have a 
tendency to underestimate the rate of growth of output during this period, with only 4 
out of 46 forecasts appearing over-optimistic.
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However, some pairwise differences do emerge in the errors made by the 
different groups. The demand based models of the LBS and NIESR tend to be more 
pessimistic than the supply-side models of Liverpool and the City University Business 
School. LBS and NIESR have average errors of about 3% for the level of output and 
1.5% for the growth rate. Liverpool and City University in contrast have errors of 
approximately 1% and 0% for the level and growth of output respectively.
For inflation, Liverpool has a tendency to under predict while the others over 
predict. Errors on inflation are less systematic than those for output however, with the 
LBS forecast errors changing sign. Overall, the worst forecasts for inflation are by 
NIESR.
Considering all four of the main variables as equally important, the best 1 year 
ahead forecasts (defined as having the lowest average root mean squared error) are 
produced by the LBS, with Liverpool producing the best 2 year ahead forecasts. Taking 
the variables individually, Liverpool and City University produce the best forecasts for 
the level and growth of output, LBS for inflation and NIESR (just) for unemployment.
63The average root mean square errors for all the models are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Average R M SE for 1984-8 (all models)64
1 year 2 year
GDP (level) 1.9% 3.1% of actual
GDP (growth) 1.2% 1.5% per annum
Inflation 0.9% 1.7% per annum
Unemployment 0.8% 1.9% of actual
The size of the RMSE's shown in table 3 are all large relative to the variable in 
question. For example, the average growth rate for GDP over that last 20 years is about 
2.5%, although for the period in question it was admittedly about 4%. Nevertheless, a 
1.2% error in forecasting a growth rate of even 4% is still a considerable margin. Trend 
GDP growth of 2.8% is quite different from boom economy of the late 80s. Similarly 




The studies discussed above considered only short term forecasts, i.e. forecasts for 1 and 
2 years ahead. In this section I will consider the longer term projections also produced 
by most forecasting groups. Table 4 (below) shows the 5 year projections made in late 
1986 by the LBS, NIESR and Liverpool groups, as well as the outturn figures.
Table 4: 5- Year Ahead Forecasts65
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
GDP Growth LBS 2.1 3.0 3.2 2.8 2.2 2.1
LPOOL 2.6 3.5 2.2 2.9 2.3 2.8
NIESR 2.5 2.1 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.0
Outturn 3.3 4.7 4.3 2.3 1.1 -2.5
Inflation LBS 3.6 3.3 4.4 4.6 3.9 2.8
LPOOL 3.8 3.1 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.2
NIESR 3.7 4.8 6.3 6.8 6.0 5.2
Outturn 3.4 4.2 4.9 7.8 9.4 5.9
Unemployment LBS 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9
LPOOL 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.5
NIESR 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1
Outturn 3.1 2.8 2.3 1.7 1.6 2.2
A cursory inspection of Table 4 shows how the rapid growth in output which 
occurred in 1987 and 1988 took most forecasters completely by surprise. The economic 
downturn which starts in 1989 and turns into a full blown recession in 1991 is similarly 
unanticipated. The doubling of the inflation rate which took place between 1987/88 and 
1990 is also not forecast by any of the groups
The disparity between the outturn data and the forecasts has led one economist66 
to conclude that the forecasts have been of ‘no value’. However, it should be noted that
67a detailed study of forecast performance by the National Institute concludes that the 
NIESR forecasts for the period 1968 to 90 are generally both ‘efficient’ and ‘unbiased’, 
suggesting that they do contain information significant for prediction. However:
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a less encouraging finding was that many of the forecasts made during the 
1980s did exhibit some degree of bias and inefficiency, and it seems that 
forecasts for some variables contained little useful information. We 
therefore applied a test for stability to the relationship between forecast and 
outturn before and after 1983. Rather surprisingly, in most cases the 
hypothesis of stability could not be rejected. It is possible to argue for most 
variables that forecasting performance is, in some underlying sense, just as 
good as it has ever been - we have just been unlucky in the last few years, 
(p. 2, emphasis in original.)
Conclusions
So far I have set out a brief history of the development of macro models in the 
UK and evaluated their relative performances. Firstly, a general overview was 
presented and some of the theoretical similarities and differences between the research 
groups were outlined. Next, it was shown that, using out of sample forecasting 
performance as a criterion, no one model or modelling team appears to have a 
significantly greater degree of success than the rest. Despite this forecasting and
modelling activity and research continue to grow apace. The current ESRC funding
68round has allocated £3.2 million to macro-modelling research and the Treasury’s 
monthly survey of economic forecasts lists over 30 contributors, and this list is by no 
means exhaustive.
This somewhat paradoxical situation is the starting point for my research. The 
questions I want to answer are:
1. what reasons do macro-modellers give for their model specifications in the 
absence of any conclusive forecasting experience;
2. what role does falsification play (if any) in macro modelling;
3. how are the errors and radical uncertainty inherent in forecasting managed and 
minimised;
4. how are economic forecasts produced.
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Chapter 2
‘Thus i f  the animal spirits [of investors] are dimmed and the[ir] 
spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a 
mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die; though fears o f  loss 
may have a basis no more reasonable than hopes o f profit had before.... We 
should not conclude from this that everything depends on waves o f  
irrational psychology.... We are merely reminding ourselves that human 
decisions affecting the future, whether personal or political or economic, 
cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis fo r  
making such a calculation does not exist; and that it is our innate urge to 
activity which makes the wheels go round ’ (Keynes, The General Theory o f  
Employment, Interest and Money pp. 161-3)1
Introduction
Economic forecasting is about predicting the future and the question this chapter 
addresses is why it is believed to be possible, at least in some circumstances, to make 
predictions about what will happen next week, next month or even next year. What 
kind of futurology are economic forecasters engaged in? Although some futurologists 
are generally believed to be more plausible than others, a common link between all is 
the plausibility of the idea that the system, be it physical or social, is in some sense 
deterministic, or at least probabilistic. The source of this driving, guiding force may be 
internal to the system, like the laws of nature, or external, like the omnipotent deity. 
Nevertheless, whatever its source, this idea is behind predicting the future.
The idea of mechanical laws or rules of human action is closely interlinked with 
the origins of the social sciences, and not just economics. In the case of economics, the 
driving force behind human action is that of rational choice. Economics is founded on 
the assumption that individual agents will act in such a way as to maximise their well­
being. Together with other axiomatic statements about the nature of tastes and 
preferences (e.g. they are stable and known) economics then proceeds to deduce 
theorems about the world. A useful analogy is with geometry. Geometry works 
forward from a few axioms to make a set of theorems about the world, and these 
theorems have implications which can be tested. In the case of Euclidean geometry, it 
turned out that the fifth postulate (the one about parallel lines never meeting) could not 
be proved and that the alternative Reimann geometry is a more useful description o f the
world (at least when the world is understood from the perspective of Einstein’s theory of 
general relativity). Economics is very similar, at least in spirit. Theorems are deduced 
from axioms and the implications of these theorems can be tested against empirical data. 
It is here that econometrics is so important. Econometric testing provides the means by 
which the veracity of the relationships deduced from economic theory can be assessed. 
The plausibility of macro-econometric theory is thus crucially related to the results of 
this econometric testing i.e. to macro-econometric modelling.
However, there is an additional condition which must be met if macro- 
econometric models are to be used for forecasting purposes. Not only must the 
relationships postulated by the theory be supported to the appropriate degree of 
accuracy, these relationships must be stable over time2. In other words, what has been 
shown to be the case in the past must continue to be so in the future if forecasts based on 
extrapolation are to remain plausible. Whilst this is a innocuous assumption in the 
physical sciences it is not clear that it makes sense m the context of social sciences . 
The importance of Keynes in this context is that he claims that this assumption is false4 
and there is thus a long standing and deep seated scepticism within economics about the 
claims which can plausibly made for macro-econometric forecasting. This chapter takes 
up this scepticism in several different ways and shows that macro-econometric 
modelling’s scientific appearance is little more than skin deep. The search for precise 
and stable quantitative relationships with which to forecast the future is, as Keynes and 
others have recognised, a search for a Holy Grail.
The chapter consists of three major sections. The first section introduces the 
basic accounting and theoretical ideas which underpin the specification of econometric 
equations and models. The second section examines the stability of one of the equations 
which make up a macro-econometric model. The method I have used in this chapter is 
to replicate some econometric work done by Giles Keating5 in the early 1980s and 
examine how the equations he estimated using data up to 1980 have been altered by the 
events o f the following 12 years. The analysis shows not just the sensitivity of 
econometrics to the sample period used but, more importantly from a sociological 
perspective, the ways in which economists’ judgement is routinely used to over-ride 
econometric evidence which does not conform to the theory. The final section assesses 
whether a commitment to economic theory improves economic modellers’ ability to 
forecast the economy by comparing the forecasting performance o f three different 
consumption functions.
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National Income Accounting and IS-LM Models
In this section I outline the basic accounting relationships within which national 
economies are discussed and introduce the theoretical framework which underpins the 
majority of macro-econometric modelling.
National Income Accounting
In order to keep their analysis and models to manageable proportions macro-economists 
are forced to aggregate large quantities of information together. This means that the 
building blocks of micro-economics with which most people are familiar (e.g. the idea 
of individual agents maximising their utility through rational choices etc.) are no longer 
appropriate. In macro-economics the basic building blocks are flows of income and 
expenditure from one sector of the economy to another and the stocks of assets held by 
each sector. However, this is not to say that macro- and micro- economics are not 
compatible. All macro-economics should be consistent with rational behaviour and thus 
the two disciplines complement rather than contradict each other.
The framework of relationships within which macro-economic modelling and 
policy are discussed and analysed is the National Income Accounting system, which 
was originally developed by Keynes in the 1930s. This system is outlined below, and 
begins by considering a simple hypothetical economy which consists only of firms and 
households. In such an economy, the households use income_ received in return for- 
labour to purchase goods produced by the firms. If the economy is in equilibrium then 
the flow of expenditure from firms to households (i.e. wages etc.) is matched by the 
flow of expenditure from households to firms. This is the basis of the Circular Flow o f  
Payments.
The economy shown overleaf in Figure 1 is an extension of this idea. The 
principle difference is that a tax-levying government sector has also been included. The 
government is assumed to use the taxes it raises to supply public services and also to re­
distribute income. Starting from the right hand side of the diagram, and following the 
flow of payments around the loop, we can see that firms have a flow of expenditure (Y) 
called factor payments. These factor payments are made up of wages, dividends and so 
on. Direct taxes (Td) are deducted from these factor payments and received as income 
by the government. Some of this tax revenue is for re-distribution as benefits (B) which 
are received as income by households.
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Figure I : Flows oj Income and Expenditure m a simple economv wuh tax-raising government.
l 'i rm sH o u se h o ld s
The total income thus received by households is therefore factor payments (Y) 
minus direct taxes (Td) plus benefits (B): (Y - Td + B). Households will use some of 
this income to finance their planned expenditure (C) and will also retain some in the 
form of saving (S). As savings represent a deduction from households’ possible 
expenditure they are said to represent a leakage from the circular flow of payments; it is 
only households’ expenditure which finds its way back to firms as income. Note also 
that because many categories of expenditure are subject to indirect taxation (Te) not all 
of the households expenditure is received as income by firms. A proportion of 
households’ expenditure will be received as income by the government and used to 
finance government expenditure programs. Finally, even in this simple economy, 
households are not the only sector which can contribute to the circular flow of 
payments. Government expenditure (G) also contributes to the flow of payments as 
does the expenditure by firms on investment goods such as new machinery and 
buildings (I).
However, it should be noted that the economy as described thus far has no 
trading links with any other economy. If international trade were to take place, then 
exports would be represented as an injection into the flow of payments, i.e. a flow of 
income into the domestic economy from the rest of the world. Imports, on the other 
hand, would be represented as a leakage, i.e. a flow of expenditure from the domestic
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economy to the international economies. The relationships are summarised in Figure 2. 
below.
Figure 2: Circular Flow of Payments in a Simple Economv with International Trade
F irm s
H o u se n o ld s
By following the flow of payments around Figure 2, the following definition for 
National Income (Y) can be derived:
Y = C + I + G + X - M
The identity defines National Income as the sum of its parts and describes how the flows 
of income and expenditure within an economy are interrelated. However, it tells us 
nothing about how National Income is affected by changes in the economic 
environment, nor does it have anything to say about what determines the level of 
aggregate expenditure or its components. It is thus only part of the story. In order to 
fully explain the level of National Income, we need to have a theory which links the 
components of aggregate expenditure to the things which influence the expenditure 
decisions of economic agents, e.g. to interest rates and money. This is what IS-LM 
analysis provides.
The IS-LM Model
The theoretical starting point for almost all macro-econometric models is the IS-LM 
model. As this primarily deals with the demand side determinants of the economy the 
IS-LM framework is frequently augmented by adding equations such as the Phillips
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Curve (which relates to a trade-off between wages and unemployment) to represent the 
supply side forces which also act on the economy.
In the simple case of the closed economy shown in Figure 1 (i.e. an economy with no 
foreign trade) there are two basic markets: the market for goods and the market for 
money. The IS-LM model provides a framework which can be used to analyse the 
conditions affecting supply and demand in each of these markets. If the theory can be 
related to economic data, it can then be used to identify the unique combination of 
National Income and interest rates at which both the money and goods markets will be 
in equilibrium at the same time.
Equilibrium in the Money Market
For the money market to be in equilibrium the demand for money (L) must equal the 
supply of money (M). If the supply of money is determined exogenously (e.g. by the 
government), then the economic theory or model must explain the demand for money. 
According to Keynes, the demand for money has two main components. Firstly, there is 
the demand for active balances which are used to finance transactions and to cover 
unforeseen expenditure. Active balances are thus an increasing function of income. 
Secondly, there is the demand for idle balances. Idle balances are held by speculative 
investors and are inversely related to the rate of interest. The total demand for money is 
thus the sum of the demands for active and idle balances.
What then happens to the demand for money as the level of income increases? If 
income increases then the demand for active balances will also increase (as more money 
is needed to finance the increased level of transactions). However, because the supply 
of money has been fixed by the government, any increase in the demand for active 
balances must be offset by a decrease in the demand for idle balances. For this to 
happen, interest rates will have to rise. In other words, for a fixed money supply, 
increases in the level of income will be met by increases in the rate of interest. Because 
of this, the LM curve, which shows the combinations of interest rates and income which 
are compatible with a given supply of money, must have a positive slope.
Equilibrium in the Goods Market
The IS curve defines the conditions for equilibrium in the goods market and is 
concerned with the relationship between Aggregate Demand and Income. In a closed 
economy there are two sources of demand for goods: demand for consumption goods by 
households and demand for investment goods (e.g. machines, buildings etc.) by firms.
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Equilibrium in the goods market therefore occurs when the planned expenditure of firms 
and households (i.e. Aggregate Demand) equals their actual income. In other words, 
the goods market is in equilibrium when Income (Y) equals planned investment (I) plus 
planned consumption (C):
Y = C + 1
By re-arranging an alternative formulation is obtained in which the goods market will be 
in equilibrium when planned investment equals actual income minus planned 
consumption:
I = Y - C
If we now note that savings (S) are, by definition, that part of income not devoted to 
consumption (i.e. S = Y - C) then the equilibrium condition for the goods market 
becomes:
I = S
In other words, the market for goods will be in equilibrium when planned investment 
equals planned savings. But what happens to investment and savings when the level of 
- income rises? Because economic agents are assumed to always save a certain 
proportion of income, as income rises, savings rise too. This means that if equilibrium 
is to be restored in the goods market, investment must also be induced to rise. In the 
closed economy, planned investment is inversely related to the rate of interest, so the 
rate of interest must be lowered to increase investment so that it once more equals 
savings. In other words, the IS curve, which is the set of combinations of income and 
interest rates for which the goods market will be in equilibrium, has a negative slope.
The IS-LM model
If the IS curve represents a series of equilibria for the goods market in a closed 
economy, then the LM curve represents the same for the money market. When the two 
curves are plotted on the same axes, as shown in Figure 3, the intersection gives the 
unique combination of income (Y) and the rate of interest (r) for which both the goods 
market and money market will be in equilibrium. The intersection of the IS and LM 
curves is thus the equilibrium point for the economy as a whole.
Although relatively simple, the basic IS-LM model can be readily expanded to 
include extra details and ‘real world’ features. For example, the effect of government
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spending (G) and tax raising (T) can be included in the specification of the IS curve, 
with the effect that the equilibrium condition becomes:
S + T = I +G
Figure J: Simple IS-LM model
If this is done, the government is therefore able influence both the LM curve (through its 
control of the money supply) and the IS curve through its control of fiscal policy and 
spending programs.
In order to make the IS-LM model suitable for analysing an economy with 
foreign trade, imports and exports are incorporated into the IS curve in a similar way to 
the government sector. For the LM curve, exchange rates and the balance of payments 
have important effects on the money supply. However, these are usually written as 
separate equations, which at equilibrium must pass through the same point in the (Y,r) 
plane as the intersection of the IS-LM curves. They thus take the form of extra 
conditions which must be fulfilled for an overall economic equilibrium.
The Need for Econometrics
Econometrics is the application of statistical techniques to the empirical questions of 
economics. For example, although economic theory predicts that households’ 
expenditure will be less than their income (i.e. the marginal propensity to consume is 
less than one), the exact proportion of income which is saved and which ‘leaks’ out of 
the circular flow of payments is not specified. Now this might actually be a very 
important thing to know. For example, a government cutting taxation in the hope of 
boosting consumption would surely like to know how much of the extra income made
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available to households will actually be used to finance expenditure. In other words, the 
government will want to know what will happen to GDP as a result of its policy 
decisions.
The value of econometrics is that statistical techniques (principally regression 
analysis) can be used to obtain quantitative estimates of just these sorts of things. 
Having derived estimates for, say, the marginal propensity to consume, the 
econometrician is then in a position to advise the government how much additional 
consumption will result from the additional income released by the tax reduction. In 
essence this is what policy analysis using a macro-econometric model is all about. By 
first modelling the economy and then running simulations it is hoped that the effects of 
economic policy decisions can be estimated and policies refined so that they have the 
best possible chance of achieving their targets.
How is this forecasting done?
According to a popular textbook on econometrics8 there are three basic ways in which 
econometric modelling and forecasting can be done. The first and most simple way is 
to predict future values by extrapolating from past values of the variable. Although this 
technique is not much use for detailed policy analysis, it is a useful way of generating 
short-term forecasts for time-series data about which theory is either undeveloped or 
simply not needed. The second technique is to use a single regression equation but 
include several different independent variables. Thus, for example, in the case of 
consumer’s expenditure (C), we may hypothesise that this is a function of income (Y), 
and test this by estimating the following regression equation
C =  k  + <xY
This single equation approach is perfectly satisfactory when we are only interested in 
one variable. However, economic policy is usually concerned with a range of variables 
(e.g. economic growth, inflation, unemployment, public borrowing, balance of trade and 
interest rates to name but a few). Although separate equations could be used for each 
policy target this would not reflect the way in which changes in one variable are related 
to changes in the others. As a result, the third, and most common approach amongst 
macro-econometric modellers is to use multi- or simultaneous equation models which 
do represent the inter-relationships within the economy. Thus, a simple model of a 
closed economy might include a equation for consumers’ expenditure, one for
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investment and an identity defining National Income. An example of such a model is 
shown below in Box 1
Box I: A Simple M odel o f  a Closed Economy
GDP Identity Yt = Ct + It + Gt
Consumption Ct = ajYt + a 2 CM + sat
Investment It = Pi(Yt - Yt_i) + pjRt+ £pt
Symbols Meanings
Y National Income or GDP
C Consumers’ Expenditure
I Investment
G Government Expenditure (not determined by the model)
R Interest Rates (not determined by the model).
s Error Term
As can be seen, the model in Box 1 defines Income (Y) as being the sum of its 
parts. Consumption (C) is related to the level of Income and also to its previous values. 
Investment (I) is related to the change in Income and also to the rate of interest (R). 
Note that in each case the level of income both determines C and I but is also 
determined by them through the GDP Identity.
By using powerful computers and sophisticated regression techniques it is 
possible to estimate large numbers of such equations, disaggregate them, expand them 
and combine them into highly complex models of the economy. Typically a macro­
econometric model uses about five hundred variables and has approximately one 
hundred estimated equations plus an unspecified number of accounting identities9. The 
next two sections examine these equations in more detail by working through the testing 
procedures by which a single econometric equation (a consumption function) is 
specified and tested.
Replicating Econometrics
This section is based on the econometric model described by Giles Keating in his 1985 
book The Production and Use o f Economic Forecasts™. It should be made clear at the 
outset that my intention is not to argue that Keating’s method is in anyway inadequate. 
In fact, my intention is quite the opposite. Giles Keating is undoubtedly a competent 
and skilled econometrician, and this is precisely why it is worth paying close intention 
to what he does. My aim is simply to use Keating’s method as a guide to ‘good 
practice’ and his results as a means of calibrating my own achievements - if  I get 
broadly the same answers as Keating then I can feel reassured that I am on the right
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track, radically different results imply a mistake. Of course, if Keynes’s pessimism is 
well founded then some differences are to be expected. Thus what counts as the ‘same’ 
is not obvious a priori and, as we shall see, the competence of my replication is, 
inevitably, negotiable11.
In what follows I describe what I discovered and learnt as I followed the 
econometric methods set out by Keating. The section illustrates one of the central 
themes in the sociology of science: the nature of knowledge transfer. The sociology of
scientific knowledge argues that knowledge is transferred by means of socialisation into
12a particular form of life. In a previous paper I discussed in detail some examples of 
the tacit knowledge macro-economic modellers require in order to succeed and I do not 
intend to discuss this aspect of the enculturation model of knowledge transfer in any 
great detail.
The relevance of the enculturation model in this context is the assertion that 
rules do not contain the rules for their own application. The appropriate way to proceed 
in science, as in other settings, has to be learnt through participation and socialisation 
and is not something which can be encoded in a set of rules. With regard to quantitative 
measurement, surely the most straight forward aspect of science to convey through 
rules, Thomas Kuhn13 has shown that even this depends on ‘reasonable agreement’, the 
criteria for which are to be found not in the canonical works of scientists, but in their 
everyday practices. Thus, in some settings, accuracy is measured to six or more decimal 
places, in others an order of magnitude will suffice. It is the sensitivity to these 
nuances of context which mark out expertise, not the rote learning of prescriptive 
methodologies. In economics, I will argue, the actions which follow from statistical 
significance testing are particularly sensitive to context and interpretation.
This section, and most of the forecasting discussed later, is based on the 
economic model shown in Box 2 (overleaf). The model is described in detail by 
Keating in his book. Briefly, from the equations in Box 2 we can see that, the demand 
for money (the first equation) is related to the level of income and interest rates. It will 
rise as GDPE increases and people need more cash to finance the increased number of 
transactions and will fall as interest rates, and hence the cost of holding cash, rise (i.e. 
the LM curve). The second equation, which is the IS curve, shows that output will tend 
to fall when real interest rates are high and when domestic prices are high relative to 
world prices, (i.e. when imports are relatively cheap). The third equation relates
domestic prices to their own past values but also to world prices which means that 
domestic prices will eventually be brought into line with world prices. Finally, the 
fourth equation, which is based on uncovered interest rate parity, suggests that any 
expected appreciation in the domestic currency must be matched by domestic interest 
rates being below world interest rate by the same amount.
Box 2: A simple linear in logs model o f  an open economy
LM  curve log(MOt/PCt) = cci log(GDPEt) - a 2 RLBt + a 3 + sat
IS curve log(GDPEt) = -PjKRLBt/400) -log(PCt/PCM)]
- p2[log(PCt) -(log(WWPIt) - log(EERt) + p3 + spt
UK prices log(PCt) = yilog(PCM) + y2[log(WWPIt) - log(EERt)] +8*
Exchange Rate log(EERt) = log(XEERt) + (RLBt - RSWt)/400
Symbols Meanings (variables are endogenous unless otherwise stated)
MOt Money supply (MO), exogenous policy variable
GDPEt Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure measure
RLBt UK short term interest rates
PCt Domestic Price Index
WWPIt World Price Index (exogenous)
EERt UK exchange rate (foreign currency per unit of sterling)
RSWt World short term interest rates (exogenous)
XEERt Expectations of the exchange rate in the next time period
8 Error term
From Box 2 it can be seen that Keating’s model is essentially a demand side 
model. By this it is meant that supply-side factors relating to the workforce etc. do not 
appear. This is not particularly important in this context as these could be included by 
re-specifying the IS curve to include variables representing the working population or 
productive capacity and so on. However, the specification of the model is not what 
makes Keating’s book interesting to me, so I am neither going to defend nor criticise the 
model used. As far as I am concerned it is simply an example of an econometric model. 
Rather, the interesting thing about Keating’s book is that it is primarily a practical book. 
It is intended to equip the reader with sufficient skills and information to produce their 
own economic forecasts. The book contains full listings of all the equations used in 
Keating’s model as well as detailed references to data sources and even some blank 
tables for readers to photocopy and use when preparing their own forecasts. It also 
describes in considerable detail the methods by which an econometric model is specified 
and illustrates this discussion with a series of highly detailed examples. It is therefore 
an excellent starting point for a sociologist (or anyone else) wishing to examine the
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theory and methods upon which econometric equations and models are based14. My 
own purpose in following Keating’s methods, is to show how a commitment to a 
particular theoretical understanding of the economy guides Keating’s actions and 
consequently determines the final structure of the model.
In addition to its value as an exposition of econometric methodology, Keating’s 
book can also be used to shed light on the more fundamental question concerning the 
stability of econometric relationships. By collecting the data identified by Keating and 
repeating his analysis one can see how the additional data which has become available 
since 1980 has influenced the regression equations described in the book. This chapter 
thus also directly addresses the very possibility of an econometric modelling science. If 
econometric relationships are not stable over time then extrapolating forward from 
estimated relationships, no matter how statistically sophisticated the techniques used, is 
going to be difficult to justify.
The Stability of Quantitative Relationships in Econometric Models
In order to replicate Keating’s econometrics it was first necessary to obtain the
appropriate economic data. As mentioned, Keating provides unusually detailed 
_ references and I was able to download most of the data directly from the CSO databank 
held at the ESRC Archive. The remaining data series, listed in the National Institute 
Economic Review, the London Business School Economic Outlook and the OECD Main 
Economic Indicators were entered manually15. Finally several transformations of 
certain series were necessary in order to bring the data in line with that used by Keating. 
For example, the CSO databank does not include non-oil imports and exports at 
constant prices, and so this series had to be constructed by transforming the series in 
current prices which was available.
Once this had been done, I was able to begin estimating the equations given by 
Keating. The most detailed exposition occurs in chapter 4, where Keating illustrates 
how one might test the specification of a particular equation, using the consumption 
function as an example. This section describes in some detail how I worked through the 
analysis outlined by Keating and examines how closely I was able to reproduce his 
results. It therefore focuses on the estimation of one of the most fundamental of 
econometric equations - the consumption function.
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Estimating a consumption function
The most general form of Keating’s consumption function is given below in Equation 1. 
It uses 12 explanatory variables plus a constant term. The variables used are the first, 
second and fourth lags of Consumers’ Expenditure (C), Real Personal Disposable 
Income (RPDI), short term interest rates (RLB) and the rate of inflation (given by the 
change in prices (PC) plus trend real growth)16.
Equation 1: General Consumption Function
log(Ct) = a! log(Ct_!) + a 2 log(Ct.2) + a 3 log(CM) +
(5, log(RPDIt.,) + p2 log(RPDIt_2) + p3log(RPDIM) +
Yi RLBt_i + y2 RLBt_2 + y3 RLBM +
q>! [log(PCM/ PCt.2) + 0.0057] + cp2 [log(PCt.2/ PCt.3) + 0.0057] + 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ cpt [log(PCt^ / PCt.5) + 0.0057] + k _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Using data from 1955Q1 to 1992Q4, I used the regression software RATS to 
estimate my own coefficients for this formula. Table 1 shows Keating’s coefficients 
(obtained from data running from 1956Q4 to 1980Q4) and mine, together with their
17appropriate t statistics . Before comparing results several caveats should be noted. 
Firstly, Keating’s estimates are derived using data based on 1980 prices and mine use 
data based on 1990 prices. If re-basing was all that had happened the coefficients 
should be exactly the same, with the exception of the constant term. However, 
economic time series are not only re-based but subject to frequent revisions which can 
literally re-write history. This is particularly important in econometrics and it is not 
uncommon to find that major papers can be sensitive not just to the sample period used, 
but also to the date at which the data was published. Thus different vintages of
ostensibly the same data set can be sufficiently different for a hypothesis which was
18supported by one to be rejected by the other . In other words, because of the potential 
effect of revisions we cannot expect any of the coefficients to be exactly the same and it 
is possible that even expecting the signs and statistical significance to be unaltered is 
also unwarranted.
As expected the numerical values differ, although the first two lags of 
consumers’ expenditure do remain highly significant. However, there are differences in 
both the signs and the significance of other variables. For example, the fourth lag of 
consumers’ expenditure is, for my data, both negative and significant, although only 
just. Keating on the other hand finds the fourth lag to be positive but statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, Real Personal Disposable Income is significant for my data,
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but not Keating’s. Although other differences are apparent (e.g. the sign on the second 
lags of interest rates and prices) none of these coefficients are statistically significant. 
What this actually tells us is that neither Keating nor myself are able to reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients are actually zero. As such, the differences in sign are 
quite meaningless.









log(Ct.,) 0 . 6 1 4 5 . 1 3 * 0 . 7 2 4 6 2 1 8 2 1 6 . 7 9 3 3 *
log(C,.2) 0 . 3 0 5 2 . 2 9 * 0 . 4 1 5 7 2 3 5 3 3 3 . 3 0 4 4 *
Iob(Cm) 0 . 0 6 8 7 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 1 9 4 4 4 2 6 0 1 - 2  . 0 4 3 6 *
log(RPDI,.,) 0 . 1 7 0 1 . 8 0 0 . 2 1 3 5 8 6 7 5 7 2 . 6 3 5 2 *
log(RPDIt.2) - 0 . 0 8 6 7 - 0  . 82 - 0 . 2 1 4 1 6 6 1 6 3 - 2  . 3 9 2 1 *
log(RPDIu) - 0 . 0 4 6 5 - 0  . 57 0 . 0 6 7 2 5 3 8 8 9 0 . 8 5 8 4
RLBt.| - 0 . 0 0 3 4 0 - 2 . 2 8 * - 0 . 0 0 1 5 6 7 1 4 8 - 1 . 5 4 9 0
RLBt.2 0 . 0 0 1 2 7 0 . 7 3 - 0 . 0 0 0 5 4 0 2 7 4 - 0 . 4 5 5 3
RLBt_4 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 0 . 13 0 . 0 0 0 5 3 6 8 0 5 0 . 6 5 9 8
log(PCt.,/ PCt_2) 
+ 0.0057
- 0 . 2 5 0 - 0 . 9 3 - 0 . 0 7 7 7 0 6 9 9 2 - 0 . 5 0 4 2
log(PCt_2/ PCt.3) 
+ 0.0057
- 0 . 0 2 3 9 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 4 9 4 2 9 2 8 1 0 . 3 1 9 4
log(PCtV PCt.5) 
+ 0.0057
0 . 0 4 9 0 . 2 4 - 0 . 0 2 2 5 7 7 0 3 4 - 0 . 1 7 7 4
K - 0 . 2 2 4 - 1 . 2 5 - 0 . 1 2 4 3 6 5 4 4 5 - 1 . 1 2 6 5
* = statistically significant at 5% level
The data in Table 1 thus indicates that previous levels of consumption remain an 
important influence on consumers’ expenditure decisions and that the weight attached to 
these factors has increased. In addition, Real Personal Disposable Income now has a 
statistically significant effect of consumers’ expenditure decisions. However, the rate of 
interest and the price level remain statistically insignificant, a result which appears to 
run contrary to economic theory. Of course it is possible that the differences which 
can be seen between my estimates and Keating’s reflect not a change in economic 
behaviour during the 1980s (and hence the econometric equations) but a difference 
between the datasets. One way to check this would be to restrict my data set to match 
the sample period used by Keating and re-estimate the parameters. If the difference is 
due to the changes in the pre-1980 dataset then this equation should be broadly similar 
to the one estimated on the full dataset. If however the differences are due to changes in 
economic behaviour which have occurred since 1980, then the new equation should be 
broadly similar to Keating’s19. Unfortunately, as was pointed out in note 17, not all the
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data used extended back to 1955 and so comparisons with Keating’s equation, although 
interesting, cannot be conclusive. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, 
comparisons with the parameter estimates detailed in Table 1 will be possible.
Table 2 shows the same equation as in Table 1, but estimated over two different 
sample periods. Columns 2 and 3 contain parameter estimates obtained when using the 
full dataset, columns 4 and 5 parameter estimates based on a sample restricted from 
1956Q4 to 1980Q420 (the same sample period as used by Keating). As can be seen, the 
coefficients and t statistics are much closer to those reported by Keating. For example, 
Real Personal Disposable Income is no longer statistically significant and, although, 
some differences between the statistically insignificant coefficients persists, the most 
important point is that we remain unable to reject the hypothesis that they are zero.








log(CM) 0 . 7 2 4 6 2 1 8 2 1 6 . 7 9 3 3 * 0 . 3 6 4 7 6 9 3 0 8 1 . 8 8 0 5 *
log(C,2) 0 . 4 1 5 7 2 3 5 3 3 3 . 3 0 4 4 * 0 . 3 9 1 8 2 5 1 7 7 2 . 0 0 5 1 *
log(CM) - 0 . 1 9 4 4 4 2 6 0 1 - 2  . 0 4 3 6 * 0 . 0 7 1 7 6 0 7 7 7 0 . 3 9 4 5
log(RPDIt.i) 0 . 2 1 3 5 8 6 7 5 7 2 . 6 3 5 2 * 0 . 2 8 1 3 4 9 6 1 8 1 . 9 1 9 2
log(RPDIt_2) - 0 . 2 1 4 1 6 6 1 6 3 - 2  . 3 9 2 1 * - 0 . 0 8 0 4 0 5 8 2 5 - 0 . 4 9 5 7
log(RPDIt.4) 0 . 0 6 7 2 5 3 8 8 9 0 . 8 5 8 4 0 . 0 3 9 3 0 5 9 8 4 0 . 2 9 1 4
RLBt., - 0 . 0 0 1 5 6 7 1 4 8 - 1 . 5 4 9 0 - 0 . 0 0 2 3 8 3 1 0 6 - 1 . 2 5 5 9
RLBt_2 - 0 . 0 0 0 5 4 0 2 7 4 - 0 . 4 5 5 3 - 0 . 0 0 2 0 5 8 5 0 4 - 1 . 0 1 4 0
RLBt-4 0 . 0 0 0 5 3 6 8 0 5 0 . 6 5 9 8 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 6 2 9 4 0 . 0 1 6 5
iog(PCt.,/ pct_2) 
+ 0.0057
- 0 . 0 7 7 7 0 6 9 9 2 - 0 . 5 0 4 2 - 0 . 2 1 6 6 6 1 6 9 7 - 0 . 8 2 8 6
log(PCt_2/ PCt_3) 
+ 0.0057
0 . 0 4 9 4 2 9 2 8 1 0 . 3 1 9 4 0 . 0 6 6 7 5 5 3 4 4 0 . 2 3 7 7
log(PCM/ PCt.2) 
+ 0.0057
- 0 . 0 2 2 5 7 7 0 3 4 - 0 . 1 7 7 4 - 0 . 1 5 2 2 9 8 9 8 1 - 0 . 7 1 5 9
K - 0 . 1 2 4 3 6 5 4 4 5 - 1 . 1 2 6 5 - 0 . 7 1 5 6 0 8 3 4 7 - 1 . 4 4 0 1
* = statistically significant at 5% level
Although the comparisons with Keating’s estimates do not resolve the question 
of whether my estimates are different because of different data or changing behaviour, 
strong evidence for the latter can be drawn from Table 2. However, by far the most 
dramatic and interesting thing about the coefficients shown in Table 2 are the 
differences which emerge as the same set of variables are regressed over different 
sample periods within the same dataset. In particular, four independent variables which 
were not significant in the past have become so with the additional data. From having
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only one statistically significant variable for data up to 1980, the regression equation 
based on the full sample has five significant variables. The differences which emerge 
between columns 2 and 4 illustrate quite clearly that the precise and stable quantitative 
relationships (which are a pre-requisite for econometric forecasting to make sense) do 
not exist. The consumption function, which is one of the most important equations in a 
macro-econometric model, simply does not appear to be stable over time.
However, it is possible to argue that macro-econometric models are used not 
simply for forecasting but to test economic theory. Indeed, there are some economists 
who believe that forecasting is inappropriate because it distracts macro-econometric 
modellers from the much more important task of using the models to test and develop 
economic theory21. From this point of view, it is possible to argue the actual parameter 
values are not so important. What matters is whether or not a particular coefficient turns 
out to be significant or not. In the next section I outline how this more theoretical type 
of analysis may be carried out. I show how the prior commitment to an economic 
theory is a guiding principle in the estimation of an econometric equation and that the 
econometric evidence itself seems to be of little importance. At the end of the chapter 
we return to forecasting and assess the importance of this theoretical commitment by 
" comparing forecasts produced using Keating’s theory-derived equation with ones 
produced using an equation generated by a simple data driven rule.
Econometrics and the Experimenter’s Regress
After estimating the first, general regression equation (Equation 1), Keating then 
proceeds to test a series of restrictions in order to construct a compact and theoretically 
coherent consumption function for inclusion in his macro-econometric forecasting
model. In this section I work through his analysis and argue that it illustrates a well
22known sociological phenomenon known as the Experimenter’s Regress . Accordmg to 
the Experimenters Regress, an experiment can only be successful when it yields the 
correct results. However, the correct results can only be obtained from competent 
experiments. When the appropriate answer is well known, the Regress disappears since 
it is obvious when you have made a mistake. It is only when what counts as the correct 
answer is itself unknown that the situation becomes tricky23. I will argue that the 
potential for change inherent in social systems means that closure is especially 
problematic in econometric modelling.
51
In most of what follows the econometrics is being used to test a standard 
economic theory and so the ‘correct’ answer is well known. If I was discussing a 
demand for money function things would certainly be more controversial. Like Joseph 
Weber’s gravity wave experiments, the econometrics of Friedman can only be rejected 
once you know what the answer should be24. However, even within the most 
conventional of economic theories room for doubt can creep in, as I shall show.
Testing theories with restricted regressions
The basic methodology for hypothesis testing in econometrics is to specify some 
sort of restriction on the regression equation, re-estimate it and see if the co-efficients 
have the appropriate test statistics. Typically one would use the theory to specify an 
equation in such a way as to test the null hypothesis that a particular variable has no 
effect. If the coefficient turns out to be statistically significant then the null hypothesis 
is rejected and the alternative, that the independent variable does have an effect on the 
dependent variable is accepted. As we shall see, this is not how things work out in 
practice.
The first restriction imposed by Keating is to drop all the fourth lag variables on 
the grounds that they are not statistically significant. As all the data used is seasonally 
adjusted this is what one would expect to find. Interestingly, however, he retains the 
first and second lags of both RPDI and the inflation term, as well as the second lag of 
the interest rate term (RLB) despite the fact that these are also statistically insignificant 
at the 5% level. Why is this? No explanation is offered for this decision, although it 
seems likely that the central importance of prices, income and interest rates in economic 
theory means that, for the model to be an ‘economic’ one, these variables have to 
remain even if they do no apparent work. Note that for my data set the first and second 
lag of RPDI are statistically significant and their inclusion is not therefore problematic. 
The inflation and interest rate variables however remain as articles of faith rather than 
econometrically supported ‘facts’.
The abbreviated equation is then re-estimated and the analysis moves on to
25consider the coefficient on the second lag of inflation rate, which is shown in Table 3 . 
Because this coefficient is both small and statistically insignificant, the second lag of the 
inflation term is dropped from the equation. Again this is consistent with my own 
dataset and so I, like Keating, have good grounds for also excluding this variable from 
the equation. On the other hand, the reasons for still including the statistically
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insignificant interest rate terms remain elusive, especially as the value of the coefficient 
on the second lag is even smaller and also not significant (see Table 4). Although still 
not articulated by Keating, it seems that prior theoretical commitments to interest rates 
and inflation means that they must be included in the model, despite the fact that nearly 
forty years worth of economic data say they should not.26
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After removing the second lag of the inflation rate, the consumption function has as 
explanatory variables the first and second lags of consumers’ expenditure, RPDI and 
interest rates, as well as the first lag of the inflation rate plus a constant term.
The next stage of specification testing involves re-arranging the consumption 
function. First the dependent variable is changed from the level of consumers 
expenditure to its first difference (i.e. [log(Ct) - log(Ct.i)]). The explanatory (or 
independent) variables remain unaltered and so, if all is well, the coefficients should 
remain the same (after all the equation has not been altered, only re-arranged). The only 
exception to this should be the coefficient on lagged consumers’ expenditure, which 
should be exactly one less than it was before. The coefficients are shown in Table 4, 
below, and we can see that this is indeed the case27.
Table 4: Rearranged Regression Equation (Evans' estimates)
Variable Dependent 
Variable = log(C)
t statistic Dependent 
Variable = log(Ct) - 
!og(C,,)
t statistic
log(Ct-,) 0 . 7 2 4 8 6 5 3 6 8 7 . 0 7 4 1 * - 0 . 2 7 5 1 3 4 6 3 3 - 2 . 6 8 5 1 *
log(Ct.2) 0 . 2 6 4 6 7 8 1 6 1 2 . 6 1 9 5 * 0 . 2 6 4 6 7 8 1 6 2 2 . 6 1 9 5 *
log(RPDIt.i) 0 . 2 3 2 3 7 8 4 2 5 3 . 0 6 4 8 * 0 . 2 3 2 3 7 8 4 2 5 3 . 0 6 4 8 *
log(RPDI,2) - 0 . 2 0 6 2 3 7 8 1 6 - 2 . 6 0 4 4 * - 0 . 2 0 6 2 3 7 8 1 6 - 2 . 6 0 4 4 *
RLBt_, - 0 . 0 0 1 3 4 7 4 4 8 - 1 . 3 9 9 5 - 0 . 0 0 1 3 4 7 4 4 8 - 1 . 3 9 9 5
RLBt_2 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 5 7 9 8 5 - 0 . 4 6 2 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 5 7 9 8 5 - 0 . 4 6 2 1
log(PCt.,/ PCt_2) 
+ 0.0057
- 0 . 0 3 1 3 6 7 5 6 0 - 0  . 2 8 5 1 - 0 . 0 3 1 3 6 7 5 6 0 - 0  . 2 8 5 1
K - 0 . 1 5 1 5 1 0 7 5 5 - 1 . 6 3 8 5 - 0 . 1 5 1 5 1 0 7 5 5 - 1 . 6 3 8 5
* = statistically significant at 5% level
The next re-arrangement is to replace the second lag of consumers’ expenditure 
by a difference (first lag minus second lag), and the lagged values of RPDI by a
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difference and a ‘new’ variable formed by subtracting income lagged once from 
expenditure, also lagged once. However, as this re-arrangement of C and RPDI uses 
only the previously existing independent variables, the coefficients on the interest rate
and inflation terms should be unchanged; the others alter so as to offset the effects of the
28re-arrangement. The results of this regression are shown in Table 5 .
The purpose of this re-arrangement is to make it possible to test the long run 
form of the equation. In particular, the long run form of the consumption function 
should contain all the variables shown in Table 5, apart from the lagged level of 
consumers’ expenditure. If its coefficient is not significant, then this variable can be 
dropped from future regressions and the equation will have a form which is consistent 
with economic theory.
Table 5: Regression with further re-arrangement
Variable Dependent Variable = log(Ct) - log(Ct.t) t  statistic
IokCCm) 0 . 0 1 5 6 8 4 1 3 8 1 .  8 3 3 8
log(Ct-i) - log(Ct_2) - 0 . 2 6 4 6 7 8 1 6 2 - 2 . 6 1 9 5 *
Ior(RPDIm) - log(RPDIt_2) 0 . 2 0 6 2 3 7 8 1 6 2 . 6 0 4 4 *
log(Ct.i) - log(RPDINl) - 0 . 0 2 6 1 4 0 6 0 9 - 0 . 3 8 8 8
RLBm - 0 . 0 0 1 3 4 7 4 4 8 - 1 . 3 9 9 5
RLBt.2 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 5 7 9 8 5 - 0 . 4 6 2 1
log(PCt-,/PCt.2) + 0.0057 - 0 . 0 3 1 3 6 7 5 6 0 - 0 . 2 8 5 1
K - 0 . 1 5 1 5 1 0 7 5 5 - 1 . 6 3 8 5
* = statistically significant at 5% level
As can be seen from Table 5, the t statistic is 1.83, which is not significant at the 
5% level. The level is therefore excluded and the re-estimated equation is shown in 
Table 629.
Table 6: Long run form  o f  equation
Variable Dependent Variable = log(Ct) - log(CM) t  statistic
log(Ct.i) - log(Ct.2) - 0 . 2 7 1 0 9 8 1 2 5 - 2  . 6 5 6 5 *
log(RPDIt.,) - log(RPDIt_2) 0 . 2 4 2 9 7 6 2 6 6 3 . 1 3 8 3 *
log(Ct.i) - log(RPDIt.i) 0 . 0 2 0 6 7 3 5 7 1 0 . 3 2 8 9
RLBM - 0 . 0 0 0 9 4 0 7 6 6 - 0 . 9 9 3 6
RLBt., 0 . 0 0 0 1 4 6 4 0 0 0 . 1 5 5 0
log(PCt-,/PCt.2) + 0.0057 - 0 . 0 9 0 3 5 0 5 5 2 - 0 . 8 5 5 0
K 0 . 0 1 7 6 9 9 2 1 7 2 . 9 0 7 7 *
* = statistically significant at 5% level
In the Tong run’ the growth rates of real consumers’ spending and income and 
the levels of interest rates and inflation are all, by assumption, constants. Keating
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further assumes that spending and incomes rise at the same rate, and so the constants 
are, respectively, k, k, r and p. From Table 6, this gives the long run consumption 
function, Equation 2.
Equation 2: Long run consumption function
T = (-0.271 + 0.243)&+ 0.021 (log(C) - log(RPDI))
____________ + (-0.0009 + 0.0015)r - 0.091/7 + 0,018_____________________________
Since k , r and p  are all constants, the equation shows that there is a constant 
difference between log(C) and log(RPDI). In other words, a constant average 
propensity to consume. In order to reflect the standard economic theory that 
proportionally more savings are needed at higher rates of inflation, in order to maintain 
the real value of savings, this constant should be low at high values of p. For this 
condition to be satisfied, the sign on [log(C) - log(RPDI)] must be the same as that on p.
This can be seen by re-arranging the function to express the ratio of expenditure 
to income, as shown below. Equation 3 shows the results based on my parameter 
estimates, and Equation 4 shows the same equation as presented by Keating.
Equation 3: Average Propensity to Consume, derived from  E vans' estimates
C/RPDI = exp.[(1.028£- 0.006r + 0.091/7 + 0.018)70.021]
Equation 4: Average Propensity to Consume, derived from  K eating’s estimates
C/RPDI = exp.[(-0.163ft - 0.00187r - 0.179/? + 0.00960)70.148]
It can be seen that as p  increases the right hand side of Equation 3 also increases, 
as the sign on the co-efficient is positive. This implies that consumers do not raise 
savings at rates of inflation, but actually save less. This is a situation in which it is clear 
that there is something wrong with my analysis; my econometrics have produced an 
incorrect result which would probably be discounted by the majority of economists 
because it conflicts with the accepted theory. In fact if  I were an economist myself I 
would probably not believe the result and would try changing the variables or the
30sample period until I had estimated an equation which matched the theory . This of 
course would be the result I would try to get published!
In fact this is exactly what I did do. Initially I restricted the sample period to the 
one used by Keating, but found that the although both the coefficients had changed sign 
they were nevertheless still different. I therefore experimented with a few different 
sample periods and found that extending the sample period by four observations (i.e. to
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run from 1956Q4 to 1981Q4) was sufficient to bring the estimated equation back in line 
with the conventional theory. Of course, it should be noted that the coefficient on the 
inflation rate was never statistically significant in either Keating’s analysis nor any of 
my own regressions and so all this could well be regarded as quite pointless. Strictly 
speaking, what Keating’s econometrics and my own actually tell us is that, at the levels 
of statistical significance conventionally used, the co-efficients on the inflation terms are 
indistinguishable from zero.
However, it is now clear why Keating chose the particular strategy that he did. 
The aim of the exercise was to produce a compact and theoretically coherent 
consumption function, and the theory defined in advance what form this consumption 
function should have. As a result certain statistically insignificant variables were also 
economically insignificant and could be discarded. On the other hand, other equally 
statistically insignificant variables were economically very salient indeed. This latter 
group of variables had to be retained in order that the equation could be presented in the 
appropriate form and the reasons for ignoring certain t statistics and respecting others 
are now clear.
Testing Further Restrictions and Hypotheses
Apart from testing that the long run form of the equation matches the standard theory, 
Keating also tests a further hypothesis. Keating argues that, in addition to maintaining 
the real value of asset holdings, consumers will tend to increase these asset holdings to 
allow for real growth in income. The reason for this is that if  they failed to do so then, 
over time, their holdings of financial assets would become either a very high or very low 
proportion of their income. On this assumption, the average propensity to consume 
equals a constant times the sum of the inflation rate and the trend real growth rate and 
implies some further restrictions on the regression equation. The hypothesis is tested in 
two stages.
In the first stage, the steady state growth rate (2.3% per annum, or 0.57% per 
quarter) is subtracted from the dependent variable, and also from the right hand side 
consumption and income growth variables. The coefficients for this equation are shown 
in Table 7 below31. The first stage of the test is to see if the constant term is 
significant. If Keating’s hypothesis is correct, then the constant should not be 
significant, and this was indeed the case for his equation. (Keating; k  = 0.00295, t = 
0.72).
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Table 7: Regression with steady state growth
Variable Dependent Variable = Iog(Ct) - 
log(Ct.i) - 0.0057
t  statistic
log(CM)-log(C t_2) -  0.0057 - 0 . 2 7 1 0 9 8 1 2 5 - 2 . 6 5 6 5 *
log(RPDIt.,) - log(RPDIt.2) - 0.0057 0 . 2 4 2 9 7 6 2 6 6 3 . 1 3 8 3 *
log(Ct.i) - log(RPDIt.i) 0 . 0 2 0 6 7 3 5 7 1 0 . 3 2 8 9
RLBM - 0 . 0 0 0 9 4 0 7 6 6 - 0 . 9 9 3 6
RLBt., 0 . 0 0 0 1 4 6 4 0 0 0 . 1 5 5 0
log(PCt.,/PCt.2) + 0.0057 - 0 . 0 9 0 3 5 0 5 5 2 - 0 . 8 5 5 0
K 0 . 0 1 1 8 3 8 9 2 2 1 . 9 9 8 3 *
* = statistically significant at 5% level
However, from Table 7 we can see that the constant term is statistically significant at the 
5% level (t = 1.99829). The implication here is that consumers are no longer raising 
their asset holdings to allow for growth in real income. Arguably this is what happened 
during the 1980s when consumers, as a group, greatly increased their financial liabilities 
and thus their assets holdings, relative to income, would have fallen. Indeed, one of the 
more distinctive features of economic behaviour in the 1980s was the decline in the 
saving ratio (which fell to about 5% in 198832). Taken together these observations 
imply that consumers behaviour may well have changed during the 1980s.
It is here that the idea of the Experimenter’s Regress is more pertinent as the 
what counts as the ‘correct’ answer is not clear. It is at least possible that the behaviour 
of consumers was actually different in the 1980s and that the statistical significance of 
the constant term is reflecting this change.33 Now, this change might either be a once- 
and-for-all event (i.e. consumers no longer raise assets holdings in line with growth in 
income) or a temporary ‘blip’ in behaviour, but it is something which a competent 
economic evaluation might reasonably be expected to pick up. In other words, this 
situation is quite different to the long run case discussed above. In this set of 
circumstances, getting the same result as Keating, rather than challenging my 
competence as an econometrician, might do quite the reverse. Interestingly, even at the 
time Keating was writing, the data were not entirely consistent with the hypothesis.
As mentioned above, testing the hypothesis involved two stages. The first was 
that the constant term in the regression equation which includes the steady state growth 
rate should not be statistically significant. The second stage involves re-estimating the 
equation without the constant term and with the second lag of interest rates replaced 
with a difference. If the restriction is correct, the coefficient on the level of interest rates 
should be insignificant. The coefficients from Keating’s equation and my own are
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shown in Table 8 below34. As can be seen, the hypothesis that the coefficient on the 
level of interest rates is zero is rejected at the 5% level for Keating’s data set and it 
should therefore be retained in the equation. However, as Keating points out, a t 
statistic of 2.48 is not statistically significant at the 1% level and so the interest rate 
variable can be dropped from the equation. In other words, by selectively invoking 
more stringent criteria, the hypothesis derived from economic theory is supported.










log(Ct.2) -  
0.0057




0 . 0 5 4 7 0 . 6 7 0 . 2 1 0 1 4 0 9 5 9 2 . 7 4 1 1 *
log(Ct.,)
log(RPDIt-i)
- 0 . 1 8 2 - 3  . 4 2 * - 0 . 0 7 2 3 7 0 0 1 3 - 1 . 6 9 1 4
RLBm 0 . 0 0 1 8 6 - 2 . 4 8 * - 0 . 0 0 0 5 8 5 7 5 7 - 1 . 3 7 9 6
RLBt_i - RLBt_2 - 0 . 0 0 1 8 3 - 1 . 4 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 1 7 1 1 2 - 0 . 2 2 7 0
log(PCt.j/ PCt.2) 
+ 0.0057
- 0 . 2 1 1 - 1 . 1 7 - 0 . 0 9 0 7 0 1 3 2 6 - 0 . 8 4 7 1
* = statistically significant at 5% level
For my data, the hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level, though the meaning o f  
this is unclear as, in order to maintain comparability with Keating, I have dropped the 
constant term even though it was significant. Of course, if I was a believer in the 
theory, I could adopt a similar strategy to Keating and remain unconvinced by the story 
about changing consumers’ behaviour and falling asset holdings. Instead I too would 
change the rules. For example, I could look at Table 7 and argue that the t statistic for 
the constant was barely significant at the 5% level (t * 2) and was certainly not 
significant at 1% level. Therefore the constant should be excluded on the grounds that it 
failed to pass the stricter significance test. From Table 8, I would argue that the co­
efficient on the interest rate level was also insignificant and that this too should be 
excluded. In other words, the hypothesis that consumers raise their asset holdings in 
line with income growth is in fact thoroughly consistent with the data.
This then is how the Experimenter’s Regress can manifest itself in econometrics: 
valid results are only obtained from appropriate econometrics, but the authority of the 
econometrics is only established by producing the correct results. In order to know how 
to interpret Table 7 we have to already know what the correct answer is. Should we
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exclude the constant or invoke more stringent tests? Have assets become a low 
proportion of consumers income or not? This is what Table 7 is supposed to be telling 
us, but without some way of knowing what has happened to asset holdings in the private 
sector we cannot tell. In other words, simply looking at Table 7 cannot answer our 
question until there is no question left to ask.
Econometrics and Theory Testing
The value of an econometric model could be that it forces economists to think carefully 
about what they are doing. Each variable included in an econometric model should be 
consistent with the wider corpus of economic theory. Ideally each variable would also 
be supported by the data, although, as we have seen, this latter criterion is only loosely 
applied. Thus, in principle, the a priori specification of the model should survive the 
process of hypothesis testing and estimation unscathed and an econometrically justified 
model be produced. In practice, however, a considerable amount of conviction and faith 
on the part of the economist is needed if  the theoretical specification is to be sustained 
in the face of the econometric evidence.
The previous section showed that one needs a reasonably clear idea about how 
the economy works in order to specify a model in the first place. Indeed, it seems one 
needs a strong set of prior commitments largely because the econometric evidence for 
the theory is so weak. A researcher who believed in the power_of statistics, as opposed 
to the power of economic theory, would probably produce a very different sort of 
model. The failure of econometrics to support economic theory is doubly ironic as 
econometric textbooks often refer to the ease with which statistically significant 
regression equations can be produced. Paradoxically, textbooks frequently argue that 
economic theory is important because it enables students to sort the ‘wheat from the 
chaff. Thus, in the introduction to his econometrics software package PC-Give David 
Hendry writes:
Even at an elementary level a critical appreciation must be engendered, 
especially for time series econometrics ... Challenge the class to select any 
two variables ... and you guarantee to produce a correlation of over 0.95 
between the two variables after at most one transformation on each variable 
... You would be unlucky to lose this challenge.35
The implication here is that there is such a profusion of statistically significant 
relationships that finding support for a theory is all too easy. My own example of
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repeating Keating’s analysis suggests that this rather overstates the case. In fact, from 
my account, it looks as though theory is needed not to discriminate between the 
important and the statistically significant but rescue the important from the statistically 
insignificant. In other words, rather than separating out the wheat, it might be more 
accurate to say that economic theory provides a way of sorting through the chaff to find 
those husks which, by virtue their colour or shape, are deemed desirable.
Of course, it might be argued that Keating is perhaps unusual in the strength of 
his prior commitments36 and that his example is not therefore typical of economists or 
econometricians in general. Certainly this has not been my intention. As emphasised 
earlier, I am using Keating’s book as a guide to good practice. As the status of 
Keating’s econometrics is crucial to the credibility of my own argument it is important 
to remember that there is nothing unusual about Keating’s approach to econometric 
modelling. On the contrary, Keating’s example is remarkably consistent with 
something I found out very early on in my study of macro-econometric modelling. In 
my very first interview with an econometrician I learnt that it is considered quite normal 
to retain statistically insignificant variables if they are theoretically interesting.
Hudson The model builder has to have a theory about what goes into an equation.
He doesn’t just look for t statistics and significance in an equation because
that tends to lead to bad forecasts. If you’ve got something which is 
statistically significant and makes theoretical sense then you are unlikely to 
be picking up chance correlations.
Evans So in some cases you would keep in [explanatory variables] that perhaps
weren’t as statistically significant as you would like
Hudson Often
Evans You would say: I think it should be in there anyway, so I’m going to leave
it in even though the t statistics say I should drop it.
Hudson Yes
Thus, in contrast to the textbooks and other representations of canonical science, the 
relationship between evidence and theory is, in practice, very complex. There are 
circumstances in which statistically significant variables will be discounted because 
they are not theoretically relevant and other circumstances in which statistically 
insignificant variables are retained because they are believed to be important. Only
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occasionally do we encounter the happy situation in which a theoretically important 
variable comes accompanied by a significant t statistic.
It is because of the ambiguity of within-sample econometric tests that, as pointed 
out in the quotation above, out-of-sample forecasting is important. The intuition is that 
any relationship due to chance which might have been found within the sample period 
will quickly be exposed by out-of-sample testing. Before discussing this process of 
testing in more detail, it will be useful to outline a typology of possible forecast tests 
and to introduce some terminology.
Out-of-sample Testing
A typology of forecasting
Economic models can be made to forecast in a variety of different ways and these 
methods can be ranked in a hierarchy in which each represents a more difficult 
challenge than the one which came before. The range of possible tests is illustrated in 
Figure 4, below.
The first simulation test which can be performed is an ex post simulation test in 
which the model is made to forecast the endogenous (i.e. “left hand side”) variables for 
some portion of the historical period over which it was estimated. Ex post simulations 
can be either static or dynamic. In a static simulation, the lagged endogenous variables- 
take their actual values, whereas in a dynamic simulation, the values generated by the 
model are used. In Figure 5, which shows forecasts and simulations using several 
techniques and is based on the different versions of the unrestricted regression equation 
(Equation 1), the fitted values are calculated using static ex post simulations.
Figure 4: A typology o f  forecasts37
ex post ex post ex ante




Next in the hierarchy is ex post forecasting, in which forecasts are generated for 
the historical period which lies between the end of the estimation period and the present
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day. Like ex post simulations, an ex post forecast may either be a static (or one-step 
ahead) forecast or a dynamic forecast. In Figure 5 (below) the forecasts generated by 
the equations estimated on data up to 1980 are dynamic ex post forecasts, but the values 
generated by the model estimated on data up to 1992 are dynamic ex post simulations. 
Ex Post forecasts are more difficult than simulations, because any information about 
changes in the economic environment which have occurred after the sample period will 
not be reflected in the coefficients.
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The final and most difficult test of a model’s usefulness is ex ante forecasting, in 
which forecasts are generated for the future values of the endogenous variables. Unlike 
dynamic ex post forecasting, where at least the values of the exogenous variables are 
known from the historical data, ex ante forecasting requires the forecaster to predict the 
future values of all variables not explicitly forecast by the model before the forecast can 
be produced. Ex ante forecasting therefore takes both the model and the modeller into 
the unknown and, in effect, the economist has to ‘forecast the policies so that the model
i o
can forecast the economy.’ Ex ante forecasts are not shown in Figure 5.
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What does Figure 5 show?
Figure 5 shows ex post simulations and forecasts for the period 1981 to 1992 using each 
of the three equations estimated39. The values shown to the left of the vertical line are 
all static ex post simulations. These values were calculated by using the actual value 
taken by all independent and lagged dependent variables and setting the error term to 
zero. The dynamic ex post forecasts (and simulation for the equation based on data up 
to 1992) are calculated by again using the actual values for all independent variables and 
assuming a zero error term, but the lagged values of the dependent variable are obtained 
by using the value generated by the model in the previous period.
As can be seen, all three regression equation fit the data for the duration of the 
sample period. During the 1980s however, the fit with the data is significantly worse 
for all three forms of the equation. Keating’s equation forecasts least well, though this 
may be due to the fact that his measure of short term interest rates is UK banks base 
rates, whereas mine is the average discount rate on Treasury bills (CSO series code 
AJNB). This hypothesis could be tested by obtaining a series for UK banks base rates 
and re-calculating the forecasts for the Keating equation. However, later we shall see 
that other equations due to Keating do not suffer from this problem, thus suggesting that 
the cause may be internal to the equation, rather than to the data mismatch40.
With regard to the two equations based on my own dataset, the apparently large 
differences in some coefficients do not seem to be reflected in the dynamic forecast 
tests. Both equations seem relatively close to actual consumers’ expenditure for 1981 
and the first half of 1982, and the equation based on the restricted dataset fits the 
observed data until about mid 1983, which is a good forecast by any standards. 
Thereafter, the equation based on date up to 1980 tends to over predict and the one 
based on data up to 1992 consistently under predicts. This may well be due to the effect 
of the downturn in consumers’ expenditure which took place at the end of the decade 
(this information was available during estimation and should therefore be reflected in 
the coefficients).
Static ex post simulations
It is surely a minimum requirement that a model which is claimed to explain a set of 
data must fit that data reasonably well. In the case of the three consumption functions 
shown in Figure 5 it is clear that, for the sample period chosen, all three equations are 
close to the actual value of consumers’ expenditure. In fact they are so close together
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that the printer is unable to draw them as separate lines. This need not be surprising 
however, as the fitted values represent functions which minimise the sum of squared 
deviances from the actual values. One would therefore expect that all functions 
generated by this method should fit the actual data quite closely, no matter how different 
their formulas may look. Thus, even though the coefficients are different, perhaps as a 
result of data revisions and other differences between the datasets, the fit of the lines to 
the observed values is remarkably similar. The portion of the chart to the left of the 
vertical line is probably best thought of as a graphical representation of an R2 o f over 
98%.
Thus, from Figure 5 we can see that, for the values actually taken by consumers’ 
expenditure, income, interest rates and prices, the differences in the coefficients are not 
particularly important. This, in turn, helps understand why out-of-sample forecasting 
and prediction is so important in assessing the merits of an econometric model.
Dynamic ex post Forecasts and Simulations
An out-of-sample test is usually done by only using part of the available data to estimate 
the equations, and then using the model to generate predicted values for the remainder. 
If the model uses its own forecasts as inputs in all iterations beyond the end of the 
sample period, then the ex post forecast is a dynamic one. Because the model is 
forecasting values which are already known, there is a ‘right’ answer (i.e. the actual 
outcome) against which the performance of the model can be assessed. In Figure 5 this 
sort of test is only really carried out on versions 1 and 2 of the consumption function 
(i.e. those estimated on data up to 1980Q4). As noted above, the unrestricted 
consumption function estimated on my dataset predicts consumers’ expenditure rather 
well until about 1983-4. Keating’s function did less well, though this might due to it 
being ‘fed’ the wrong measure of interest rates. In addition to the data problem, it 
seems that for Keating’s unrestricted equation, the initial over estimate of consumption 
for the first forecast period is then compounded in the following iterations, producing a 
forecast which explodes upwards. This may be independent of the interest term 
problem.
Turning to the forecast mistakes which appear after 1983-4, these are not 
unexpected and may be attributed (at the very least) to any or all of the following: the 
radical economic policies introduced by the Thatcher government; the conflict in the 
Falklands; the miners’ strike. Although other explanations are undoubtedly possible,
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the general hypothesis that there is a structural break in the economic time series can be 
tested by comparing equations estimated on data covering the periods before and after 
198141.
The third ‘forecast’ cannot really be compared to the other two in this way as, 
although dynamic, it is not strictly speaking ‘out-of-sample’ (the equation was estimated 
on data up to 1992Q4). The values are thus ex post simulations because the coefficients 
for this equation thus already contain information about the nature of the relationship 
between the dependent variables during the forecast period. It is as if  a forecaster had, 
in 1980, access to the next 11 years worth of economic data when estimating their 
model. What is interesting about the simulation produced by consumption function 3 is 
that it implies that even if forecasters had somehow obtained access to data about the 
boom and bust in the 1980s they would still have been unable to forecast the rise in 
consumers’ expenditure any more accurately. In fact, it is consumption function 2 
which appears to do the best job in anticipating the rise in consumers’ expenditure 
(although it is unlikely that it would have been believed).
However, this may be too harsh. The additional information provided by the 
extra data is reflected in that consumption function 3 tends to be lower than the one 
estimated on data up to 1980. The sharp fall in consumers’ expenditure which occurred 
at the end of the 1980s thus tends to pull the equation down. If the mean square errors- 
due to functions 2 and 3 were calculated, it is likely that the relative accuracy towards 
the end of the forecast period of the function estimated on the full data set would ensure 
that it had the best performance overall. What the ex post simulation produced by 
function 3 does show, and shows quite clearly, is the importance of using the actual 
value of lagged dependent variables when calculating the fitted values. The only 
difference, insofar as function 3 is concerned, between the forecast and fitted values is 
that the lagged values of consumers’ expenditure are not the actual ones, but the ones 
forecast by the model. It is clear that this change in procedure has had a very important 
effect on the performance of the model.
Finally, it can be seen from Figure 5 that the consumption function estimated on 
data up to 1980 predicts fairly well until about 1983, i.e. for about 2 years. After this it 
breaks down and does not fit so well. However, the early 1980s were a time of radical 
policy change so maybe this is not surprising. In addition, economists are not 
concerned purely with prediction, but also with a theoretical understanding. With this in
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mind, it is worth examining how the final version of the consumption function derived 
through the specification testing procedures outlined in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 above 
performs in out-of- sample testing. The aim in this final section is to assess the value 
added by using economic theory to guide the specification of an econometric equation.
The Consumption Function and Economic Theory
In Chapter 4 of his book Keating discusses briefly the out-of-sample testing of the 
consumption function he has derived. By comparing the forecast 10 quarters ahead with 
the known outturn Keating is able to compute a test statistic (he does not define which 
one), according to which the hypothesis that forecast values are sufficiently close to the 
actual values for the errors to be considered random cannot be rejected. However, 
because the test is based on a comparison of within sample errors to out-of-sample ones 
it is possible for an equation which fits the historical data very badly to pass the test not 
because it forecasts well but because the error terms in the past have also been large. 
Keating checks for this possibility by examining the standard error of the estimated 
equation which provides an estimate of the square root of the variance of the error 
terms. In Keating’s case this figure is 0.01177 which, because the dependent variable is 
measured in natural logarithms, implies about 1.2%42. As Keating admits:
There is no formal measure of whether this is a large or small standard 
error, but a judgement can be made by comparing it with the average change 
in consumers’ expenditure over the estimation period. This suggests that 
the standard error is neither exceptionally large nor very small, implying 
that the forecast test is a reasonably good guide to the forecasting ability of 
the equation43.
A further point worth noting is that the out-of-sample forecasting testing done by 
Keating is a static test. In other words, the lagged values of the dependent variables are 
the actual ones rather than the ones forecast by the equation. We saw in Figure 5 that 
the difference between static simulations and dynamic simulations was quite significant 
and that, as Keating also notes, dynamic tests are much harder.
In what follows I compare the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the 
consumption function used by Keating and specified according the methods outlined 
above with my own version of the function and a third equation derived according to a 
simple statistical rule. The rule used was the following: starting from the general 
consumption function in Equation 1, exclude the variable with the lowest t statistic and
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re-estimate the equation, repeating this process until all remaining variables are 
significant at the 5% level44. The equation produced is shown in Table 9 below.
Table 9: Equation derived by application o f  statistical rule
Variable Dependent Variable = 
log(Ct)
t statistic
log(C M ) 0 . 6 9 8 1 0 2 4 4 7 6 . 4 8 7 8 *
log(R PD It_,) 0 . 3 0 1 6 1 7 0 7 5 2 . 8 2 0 6 *
RLBt.! - 0 . 0 0 2 7 6 0 0 1 2 - 3  . 9 3 1 0 *
* = statistically significant at 5% level
The purpose of including this equation was to examine the ‘value added’ by Keating’s 
economic theory. If economic theory does explain how consumers behave then it seems 
reasonable to expect that a model based on this theory will prove a better forecasting 
model than one derived from an atheoretical data fitting methodology, especially over 
long periods45.
Figure 6 shows fitted values (static ex post simulations) and dynamic forecasts 
for three equations, all of which were estimated on data up to the end of 1980. The lines 
labelled ‘Keating’ and ‘Evans’ show the ex post simulations and forecasts for 
consumers’ expenditure, calculated using the specification procedures outlined 
_ previously. The line labelled ‘Rule’ shows ex post simulations and forecasts calculated 
using the equation estimated by the rule: exclude the least significant variable and re- 
estimate.
As was the case with Figure 5, which showed the values calculated from the 
general regression equation, the fitted values are very close both to each other and the 
actual value. However, unlike Figure 5, the equation due to Keating and the one 
estimated by myself are now very close together and the tendency for them to accelerate 
explosively, which was particularly marked in Keating’s equation, seems to have gone. 
In addition, it now looks as if the dynamic forecasting performance of the equations is 
very similar and any differences between the datasets used by Keating and myself do 
not appear to have had much effect.
Thus, from Figure 6 it appears that the specification search procedure has had 
the following effects. Firstly, as might have been hoped, it has produced an equation 
which is robust with regard to the vintage of the data set and the measures of interest 
rates used. Both equations fit the past data very well and the out-of-sample forecasting 
performance appears to be similar. Less positively however, the result seems to be that 
both equations now forecast a more or less constant rate of increase in consumers’
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expenditure through out the 1980s, missing both the downturn at the beginning and the 
boom in the middle. However, by the end of the decade the downturn caused by the 
recession has brought the actual values back into line with those predicted by the model.
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The performance of the equation derived from the data fitting rule is rather 
different from the equations derived from economic theory. The mechanically derived 
equation correctly forecasts the downturn, and is thus closer to the actual values of 
consumers’ expenditure during the first few years of the decade. Thereafter it too 
under-predicts the growth in consumers’ expenditure but seems more responsive to 
changes in its other independent variables (i.e. Real Personal Disposable Income and 
short term interest rates) and finishes the decade with the highest forecasts. The 
impression gained from Figure 6 is that the ‘Rule’ based model tracks the upturn in 
consumers’ expenditure more closely.
Although Figure 6 shows the history of the 1980s it is not necessarily the best 
way of examining the relative merits of the three equations as forecasting models. To 
do this it is more useful to look at the errors, and these are shown in Figure 7 (overleaf) 
in which the story outlined in the previous paragraphs is again visible. The theory based 
models used by Keating and myself make a similar pattern of mistakes. The over-
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predictions at the beginning of the decade are shown in Figure 7 as positive errors, and 
the under-prediction of the boom years as an increasingly large negative errors. The 
recession at the end brings forecast and reality back together.
In Figure 7, the forecast of the rule derived equation is close to the actual 
outcome at the beginning of the decade, and for short term forecasting, at least, is 
clearly superior to either of the equations derived from economic theory. Again, this is 
not necessarily an unusual phenomenon. For example, Wallis and Whitely46 found that 
over short term forecasting horizons Vector Autoregressive models performed at least as 
well as structural econometric models. It was only over longer term forecasting 
horizons that the structural models which incorporated economic theory were 
unambiguously superior.
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However, in the case of the consumption functions shown in Figure 7 this does 
not appear to be the case. In fact, from Figure 7 it looks as if the atheoretical data fitting 
model performs the best throughout the entire forecasting period. This intuition can be 
tested more formally, and a common way is to calculate the Root Mean Square Error47 
of the different functions throughout forecast period. The RMSE for each of the three 
consumption functions are shown Figure 8.
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From Figure 8 it is apparent that, with the exception of the middle portion of the 
graph (i.e. approximately the period from 1987 to 1988) the consumption functions 
based on economic theory forecast less well than the atheoretical version. This 
difference is particularly marked for the first five years or so of the forecast period. 
Thereafter the RMSE increases quite dramatically for all three functions, but from about 
1989 onwards the forecasts produced by the data fitting method are superior. The only 
conclusion which can be drawn from Figure 8 is that the theory introduced by Keating 
and defended with econometrics has added little, if anything to the forecasting abilities 
of the model.
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Indeed it seems that using economic theory to inform the specification of the 
consumption function has actually produced a worse result, and it is this aspect which is 
the most troubling. It seems from Figure 8 that, for the 2 to 3 year time frame that most 
forecasters are really interested in, economic theory is detrimental to the forecasting 
ability of the model.
Of course, as noted, it is possible to counter these sort of criticisms by referring 
to other reasons for wanting economic theory in one’s model; for example, tractable 
long run properties, developing a theoretical understanding of the economy and so on.
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However, a sceptic would surely maintain that if these theories are neither supported by 
the data nor useful for forecasting then their relevance to practical matters must surely 
be in doubt.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked at the estimation of a single equation and shown how 
econometrics and judgement are interwoven in the specification of an equation. From 
the very beginning of the analysis, when a demand-based specification was chosen and 
supply-side variables omitted, judgement played an important role. When statistically 
insignificant variables were included and other, apparently equally insignificant ones 
excluded, it is the economist who makes this judgement. When testing restrictions, the 
crucial decision is deciding what level of statistical significance is appropriate. Thus, 
whether or not the hypothesis should be rejected is likewise a matter of judgement and 
again it is the economist who decides.
But note this was only one equation, using just four variables. A typical 
macroeconomic modeller may use up to five hundred variables and estimate several 
dozen equations, each of which will need the same combination of econometrics, 
- economics and conviction as the consumption function detailed above. What this 
chapter has shown then is that the foundations of macro-econometric modelling are set 
not just in the (relative) certainty of econometric procedures and statistical theory, but 
also in the social practices and shared convictions o f economists. However, this 
foundational role is not the only way in which the social enters into macro­
econometrics; it is merely the beginning.
Estimating equations and combining them into a coherent model is but a prelude 
to the real business of macro-econometric modelling - which is either policy analysis or 
making money depending on your employer (although the two are connected). It is 
hoped that the rigor of economic theory and the empirical analysis of econometrics will 
combine to identify behavioural laws, or at least regularities, which can then be run 
forward in time to show what the future will bring. Unfortunately economic modelling 
and forecasting does not appear work like this. Instead, as this chapter has shown, 
empirical analysis in econometrics, whether used by experts like Keating or novices 




1 The full reference is: Keynes, J.M. (1936) The General Theory o f  Employment, Interest and Money. Harcourt 
Brace, New York pp. 161-3
2 If the aim is simply to test the theory then the stability o f the co-efficients is less important than their statistical 
significance.
3 Winch, P. (1958/1988) The Idea o f a Social Science and its Relationship to Philosophy. London and New York: 
Routledge.
4 See, e.g. Keynes op cit. note 1 or Keynes, J.M. (1939) ‘Professor Tinbergen’s Method’, Economic Journal, Vol. 
49, pp. 558-68.
5 Keating, G. (1985) The Production and Use o f  Economic Forecasts. London: Methuen. According to his entry in 
W ho's Who in Economics, Keating studied economics at Oxford and the London School o f  Economics and was a 
Research Fellow at the London Business School. His areas o f expertise are macroeconometric modelling and 
forecasting, and domestic and international financial systems. He is currently Chief Economist and Director o f  
Research for Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd.
6 Diagram adapted from Begg, D., Fisher, S. And Dombusch, R. (1991) Economics: 3rd Edition. London: 
McGraw-Hill, p. 361.
7 Diagram adapted from Begg, D., Fisher, S. And Dombusch, R. (1991) Economics: 3rd Edition. London: 
McGraw-Hill, p. 361.
8 Pindyck, R.S. and Rubinfeld, D.L. (1991) Econometric Models and Economic Models: 3rd edition. New York: 
McGraw-Hill International Editions.
9 See e.g. the recent review by the ESRC Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau: Church, K.B., Mitchell, P.R., Smith, 
P.N. and Wallis, K.F. (1993) ‘Comparative Properties o f Models o f the UK Economy’. National Institute 
Economic Review, August 1993, pp. 87-100, esp. Box A, p. 89.
10 op cit. note 5.
11 This is the Experimenters’ Regress. See Collins, H.M. (1985) Changing Order: Replication and Induction in 
Scientific Practice. Sage: London.
12 Evans, R. (1993) ‘Macro-econometric Modelling: A Sociological Perspective’. Unpublished M.Sc. dissertation, 
University o f Bath.
13 Kuhn, T.S. (1961) ‘The function o f measurement in modem physical science’. Isis, 52, 162-76. Reprinted as 
‘Normal Measurement and Reasonable Agreement’, in Barnes, B. And Edge, D. (Eds.) Science in Context. 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
14 In fact, this was the context in which I first came across Keating’s book which was recommended to me by 
Andrew Britton, director o f  the National Institute for Economic and Social Research.
15 Keating is remarkable for the detailed references he gives. This is actually very unusual amongst economists and 
replication o f econometric work is usually founders because would-be replicators are unable to re-construct the 
dataset. However this is not the only problem. In a 1986 paper, Dewald, Thursby and Anderson found that 
datasets and programs submitted with journal articles ‘were often so inadequately documented that [they] could 
not identify the variables which had been used in calculating the published empirical results’ (p. 592). In many 
case, Dewald et al found that replication was only possible after extensive consultation with, and active assistance 
from, the economist who had submitted the paper. In some cases even this was not enough to reproduce the 
results. Dewald, W.G., Thursby, J.G. and Anderson, R.G. (1986) ‘Replication in Empirical Economics: The 
Journal o f  Money, Credit and Banking Project.’ American Economic Review, 76, No. 4, pp. 587-603.
16 The data series used were as follows, the four letter code in parentheses indicates the CSO codes for that series: C 
= Consumers’ Expenditure in 1990 prices (CAAB); PC = Consumer Price Index, calculated by dividing 
Consumers’ Expenditure in current prices (AIIX) by Consumers’ Expenditure in 1990 prices (CAAB) and 
multiplying the result by 100; RPDI = Real Personal Disposable Income, calculated by dividing Personal 
Disposable Income in current prices (AIIW) by (PC/100); RLB = Average Discount Rate on 91 Day Bill (AJNB). 
In Keating’s model, RLB is the UK banks’ base rates. However, I was unable to find a sufficiently long run o f  
figures for this and was forced to used the average discount rate instead.
17 The full details o f the regression output are reproduced below. Note that although the sample period was set at 
1955Q1 to 1992Q4, one o f  the data series does not extend that far back and the estimation only includes data from 





PCRATIO = LOG((PC/PC{l)) + 0.0057)
Dependent Variable LOGC - Estimation by Least Squares 
Quarterly Data From 1964:01 To 1992:04
Usable Observations 116 Degrees of Freedom 103
Centered R**2 0.997059 R Bar **2 0.996717
Uncentered R**2 0.999999 T x R**2 116.000
Mean of Dependent Variable 11.013402234
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.212329342 
Standard Error of Estimate 0.012166722
Sum of Squared Residuals 0.0152469988
Regression F(12,103) 2910.1168
Significance Level of F 0.00000000
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.966016
Q (29) 27.129075
Significance Level of Q 0.56474111
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif
1 . Constant -0.124365445 0.110400318 -1.12650 0.26257361
2 . LOGC{1} 0.724621821 0.106667865 6.79325 0.00000000
3 . LOGC{2} 0.415723533 0.125809593 3.30439 0.00131007
4 . LOGC{4} -0.194442601 0.095145123 -2.04364 0.04354130
5. LOGRPDI{1} 0.213586757 0.081052181 2.63518 0.00970793
6 . LOGRPDI{2} -0.214166163 0.089530596 -2.39210 0.01856531
7 . LOGRPDI{4} 0.067253889 0.078345645 0.85843 0 .39265086
8 . RLB{1} -0.001567148 0.001011728 -1.54898 0.12445331
9. RLB{2} -0.000540274 0.001186537 -0.45534 0.64982551
10. RLB{4} 0.000536805 0.000813624 0 .65977 0.51087352
11. PCRATIO{1} -0.077706992 0.154128904 -0.50417 0.61521950
12. PCRATIO{2} 0.049429281 0.154739128 0.31944 0.75004273
13. PCRATIO{4} -0.022577034 0.127275948 -0.17739 0.85955318
18 In his Ph.D. Bernard Walters examines the sensitivity o f Layard and Nickel’s labour market econorr
vintage o f the data set and finds that an initially supported hypothesis is rejected by later versions of the data.
19 Subject to the caveat that data revisions have not changed the economic history to such an extent that completely 
new relationships throughout the entire period are now implied
20 Full regression output is shown below, all variables as defined in note 17
Dependent Variable LOGC - Estimation by Least Squares 





Mean of Dependent Variable 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 
Standard Error of Estimate 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Regression F(12,44)
Significance Level of F 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
Q (15)
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Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif
1. Constant -0.715608347 0 .496902667 -1.44014 0.15690627
2 . LOGC{1} 0 .364769308 0.193977968 1.88047 0.06667384
3. LOGC{2} 0.391825177 0.195417640 2.00507 0.05113193
4 . LOGC{4} 0.071760777 0.181901830 0.39450 0.69511563
5. LOGRPDI{1} 0.281349618 0.146594839 1.91923 0.06145503
6. LOGRPDI{2} -0.080405825 0.162207397 -0.49570 0.62257466
7. LOGRPDI{4} 0.039305984 0.134872185 0.29143 0 .77209096
8 . RLB{l} -0.002383106 0.001897493 -1.25592 0.21577203
9. RLB{2} -0.002058504 0.002030083 -1.01400 0.31612658
10. RLB{4} 0 .000026294 0.001595276 0.01648 0.98692399
11. PCRATIO{1} -0.216661697 0.261471885 -0.82862 0.41179004
12. PCRATIO{2} 0.066755344 0.280871316 0.23767 0.81323851
13 . PCRATIO{4} -0.152298981 0.212750691 -0.71586 0.47786197
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“5 Full regression output is shown below, all variables as defined in note 17:
Dependent Variable LOGC - Estimation by Least Squares 
Quarterly Data From 1963:03 To 1992:04
Usable Observations 118 
Centered R**2 0.996995
Uncentered R**2 0.999999
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 
Standard Error of Estimate 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Regression F(8,109)
Significance Level of F 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
Q (29)
Significance Level of Q 
Variable
Degrees of Freedom 
R Bar **2 0.996774











Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif
1. Constant -0.151381017 0.093847795 -1.61305 0.10962560
2 . LOGC{1} 0.725039309 0.104477986 6.93964 0.00000000
3 . LOGC{2} 0.264417707 0 .104975072 2.51886 0.01322480
4 . LOGRPDI{1} 0.232492799 0.077070393 3.01663 0.00318148
5 . LOGRPDI{2} -0.206278514 0.079660199 -2.58948 0.01092416
6 . RLB{1} -0.001348282 0.000970975 -1.38859 0.16778987
7. RLB{2} -0.000455812 0.001020377 -0.44671 0.65597137
8 . PCRATIO{1} -0.030471083 0 .143911740 -0.21173 0.83270955
9. PCRATIO{2} -0.001311091 0.134775165 -0.00973 0.99225609
The same is also true o f the impact of interest rates on investment where economic theory expects a clear 
connection which econometrics has yet to find; see Evans, R. (1993) ‘Soothsaying or Science: falsification, 
Uncertainty and Social Change in Macroeconometric Modelling’. Unpublished M.Sc. dissertation, University of 
Bath.
27 Full regression output is shown below, all variables as defined in note 17. In addition: 
CDIFF = LOGC - LOGC{1}
Dependent Variable LOGC - Estimation by Least Squares 
Quarterly Data From 1963:03 To 1992:04
Usable Observations 118 
Centered R**2 0.996995
Uncentered R**2 0.999999
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 
Standard Error of Estimate 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Regression F(7,110)
Significance Level of F 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
Q (29)
Significance Level of Q 
Variable
Degrees of Freedom 110 
R Bar **2 0.996803







































Dependent Variable CDIFF - Estimation by Least Squares 
Quarterly Data From 1963:03 To 1992:04 
Usable Observations 118 
Centered R**2 0.196310
Uncentered R**2 0.331732
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 
Standard Error of Estimate 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Regression F(7,110)
Significance Level of F 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
Q (29)
Significance Level of Q
Degrees of Freedom 110 
R Bar * * 2 0.145166











































28 Full regression details are shown below, all variables as defined in note 27. In addition:
RPDIDIFF = LOGRPDI - LOGRPDI{l}
CRDPI = LOGC - LOGRPDI
Dependent Variable CDIFF - Estimation by Least Squares 
Quarterly Data From 1963:03 To 1992:04
Usable Observations 118 
Centered R**2 0.196310
Uncentered R**2 0.331732
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 
Standard Error of Estimate 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Regression F(7,110)
Significance Level of F 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
Q (29)
Significance Level of Q
Degrees of Freedom 
R Bar **2 0.145166











Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat
1. Constant -0.151510755 0.092472159 -1.63845
2. LOGC{1} 0.015684138 0.008553013 1.83376
3 . CDIFF{l} -0.264678162 0.101040980 -2.61951
4 . RPDIDIFF{l} 0.206237816 0.079187882 2 .60441
5. CRDPI{1} -0.026140609 0.067234148 -0.38880
6 . RLB{1} -0.001347448 0.000962777 -1.39954
7. RLB{2} -0.000457985 0.000991076 -0.46211
8. PCRATIO{1} -0.031367560 0.110032252 -0.28508
2 Full regression details are shown below, all variables as defined in note 27: 
LINREG CDIFF
# CONSTANT CDIFF{1} RPDIDIFF{l} CRDPl{l} RLB{l 2} PCRATIO{l}
Dependent Variable CDIFF - Estimation by Least Squares 
Quarterly Data From 1963:03 To 1992:04
Usable Observations 118 
Centered R**2 0.171741
Uncentered R**2 0.311303
Mean of Dependent Variable
Degrees of Freedom 111 
R Bar **2 0.126970
T X  R**2 36.734
0.0058944263
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0131498134 
Standard Error of Estimate 0.0122866678
Sum of Squared Residuals 0.0167568049
Regression F(6,lll) 3.8360

























Significance Level of Q 0.34493724




































30 It is o f course a widely held suspicion that most hypotheses can be supported by a regression analysis if one is 
prepared to keep trying.
31 Full regression details are shown below, all variables as defined in note 27. In addition:
NEWCDIFF = LOGC - LOGC{l} - 0.0057 
NEWRPDI = LOGRPDI - LOGRPDl{l} - 0.0057
Dependent Variable CDIFF - Estimation by Least Squares 
Quarterly Data From 1963:03 To 1992:04
Usable Observations 118 
Centered R**2 0.171740
Uncentered R**2 0.311303
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 
Standard Error of Estimate 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Regression F(6,lll)
Significance Level of F 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
Q (29)
Significance Level of Q 
Variable
Degrees of Freedom 
R Bar **2 0.126969















































Source: Gavyn Davies, Panel of Independent Forecasters Report, July 1993, H.M. Treasury. P. 49.
33 The retrenchment which has taken place over the last few years, as evidenced by the exceptionally high savings
ratio, suggests that consumers are now taking steps to restore their balance sheets. Thus it is possible that in a few
years the data might, once again, support the hypothesis.
34 Full regression details are shown below, all variables as defined in note 27. In addition:
RLBDIFF = RLB - RLB{1}
Dependent Variable NEWCDIFF - Estimation by Least Squares 
Quarterly Data From 1963:03 To 1992:04 
Usable Observations 118 
Centered R**2 0.141944
Uncentered R**2 0.142133
Mean of Dependent Variable
Degrees of Freedom 
R Bar **2 0.103638
T X  R**2 16.772
0.0001944263
112
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0131498134
Standard Error of Estimate 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
Q (29)
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35 Hendry, D.F. (1989) PC-Give: An Interactive Econometric Modelling System, version 6.0/6.01.
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36 Note that this is not necessarily a bad thing as all theories take time to establish and thus a certain tenacity may be 
an admirable quality in a scientist
37 Adapted from Hudson, J. and Dymiotou-Jensen, M. (1989) Modelling a Developing Country: A Case Study o f  
Cyprus. England: Avebury, p. 55.
38 Paraphrase o f Prof. Assar Lindbeck, quoted in Parkin, M. and King, D. (1992) Economics. England: Addison- 
Wsley Publishing, p. 3.
39 For details o f the equations used see Table 1 and Table 2. See also notes 17 and 20.
40 For example, all the co-efficients on lagged consumers expenditure are positive, implying that consumers 
expenditure can only increase. Professor Christopher Heady has also pointed out that the coefficients on these 
variables sum to one, which is an undesirable outcome.
41 This question was addressed directly by the National Institute in a report which analyses forecasting performance 
in the UK during the 1980s. Britton and Pain conclude that:
There only appears to be evidence o f structural breaks in the relationships for investment and disposable 
income when the latest outturns are used, although the statistics for GDP, domestic demand and inflation 
are significant at the 10% level... [However] if the null [i.e. that there is no structural break] is rejected for 
GDP, inflation, employment and disposable income
Britton, A. And Pain, N. (1992) Economic Forecasting in Britain. National Institute o f Economic and Social 
Research, Report Series, Number 4.
42 Full details o f the regression output are shown below, all variables as defined in note 27. The comparable figure to 
the one quoted by Keating is 0.0124994245, which seems remarkably similar with Keating’s figure.
Dependent Variable NEWCDIFF - Estimation by Least Squares 
Quarterly Data From 1963:03 To 1992:04
Usable Observations 118 Degrees of Freedom 113
Centered R**2 0.127363
Uncentered R**2 0.127556
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 
Standard Error of Estimate 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
Q (29)
Significance Level of Q









Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif
1. NEWCDIFF{1} -0.210385218 0.094557184 -2.22495 0.02807056
2 . NEWRPDI{1} 0.235498640 0.074724145 3.15157 0.00207932
3. CRPDI -0.027616909 0.028010672 -0.98594 0.32626776
4 . RLBDIFF{l} -0.000508763 0.000936491 -0 .54327 0.58801681
5 . PCRATIO{1} -0 .123587235 0.104800741 -1.17926 0.24077192
op cit. note 5, p. 83.
Full details o f the regression equation are given below, all variables as defined in note 27
Dependent Variable LOGC - Estimation by Least Squares 
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Standard Error of Estimate 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
Q (24)
Significance Level of Q 
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See e.g. Evans, R., op cit. note 26
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46 Wallis, K. F., & Whitely, J. (1991). ‘Sources o f Error in Forecasts and Expectations: UK Economic Models, 
1984-8’. Journal o f  Forecasting , Vol. 10, pp. 231-253.
47 Formulae for calculating RMSE are as follows, where X f = forecast and Xt = actual:
Mean Square Error (MSE) = E(Xf - Xt)2 / (t - 2); RMSE = VMSE
Source: Ramanathan, R. (1992) Introductory Econometrics; with applications. 2nd Edition. Florida, USA: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich International, p. 115.
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Chapter 3
The previous chapter examined in detail the specification and estimation of a 
single econometric equation. The conclusion drawn was that the foundations of an 
econometric model are sunk not just in the observed regularities of economic data, but 
also in the shared theoretical convictions of economists. In this chapter I will extend 
this argument to include not just the specification of econometric equations but also 
their use in econometric forecasting. The chapter thus makes one major claim: 
economic forecasts are not extrapolations of the past into the future, but considered 
judgements about what is most likely to happen. The argument thus concerns the nature 
of expertise and skill. It is not a denunciation of macro-econometric modelling, but a 
re-evaluation of the basis of its claims to knowledge. If economic forecasts are products 
of considered judgement and not the inevitable consequence of the application of 
immutable laws and forces then attitudes to economic forecasting, especially as it 
impinges on the making of economic policy, will need to be re-examined. However, 
this is the task of later chapters. In this chapter I merely want to describe how an 
economic forecast is produced.
The purpose of the exposition is not to argue that macro-econometric modelling 
is of no value whatsoever, and the argument is not necessarily a negative one. 
Economic modellers and forecasters probably know more about the economy than any 
one else, and they possess this knowledge because they have spent most of their 
working lives trying to model it. Constructing, maintaining and updating macro­
econometric models is a full-time job which compels a small group of people to 
continuously monitor the economy and by this process to become experts about it.
Instead, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate these points and demonstrate, in 
fairly general terms, the importance of judgement in the production of economic 
forecasts. A more detailed analysis of the way in which specific judgements affect 
forecasts is given in the following chapters. The aim now is to substantiate the claim 
that judgement matters and to introduce the practical experience of forecasting. The 
chapter does this by showing how a macro-econometric model is used to produce an 
economic forecast. Drawing on the first meeting of the Panel of Independent 
Forecasters, I demonstrate that it is not just the model which determines the forecast, but 
the also the judgement of the economist(s). The argument is illustrated by showing how
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a single econometric model can be used to produce forecasts consistent with any of the 
Seven Wise Men’s individual positions.
The Model to Model all Models?
In this section I outline my version of the model estimated by Keating. The 
theoretical basis of the model was outlined in Chapter 2, here I present a more practical 
representation of the model. By using a flow chart one can identify the variables which 
make up the model and represent diagrammatically how they are inter-related. A flow 
chart for my model is shown in Figure 1, overleaf.
In the chart, all variables enclosed in ellipses are endogenous, which means that 
their future values are forecast by the model. Variables enclosed in rectangular boxes 
are exogenous which means that they are not forecast by the model and that any future 
values must be forecast by some other method. One way is to input the values directly 
(this is done for the Expected Exchange Rate and Interest Rate) Another method is to 
use a simple univariate autoregression to extrapolate forwards from the base values (this 
is used for the majority of exogenous variables). A more complex alternative, not used 
in my model, would be to use a multi-variate autoregression model to produce the 
exogenous projections.
Lines joining the boxes show the links within the economy with arrows 
indicating ‘causality’. Where a line splits or branches to influence two or more 
variables this is represented by a small triangle at the junction. If no triangular symbol is 
present, this means that the lines simply cross and do not interact with each other in 
anyway (the right-angled nature of this crossing attempts to imply the orthogonal nature 
of the two forces). This is done to assist in distinguishing between the T-junction where 
a path branches and the crossroads where two lines simply cross.
In addition to elliptical and rectangular boxes, there are also three lozenge 
shaped rectangular boxes with rounded comers (Interest Rates, in the upper left quadrant 
of the chart, and the Balance of Payments and the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
at the bottom). These boxes are used to identify variables which, in Keating’s original 
specification of the model these variables were endogenous, but which in my model are 
exogenous.
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Figure I : Flow Chart o f  Macro-Econometric Model
In the case of Interest Rates this decision was made in order to follow the format 
adopted by the Treasury’s Panel of Forecasters in their reports. The dotted line linking 
prices to interest rates shows the channel of influence which has been cut as a result of 
this decision. The PSBR and Balance of Payments were made exogenous for rather
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more pragmatic reasons: the equations given by Keating simply did not fit my data at all 
well (possibly due to changes in tax structure and rates etc. during 1980s) and 
forecasting these variables using autoregressive equations proved far more successful 
than attempting to reproduce the specifications used in Keating's model.
Other changes from the model specified by Keating concern the variables which 
influence Imports. In Keating’s model, Imports are influenced by several ‘world 
variables’ (e.g. World GNP, Prices and the Exchange Rate). These variables are not 
included in the specification of my Import equation as I was unable to obtain an 
appropriate data series. These variables thus had to be dropped from the equation. 
Once again the dotted lines reflect the channels of influence which one might ordinarily 
expect to find in a macro-econometric model. I now turn to a discussion of the model of 
the economy represented in Figure 1.
In the model shown in Figure 1, the single most important variable is Domestic 
Prices, which are determined by the level of GDP from the previous iteration or time 
period and several exogenous variables (Indirect taxes, Trend Production and World 
Prices). Once forecast, Prices directly influence Average Wages, Fixed Investment and 
Consumers’ Expenditure. Through their effect on Wages, Prices also influence 
Competitiveness, Export Prices, the Expected Interest Rate, Inventories and Imports. In 
addition, Competitiveness, which is responsive to Prices because of their effect on 
Wages, also influences Export Demand.
In Keating’s model, the influence of Prices is even greater. Remember that the 
Interest Rate should be endogenous and is, in part, determined by Prices. If this linkage 
had been maintained, there would be an additional set of effects. In particular the 
Exchange Rate would be responsive to changes in Prices and these effects would, in 
turn, impact upon the Expected Rate of Interest (and hence Inventories) as well as 
Imports.
Figure 1 thus shows the basic structure of the econometric model, and by 
following the connections between variables it is possible to see how a change in one 
variable can propagate through the system. Thus, for example, an increase in Prices 
might push up Wages, thereby reducing Competitiveness and thus Employment and 
Fixed Investment. The increase in Wages might be expected to raise Export Prices and 
also to increase the Expected Rate of Interest (which would have to increase to maintain 
the real rate of interest at a particular level). In addition to increasing the Expected Rate
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of Interest, a rise in Prices would also increase the actual current or nominal Rate of 
Interest and hence the Exchange Rate (because sterling deposits become increasingly 
attractive due to their higher rate of return). This would happen directly in Keating’s 
model, and indirectly in my own as the implications of the change in Prices was taken 
into account when setting the exogenous variables. Finally, the rise in Prices would also 
have impacts upon Consumers’ Expenditure decisions (for example by encouraging 
precautionary savings).
Clearly, the structure given in Figure 1 can be used to develop rich and complex 
stories about economic events. The problem is that although we can say that the 
increase in Prices will push up Wages, reduce Competitiveness and hence Employment, 
we cannot say by how much, nor how soon. For governments and businesses alike 
these are the really important questions. A government planning to raise additional 
revenue through increasing Indirect Taxes (one of the variables which directly 
influences Prices) would obviously like to know what the consequences of choosing a 
particular tax-raising policy would be. Similarly, a firm planning its investment or 
marketing strategy would like to think it had some idea about the likely level of 
Consumers’ Expenditure and the Rate of Interest applied to any loans it may have to 
repay. Unfortunately it is just this kind of detail that the flow chart cannot provide. 
Although it may be a convenient way of organising one’s thoughts it is not much use for 
the sort of decisions that people who rely on economic forecasts are called upon to 
make. These people need numbers, and this is what an econometric model provides.
An econometric model is simply a mathematical version of the flow chart shown 
in Figure 1, but the lines linking variables have been replaced with numerical weights. 
In addition, a time dimension can also be added by allowing (several) previous values of 
a particular variable to appear in each equation. Thus the effects of Prices on Wages 
and ultimately Employment might be seen very quickly or relatively slowly. The 
mathematical version of the model is listed in Appendix A and Appendix B gives details 
of the data series used. In the remainder of this chapter I illustrate how an economic 
forecast is produced. In this case the forecast is the average of the Seven Wise Men’s, 
as detailed in their report of February 1993.
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The Seven Wise Men and Economic Forecasting
In this section I will use the Treasury’s Panel of Independent Forecasters to show that 
even if it were possible for economic modellers to agree on one unique model of the 
economy (in this case the one used by Keating and myself) they could still disagree 
about the future prospects. The use of different models certainly reflects differences of 
both opinion and economics between the Wise Men. However, it would be a mistake to 
think that the models were the cause of these differences and that, if  only they could 
agree on a model, they would agree on everything else.
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate this point and to demonstrate the ways 
in which the judgement and expertise of economists bridges the gap between an 
extrapolation and a forecast. To do this, I have used the model detailed in Appendices 
A and C to reproduce the average of the forecasts made by the Seven Wise Men at their 
meeting in February 1993. This particular forecast (i.e. the average) is important for two 
reasons. The first is that it is a proxy for ‘the average of recently published forecasts’, 
and this is an important reference point for economic forecasters. Put simply, a forecast 
which turns out to be wildly inaccurate and stands outside the consensus will make the 
forecaster look particularly foolish. Of course there are big gains for a forecaster who is 
the only one to get it right, but this is a high risk strategy. On the other hand, if a 
forecast turns out to be wrong but is nevertheless within the consensus, things are not so 
bad as blame (like praise) can be shared. The implication here is that the reference 
points against which economic forecasters judge themselves, and are judged by others, 
are other forecasters first and the economy only second. Truly, there is safety in 
numbers and the herd instinct is particularly strong in economic forecasting.
The tendency for forecasters to converge (intentionally or not) towards a 
consensus value is illustrated in the histograms shown below. The histograms show 
forecasts for the 1993 values of four key economic indicators made by over fifty 
different organisations. All the forecasts were made at the end of 1992.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the forecasts are more or less normally distributed 
around a mean value. For example, for the 50 GDP forecasts which are summarised in 
histogram in Figure 2, the mean value is 0.98 and the standard deviation 0.42. What 
this means is that at any point in time there is a consensus value around which forecasts 
tend to cluster. One way of interpreting the average of recently published forecasts, is 
thus as a yardstick against which other individual forecasts can be compared. Forecasts
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which are close to this value require less justification and defence than the outlying 
ones. In this way, the average also defines the consensus - it is roughly what most 
forecasters are thinking.
Figure 2: Forecasts made in 1992fo r  key economic indicators in 1993
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Because of the importance of the ‘average of recently published forecasts’ I am 
going to using my own model to reproduce the average of the Seven Wise Men’s’ 
February forecasts. The analysis shows how the need to conform to the pressures of the 
social group can impact upon and shape economic forecasts and, in the extreme case, 
can actually determine what they will be. In later chapters I will argue the point in the 
opposite direction and show how judgements which challenge the consensus values can 
be used to produce more distinctive forecast positions. In either case however, it is the 
economist(s) and not the model which is doing the forecasting. Thus, although I have 
chosen to replicate the average forecast, it would have been possible for me to re­
produce any and all of the individual forecasts if I had so wished, and this claim is 
further substantiated in the following chapters.
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The purpose of the present exercise, is to show how, for the orders of magnitude 
which matter to economic forecasters, the model does not determine what the forecast 
will be1. Throughout the emphasis will be on the thought processes, arguments and 
judgements which I was forced to make as I compared what my model was telling me 
with other information available at the time.2 The chapter thus offers a reflexive and 
ethnographic, if somewhat personal, account of how an economic forecast is produced.
The February 1993 Forecast(s)
Preliminaries to forecasting
Before I could actually use the model to forecast I had to estimate, compile and debug 
the program. After all the usual trials and tribulations associated with programming a 
computer, I thought I had built a working model and so I began forecasting 1993. 
However, it was clear that my first effort was something less than a success. In 
particular, the level of the consumer price index, the inflation term used in Keating’s 
model, fell from 114 in 1992Q4 to just 66 one year later, with the result that consumers’ 
expenditure rose very rapidly indeed. Other wildly anomalous results were expected 
interest rates of over 230 per cent and an unemployment figure of about 5.7 million.
Some of these implausible (even to me) forecasts could be attributed to mistakes 
in the programming. For example, the formula calculating the expected real rate of 
interest bore absolutely no relation to the estimated equation from which it was 
supposed to have been derived. Other smaller mistakes were incorrect signs on some 
coefficients. However, correcting these mistakes was not sufficient to resolve the 
problems, although using the correct coefficients did improve the expected interest rate 
forecast to a rather more plausible 6.5%.
As a result of these, and other changes , the model code is now (once again) as 
‘bug free’ as I can make it. There are no errors of which I am aware and so I can once 
again begin forecasting. The time is February 1993 and the situation in the UK 
economy can be summed up as follows:
Since the middle of 1990, the UK has experienced a prolonged and severe 
recession. GDP fell in 1992 for the second year in succession, and 
unemployment has risen to about 3 million. Since the Government 
suspended its membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) on 16 
September [1992] it has been able to relax monetary policy by cutting 
interest rates and the exchange rate has fallen4.
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The challenge facing economic forecasters is to predict what will happen as a result of 
these changes in economic policy.
A First Forecast
The first forecast an economist would make would simply be to run the model 
forwards and see what happens. It would not be expected that this forecast would be the 
one to get published, but the extrapolation would offer some sort of guide as to where 
the economy might be going if past trends were to repeat themselves. No adjustments 
would be made at this stage, and very little expertise is required to produce this sort of 
forecast. In fact, you don’t really need a large econometric model to do this sort of 
forecasting. A simple Vector Auto-Regressive model (in which everything is regressed 
on to everything else) can provide this sort of extrapolation for much less time and 
trouble. The problem is, as we shall see, that these extrapolations are not much use as 
forecasts. In order to turn the initial extrapolation into a plausible forecast the 
economist has to use his or her expertise to adjust the model in the light of what they 
know about the economy. In other words, the economist will have to sift and analyse 
the vast quantities of economic data which are produced daily and use the judgements 
distilled from this process to finesse the forecast into a persuasive and coherent story. 
The model may ensure that all the numbers add up, but that is about all it does.
Table 1 (overleaf) shows a selection of forecasts for the 1993 values of several 
economic indicators which could have been produced in February 1993. The first 
column shows the Average of the Seven Wise Men’s forecasts, as published in their 
February Report to the Chancellor5. The second shows the model-only forecast 
produced by my model. The third column shows the forecast produced by a Vector 
Auto-Regressive model, subject to the constraint that GDP growth in 1993 must be 
1.2% (i.e. the same as the Seven Wise Men Average). For comparison, the fourth 
column shows the actual outturn figures for 1993
These forecasts can be ranked according to the economic expertise which was 
necessary to produced them. In descending order the ranking would be, firstly, the 
Average of the Seven Wise Men which represents (in some sense) the crystallised 
wisdom and experience of seven leading UK economists. Second is my own effort, 
which represents the sort of thing that more or less anyone could do, so long as they 
know enough about economics and computing to program the model into a computer. 
Finally, the VAR model requires the least skill of all, as one doesn’t have to understand
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the first thing about economics in order to use it. In the remainder of this section I will 
elaborate on this distinction and show why it is that forecasting is so much harder than 
econometrics.









GDP % growth 1.1 -1.0 1.1 1.9
Price Index 
(1993Q4)
3.9 2.8 7.9 2.7
Interest rates % 5.4 6.33 8.4 5.8
C urrent account 
f£bn)
-15.7 -10.1 -11.1 -10.7
PSBR (£bn) 47.0 32.8 43.9 45.9
From Extrapolation to Forecast
By comparing columns 1 and 3 of Table 1 we can see that the judgement of the
Seven Wise Men is that interest rates and prices will be rather lower than a simple 
extrapolation would suggest and that the balance of payments deficit and the PSBR will 
be higher. In other words, we might say that the economists are more optimistic about 
prices and interest rates than the VAR model, but more pessimistic about net trade and 
the PSBR.
Another way to look at this difference might be to ask whether or not economic 
forecasters are conservative, in the sense of tending to underestimate year-on-year 
changes and over-emphasising the inertia or momentum in the economy. To address 
this question we need to look at the outturn data for the previous year and compare the 
changes which have been forecast by each system. In 1992, prices increased by 3.7%, 
short term interest rates stood at 7.5%, the current account balance was £bn -11.7 and 
the PSBR was £bn 37.36. We can see therefore that, for the same growth in GDP, the 
economic forecasters are not consistently more conservative than the economic 
extrapolaters. Thus, although they forecast less of a change in Prices, they forecast 
bigger changes in Interest Rates, the Current Account and the PSBR.
With regard to the forecasts produced by my structural model, we can see that 
things do not look too good. In particular, I am forecasting a contraction in GDP of 
around 1%, despite the devaluation and other relaxations of monetary policies which 
have occurred in the preceding few years. For example, interest rates were cut from 15
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to 10.5% between 1990 and 1991, and rates had fallen again, from 10 to 6%, in the 
previous few months'. Taken together these imply a considerable boost to the economy 
which should manifest itself in GDP growth. To try to find out where the model might 
be going ‘wrong’, it is necessary to look at the components of GDP. As was discussed 
in Chapter 2, GDP is the sum of several different categories of expenditure. To 
understand why the model is forecasting a fall in GDP it is therefore necessary to the 
examine the individual forecasts for each element of GDP which are shown in Figure 3 
(overleaf). In my model, GDP is forecast using the identity given in Equation 1 below.








+ Net Oil Exports
- Adjustment to Factor Cost
If we look at the forecasts for the individual components of GDP, which are shown in 
Figure 3 below, it can be seen that the majority are actually increasing throughout 1993.
Figure 3: Model only forecasts fo r  GDP and its components



















The only exceptions to this trend are Imports and Stockbuilding. However, 
Imports are a negative contribution to GDP and so, all other things being equal, a fall in 




























































attributed to the declining forecast for Imports. Although the fall in Fixed Investment 
does have a negative effect on GDP, and may therefore be to blame for the fall in GDP, 
boosting the forecast for Fixed Investment to increase GDP is not an attractive option. 
The reason for this is that, according to the Average of Recently Published Forecasts 
(i.e. the Seven Wise Men), Fixed Investment is expected to be negative during 1993. 
Although the range of values is large (ranging from -3.1% to +2.6% for the six which 
use the same definition) the average value for the forecast for 1993 is -1.9%. Thus, 
increasing the Investment forecast would position the forecast outside the consensus 
view and this is something an economic forecaster might be reluctant to do without 
good reasons.
It is interesting to note at this point that the uncertainty surrounding the forecast 
for Fixed Investment is actually very large compared to the sort of change in GDP 
which is important in economic forecasting. For example, if, in my model, the forecast 
for Fixed Investment was adjusted so as to show a growth of 1.5%, which is well within 
the range being forecast by the Treasury’s Panel of Forecasters, this would be sufficient 
to increase the forecast for GDP from its current value of -1.0% to a growth forecast of 
0.6%. Thus, the uncertainty which surrounds the forecasting of one component of GDP 
" is sufficient to swamp the forecast of the aggregate. When evaluating economic 
forecasts it is therefore important to remember the cliche that a chain is only as strong as 
its weakest link. In economic forecasting this means that a forecast is only as good as 
the economist’s best guess about the most volatile component.
Returning to the forecasting problem, the decision is taken not to ‘fix’ the GDP 
forecast by increasing the Fixed Investment forecast, and so another explanation must 
be sought. If the forecast is for a contraction in GDP and the components which 
contribute positively to GDP are all forecast to increase, then it follows that the 
contraction must be due to an overly large negative contribution from either Imports, 
Net Oil Exports or the Adjustment to Factor Cost. We have already noted that Imports 
are falling, so they cannot be the cause. Although the forecast for Net Oil Exports is 
negative, the numbers involved are very small and, are in any case, consistent with the 
notion that the UK is a net oil importer (which I think is the case). This leaves the 
Adjustment to Factor Cost, which is something like a balancing item that ensures the 
components of GDP sum to the total. Although it is forecast by an equation in the 
model, it has to be admitted that this equation is not very good. In particular it can be
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seen that, at the end of 1992, the fitted value was approximately 8000 more than the 
actual value (see Figure 4).
Given that this is the case, then a good place to begin adjusting the model, would be 
with the Adjustment to Factor Cost. In other words, because it is known that this 
equation has over-predicted in the past (and quite dramatically) it would be appropriate 
to attempt to offset this known miss-specification with a residual adjustment. By 
calculating that the fitted value was (to the nearest 100) 8200 too high at the end of 
1992, the decision was made to reduce the Adjustment to Factor Cost by this amount for 
each quarter in 1993. This may not be the final pattern of residuals which need to be 
set, but it is a good first approximation.
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After thus revising the Adjustment to Factor Cost the forecast for GDP was for 
growth in 1993 and this seemed more consistent with both the general expectation of 
other forecasters and also the story being told by the model (which was forecasting 
growth in most categories of expenditure). Before making further adjustments to ‘fine 
tune’ the model, I also noticed that my assumption about interest rates was at odds with 
the central expectation of the other forecasters.
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My initial assumption was that interest rates would remain unchanged 
throughout 1993. However, I have to ask how plausible is this assumption in the light 
of what is known about the economic situation in the UK? Firstly, although recovery is 
forecast, the average of forecasts is still only for below trend growth of 1.1%. The 
recovery is not therefore expected to be strong. In addition, as we shall see, some of the 
reasons for the anticipated weakness of the recovery is the belief that consumers’ 
expenditure will be restrained (e.g. because of the debt overhang from the 1980s). 
Keeping interest rates higher than they need to be will only compound this problem and, 
because of this, must be regarded as an unlikely economic policy. In addition to its 
inhibitory effect on consumers' expenditure, a high rate of interest will also tend to push 
up the exchange rate (by making sterling deposits attractive to investors). However, 
export growth, which is important for economic recovery, can only be held back if the 
exchange rate is unnecessarily high.
There are therefore several reasons to believe that the rate of interest is likely to 
fall during 1993. In the light of this evidence, the decision is made to change the 
exogenous projections for interest rates to show a constant decline throughout 1993, 
reaching the Seven Wise Men average of 5.4% in the fourth quarter.
Once these changes have been made the model is run again and a new set of 
forecasts for 1993 produced. Now that GDP forecast is at least in the right ‘ball park% 
and the exogenous assumptions plausible, the task of forecasting the economy in detail 
can begin. Given the central importance of Prices in the model (see Figure 1) the first 
thing to check is the forecast for the Price Level in 1993.
Forecasting Prices
When forecasting Prices for 1993, what one is effectively doing is trying to identify 
which, of all the factors which cause prices to change are going to be the most important 
in the current situation. The Panel of Independent Forecasters describe the decision in 
terms of the balance of two opposing tendencies:
On the one hand, the fall in the exchange rate since September will 
inevitably put upward pressure on retail prices in the short term. On the 
other, the considerable slack in the economy is a powerful disinflationary 
force ... The extent to which any rise in inflation due to the recent fall in the 
exchange rate proves temporary will be determined by the behaviour of 
wages. [The Wise Men] all agree that there is some risk that inflation could
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rise in 1994 as the recovery gathers place. But [they] have different views 
about the likelihood of this occurring. Most of [them] think that low 
headline RPI inflation (due in part to recent cuts in mortgage rates) and the 
high level of unemployment should keep the rate of earnings growth to 
below 5% in 1994. But [two] expect that these factors will be outweighed 
by the effects of stronger activity.9
It is clear that what is needed is some sort of judgement about how the effects of the 
devaluation will be offset by the recession which preceded it. In particular, how much 
will one tend to cancel out the other. This is the sort of judgement which economic 
forecasters are routinely called upon to make. It is known that there are two opposing 
forces acting upon the economy. The past data show how things have worked out in the 
past. The econometric model tells us how things will work out this time, based on an
aggregation or averaging of what happened before. What the economic forecaster has to 
do is to, firstly, recognise the general case (e.g. a devaluation) of which the present 
circumstances are but an instance. The second judgement economists have to make is to 
identify the factors which make the present situation unique and to incorporate these 
into the analysis and forecast.
In Table 1 my forecast was for Prices to increase by 2.8%, which was below the 
Seven Wise Men average. However, because Prices are, in part determined by previous 
values of GDP, increasing GDP (which is what the adjustment to the Adjustment to 
Factor Cost effectively did) means that the new forecast for the Price Level should be 
higher. In fact the new forecast for Prices is for the Consumer Price Index (the measure 
used in my model) to increase by 3.9%, from 113.97 in 1992 Q4 to 118.36 in 1993 Q4. 
Now, this is exactly the same number as the average of the forecasts produced by the 
Seven Wise Men. However, satisfaction at this outcome is tempered by remembering 
that, although the numbers may be the same, the forecasts are for different Price Indices. 
My forecast is for Consumer Price index (which is calculated from the ratio of 
consumers’ expenditure in current prices to consumers’ expenditure in constant prices). 
The Seven Wise Men, on the other hand, forecast Retail Prices. According to the Bank 
of England:
The RPI [Retail Price Index] is intended to measure the cost of purchasing a 
representative basket of goods and services. It includes expenditure on 
consumption only; expenditures on investment and saving are excluded10.
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However, the RPI, which includes Mortgage Interest Payments as a measure of housing 
costs is not the measure favoured by the government. The government’s anti-inflation 
policy targets the RPIX measure of inflation, which is the Retail Price Index excluding 
Mortgage Interest Payments (MIPS). This qualification is important as different Price 
Indices change at different rates. Thus, whilst the Panel of Forecasters expect RPIX to 
increase by around 3.9% in 1993, the RPI (i.e. the more inclusive measure of prices) is 
expected to increase by only 2.6% in the same time period11
There is thus an important choice to be made: which of these two measures of 
inflation is most like the Consumer Price Index forecast by my model. Because 
consumers’ expenditure (the data series from which the Consumer Price Index is 
constructed) includes ‘accomodation in owner-occupied homes’12 then it seems likely 
that the Retail Price Index which includes MIPS is the more appropriate proxy. 
However, at this early stage of the forecasting process, the decision is made that the best 
strategy would be to hedge my bets and go for an inflation forecast somewhere towards 
the bottom end of the range marked out by the RPI and the RPIX measures. In order to 
achieve the desired outcome and restrain the growth in Prices during 1993 to a slightly 
lower level the following residual adjustments were made:






The result of these adjustments was to reduce the growth in Prices to about 3.5% in 
1993. Whilst the initial feeling is that this may not in fact be enough to fully reflect the 
weight of housing costs in the Retail Price Index, and hence in my Consumer Price 
Index, it should be remembered that adjustments yet to be made to other equations in 
the model will also impact on Prices and so the final forecast is still undecided. The 
adjustments made thus far, like those to the Adjustment to Factor Cost, are best thought 
of as a first approximation in an iterative process which may have several more loops to 
run.
If some justification for these adjustments were needed (apart from the excuse 
that is the safest option) the following reasons could be adduced. As was noted when
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making the projections for interest rates, it is generally recognised that any recovery 
which does occur in 1993 will be weak, and that consumers will be unusually reluctant 
to spend the economy out of recovery. What this means for Prices is that producers will 
be unable to pass on the increased costs associated with the rise in import prices due to 
the devaluation and so ‘imported inflation’ might be expected to be lower in this cycle 
than in previous ones. In addition there are grounds for believing that the large pool of 
unemployed workers will keep a firm downward pressure on wages and so this force, 
which would tend to increase inflation, is also unusually muted. Taken together these 
observations suggest that there are several distinctive features in the present economic 
situation which make it reasonable to believe that Prices will rise by less than an 
extrapolation of past trends would suggest.
After having thus set an initial and plausible path for Prices, the forecaster’s 
attention next turns to the components of GDP. The first to be considered is 
Consumers’ Expenditure, principally because it is the biggest.
Forecasting Consumers’ Expenditure
As can be seen from Figure 3, the initial model-only forecast was for
Consumers’ Expenditure to increase during 1993 by around 3.4 %. As has been pointed 
out before, it is generally believed that the economy is at an unusually low ebb and this 
forecast thus seems rather too optimistic. This is a suspicion which is confirmed by the 
Seven Wise Men:
[who all] agree that consumer spending is likely to be restrained by balance 
sheet problems (for example, the large overhang of debt), the weakness of 
the housing market, rising unemployment and a squeeze on real incomes 
caused by rising import prices.13
At this point, several options are possible. For example, one could argue that in order to 
restrain this growth the government will be forced to raise interest rates in 1993 and not 
to let them fall, which is the current expectation. However, as was already noted, an 
appreciation of sterling on the foreign exchanges would be very damaging to exports 
and one of the last things the government would be expected to do. Thus, Gavyn 
Davies, in his submission to the Treasury’s Panel of Forecasters explicitly warns of the 
dangers of too-high interest rates and argues reducing rates should be the priority, with 
sterling being allowed to slide if necessary. Patrick Minford and Wynne Godley 
advocate a similar policy, although for different reasons.
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Given this analysis, reducing the forecast by returning interest rates to the higher 
than necessary values previously assumed does not seem a particularly plausible 
solution. In addition, if it is consumers’ debts which are behind the current high saving 
ratio, increasing the cost of this debt more than necessary seems a particularly unlikely 
government policy. In other words, the interest rate assumption seems perfectly 
plausible and is not therefore a particularly appealing candidate for change.
Another possible way in which the behaviour of consumers might be influenced 
is through the effect of wages. As noted when forecasting Prices, there is a case for 
arguing that the large pool of unemployed workers will mean that wage increases will 
remain low. Although wages do not appear directly in the Consumption Function used 
in my model, disposable income does. One solution to the problem of overly high 
consumers expenditure forecasts might be therefore to revise the exogenous projections 
of disposable income down, in light of the expected low level of wage settlements. At 
present, disposable income projections are produced by a simple univariate 
autoregression equation. This is hardly a sophisticated forecasting tool and so the use of 
a judgmental adjustment to the exogenous projections can be justified. An alternative, 
would simply be to impose a residual adjustment on the Consumers’ Expenditure 
~ equation to represent both the unusual reluctance of consumers to spend and also the 
unusually low level of wage increases which are expected to lead to a relatively small 
growth in disposable income.
I suspect a professional modeller would first revise the exogenous projections 
for disposable income to make them compatible with the assumptions and forecasts 
about wages and only after this to adjust the Consumers’ Expenditure equation. 
Revising the exogenous database has the presentational advantage of not appearing in 
any list of residual adjustments and also means that any residual adjustments which are 
necessary will look smaller. In my case, for ease of programming and presentation, I 
chose to make the adjustments to the Consumers’ Expenditure equation itself. The 
adjustments are given in Table 3 and have the effect of reducing the growth in 
Consumers’ expenditure to around 1%. However, reducing Consumers’ Expenditure 
has also reduced GDP and the lower levels of GDP have fed back into the Price 
equation, causing the forecast for Prices to fall slightly. It is therefore possible that the 
residual adjustments made to the Price equation will have to be reset to zero in the next 
iteration.
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As was noted when discussing the model-only forecasts shown in Figure 3, the range of 
uncertainty which surrounds the forecasts for Gross Fixed Investment was very large, 
with some of the Panel of Forecasters anticipating an increase in the level of Fixed 
Investment and others expecting a decrease. The range of plausible outcomes was such 
that the judgement made about the level of Investment could mean the difference 
between a forecast for GDP growth and a forecast for continued recession. Indeed, it 
can be argued that many of the major forecasting mistakes can be attributed to mistakes 
in the forecasts for Investment. These problems notwithstanding, a forecast must be 
made for Fixed Investment and this is the task to which we now turn.
After the adjustments which have been made so far, the model is predicting that 
Fixed Investment in 1993 will increase by around 11%. This is clearly too high and is 
well outside the range of values forecast by the Seven Wise Men. Before going in and 
making a series of residual adjustments however it is important to consider the 
possibility that the forecast is due to an error in some other part of the model which then 
feeds into the Investment equation where it then becomes apparent.
In the model, Fixed Investment is determined by the Wages and Employment. It 
is therefore important to ensure that the forecasts for these two series are plausible 
before the Investment equation is altered. Because Wages influence Employment, the 
forecasts for Wages will be considered first. At present Wages are forecast to remain 
virtually static throughout 1993, with the index of wages and salaries increasing by 0.1, 
from 115.4 to 115.5.
As was noted when discussing Prices, one effect of the ending of the recession is 
expected to be an upward pressure on wage demands. On the other hand, it was also 
noted that high levels of unemployment will tend to work in the opposite direction. In 
addition, the conclusion that Prices will be increasing at what is an historically low rate 
should also act to keep wage increases relatively low. However, the recession has 
ensured that wage increases in the previous few years have been very low, and there is 
therefore a belief that the growth in GDP which is expected to occur may be sufficient
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to trigger an increase in the rate of earnings growth. As a result of these considerations, 
the range of forecasts for Average Earnings by the Seven Wise Men runs from 2.8 to 
6.4%. Thus, although some see Wages as a bigger problem than others, an increase in 
the level of wages is nevertheless the expectation of every forecaster. In light of this, 
the current forecast is clearly in need of some adjustment, and it is possible that the 
equation itself may need re-specifying in a more fundamental manner. However, the 
immediate priority is to ensure that the forecast for wages is an increase throughout 
1993; any re-specification will have to wait until another day. By making the following 
adjustments to reflect the wage pressure due to the upturn in economic activity, as well 
as to correct the perceived mis-specification, the forecast for the Index of Average 
Wages can be made to show an increase of about 4 per cent.






Having thus achieved a plausible forecast for the increase in Average Wages, we 
must now turn our attention to the forecasts for Employment, which was also a 
determinant of Fixed Investment. The current forecast is for employment in the 
economy to fall during 1993. Initially this seemed quite plausible because the Seven 
Wise Men expect unemployment to increase by around 300 000, from 2.9 million to 3.2 
million throughout 199314. Thus, although the fall is rather large (it actually implies an 
unemployment level of about 4.5 million if all the newly unemployed are added to the 
jobless total) at least the direction is correct. In fact, the average of the Seven Wise 
Men’s’ forecasts is for Employment to fall by about 2%15. Again, the general direction 
of the forecast is correct and using residual adjustments shown in Table 5 the forecast 
can be ‘fine-tuned’ to this range.





1993 0 4 0.018
98
Having now ensured that the inputs to the Fixed Investment equation are as good 
as possible, we are now in a position to examine the forecasts for Investment. 
Unfortunately the changes made have in fact made things a little bit worse. The forecast 
now is for Fixed Investment to increase by 13%. However, by imposing non-zero 
residuals, the forecast can be made to show a fall of 2%. This is consistent with the 
Seven Wise Men’s forecasts, which ranged from -3.1 to +2.6 per cent.
Stockbuilding
Like Fixed Investment, Stockbuilding is a fairly volatile component of GDP and 
forecasting it is made difficult by the general uncertainty which surrounds business 
spending. The forecast produced by the model is for Stockbuilding to make a positive 
contribution to GDP growth in 1993. Whilst this is in the right general direction, the 
actual forecast is for Stockbuilding to increase by an amount which would add just over 
1% to GDP16. This is higher than any of the forecasts produced by the Seven Wise Men 
and, in the absence of a strong reason for expecting a high level of Stockbuilding, a risk- 
averse forecaster would revise this forecast down to something closer to the average.










This option is doubly attractive as what reasons there are for making adjustments 
tend to be those which would favour a cautious approach. In particular, the tentative 
nature of the recovery and the general belief that it is far from firmly established, means 
that businesses might be expected to be reluctant to invest in Stockbuilding as it is not 
clear where the return on this investment is going to come from. In the light of these 
considerations, the following adjustments were made and the forecast for Stockbuilding 
is reduced slightly so as to show a positive contribution to GDP growth of 0.25% (the 
Seven Wise Men average is 0.28%)
However, an unintended consequence of this is to make Fixed Investment fall by 
more than we had wished. The residual adjustments made for that equation will need to 
be revised before the forecast is finalised. At present, the decision is made to continue 
with the first iteration of the forecasting process and make sure that the Net Trade
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forecasts are satisfactory. Only after the whole forecast is a satisfactory first 
approximation will the fine tuning of individual components make sense17.
Net Trade
Net Trade is the contribution made to GDP growth by Exports minus Imports plus Net 
Oil Exports. The Seven Wise Men expect Net Trade to contribute 0.4% to GDP growth 
during 1993. For my model, the forecast is very similar, with an initial negative 
contribution to GDP changing into a small positive one by the end of the year. This is, 
in fact, pretty much what one would expect to see as a result of the devaluation. As 
imports become relatively more expensive and exports relatively cheaper, one would 
expect exports to rise. The problem is that one would not necessarily expect imports to 
fall, rather the expectation would be that the rate of growth of imports would fall.
Thus, the Seven Wise Men expect that both imports and exports will grow 
during 1993, but that exports will grow faster, and so give a positive overall 
contribution to GDP overall. In my model, although the final forecast is plausible (and 
thus no adjustments have been made) the individual forecasts do not seem to match the 
expected pattern. In particular, the forecast for imports is for them to fall during 1993. 
This is completely at odds with the average of recently published forecasts (or at least 
their proxy, the Seven Wise Men).
The averages o f the Seven Wise Men’s forecasts (excluding Godley, who 
forecasts a different variable) are for Exports to grow by 5.5% in 1993 and Imports by 
4.7%. The problem is that if these projections are applied to my data values for 1992 
Q4, then Imports remain larger than Exports and so the Net trade contribution to GDP is 
negative. The problem, I suspect lies with the data for Imports and Exports, which 
show a too large gap between the two. In fact, these series were, as noted in the 
previous chapter, difficult to obtain and had to be constructed by combining other data 
series. It is quite likely that some “error was made during this procedure. The best 
solution to the problem would therefore be not to adjust the equation, but to first obtain 
another data series for non-oil imports and exports against which to compare the ones 
currently being used. If, as I suspect, there turns out to be a difference, then this should 
be corrected before any adjustments are made.
For the time being however, the decision is made to do nothing, but to flag the 
potential problems with the forecast in any presentation. The forecast is thus for Net
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Trade to make a small positive contribution to GDP growth and for Exports to grow. 
Imports are also expected to grow, but at a slower rate than previously.
The forecast so far
After completing the first round of adjustments to the forecast, it is now time to take 
stock of the situation. Most of the forecasts for the components of GDP are reasonably 
plausible as a result of the residual adjustments which have been made. The forecast for 
Prices has fallen slightly as a result of the adjustments to the other equations and now 
stands at a 3.3% increase over the year. However, as was pointed out above, the 
forecast obtained for Prices was perhaps a little bit too high in any case, and so this is 
not a cause for concern.
More troubling is the realisation that the adjustments made in other parts of the 
model have affected the forecast Fixed Investment, which now shows a bigger fall than 
was hoped for. It therefore seems that the residual adjustments made to the Fixed 
Investment equation were too large and need to be reduced. By re-setting the residuals 
to the values shown in Table 7 below, the forecast is made to show a fall of 1.8%.






The forecasts for Prices, Wages, Employment and the components of GDP are 
now in reasonable agreement (whatever that means) with the average of recently 
published forecasts. The only thing which now needs to be checked is that the forecast 
for GDP satisfactory.
The forecast for total GDP growth is, in fact rather too high. GDP growth is 
predicted to be about 3.5% in 1993. As the forecasts for the components are all OK the 
adjustment must be made in the Adjustment to Factor Cost. At the beginning of the 
forecasting period, the residuals on the Factor Cost Adjustment equation were set at a 
constant -8200 through the forecast period. In order to make the forecast for GDP 
lower, the Adjustment to Factor Cost must be made larger, which means that the 
residual adjustments need to made smaller. The question is how can this be justified,
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other than on the pragmatic grounds that it needs to be done in order for the forecast to 
come out ‘right’.
Fortunately other reasons can be given. If we re-consider the chart shown in 
Figure 4 we can see that the Adjustment to Factor Cost is a volatile series which does 
tend to go up and down quite frequently. It is therefore most unlikely that it will remain 
virtually constant throughout 1993, which is what the current pattern o f residual 
adjustments implies. Moreover, from Figure 4 we can see that the Adjustment to Factor 
Cost is on a downward trend in the year leading up to 1992 Q4. Consequently, to set a 
pattern of decreasing residual adjustments for the period 1993 Q1 to 1993 Q4 would 
introduce a turning point into the series which would be more or less consistent with the 
previous data. There are some grounds for reducing the residuals on the Factor Cost 
equation and thus increasing the size of the Adjustment. By setting the following 
pattern of residual adjustments a forecast for GDP growth of 1.1% in 1993 was 
obtained.






The forecast is now consistent with average of the Seven Wise Men, as can be seen in 
Table 9 (below). There are still some problems that need rectifying, particularly with 
regard to the forecasting of Imports. One can hypothesis that had the series for Imports 
been boosted to a level closer to that of Exports then the negative contribution made to 
GDP by Net Trade in the first 3 quarters of 1993 would have been smaller and the 
overall forecasts for GDP growth larger. This is in turn would have implied that 
residuals set on the Factor Cost Equation might have needed to be set at a lower level.
However, these problems, which could no doubt be solved by further rounds of 
the adjustment process, should not distract from the main purpose of this exposition. 
The aim has been to illustrate how an economic forecast is actually produced using a 
macro-econometric model and to show how important the judgement of the economist 
is if the forecast is to be plausible. The implications of the example are discussed in the 
next section.
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Table 9: Summary o f  Forecast fo r  % change in GDP and its Components fo r  1993 by R. Evans and Seven Wise Men 
(Average)
Evans Average of Seven 
Wise Men
GDP % growth 1.1 1.1
Consumers’ Expenditure 1.1 0.91
Gross Fixed Investment -1.8 -0.7
Stockbuilding2 0.25 0.31
Government 1.2 1.01
Net Trade2 0.7 0.4
Excludes Minford Contribution to GDP Growth per cent
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to illustrate the ways in which the apparently 
precise and quantitative output of an econometric model is the product of a process of 
interpretation and adjustment. It has been shown that forecasting the economy relies on 
the skill and reasoning powers of the economists and that the output of an econometric 
model is not necessarily an economic forecast. Even after the economist has specified 
and estimated the model, a process which itself is influenced by prior beliefs, the 
forecasts produced still need to be assessed, interpreted and their plausibility in the 
wider community established. In fact, forecasting the economy using a macro­
econometric model seems to rely even more heavily on the economist’s powers of 
reasoning, rhetoric and judgement than the estimation of the model itself.
One reason for this is that forecasting is necessarily about the future and the
future, at least of the social world, is inherently unknowable as existing practices evolve
18and new ones emerge to challenge and change established relationships and patterns. 
When an econometric model, however large and sophisticated, is used to project the 
future the judgement of the economist is a necessary input if  the extrapolation of past 
trends is to become a plausible economic forecast upon which government policies and 
business investment decisions are to be based. As was shown in the preceding 
discussion, the exogenous database must be constructed in order that the future paths of 
the variables which the model needs in order to produce its forecasts are available as 
inputs. However, these projections are themselves forecasts of the economic future and 
thus already embody some expectations about what the forecast will be. For example, if
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World Trade is expected to decline or grow comparatively slowly then this will have 
negative consequences for the domestic economy which is going to be exporting into a 
shrinking market place. Similarly, it is difficult to see how projections for interest rates 
(which remember are listed as assumptions not forecasts in the reports of the Panel of 
Forecasters) can be made without having some idea about where the domestic economy 
is going.
In the forecast presented above, an example of this kind of decision was the 
treatment of disposable income. Real Personal Disposable Income is an exogenous 
variable which appears in the consumption function. If  consumers disposable income 
does not increase, or even falls, then this can be expected to have a negative effect on 
the level of consumers’ expenditure and hence to restrain GDP growth or even cause a 
recession. However, what grounds do economic forecasters have for expecting the 
growth in Disposable Income to be unusually low apart from the generally weak 
position of the economy. For example, the large pool of unemployed workers means 
that wage increases are expected to be low, and if wages do not increase by more than 
inflation then Real Disposable Income must fall. The result of this is that consumers 
spend less, thus reinforcing the generally weak nature of the recovery and ensuring that 
the conditions which brought about the sluggish recovery are reproduced. However, 
this economic future is exactly what the model is supposed to be predicting and yet it is 
already contained in the exogenous variables. This is not to say that when setting future 
paths for the exogenous variables the economist simply sets them in such a way as to 
produce the desired forecast. Rather the situation is much more like trying to untangle 
the riddle of whether there were chickens before there were eggs.
Economic forecasters are in effect part of two communities. They are a part of 
the general social system which makes up the economy and are thus aware of what 
might be called the ‘public mood’. In addition, however, they are also part of a 
community of ‘economy watchers’. Like the ‘Kremlin watchers’ of the secret services 
analysing satellite photos, gossip and coded messages, ‘economy watchers’ spend their 
lives studying surveys, press releases and prices and from these sources they must 
produce an analysis of what is going to happen next. The process is thus one of 
interpretation and uncertainty and, in these situations, intuition and judgement are more 
useful guides than extrapolation. This is not to deny that there are regularities and 
tendencies which can be discerned in the economic history of a modem capitalist 
society. Rather it is to acknowledge what we all know - history does not repeat itself, at
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least not exactly. And it is precisely because of this observation that simply 
extrapolating past trends into the future is not going to be sufficient to produce an 
economic forecast. The expertise of the economic forecasters is their ability to 
recognise the patterns and regularities in economic data but also to identify the 
singularities of the current situation. It just so happens that economic forecasters use a 
macro-econometric model as a way of integrating this analysis of the general and the 
particular. We should not however be fooled into thinking that it is the model which is 
doing the analysis.
It should not necessarily be concluded from this that macro-econometric 
modelling is somehow not quite scientific. After all, the central message of the 
sociology of science may well be that all science is based on the negotiation of meaning 
and evidence. There is nothing unusual going on in macro-econometric modelling. 
Judgement and interpretation are a central part of all science, although not a part to 
which much attention is usually given it has to be said.
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Notes
1 The reason I had to do rely on the distilled wisdom o f others was because I am not an economic forecaster and do 
not have either the knowledge or the connections to justify strong and informed opinions. It is this knowledge gap 
which separates economic forecasters from the general public and explains why a ‘ready-to-run’ economic model 
would be o f little use to anyone.
2 For examples o f the sorts o f adjustments which professional forecasters make see Wallis, K. F., & Whitely, J. 
(1991). ‘Sources o f Error in Forecasts and Expectations: UK Economic Models, 1984-8’. Journal o f  Forecasting , 
Vol. 10, pp. 231-253. The London Business School publication Economic Outlook provides a list o f  the residual 
adjustments used in its forecasts, although with no description o f why they were made.
3 This chapter is based on paper presented to the Post Keynesian Study Group in February 1995. (See: Evans, R.J. 
(1995) How Do They Do That? The Roles o f  Extrapolation, Econometrics and Judgement in the Economic 
Forecasts o f  the Seven Wise Men.)
Whilst writing up this chapter, I discovered several mistakes in the model used as the basis o f that presentation. In 
particular, the Price equation, which was very problematic in that paper turned out to have been miss-specified in a 
rather basic way, with log transformations being omitted from two o f  the independent variables. As the 
coefficients were estimated using variables in logarithms it seems likely that the poor performance o f  the Price 
equation will be improved by returning the model equation to the form in which it was estimated.
Two other mistakes which also became apparent during the writing o f  this chapter were as follows. Firstly, a 
constant term had been included in the Consumers’ Expenditure equation, although (as we saw in a previous 
chapter) there are grounds for excluding this if  the theoretical coherence o f  the model is to be maintained. The 
other error occurred in the Import equation, from which (as noted above) several variables had to be dropped in 
order for the model to forecast satisfactorily. However, dropping some o f  independent variables meant that the 
equation had to be re-estimated and the coefficients in the model updated. This was not done initially but has been 
for this chapter. The full (up to date) listing o f the model code used for this Chapter, which incorporates all these 
changes, is shown in Appendix C.
4 The Panel o f  Independent Forecasters February 1993 Report. H.M. Treasury, para 1.
5 op cit. note 4.
6 source: op cit., note 4, Table B1, Seven Wise Men Averages.
7 Andrew Britton, Submission to Report o f  the Panel o f  Independent Forecasters, February 1993, para. 6
8 Only 2 o f the Seven Wise Men (Britton and Currie) forecast an increase in Investment for 1993. The median 
forecast is -0.5%. In addition, Minford’s forecast, which is not included in these calculations because he forecasts 
a different measure o f Fixed Investment is also negative (-2.7%). Overall it seems that the ‘consensus’ is negative.
9 op cit. note 4, paras 12-14
10 Bank o f  England Quarterly Bulletin, February 1993, Vol. 33, No. 1, p. 12.
11 source: op cit. note 4, Table B 1.
12 According to a standard economic textbook:
Consumer goods and services are final products which firms sell to households and which households 
buy because they are useful or pleasurable. They include items such as bread and ice-cream, shoes and 
ornaments, haircuts and rides at the fair. They also include acommodation in owner-occupied homes 
which are held to be let by their owners to themselves.
Source: Parkin, M., & King, D. (1992). Economics. Wokingham, England: Addison-Wsley Publishing. Quote at 
p. 561
13 op cit. note 4, p. 5
14 source op cit. note 4, Table 1.
15 source: op cit. note 4, Table B4.
16 Stockbuilding is usually measured in terms o f its contribution to GDP growth
17 Does it make sense to think like this about a non-linear system?
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18 The idea is neatly capture in the following limerick:
A trend is a trend is trend 
But the question is, will it bend?
Will it alter its course 
Through some unforeseen force 
And come to a premature end?
Source: Caimcross, A. (1969) ‘Economic Forecasting: Presidential Address to the Royal Economic Society, July 
3, 1969’, The Economic Journal, 79, pp. 797-812.
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Chapter 4
This chapter complements the ‘outsider’ perspective given in the previous chapters and 
gives some idea of how macro-econometric modelling is perceived by those who 
actually do it. The aim is to illustrate how the ambiguity of econometrics, which was 
highlighted in the previous chapters, manifests itself in the day-to-day practice of 
macro-econometric modelling. It has already been noted in Chapter 1 that macro­
econometric modelling methodologies can permit a range of theoretical specifications to 
co-exist, with none being unequivocally superior to the rest. This chapter gives some 
insight into the reasons for this interpretative flexibility and shows why using 
econometrics to prove or disprove an economic theory is an almost impossible task.
The chapter is about macro-econometric modelling in the most general sense and 
explores the conceptual and practical problems associated with it. The problems 
identified apply more or less equally to all macro-econometric models and the chapter 
therefore highlights the gap between the scientific image of econometric modelling and 
its actual practice. As with the rest of the thesis, it is not a denunciation of econometric 
modelling, but an attempt to re-locate the skill and expertise which economic forecasters 
undoubtedly possess amongst the social practices of the group.
What Is a macro-econometric model
In Chapter 2, I described in some detail how one of the equations in a macro 
econometric model is estimated using regression analysis. A full scale macro­
econometric model is ‘simply’ a number of these equations which feed into each other 
before being grouped together to form the accounting relationships and identities which 
define the national income. So far I have focused on highlighting the ambiguity of the 
regression analysis which is used to estimate these equations, and shown how 
judgement and the ‘cherished beliefs’1 of the economics community are used to end the 
Experimenters’ Regress2 which arises when econometrics are used to test a theory. 
However, there is another aspect of regression analysis which has not been discussed 
thus far and this is the statistical uncertainty which needs to be attached to the results 
before they can be properly understood.
For example, in Chapter 2 ,1 presented several Tables in which the co-efficients 
in regression equations were given to 9 decimal places, which certainly looks very 
precise. However, this sort of precision is quite illusory when interpreted within the
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context of what a regression analysis actually means. At its most basic (i.e. when there 
is just one independent variable being used to predict the dependent variable) regression 
analysis calculates the equation for the straight line which best fits the available data 
points. In regression analysis, ‘best fit’ is taken to mean that the straight line given by 
the estimated regression equation is the one from which the sum of the (squared) 
deviations of the data is as small as possible. If two independent variables are used to 
explain or predict the dependent variable, then regression analysis calculates the ‘plane 
of best fit’3. Although it becomes increasingly difficult to visualise what the regression 
analysis is doing as the number of explanatory variables in the equation increases, the 
underlying principles remain the same. In every case, the regression equation is the best 
estimate of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent. This 
means that, if the regression equation is used to predict values of Yv given values for the 
independent variables (Xu ... Xni), then the answer will not be the observed value of 7j 
but a number ‘close’ to Yy If the estimated regression equation is used to predict all the 
values of 7j associated with all the input data then, on average, the difference between 
the predicted and actual value will be zero (this is why regression estimators are said to 
be unbiased). However, it is important to remember that for any particular value of 7S it 
is most unlikely that the value of this deviation or error term will be zero. Thus, for 
each regression equation there is a set of error terms given by the difference between the 
actual value of 7j and the values estimated by using the equation.4
The practical implications of this are as follows. The apparently precise 
appearance of a regression equation in which co-efficients are calculated to 9 decimal 
places is potentially misleading because there is an extra term which has not been 
shown. This extra term is the error term and can be thought of as a random ‘draw’ from 
the distribution of possible error terms. The error could be either positive or negative 
and the range of values which it is likely to take is determined by the closeness of the fit 
between the estimated values of Yt and the original data. In the best cases, these errors 
will be small relative to the value of Yh in the worst they will be of the same order of 
magnitude.
In other words, every ‘point forecast’ produced using a regression equation 
comes with the following implicit caveat: 95 times out of 100, the observed value of Y{ 
will not be the one calculated but will be somewhere in the range given by the estimated 
value plus or minus twice the standard deviation of the distribution of the error term (i.e.
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the difference between the observed and estimated values). The information value of 
the forecast must therefore crucially depends on the size of the standard deviation of the 
error term relative the dependent variable. It is important to remember that all 
econometric equations have this property - it is a necessary consequence of the 
statistical methods by which they are produced. The following section discusses this 
statistical uncertainty in more detail.
Statistical Uncertainty in Macro-econometric Modelling
A macro-economic model is a system of linked equations. Some o f these 
equations are accounting or definitional identities which are true by fiat, others are 
behavioural equations which attempt to model the actions of economic agents in the 
economy. These behavioural equations can either be estimated individually and then 
combined into a whole model, or the whole model can be estimated in one go using a 
‘systems technique’ such a three stage least squares. The ‘systems techniques’ are in 
theory the best way to estimate a multi-equation model because the method takes into 
account the co-variances between equations caused by the fact that dependent variables 
in some equations appear as independent variables in others.
In addition to recognising the simultaneous nature of the equations, using a 
systems estimation technique would enable the standard error of the model to be 
calculated. The standard error of the model is basically similar to the standard error of 
an individual equation. If it were known, it would mean that any point estimate could 
be accompanied by an accurate estimate of the range of possible values implied by the 
fit of the model to the data. This would mean that the statistical uncertainty attached to 
the model would at least be known and could therefore be used when interpreting and 
presenting economic forecasts.
If the equations are all estimated separately and only later combined into a single 
model, then the model standard error cannot be calculated directly and must be 
estimated by some other means. In practice this is generally what happens and almost 
all macro-models are composed of equations estimated individually using partial 
information techniques such as instrumental variables5. Because of this a direct 
measure of the model standard error is not available and so, if one is needed, it must be 
calculated indirectly. The usual way of doing this is to conduct what is known as a 
‘stochastic simulation’ in which the error term in each equation is allowed to take the 
range of values specified by the equation's standard error. For each error value, a
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simulation run is made and the forecast recorded. By repeating this process for literally 
thousands of runs, the distribution of forecast values can be plotted and the error 
associated with the model estimated from this.
From simulations such as these it transpires that the standard errors, however 
they are calculated, tend to be of the same order of magnitude as the actual outcomes, 
and the presentation of forecasts to one or even two decimal places is therefore 
somewhat misleading. For example, a forecast for the GDP growth rate over the next 
12 months is surrounded by an uncertainty band of about 1.25% either way. In other 
words a forecast for GDP growth of 2.5% over the next year really means that it is most 
likely that the outcome will be between 1.2% and 3.8%, but there remains a 5% chance 
that it will be above or below this range. When looked at this way it seems that 
economic models do not tell us very much, especially over the longer term, and this is 
indeed the case:
Britton after 2 [years] I think you've got to the stage where the information content 
of the forecast is probably about nil. In other words, that the standard error 
in the forecast is as large as the standard deviation of what you are trying to 
forecast, whilst over one year you roughly halve it, which is clearly useful6
Once the uncertainty which surrounds an economic forecast becomes apparent it is also 
clear why despite their theoretical differences, macro-econometric models are all more 
or less compatible with the economic data. A wide range of outcomes are compatible 
with any given forecast, and ‘the differences that are often argued about are really well 
within sampling error.’7
In fact, a closer analysis reveals that the information content of a pure model 
forecast is even less than that which has been implied so far. The reason is that the 
stochastic simulations used to estimate the standard error of most econometric models 
do not draw out the full range of- possible errors. For example, when stochastic 
simulations are carried out, the coefficients of the equations are usually held constant, 
whereas they are actually values from a probability distribution and should therefore 
also be allowed to vary. On the other hand, there are some evidence to suggest that the 
estimates produced by stochastic simulations are rather too large, particularly for longer 
time horizons.
Currie I'm less sure about that [i.e. the error estimates produced by stochastic 
simulations], because, some work I've seen by David Hendry, suggests
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actually that the errors don't explode in that way, that they go up and then 
sort of stabilise8. But stochastic simulations are one way of trying to get at 
it, but even that's not a very good way of getting at it, its not the real 
answer9.
In addition to the statistical uncertainty associated with the estimation technique and 
estimated by stochastic simulations there is another and far less tractable source of 
uncertainty which arises when macro-econometric models are used for forecasting. 
When the model is being used for forecasting, as opposed to the analysis of a historical 
data set, the future values of any variables which are not forecast by the model (i.e. the 
exogenous variables) must be assumed by the modeller. These exogenous projections 
add a further unquantifiable uncertainty to the forecasts. However, this is not the only 
way in which the unquantifiable uncertainty of human judgement enters into economic 
forecasting. As was shown in Chapter 3, forecasters can fine tune their forecasts by 
setting the error terms in various equations to take non-zero values and, research by the 
ESRC Macromodelling Bureau, suggests that such practices are fairly commonplace10. 
Whilst these adjustments usually reduce the final forecast error, which is probably a 
good thing, they mean that even if the model standard error were known we would still 
not be able to assess the ‘uncertainty band’ which should be placed around any given 
economic forecast because so many other sources of uncertainty had been left out. 
Interestingly the feeling amongst macro-econometric modellers is that, because the 
standard error , estimates which would be generated if all this uncertainty was fully 
acknowledged are so large, they are not worth publishing at all:
Ormerod Well, in fact, its been technically feasible to calculate the mean and standard 
errors for many years. In fact, we could have done this at the National 
Institute in the mid 70s, but we suppressed it on the grounds that the 
standard errors were so large, that it would have been difficult for non­
specialists, you know people using the models, using the forecasts, to 
appreciate. It would have discredited them.11
Minford The trouble is that these stochastic simulations they have a very restricted 
bunch of errors that they draw on and you've got the, you have the errors in 
the exogenous variables as well which are not generally included in these 
stochastic simulation exercises
Evans And if they were the outcome would be even worse
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Minford Oh absolutely, that why its absolutely pointless to publish these forecast
error bands because they are extremely large ... I'm all for publishing full
and frank statements but you see the difficulty [with] these standard errors is
that they're huge. If you were properly to draw out the uncertainty
12surrounding a forecast it’s huge, absolutely huge.
However, it would be quite wrong to conclude from this that macro-econometric
modellers are engaged in some sort of plot to conceal information about the uncertainty 
surrounding an economic forecast. Rather the emphasis is on how the error can be 
communicated in such a way as to strike a balance between full disclosure and 
undermining one’s own credibility. Apart from the technical criticisms mentioned 
above, probably the most important failing of stochastic simulations is that they take no 
account of the input of the modeller. This aspect is particularly important because the 
ESRC Macromodelling Bureau’s ex post analyses have frequently shown that the 
residual adjustments made by the modellers have tended to offset the error in the pure
13model forecast and improve the accuracy of the published version . In assessing the 
uncertainty surrounding a forecast, some way of accounting for this ‘added value’ needs 
to be found. The most frequently mentioned compromise is therefore for the modelling 
team to look back over its own past record.
Britton Well I think the best way to do that is to just look at your own past 
mistakes.14
Wallis the best you can do, I feel, is to look back at what your forecasting record 
has been in the past, obviously it will slowly change over time but hopefully 
only slowly. I would argue that a lot of the other forecasters ought to do 
what the Treasury does and report some summary statistics about past 
performance so that the point forecasts are taken with a grain of salt.15
And, in fact, this is what most forecasters actually do. The LBS includes in the 
Economic Outlook details of its previous 4 forecasts; the National Institute forecasts 
contain a box detailing the mean errors of its one and two year ahead forecasts for a 
selection of key variables. Another approach might be to discuss a range of outcomes in 
the text16. The common feature of these strategies, and their advantage from the 
forecaster’s point of view is that they evaluate the finished forecast (i.e. the final 
product) and not just the model (i.e. the machine which is partly responsible for it). 
However, this does have the effect of changing the question being asked: it is no longer 
a question of what are the confidence limits surrounding this forecast; but how close to
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the outturn has this particular combination of model and modeller been in the past17. 
These problems would remain even if the standard error of the model would be known 
precisely as some the input of the modeller would still have to be taken into account. In 
other words, so long as modellers make residual adjustments and exogenous projections, 
uncertainty bands will remain uncertain.
Who knows?
Given the importance of the ‘uncertainty bands’ which could, and perhaps 
should, be drawn around an economic forecast it seems pertinent to ask how far do 
economists go in drawing attention to these issues. The (stereo) typical individual is
perhaps unaware that the apparently precise figures quoted in the media are, in fact,
18merely the mid-pomts in a very large range of probable outcomes . However, it 
remains the case that models are specified and estimated for a particular person and 
usually at the request of a specific funding organisation. The target audience influences 
both the style and content of the published results19.
Minford in the early 80s people who took notice of our inflation forecasts made a lot 
of money on gilts, which was nice for them, and very important. You've got 
to remember who are the customers for forecasts. There are two major 
customers, the city and to a much lesser extent as a matter of interest, 
business. Business is not that interested in forecasts interestingly. They use 
them a bit like wall paper, you know to feel respectable ... but the City 
people want forecasts the whole time.20
In other words, the main customers are Business and the City. This is especially true for 
those forecasting groups receiving little or no public money (which means just about 
everyone apart from the National Institute) and the difference this makes is evidenced in 
the following remarks
Britton So [there] was an attempt to become more open, more formal I suppose, and 
we got support in that way from the ESRC, who took over the financing of 
model-building here and also at the LBS, and one or two other places. The 
fact that we were doing it for a Research Council, instead for a government 
department had a lot to do with the way in which it was done, and 
particularly the way it got written up. It became more academic, a bit more 
scientific, and rather less ‘Believe me, I know’.21
Minford What audience are we trying to convince about these models? Whose 
beliefs do we weigh the highest in this business? People who actually put
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their money in support of them, or academics who don't really give a damn 
about them?22
23In addition to the more obvious difference in orientation the existence of private 
funding groups also creates areas of privileged information, known to some subscribers 
but not to others. For example, in explaining why the LBS publishes the values of 
residual adjustments with no explanation of either the specification of the relevant 
equation or the reason why the adjustment was felt to be necessary, I was told:
Currie Well it would be nice if one could. I mean we tend not to because in that
publication [Economic Outlook] because its not aimed at model users. We're 
writing for people who want to know our views on where the economy is 
going, [and] we happen to have used a model as a technique for getting at it. 
If we were writing for model users we clearly would describe those things, 
and indeed when we write up our material for our forecast consortium, who 
use our model, we do actually provide a description of the variables, why 
key residuals were set and how the forecast may be sensitive to variation in 
them. But that's because they're model users - we're not targeting the 
E[conomic] 0[utlook] at that group.24
Social Change and Macro-econometric Modelling
The previous section highlighted the ways in which the statistical uncertainty 
associated with regression analysis means that any given ~ economic forecast is 
compatible with a wide range of data. This is a proposition with which most economic 
forecasters would agree and it is something which they seem to take for granted. 
Although it may seem to an outsider that such uncertainty might invalidate the whole 
enterprise it seems that the increase in accuracy brought about by the forecasters’ 
adjustments and fine tuning is sufficient to make the funding of the joint project (i.e. 
model plus modeller) worthwhile.
Moreover, if the unavoidable statistical uncertainty was the only reason why 
economic forecasts were only ever approximately correct then the continued funding of 
model development would eventually reduce this uncertainty (e.g. as the sample size 
gets bigger) and thus, over time, forecasts would become more accurate. The parallel 
here is with weather forecasting in which a continued investment in meteorological 
research has improved the accuracy of weather forecasting. Unfortunately, however, the 
economy is a social system which means that, unlike the weather, the processes which 
generate the data can and do change over time. Thus, meteorologists are always trying
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to model the same system (even though their understanding of it firstly as a 
deterministic and now as a chaotic system has changed). In the case of economic 
modelling this is not the case because social systems can change over time.25
The following sections detail how economic forecasters resolve the tension 
between their implicit assumption that the processes which generate economic data do 
not change (much) over time and their admission that the economic environment is 
altered by policy and world events. The situation is quite unlike weather forecasting, 
where more data reduces uncertainty. In economic modelling, where more data can 
mean more changes to the system, more data can actually mean more uncertainty. The 
discussion begins with a brief example illustrating just how sensitive econometric 
models can be to changes in the data set used for their estimation.
Practical macro-econometric modelling
On one of my first fieldwork visits I arrived slightly early, and found the
economist I was due to interview working with a colleague on the re-estimation of his 
model. It seemed that one equation, for a series called ‘SSR\ was causing particular 
problems. In the newly estimated equation, the coefficient on one variable was given 
as 0.6, but the economist felt it ought to be nearer l 26. Initial attempts to solve the 
problem were made by the re-estimating the equation using a different statistical 
technique. However, because this involved removing the correction for correlation 
between the error terms, the re-estimated equation failed to satisfy the most basic
27 • •econometric tests (the Durbin-Watson statistic being too small). Following this, 
several further attempts were made to resolve the problem by re-specifying the equation 
by adding new variables and changing the lag structure but none of these strategies 
was very successful either.
At this point the economist changed the equation back to its original formulation 
in order to explain to me in more detail what was going on. This time the estimated 
coefficient was just over 1, exactly the value it ‘ought’ to have been. A closer 
inspection revealed that this equation was in fact slightly different from the original 
version. Although the specification was exactly the same, the data period over which it 
had been estimated now began in 1970, and not 1973 as in the original case. These 
extra observations had been enough to bring the wayward coefficient back into line.
This example illustrates one of the central dilemmas faced by all economic 
modellers; namely, how sensitive are the equations used in econometric models to
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changes in the sample period over which they are estimated? Although in the case 
quoted above it was pre-1973 data which made the difference it is equally possible (as 
was shown in Chapter 3) that future data will have a similar effect. If this is the case, 
what warrant do we have for basing economic policy on extrapolations of past 
relationships?
Although these concerns are well known to economists, perhaps receiving their
29strongest expression in the Lucas Critique , economic modellers seem relatively 
unmoved by this seemingly fundamental flaw in their approach. Basically the criticism 
is that parameters (i.e. coefficients) in an econometric model are a function of the 
policies enacted during the period over which the model has been estimated. If the 
model is then used to evaluate a new policy the parameters must be changed to reflect 
the effects of the new policy. However, it is just these effects that the model is 
supposed to be predicting30. In principle the Lucas critique should apply to (and 
undercut) all macro-econometric model-based policy evaluation. However all 
econometric modellers I spoke to were keen to minimise its significance.
Minford We obviously have to accept that the Lucas Critique applies to the models.
We use them with our heart in our mouths, because obviously we're really 
betting against there being some change in the environment having mucked 
up our parameters. We're doing this the whole time, its very judgmental31
Evans So you don't think it [the Lucas Critique] applies to your kind of model?
Godley I don't think it applies to it at all. Not seriously at all.
Evans Even though according to Lucas all the behavioural equations in your model
would change as a result of the policy change?
Godley Well I don't think they would.32
Currie I think the answer is, if one is concerned with that, as we are, is to say well
let us look at other methods of modelling which take account of structural 
change, and there are quite a lot of modelling methods, for example Kalman
33Filtering which allows one to deal with shifting coefficients over time.
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Britton I think that it evolves rather than changes abruptly and its based on a sort of 
weighted average of the recent past. The recent past might be 20 years in 
some cases so I don't want to exaggerate the extent to which things change .. 
The economy won't change overnight; unless we have a revolution its not 
going to become a totally different economy. So the model is nearly right 
all the time, but its not exactly right.34
This is not to say that the economists I spoke to were in complete agreement about the 
stability of the economic system. Rather, the issue was how quickly do the processes 
which generate economic data change over time. If the economy stays more or less the 
same, then model parameters should remain reasonably constant over time. If however 
the economy changes rapidly then macro-econometric models should likewise change as 
they are re-estimated for new data, and perhaps change quite dramatically. Thus even 
within the conceptual space where econometric modelling can be seen as worthwhile, 
different methodologies are possible. There are those who believe the economy is 
fundamentally stable and that models should likewise be similar over time; and those 
who attempt to match their model to the constantly changing economic environment.
‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ claims in Macro-Econometric Modelling
An alternative way of thinking about this ‘slow-change/quick-change’ 
distinction is in terms of the relative weights given to economic theory and economic 
data. Those economists who believe that models should remain stable tend to be those 
with a strong commitment to a particular theoretical understanding of the economy. 
Proponents of this perspective are engaged in what I term ‘strong’ macro-econometric
-j c
modelling . In contrast, those economists who allow the economic data to play a 
greater role in determining the specification of the model can be regarded as adopting a 
more pragmatic approach and being less attached to a particular economic theory. 
These economists are engaged in what I will term ‘weak’ econometric modelling.
Taking first the ‘strong’ perspective (according to which the processes which 
generate economic data change only slowly), the criticism made of the more data-driven 
methodologies is that changes in the economy are neither as great nor as frequent as 
‘weak’ models suggest. For example:
Ormerod If you track an individual model over time, the results which you get out of 
it vary enormously, which must further undermine their credibility ... In any 
individual model, the multiplier will often vary from say 1 to 2 in a matter
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of a couple of years. Now, if that's the case then I simply don't believe what 
comes out of the model. That can't be right, that it can vary so much.36
Minford I think it’s just the properties of their model are far too influenced by little 
wiggles in the data. They don't think through what it is they are trying to 
say, and have a stable theoretical framework, so you actually know where 
they are coming from.37
In contrast to this pragmatic approach, ‘strong’ econometric modelling assumes that 
most of the variation in economic behaviour can be accounted for by the error terms in 
equations. The theoretical understanding, and hence the actual specification, thus 
remains relatively stable, as explained below:
Minford My starting point for this is that economics is perfectly obviously not a
precise science in the normal sense of the word. It is highly stochastic: 
relationships are very hard to pin down precisely, and they shift because of 
all problems that Lucas drew attention to. Nevertheless, there are certain 
fundamental laws, basically the laws of supply and demand, which regulate 
economic behaviour, particularly over the long term.38
In other words, the stability of the economy is mirrored in the constancy of the model. 
It follows from this that a good econometric modelling methodology is one in which the 
structure of the model remains constant over time:
Minford What I'm saying is that we have, subject to re-estimating on quarterly data
which we did a few years ago, preserved the structure and just changed 
some of the parameter detail. We've not felt it was worth changing model 
parameters for the sake of a few wiggles in the data. The only basis on 
which we change model parameters is if there are major upsets to our 
forecasts or some sort of major evidence that the parameters are going
39wrong.
In contrast to this belief in a clear and stable economic structure, other macro­
econometric modellers are equally adamant that changes do occur. Forecasting is only 
possible because the economic system will change only gradually and thus the forecast 
period will be sufficiently similar to the recent past for the model to hold as a reasonable 
approximation to reality. However, because these gradual changes are occurring all the 
time, frequent re-estimation, and if appropriate re-specification, of macro-econometric 
models is both a necessity and a virtue.
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Britton I was surprised for a moment when you said that the trouble with the 
Institute model is it changes too often because in some senses the trouble 
with the National Institute model is that it doesn't change often enough ... I 
mean, the economy changes a lot and that's the basic difficulty of economic 
forecasting as compared to say weather forecasting.40
Within this pragmatic econometrics tradition the aim is not so much to develop a single 
‘true’ model but rather a portfolio of analogues against which events and changes in the
real economy can be compared. However, because econometric models are only
informative to the extent that history is repeating itself, novel events are extremely 
problematic, and it is in circumstances where no comparison can be made that a macro­
econometric model will be of least use. Thus
Wallis The place where you're most susceptible to find the model incorrect is
where the nature of the change is completely new and has no analogy 
before.41
To sum up what has been said so far: the degree to which the processes generating 
economic data change or remain the same is one of the key issues in macro economic 
modelling, and I have used it to make a distinction between ‘strong’ theoretical models 
and ‘weak’ pragmatic ones. However, although I have used this idea to identify 
different methodologies, it is important to remember its salience for economic policy in 
general and this is the burden of the rest of the paper.
In the following 3 sub-sections I outline the main results of the interviews 
undertaken and the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next, I expand on 
the distinction between theoretical and pragmatic methodologies and discuss the 
differences between the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ approaches in more detail. This section 
also discusses how the use of formal models adds a scientific imprimatur to the 
forecasting business and sheds some light on the rather vexed question of what 
economists actually agree about.
The remainder of the discussion looks at the positions adopted by the macro 
modellers more critically and examines how closely they live up to their scientific 
aspirations. The analysis investigates issues relating to falsification, and examines what 
persuades economists that their model needs changing. The main foci here are ad hoc 
responses in hypothesis testing and forecasting as a crucial experiment.
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The previous section has already examined the stochastic properties surrounding 
economic models and forecasts. Taken as a whole, this chapter demonstrates the not 
inconsiderable diversity of macro-econometric models and theories which are at the 
policy makers’ disposal, and argues that none appears to be significantly better than the 
rest. Moreover, the possibility of ranking models must remain distant as the most basic 
questions (e.g. when has a forecast mistake occurred) cannot be answered.
How is Macro-Econometric Modelling ‘Scientific’?
On the whole macro-econometric modellers do try to live up to the traditional norms of 
science, and believe that hypotheses should be tested against empirical data whenever 
possible. The mainstream view of economic modelling as conforming to traditional 
science yalues is well illustrated in the following quote which contrasts the objectivity 
of scientific forecasts with the subjectivity of what would otherwise be no more than 
‘assertions of faith’42.
Britton The feeling certainly was that the Institute was likely to attract more support 
from the academic community, and would actually perform a better function 
in contributing to the debate, if it made its approaches as scientific as they 
could be. Therefore everything we do should be capable of replication - 
anybody who wants our database can have it; anyone who wants to run our 
model can have it; and we ought to give statistical criteria by which we'd 
decided what to do, rather than just saying ‘It felt like that’.43
The other important science value highlighted in this quote is that of replication. 
Although replication in all sciences is frequently problematic44 it raises particular 
problems for macro-econometric modelling and forecasting. The reason is that, for an 
experiment to be ‘replicable’, the skills and tacit knowledge essential for its success 
must be diffused amongst the community. In terms of macro-econometric forecasting 
this means that the ‘model’ must be made separate from the ‘modeller’. In other words, 
for replication to be possible the econometric model must appear as uncontroversial to 
economic forecasters as a voltmeter would to an electrical engineer. After all, if  this 
were not the case then how would replication be possible?
To be more specific, the problems these issues raise for economic forecasters are 
twofold. Firstly, the model, far from being a ‘black boxed’ technological artefact, is the 
subject of long running controversies both about what sort of model should be used and 
what even the best model can achieve. Secondly, the techniques used to test hypotheses
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in econometrics do not appear powerful enough to resolve any of these disputes. 
Because of these factors, econometric modelling remains in a state of flux and seems 
likely to do so for some considerable time. The rest of this chapter outlines the fault 
lines which run across the forecaster’s map of the economy.
‘Strong’ and ‘W eak’ Econometrics Again
In the previous section a distinction was made between the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ macro- 
econometric modelling. A flavour of the ‘strong’ perspective, which is closely related 
to traditional science norms and methodological ideals, was hinted at in the extract 
quoted above45, A ‘strong’ macro-economic model would encode the actual rules of 
behaviour or laws of economics which govern economic activity. The reason is that ‘if 
there are any statistical relationships it must be due to something happening out there in 
the real world.’ ( Britton, p. 25) ‘Science’ is seen as providing the methods by which 
theories about the world can be tested and false ones discarded. This, in turn, explains 
the importance and popularity of regression analysis46 in macro-econometric modelling. 
By specifying a regression equation it is possible to establish whether or not the 
behaviour of one variable is likely to have been associated with changes in the 
behaviour of another47.
Currie I don't think there is any alternative. I mean all we're doing really is testing 
hypotheses in a systematic way. If we want to, say, test whether Tim 
Congdon has something useful to say, well you can take the various parts of 
his proposition, and test them against empirical [data]. Its the only way you 
can have a progressive methodology in this area.48
Of course, chance correlations and nonsense regressions are always possible. 
Nevertheless, a clear implication of the ‘strong’ econometric methodology is that there 
is only one ‘true’ model of the economy, and that the purpose of economic modelling is 
to identify these elusive statistical relationships. If these relationships hold over long 
periods of time, surviving repeated falsification attempts, then they will be important 
not just for forecasting but also policy making.
This is not to say that developing an economic model and using it to produce 
forecasts is a straightforward or easy task, but it is to say something about the sorts of 
problems which will be encountered. Principally, these will be technical problems 
associated with the limited amount of data available, the quality of this data, and so on. 
Another implication of the ‘strong’ approach is that although judgemental adjustments
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(i.e. the imposition of non-zero error terms to individual equations) must be made if and 
when necessary, they are generally used as a way of incorporating information about 
policies due to be enacted or as a temporary way of making up for the shortcomings of 
the model49. In other words, they are not a central part of the forecasting process but a 
necessary evil.
In contrast ‘weak’ econometric modelling is characterised by two elements. The 
first of these is that judgement is an important part in the whole forecasting process and 
not something added on at the end to ‘fine tune’ the forecast. Models do not supplant 
judgement but externalise some of the steps taken by the modeller and preserve the
structure of the overall argument. With the model now acting merely to ensure
consistency, the model and the modeller now become complexly interwoven50, and the 
previously clear split between the model and modeller is blurred or even dissolved.
Britton I think there are really two rather different approaches. One is to say that 
this is a branch of science and that everything must be based on objective 
criteria which people can understand. The other is to say that is just too 
inflexible, and that there's something called judgement, intuition if you like,
which has its place in the sciences and that its the people who are intuitive
who are successful. There's some truth in both I guess51
Within the ‘weak’ methodology, there are those who see the model-modeller split as, aL 
best, a heuristic device:
Currie I suppose the first thing to say is that each of us has in our mind a sort of 
way of thinking about the world which may or may not correspond to the 
model’s views. I mean, clearly there is some relationship, because we've 
helped to develop them.52 (p. 3).
and others who see it as wrong in principle:
Godley I would disagree. I "don't, the forecasts I publish are not the result of a 
model working independently of my mind.53
The pervasive influence of judgement in ‘weak’ macroeconometrics means that 
replication, a difficult enough task in the first place, has now been rendered virtually 
impossible. If a forecast is now something like a well-reasoned argument deploying 
empirical results where appropriate, it is clear that while we may come to agree with the 
point of view being expressed we cannot replicate its production54.
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The second characteristic of the ‘weak’ program in econometric modelling is 
that it puts limits on the range of application of the econometric models. It has already 
been noted that all models are limited because they can only be used for those 
circumstances in which the current or expected variation in a particular data series is no 
greater than that which has been experienced in the past55. However, models are further 
limited by the fact that they have been commissioned, specified and estimated for a 
specific task. There is not therefore a general macro-econometric model:
Wallis No, there is never a true [model], but there is an economy out there and we 
have a lot of different representations of it, and approximations to it.56
Parenthetically, we can note that from the ‘strong’ econometric perspective, questions
about the generality or ‘truth’ of a model are also problematic:
Minford I don't know what a true model is ... the word ‘true’ model is not really very
helpful. I'd say what is a useful model for the purpose in hand? Is it a model 
that on the whole gives you reliable results, for a particular purpose, given 
the state of technology?57
However, within the context of a clearly defined question or purpose (e.g. forecasting 
main economic indicators and analysing policy) proponents of the ‘strong’ perspective 
must surely believe that the veracity of some models will be better founded than others.
Returning to the ‘weak’ approach in macro-econometric modelling we can also 
see that the kind of economy which is being modelled is also very different from the one 
which ‘strong’ program econometricians are dealing with. From the perspective of 
‘weak’ econometrics, the economy has a shifting, ephemeral quality which means that 
econometric models must be used with considerable caution. In particular, modellers 
must continually ask whether their model is still a valid approximation to the economy, 
or has change rendered it obsolete. The precise timing and nature of any change may 
not be predictable, but the economic forecasters must always be looking for signs that a 
change has occurred so that its effects can be taken into account:
Ormerod To say that the system will change, [and] may change at any point in time, 
means that that's very hard to anticipate. But I think that macro models 
really help to destroy thought. People should be thinking about these sorts 
of thing all the time, and I don't think its an accident that people like 
Congdon and Godley who don't have, quotes, ‘elaborate’ models which
124
back them up, spend more of their time thinking about what are the key 
issues now.5*
In addition, the goals of the forecasting exercise are now rather more subtle than the 
deterministic futurology implicit in the ‘strong’ program:
Godley I think tables of numbers are the enemies of good forecasting. [Forecasts] 
should be judged by whether or not they give a good idea of what the whole 
situation is going to be like, what character it will have, otherwise you 
wouldn't bother to write anything59.
Is there a Consensus?
In the preceding section it was noted that economic models are designed for specific 
purposes and that this, to some extent, can account for differences between them. 
However, similarity and difference are often matters of perspective. For example, the 
Treasury Model of the economy differs from many others in that it has an unusually 
detailed representation of the public sector, because this is an area of the economy of 
particular interest to the government. On the other hand, the Treasury model of the 
economy is also a fairly standard econometric model, employing the same set of 
economic theory, data and methods as other ‘mainstream’ models.
All the economists I interviewed were engaged (or had been) in modelling the 
macro-economy with the aim of evaluating economic policy and producing short- and 
medium- term forecasts for the major economic indicators. To this extent all the models 
had been developed for the same task, and differences between them cannot be 
explained away in this manner. It might be expected, therefore, that there would be a 
considerable degree of similarity between the models. In this section I examine what 
the modellers see as being the areas of similarity and difference between their models.
The basic claim for similarity between macro-economic models is that they all 
have the same 3 major relationships, and that disagreements are over orders of 
magnitude, lag structure and other differences of degree.
Minford The competition we're talking about here is competition very much at the 
margin, in trying to, its almost like different sorts of camera, whether they
catch the light in a more or less appealing way. All the features are very
• • ,  60 similar.
Wallis In general there is a kind of consensus, a general framework which most 
people subscribe to. The argument really is about orders of magnitude,
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relative strengths of [unclear], not whether anyone has a computer system 
that does or does not represent a particular channel of influence.61
However, not all the economists I spoke to lay within this area of consensus. On the 
one hand, some economists question the demand-side emphasis of the mainstream IS- 
LM models:
Ormerod These macro models, their problem is that the theory which lies behind 
them, I think, is basically wrong. The economy isn’t driven by demand, its 
more supply side driven; its driven by productivity and level of profitability 
and investment. Its the whole approach that's wrong.62
On the other, there are economists who believe that the problem lies with the way in 
which IS-LM models treat the supply side of the economy:
Godley Straightforward textbooks would have IS-LM plus a supply side. I mean IS- 
LM deals with aggregate demand, but there is also a thing called aggregate 
supply. I would accept the IS-LM part of it up to a point, but I wouldn't 
accept the aggregate supply part.63
In addition to these arguments about what the correct interpretation of basic 
economic theory another, possibly more contentious, issue in macro-economics is the 
extent to which explanations of macro-economic phenomena should be grounded in the 
optimising behaviour of individual economic agents; the so-called micro foundations. 
In macro-econometric modelling, this idea usually manifests itself as the Rational 
Expectations hypothesis, the proponents of which can be thought of as forming a sub-set 
of the micro-foundationalists.
Of the economists I interviewed, Patrick Minford is probably the most well 
known UK advocate of the Rational Expectations approach and believes it is one of the 
defining characteristics of the new consensus in macro-economics:
Minford All these models have IS-LM curves and a Phillips curve - you have 3 major 
relationships. In an open economy context its a little bit more complicated 
but its essentially an adaptation of that closed economy framework, and the 
disputes have been on the degree of rational expectations. But that in a 
sense, in itself shows you how far economists converge.64
Minford [in over 10 years] there's been no big challenge to this what you describe, 
this IS-LM, Phillips curve plus rational expectations, sort of new classical /
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new Keynesian framework, which they all more or less operate in to 
differing degrees65
On the other hand, of the two mainstream economists I spoke to, one had stopped using 
rational expectations altogether66, and the other was keen to differentiate himself from 
the full-blooded rational expectations methodology of the Liverpool group.
Britton On the question you raised about RE, in 1985 we introduced RE in a very 
different way to the way in which Patrick Minford and the Liverpool model 
had them. What we were doing actually was taking account of output 
expectations in order to get a marginally, I mean its not a vast difference, to 
try and get a marginally better explanation of employment behaviour, 
stockbuilding and one or two other things. In other words, decisions about 
volumes. It was very different to the sense in which RE was being 
discussed, particularly in the Liverpool model, where they were assuming 
that the world corresponded to a very simple model in which events were 
totally transparent.67
Thus, despite Professor Minford’s claim that Rational Expectations is a defining 
characteristic of the consensus in macro-economics, the mainstream econometric 
- modellers appear distinctly lukewarm about the idea. The other modellers were more 
forthright in their rejections of the need to ground macro-econometric models in micro- 
economic theories:
Ormerod I think that, on a different point, though its connected, the aim of building 
up macro relationships from individual maximising behaviour is 
fundamentally flawed. Because of feedback in the system, peoples’ 
behaviour is altered by observing other peoples’ behaviour, and the 
behaviour of the macro economy may be quite different from the behaviour 
of an hypothesised individual on a desert island. It simply cannot be 
aggregated from individual behaviour.68
Godley Well... when people speak of micro-foundations they tend to mean by that a 
very special thing, which is its all deducible in terms of the optimising 
behaviour of individual rational agents, and I don't accept that as an 
appropriate concept.69
From the preceding discussion we can see how economic modelling is perceived by its 
practitioners. I have shown how there are diverse opinions about all aspects of 
economic forecasting, ranging from the basic ontological conception of the economy
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(changing or stable) to the appropriate theoretical tools to use in understanding it. In 
part this heterogeneity persists because of the ambiguity of econometric analysis which 
was highlighted in Chapter 2. The basic conclusion is that econometric testing does not 
discriminate between economic theories.
However, econometrics is not the only way in which an economic theory can be 
tested. Indeed there is a strong tradition in economics (usually attributed to Friedman’s
70influential essay ) of testing theories by the accuracy of the predictions which they 
make about the world. If regression analysis is, for various reasons, unable to 
discriminate between economic theories, can forecasts be interpreted as testable 
hypotheses about the economy and forecasting performance used to evaluate 
econometric models?
Falsification and Cruciai Experiments
In this section I examine how ideas of falsification enter into economic forecasting and 
show how the economists are able to maintain their state of chronic disagreement whilst 
simultaneously upholding their scientific ideals. In particular, I try to answer the 
question what persuades economists to adopt one specification rather than another or 
what does it take to falsify a model or an equation? The discussion focuses on the 
extent to which economic forecasts are regarded as crucial experiments, and the ad hoc 
strategies used to defend these apparently rejected hypotheses.
Falsification
The ‘forecasts-as-falsification-tests’ position receives its clearest expression in the 
following quote:
Minford There are two main ways in which the profession changes its view. One is 
if a theory makes palpable nonsense, they jettison it, or if another theory 
comes and makes sense they may accept it ... The other things that prove 
irresistible are big forecast errors.71
The reason forecast tests are important is that, as we have noted, conventional 
econometric tests are not sufficiently restrictive to weed out all the ‘wrong’ models. 
Thus, in a nutshell, ‘it is [not] possible for econometrics to actually test economic
• • • 7 7theories over short periods of time, or on actual data.’ One economist summed up the 
problem as follows
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Ormerod People can design models which may have quite important differences in 
their policy conclusions, but all of them are quite capable of producing 
models which satisfy these design criteria [ i.e. econometric tests], and not 
one of which is unequivocally superior.73
Similarly:
Minford One is reminded that there are quite a lot of models which are 
observationally equivalent in terms of their variances, but which 
nevertheless are quite different representations of the world.74
Perhaps unsurprisingly, not everyone agrees with this assessment
Wallis What one does then try to do, from an econometric point of view, is to ask 
how good the model was, or how good the model is, and we have ways of 
doing that, and I would be much happier taking those things, those analyses, 
to be the tests of the theory, rather than the failure of the published 
forecasts. I think the evidence in the economics community is that, by and 
large, they don't take forecast failures as crucial experiments.75
There are also more sophisticated arguments in which the stochastic nature of 
econometrics is stressed. In this argument, forecasting mistakes are to be expected and 
are nothing more than bad luck as there is always a chance (typically 1 in 20) that the 
evidence will not conform to the theory.
Britton [Forecasts] are all probability statements. All econometrics is based on the 
idea of probability criteria, that you are going to say that, you know, the 
likelihood of this result not being consistent with theory is below 5% or 
something, and you have to cut off at some point. You don't get the one 
definitive experiment which shows you that, you know, the speed of light is 
the same in all directions76.
Alternatively, the idea of a quantitative falsification can be rejected as inappropriate.
Godley I don't really agree with that way of looking at it. If you're going to look at 
the forecasting operation as being GDP going up 3% and that kind of thing, 
I wouldn't accept that. I wouldn't accept that as I think that all the people 
who do that sort of forecasting, in that way, are really doing a stupid thing... 
The concept of judging a forecast in terms of a number and its relationship 
to another number which is later published [is wrong]. A forecast ought to 
convey the whole character of the forthcoming period; it shouldn't be 
thought of as being an entirely quantitative thing.77
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The argument thus turns on what is the appropriate test for an econometric model. In 
the remainder of this section I will demonstrate that whichever option you choose, 
econometrics or forecast mistakes, the conclusions are always ambiguous because ad 
hoc strategies are always available. To give an example and set the scene, consider the 
following, from a proponent of the UK’s membership of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (the ERM):
Currie We were strong exponents of membership of the ERM, and we thought that
it was sustainable. It turned out not to be sustainable. Well that may be 
because we chose the wrong rate, it could be that fixed exchange rates are a 
disaster as Patrick Minford would argue, or it could be because the Bank of 
England made a lot of tactical errors, and its easy to argue that. Its very 
hard to know.78
A d hoc Responses
Taking first econometric testing of models it is, as has already been noted, extremely 
difficult to get a ‘clean kill’ on a theory. Some of the reasons given for this by 
economists are as follows:
Minford I think most econometrics is rubbish frankly, there's an awful lot of sheer
bullshit published in the journals where people purport to have tested 
something. But its balony, because there's 5 other runs on the same data 
with slightly different specifications, with slightly different sample periods, 
which have either supported the [null] hypothesis or only marginally 
discounted it.79
Ormerod Even within the same political framework, what is a relevant definition of 
wealth in a consumption function? There are many different ways of 
looking at it. I mean is it important for example to consider the impact of 
inflation on income or whatever?80
Britton I think the reason why these statistical methods we use don't produce 
success more often is that we're always dealing with a sample which we 
know is too small. If you asked, you know, what size of sample would you 
like to have in order to estimate the relationship between imports and 
activity using quarterly observations, I'd say about 300 years would begin to 
be adequate, and we've actually got about 30.81
Britton If you look at the theory which says that real interest rates should influence 
investment, its very difficult to find many studies which convincingly show
130
it does. This is not necessarily to say it has no effect, but just that for 
practical purposes this effect, which theory would emphasise, is actually 
rather difficult to see in the data. Of course, there are always reasons [and] 
the way in which the falsification of one hypothesis generates the next one 
makes it a little more complicated - its not just the real rate of interest, its 
the post-tax real rate of interest, and so on.82
For these, and many other, reasons econometric evaluation is always open to re- 
interpretation at the hands of a determined sceptic. This is not to say that there is 
necessarily anything wrong with this. Indeed, that scientists use ad hoc strategies to 
defend their beliefs is common currency to many philosophies of science and should 
surprise no-one. The point is simply that, taken alone, econometric evidence is unlikely 
to persuade anyone to hold or reject a particular theory.
What then of the ‘big forecast mistake’ test - is this anymore forceful in 
practice? Certainly the rhetoric of the ‘big forecast mistake’ has straightforward down- 
to-earth appeal, which can contrasted with the technical and evasive qualifications of 
formal econometrics. The argument is that because econometric tests can be very 
sensitive to the sample period used, and are known to be so, economists are relatively 
- unimpressed by them. In contrast, a model which can reliably predict the future 
accurately is a model which commands respect.
Minford The empirical tests that are favoured in practice by the economics 
community are very robust ones, just like the City and Business actually. 
[When] Joe Economist evaluates models and he doesn't really look at fancy 
estimation or any of this.83
‘Big Forecast Mistakes’
An obvious pre-requisite for applying the ‘big forecast mistake’ test is to be able to 
identify a forecast which was clearly wrong. Although this sounds (as it is no doubt 
meant to) quite simple it turns out to be rather difficult in practice. To begin with, some 
forecast mistakes are judged to be more important than others. For example, when 
asked why the Liverpool model had not been falsified when it completely failed to 
predict the 1980-81 recession, Patrick Minford replied
Minford Sure, sure, but I'm not talking about, I'm talking about the big errors, the big 
errors. Now of course, we didn't call the recession we saw in 1980 for 
example. We forecast that the Thatcher policies would deliver a mild 
recession, a growth recession, but a tremendous drop in inflation, but other
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people were saying there'd be something more of a recession but no drop in 
inflation.84
Thus, the status of the Liverpool forecast as a ‘big mistake’ is open to question. 
Needless to say there are those who would argue that predicting that output would 
remain constant when, in fact, it contracted by nearly 3% must surely count as a major 
forecasting disaster.85
In is interesting to note the other side of this particular coin. Just like 
‘wrongness’, so too the ‘rightness’ of a forecast has also to be established and, as such, 
can also be disputed. Thus, it is possible a numerically correct forecast to be discounted 
because it is for the ‘wrong’ reasons:
Minford Cambridge... got unemployment right because they were very bad on output 
of course. They were too optimistic on their unemployment-output 
relationships, so they got unemployment right but they got the mix if you
like, rather than unemployment, wrong, like everybody else. So I don't
think people were terribly impressed by the Cambridge thing, they just felt 
they were that they were just far too pessimistic on demand and output and 
felt that they got unemployment right by mistake.86
Again this perception is not shared by everybody
Godley Cambridge Economic Policy Group was very good.
Evans For unemployment, but Patrick Minford's group was very good for inflation. 
There's an article by Ken Holden
Godley Our forecast for inflation was very good
Evans But if you compare the errors, who did the best ones, then apparently 
Liverpool are the best for inflation
Godley I don't believe its true.87
In addition to just being the lucky result of mistakes elsewhere in the econometric
model, a correct forecast can also be produced simply by chance, and thus confer no
credibility to either the model or modeller. For example, Tim Congdon is generally 
credited (at least by fellow monetarists) with calling the inflation of 1989 and 1990 very 
accurately. However, non-monetarists are less convinced:
Currie You need to go back with Tim. I mean Tim forecast the inflation of 88-89, 
but he also forecast it back earlier. I mean he was forecasting that for some
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considerable time, [and] if you go look at the growth of broad money you 
see why, because it was growing very fast for some time without causing
any explosion. So the question you have to ask is that a forecast, is that a
88forecasting triumph, or not?
Even in the case of an acknowledged forecast failure, we can identify a number 
of reasons why a discrepancy between the forecast and the outturn will not necessarily 
lead to the rejection of the model. These issues have been discussed at length
89elsewhere and I offer only a brief summary of the conventional decomposition here. 
Firstly, the data used to estimate the model may subsequently be revised thus changing 
the definition of the recent past and hence the parameters of the model. Secondly, in 
order to use the model to forecast, the future values of all variables not determined by 
the model (i.e. the exogenous variables) must be input directly. If the projections made 
for these exogenous variable are not fulfilled then the forecast may turn out to be wrong 
but this does not imply that the model itself was at fault. Indeed it remains a possibility 
that had the exogenous conditions been met then the forecast would have been 
fulfilled90. Thirdly, some of the judgmental adjustments made might, with the benefit of 
hindsight, be regarded as inappropriate.91 It is only after all these possibilities have 
been exhausted that the mis-specification of the model becomes an issue. Thus, even if 
the modellers agree that there has been a forecast mistake, the next step need not be a 
rejection of anything as ad hoc rescues are always possible:
Currie It may be that we had overlooked something ... It doesn't necessarily force
us to reconsider our ideas. On the other hand it might, if it goes far enough, 
and then it depends very much on how strong the priors are on one's
judgement about these sorts of thing.92
Even if it eventually has to be conceded that the model is mis-specified this need not 
reflect too badly on the modelling team. In discussing the National Institutes failure to 
predict both the boom and recession phases of the last economic cycle in the UK 
Andrew Britton explained
Britton [Its possible that the model was always wrong] but in fact that wouldn't have 
explained why forecasting performance had deteriorated. The fact that 
virtually all the models, all the sort of formal fully developed models failed 
to predict, suggests that it was not that our model was particularly bad, but 
that the underlying economy had changed93
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In other words, the problem is that the economy no longer matches the model - it was 
the economy which was wrong. This observation brings as back to the beginning of this 
section where is was noted that change in the economy can render econometric models 
obsolete as representations of the economy.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown how the fluid and open nature of macro-modelling is 
maintained. Because econometric testing is chronically ambiguous no one model, 
theory or specification can be shown to be unambiguously superior to the rest. In 
addition, forecast mistakes are similarly ambiguous and, even when acknowledged, do 
not force any particular course of action on the modelling team. What this means is that 
economic modellers are trapped within an experimenters’ regress from which they are 
unable to break free. Because they are unable to agree on what the correct outcome 
should be, they can never know when an experiment has been carried out competently, 
thus establishing the veracity of the original knowledge claim.
In this situation, which might be likened to a constant controversy, economists 
must resort to other, non-econometric methods to buttress their arguments. The 
question raised by this is as follows: if  the ‘formal’ procedures are indeterminate what 
actually is it that persuades economists to adopt one course of action rather than another. 
Are there other sorts of reasons for believing an economic forecaster, and if so what are 
they?
Minford I think the econometrics is important, [but] it’s only one fairly moderate 
constituent in the whole process of fielding a competitive modelling effort. 
You have to have a theory that is at once decent, consistent and respectable; 
persuades you and others. It also has to be sufficiently simple to be 
implementable. It has to be reasonably stable over time so its recognisable. 
And then it has to pass these much more informal tests of can you tell 
stories about what's going on. Can you, if you have made a forecasting 
error, can you say why? What is it that you got wrong? Obviously its got to 
avoid major forecasting catastrophes, that's absolutely crucial.94
It seems therefore that, as McCloskey has argued95, the supposedly scientific part of 
econometric modelling, the econometric testing, does not count for much amongst 
economists. It is McCloskey’s belief that economists are ultimately persuaded not by 
statistics, but by a well-reasoned argument, clearly and lucidly expressed. From my 
own interviews it seems clear that this view is shared by others:
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Evans What actually does resolve disputes in economics 
Godley Nothing!
Evans They just go on. Well, they certainly seem to
Godley Successful rhetoric is what resolves issues.96
Summary
This chapter began by examining the statistical uncertainty which is associated with an 
econometric model and its forecasts. I argued that if the ‘error bars’ which bound an 
econometric forecast were to be formally estimated they would enclose a wide range of 
economic outturns, and that this range might be large enough to undermine the 
credibility of the whole enterprise. It was then shown how this ‘uncertainty’ is reduced 
and managed by the economists, principally through re-defining the question into one 
about past errors and limiting the dissemination of information.
The second theme developed in this chapter has been the ‘interpretative 
flexibility’ of macro-econometric modelling. In this chapter I have used the 
juxtaposition of interview quotes to demonstrate the openness and variety of discourses 
_ within macro-modelling and to illustrate how all economic data are capable of 
sustaining alternative hypotheses. I have tried throughout to show how each claim has 
its counter-claim, how each position in every argument is capable of supporting an 
alternative hypothesis. Thus, econometric models are seen by some as objective and 
replicable, to others they are inextricably bound up with the modeller. As with other 
branches of science, tests are subsequently seen to be inadequate and falsified 
hypotheses are rescued. However, and this is where econometric modelling differs from 
other branches of science, the situation in which many different models are equally 
compatible with the evidence and no one specification is unambiguously superior to 
another seems to have become an-institutionalised way of life. Indeed, the main 
conclusion which can be drawn from this chapter is that is difficult to see how the 
chronic controversy in economics can be resolved.
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Chapter 5
This chapter is the first of 3 which examine the forecasts produced by the Seven Wise 
Men during 1993. The aim is to look at the reasons given by each of the forecasters 
when they were asked to explain why they had forecast the way they did and also to 
explain where they thought the others were most likely to be caught out. The aim 
therefore is to show how each forecast is the complex balancing of judgement, beliefs 
and hunches. By imposing these beliefs upon the models, the econometric forecasts can 
be finessed into something which the economic forecaster is able to defend. This 
chapter thus shows how the very different forecasts for 1993 were justified by the 
proponents. The remaining chapters show how these interpretations are maintained and 
modified as the year progresses and new data and evidence become available.
Forecasting 1993
February 1993
In February 1993, the forecasts produced by the Treasury’s Panel of Independent 
Advisers ranged from reasonably optimistic to extremely bleak. A summary of the 
forecasts for the major economic indicators is given in Table 1.






Britton 2.0 1.8 0.1 3.2 4.6
Congdon 1.1 0.5 0.7 3.3 3.5
Currie 1.4 1.6 -0.1 3.2 4.0
Davies 1.5 1.4 0.1 3.2 3.6
Godley 0.5 0.2 0.3 3.4 4.8
Minford 0.2 -1.0 1.3 3.1 3.8
Sentance 0.7 0.3 0.3 3.1 3.1
Average 1.1 0.7 0.4 3.2 3.9
Percentage changes on a year earlier unless otherwise stated. 
'  Contribution to GDP growth, per cent.
3 Millions.
Part of the variation in the forecasts made in February 1993, is due to the considerable 
uncertainty which remained about the economic data for 1992. In other words, some of 
the differences in forecasts for 1993 can be attributed to differences in the ‘backcasts’ 
for 1992. In fact, as we shall see later, data revisions in mid 1993 had quite a significant 
effect on several forecasters. However, just to give an example of the uncertainty about
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what had come before consider the following. In February 1993, figures for domestic 
demand in 1992 ranged from -0.5 (Godley) to 0.2 (Congdon); for Net Trade, from -1.4 
(Congdon) to -0.4 (Godley). In other words, although there was a general agreement 
that GDP had contracted by about 0.8 per cent in 1992, there was much less consensus 
about where the contraction had occurred.
Forecasts for GDP Growth and its components
GDP growth is one of the most important indicators of economic health and well being 
and its forecasts are therefore very significant. Amongst the Panel there was a 
consensus that the economy was now more likely to resume some sort of economic 
growth as a result of the exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). However, 
there remained a range of views regarding the extent of this recovery:
The substantial relaxation of monetary policy since sterling’s suspension 
from the ERM has greatly improved the prospects of recovery in 1993. 
However, there is considerable uncertainty and disagreement about the 
likely strength of output. The average of our forecasts is for GDP to rise by 
1% this year. But the range is from 0.25 to 2 per cent, with Minford and 
Godley expecting little, if any, recovery.1
In fact, a closer examination of the individual submissions reveals that the economists 
differ even more profoundly on other parts of the forecasts. Thus, the consensus view 
(that GDP growth in 1993 will at least be positive and that the recession is over) 
actually comes from quite different views about where the growth is going to come 
from. In particular, the relative contributions of domestic demand and net trade to
overall economic growth vary considerably. In the case of domestic demand, the
difference is not just one of magnitude but of direction:
The average of our forecasts for domestic demand is a rise of 0.75 per cent 
in 1993 but the range stretches from -1 to [+] 1.75 per cent. We agree that 
consumer spending is likely to be restrained by balance sheet problems (for 
example, the large overhang of debt), the weakness of the housing market, 
rising unemployment and a squeeze on real incomes caused by rising import 
prices: variations between our forecasts largely reflect different judgements 
about the extent to which these factors will hold back spending. There is 
less consensus about the prospects for business spending and government 
consumption. However, most of us agree that government will make very
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little contribution to growth in 1993 and 1994, and only Britton and Currie 
expect any contribution to growth from fixed investment in 1993.2
The way in which these forecasts differ and develop as 1993 progresses is shown in the 
following tables. Table 2 and Table 3 (overleaf) show the forecasts for a selection of 
key economic variables which were produced by the Panel members at each of their 
meetings. Of particular interest in this and later chapters will be the differences within 
columns (i.e. the differences between forecasters). Although the differences within 
rows (i.e. the differences between forecasts made at different times) are also interesting, 
the primary focus in this thesis is not how new information changes forecasts, but on the 
variety of interpretations which can be put on essentially the same data.
From Table 2 we can see that, in February forecasts for GDP growth in that year 
ranged from 0.2% to 2.0%. In addition, and perhaps more interestingly, the kinds of 
growth being forecast also differed quite dramatically. For the three most optimistic 
forecasters (Britton, Davies and Currie), the main engine driving economic growth was 
to be Domestic Demand, with Net Trade either contributing little to the recovery or 
actually hindering growth. However, all three were concerned that the recovery would 
prove to be short lived because unemployment could not be reduced without an increase 
in demand so dramatic that deflationary policies would be required to contain inflation. 
Thus, to ensure the future sustainability of the recovery, new policies would need to be 
enacted in order to divert resources from consumption (public and private) and into 
investment.
The remaining 4 economists on the Panel offered rather different pictures. 
Sentance and Godley were essentially pessimistic in both the short and medium terms. 
Each forecast only minor increases in both Domestic Demand and Net Trade, and thus 
offered a future characterised by continued economic stagnation. Congdon’s forecast 
was similar to Godley’s and Sentance’s view, in that recovery was more or less equally 
split between domestic and foreign markets. However, he was significantly more 
optimistic than either of these, believing that, providing the appropriate policies are 
followed, several years of above-trend growth, coupled with low inflation were likely.
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Table 2: Forecasts fo r  GDP, Domestic Demand and Net Trade m ade during I9 9 3 \
F ebruary 1993 July 1993 O ctober 1993 F eb ru ary  1994
G D P D om estic Net G D P D om estic Net ? G D P D om estic Net G D P D om estic Net
D em and Trade" D em and Trade" D em and Trade" D em a n d Trade'
Britton 2 .0 1.8 0.1 2 .0 2.0 0.0 2 .0 1.1 0.9 2 .0 1.7 0.3
C ongdon 1.1 0.5 0.7 1.5 0.9 0.7 1.8 1.1 0.8 2 .0 1.6 0.6
C urrie 1.4 1.6 -0.1 1.5 2.4 -0.8 1.6 1.1 0.7 2 .0 1.6 0.5
Davies 1.5 1.4 0.1 1.7 2.1 -0.5 2 .0 1.0 1.1 2 .0 1.5 0.5
G odley 0.5 0.2 0.33 1.2 1.3 0.0' 1.3 1.2 i o k> 2 .0 1.0 0 .8 1
M inford 0 .2 - 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.0 0.6 1.5 0.4 1.1 2 .0 1.3 0.6
Sentance 0.7 0.3 0.3 1.6 1.3 0.3 1.7 1.1 0.1 __ __
A verage
} r.
1.1 0.7 0.4 1.5 1.6 0.0 1.7 1.0 0.8 2.0 1.5 0.5
P ercentage changes on a ye a r  earlier unless o therw ise sta ted  
C ontribution to G D P  grow th, p e r  cent.
3 Non-O il.
Table 3: Forecasts fo r  Inflation (RPIX)1 and Public Sector Borrowing (PSBR) 2 made during 1993.
F ebruary 1993 July 1993 O ctober 1993 F eb ruary  1994
R PIX P SB R R PIX PSBR RPIX P SBR R PIX P SB R
B ritton 4 . 6 4 3 . 3 4 . 1 4 6 .  0 3 . 6 4 6 .  0 2 . 7 4 5 . 2
C ongdon 3 . 5 4 4  . 0 2 . 9 4 1 . 0 2 . 8 4 5 . 0 2 . 7 4 5 .  0
C urrie 4 . 0 4 9 . 5 3 . 5 5 2 . 0 3 . 2 4 9 . 1 2 . 7 4 7 .  0
D avies 3 . 6 5 2 . 0 3 . 0 4 8 . 0 3 . 4 4 9 .  0 2 . 7 4 8 . 0
G odley 4 . 8 5 5 . 0 3 . 7 4 2 . 0 3 . 5 4 2 . 0 2 . 7 4 2 .  0
M inford 3 . 8 4 0 . 0 2 . 5 4 2 . 0 2 . 9 4 3 . 3 2 . 7 4 2 . 3
Sentance 3 . 1 4 5 . 2 3 . 1 4 7 . 9 2 . 8 4 6 . 1 ---- ----
A verage 3 . 9 4 7 . 0 3 . 3 4 2 . 2 3 . 2 4 5 . 8 2 . 7 4 4  . 9
P ercen tage changes on a y e a r  earlier  
2 £  billion
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Finally, Minford believed that the domestic economic was very weak and that only a 
strong export performance would enable GDP to grow slightly in 1993. However, like 
Congdon, Minford is distinctly optimistic about the medium term.
From Table 3, we can see that a similar diversity of forecasts exists for inflation 
(RPIX) and the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). Here however, the 
interpretation is rather more complex. Britton forecasts that strong growth would lead 
to a relatively low PSBR, but that the pick up in demand would also be reflected in a 
rise in inflation. Currie, Davies and Sentance all told much the same story, although 
being less optimistic on demand, they foresaw less inflation and higher levels of Public 
Borrowing. In other words, the recovery was by no means assured and medium term 
policy had several difficult problems to address.
Minford and Congdon offered forecasts which, while numerically similar to 
those of Britton, Currie, Davies and Sentance, described a very different sort of 
recovery. In particular, both Minford and Congdon believed that the excess capacity 
created during the preceding recession meant that any inflationary effects of increasing 
demand would be muted. Thus, despite differing over the speed with which demand 
would pick up, they both saw inflation and the PSBR as being on downward trends over 
the medium term. Thus, for these two economists, the medium term outlook was rosy 
and presented few policy problems.
Finally, Godley’s view was of an economy constrained by deep-rooted structural 
problems which mean that it is unable to sell goods in either domestic or world markets. 
Godley’s view is that because economic growth will result in increased imports, and 
thus a worsening of the balance of payments, any pick up in demand will be have to be 
restricted, thereby increasing unemployment. The outlook for the medium term could 
therefore, according to Godley, be very bleak indeed unless very large changes in UK 
economic performance can be achieved.
These differences can be summarised by noting that they relate to three 





The GDP-Inflation trade-off is perhaps the most important. The idea of a trade-off 
between GDP growth and inflation stems from the way in which growth in GDP, which 
is good, tends to raise prices, which is not so good. Conversely, policies which bring 
down inflation will also tend to slow down GDP growth. Thus, the goal for 
macroeconomic policy is to ensure that growth is sustained but that inflation remains 
low and the tendency for a good outcome on one measure to imply a poor performance 
on the other means that some sort of compromise is inevitable. However, the exact 
nature of the trade-off, i.e. how much can GDP grow before inflation takes off is unclear 
and this is a key difference between the Panel members.
The relationship between Inflation and Wages is rather different. Instead of 
there being a trade-off between wages and inflation, the metaphor most frequently used 
is that of a spiral. As inflation rises so wage claims also increase, this in turn increases 
prices and so on. The differences here stem from two main sources. One is the forecast 
for inflation. Clearly if inflation is low, then wage increases are also likely to be low. 
There is however an additional factor, and that is the trade-off between unemployment 
and wages. This is often referred to as the Phillips Curve. The idea is that if 
unemployment is high then wage inflation will be kept low by the strong competition 
for jobs. However, there are serious differences about the extent to which the 
unemployed can compete for employment and are thus able to keep wages low. This is 
a topic which was discussed in some detail by the Panel in their July meeting, and so I 
will postpone a detailed discussion of it until Chapter 6. However, it is worth noting 
that those on the Panel who believe that the unemployed do exert a strong influence on 
wages will be those who are most optimistic about the GDP-Inflation trade-off.
Finally there is the relationship between inflation (and hence output) and interest 
rates. The short term interest rate is the government’s main instrument of monetary 
policy. Again, the differences here are not about the relationship itself, but about the 
likely path of inflation and the appropriate policy response. To caricature, there are 
those who see a poor GDP-Inflation trade-off, due in part to poor training programs for 
the long-term unemployed, and thus believe that inflation will rise soon and that interest 
rates will have to rise to control it. On the other hand, there are those who see flexible 
labour markets improving the GDP-Inflation trade-off to the extent that good outcomes 
are possible on both measures. This group therefore see no need for interest rates to rise 
and indeed some would even argue that the deflationary effect of high unemployment is
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so strong that interest rates actually need to be cut to ensure that there is any significant 
growth in GDP at all during 1993.
The dilemma faced by the policy makers is thus at what level should interest 
rates be now to ensure that in 12-24 months time there will be continued economic 
growth with low inflation. Interest rates at too low a level imply accelerating inflation, 
while too high rates imply economic stagnation. It is thus a question of choosing which 
outcome one wishes to avoid the most:
Britton It appears from the most recent cut in interest rates that the Government and 
the Bank of England are prepared to run a risk of adding to inflation in order 
to reinforce the recovery of output. If that is their priority, I sympathise 
with it3.
In the remainder of this chapter I analyse in more detail how the differences 
outlined above are supported and how it is that each of the Panel members arrives at 
their forecasts. I begin by examining what they identify as being the key factors behind 
their forecast.
Theoretical Frameworks
" In this section I set out the main factors identified by the Panel of Forecasters in their
February 1993 submissions. Needless to say, different members of the Panel see 
different factors as being crucial and they differ on the reliability of several important 
indicators. Despite this, the views of the Panel members can be differentiated according 
to whether their analysis focuses on the devaluation or the effects of the recession which 
preceded it.
Taking first the ‘Devaluationists’, this group can be characterised as representing 
the mainstream consensus view, and its principal proponents are the National Institute 
and the London Business School. According to this view, the economy will recover 
during 1993, with economic growth resuming as a result of the fall in the sterling 
exchange rate. In addition, the low level of interest rates is expected to bring about a 
modest expansion in consumer spending. The analysis is summarised by David Currie 
as follows:
Currie The past two years have seen the PSBR move from balance towards a 
deficit of around £50bn, interest rates cut from 15 per cent to 6 per cent, and 
the pound devalued by 15 per cent. This is a very large relaxation of policy: 
because the economy responds with a substantial delay, we have yet to see
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its major impact on demand, output and inflation ... The 15 per cent 
devaluation provides an important impetus, boosting export volumes and 
holding back imports ... Low interest rates are expected to lead to growth in 
consumer spending, though slowly because o f rising unemployment, 
uncertain employment prospects and continued risks about house prices4.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that one effect of this appeal to precedent and 
evidence, is an implication that the analysis has a certain objectivity and robustness to it. 
This is important if one remembers the context in which the forecasts were being made. 
At the time (February 1993) macroeconomic forecasting was held in rather low esteem' 
as the result of a series of forecasts which had suggested that the recession would be 
much less severe than it actually was. The forecasting performance of the 
macromodelling industry is graphically illustrated in Figure 1.
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Thus, in the following quotation, Andrew Britton’s reference to the devaluation as the 
source of recovery distinguishes the National Institute’s optimism from that of other 
forecasters who had, in the past, forecast recoveries which subsequently failed to 
materialise.
Britton [The] National Institute’s forecasts for a recovery in the economy do not 
rest mamly on the indications o f an improvement in confidence or in the 
levels o f economic activity around the turn o f the year. They rest rather on
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our analysis of the effects of the relaxation in monetary policy beginning 
from last September, especially the devaluation of sterling6.
An interesting feature of the Devaluationists’ analysis is that the persuasiveness of their 
forecasts now rests upon the response of the UK economy to previous devaluations. 
Thus Andrew Britton and David Currie both make reference to the response of the UK 
economy to the 1967 devaluation being a guide to what will happen in 1993 and 
beyond. In other words, the emphasis is shifted from the specific nature of the present 
case, to a more abstract discussion of ‘devaluations in general’. However, the effect of 
this strategy is that the plausibility of the forecast is now linked to the plausibility of the 
idea that the economy is subject to regular and predictable sequences of events, i.e. that 
what happened in the past will happen again. As was shown in Chapter 4 it is by no 
means dear that this is the case.
Another economist for whom the devaluation is very significant is Wynne 
Godley. It has been a long-standing theme in Godley’s economics that an economy can 
grow no faster than what is warranted by its performance in world trade. The 
seriousness of the situation, i.e. that it has now reached ‘critical proportions’, is made 
clear in the following quotation:
Godley One structural problem is that the long term deterioration in Britain’s 
competitive performance in world markets has now reached critical
proportions. The trend of exports relative to import penetration has proved
so relentlessly adverse that the current balance of payments is 2 per cent of 
GDP in deficit before any recovery at all has taken place7.
For Godley, the long term deterioration in the competitiveness of UK exports is a
crucial factor in explaining UK economic performance over the previous 20 years.
Thus, to the extent that the devaluation has lowered the exchange rate and improved the 
UK’s competitiveness, then it is a step in the right direction. However Godley also sees 
other problems in the UK economy which mean that the devaluation by itself will not be 
enough. In particular, it will not solve the long term problem of the UK’s balance of 
trade deficit, which is in danger of, once again, imposing a constraint on UK economic 
growth. Godley is thus playing a much longer game than the mainstream modellers, and 
sums up the situation as follows:
Godley Britain faces chronic depression and growing mass unemployment unless 
large scale structural changes now occur. Simple expansion of domestic
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demand cannot provide even temporary alleviation. On the other hand, if 
the right policies are resolutely pursued, there is a reasonable chance that 
the necessary transformation can be brought about over a period of years. 
There has been a marked change in the stance of policy since September and 
I believe the Government is now essentially on the right track. It should on 
no account be panicked (for instance by accusations that it is “drifting”) into 
changing course. Conceivably we have a unique opportunity for breaking 
out of the deeply entrenched and self-reinforcing process of decline which 
has afflicted the country for so long8.
Interestingly, however, for Godley what is important about 1993 is not that there has 
been a devaluation like, say, 1967, but that the ‘present conjuncture contains a number 
of well known features which, taken together, make it very different from the later 
stages of all previous recessions.’9 In other words, it is the uniqueness of the situation 
which must be appreciated if it is to be properly understood and not its similarities to 
previous events. The principal factors which Godley identifies as making 1993 different 
are financial deregulation and the high debt levels associated with the credit boom of the 
1980s. Thus, he writes:
Godley All earlier recoveries were assisted, if not initiated, by the relaxation of 
credit controls which caused a discontinuous increase in spending on 
durables. For instance, in the first quarter of 1983, following the removal of 
credit controls in mid-1982, consumption of durables was over 25 per cent 
higher than a year earlier. The same thing cannot happen this time as there 
are now no credit controls to relax. Moreover, while the flow of net credit 
to the household sector has fallen dramatically (by at least 10 per cent of 
disposable income) since 1988, it remained positive, at least until the middle 
of last year, so that total household debt is still nearly 100 per cent of 
disposable income - three times the proportion reached in 1974, at the peak 
of an earlier notorious credit boom10.
In addition to the high levels of household debt, and the weak balance sheets and 
continued high saving which this implies, there has also been another change to the UK 
economy.
Godley Another structural problem arises because of the distortion in the 
composition of demand which has taken place during the last decade. 
Compared with the seventies, the share of domestic demand in GDP has 
risen by about six percentage points - the straightforward counterpart of the
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move from surplus to deficit in the balance of trade. Within domestic 
demand, the share of GDP taken by fixed investment, after rising sharply in 
the late eighties, has fallen sharply during the recession, and is now back to 
the very low levels of 1981-2. By contrast, the share of personal 
consumption, which rose extremely fast during the boom to quite 
unprecedented levels in the late eighties, has hardly fallen back at all, 
although the credit boom was broken in 19901 \
Again this change, which is related to the deregulation of credit, implies a change in the 
economy which must be recognised if economic developments in 1993 and beyond are 
to be properly understood and anticipated. In particular, it will be necessary, according 
to Godley, to reduce the share of personal consumption in GDP and to increase the share 
of investment and net exports if a sustainable balance is to be restored to economic 
activity. However, the problem is that, because household debts are so high, taxes to 
deter consumption are singularly inappropriate at this point because households are 
already extremely reluctant to spend. The time to raise taxes is at the point when the 
household sector has reduced its debt levels and its consumption has started to pick up. 
In the meantime, and this is where Godley differs significantly from the rest of the 
Panel, the PSBR may have to be increased in order to boost investment expenditure, 
particularly in the construction sector, in order to assure recovery. The increased PSBR 
would be have to be financed by substantial tax increases at a later date.
The other way of analysing the recovery is to refer directly to the recession 
itself. This style of analysis was used most clearly by the monetarist economist Tim 
Congdon. For Congdon, what is important is that the recession has pushed the economy 
a long way from its long run trend position, and that the disequilibrium thereby created 
should ensure recovery. Although the devaluation is important in this account, it is not 
the cause of the recovery; if anything, the disequilibrium is the cause of the devaluation. 
The distance of the economy from its trend or long run position is measured by the 
difference between actual output and trend output. According to Congdon this ‘output 
gap’ is, as shown below, ‘exceptionally large’:
Congdon In the last two-and-a-half years, the British economy has been through a 
severe recession. Although the recession has been less intense than that of 
1980 and 1981 (i.e. the average quarterly fall in output has been smaller this 
time), it has lasted significantly longer. On the assumption that underlying 
trend growth has remained in the normal 2-2.5 per cent area, the excess of
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trend output over actual output - the so-called “negative output gap” - must 
be exceptionally high. Calculations at Lombard Street Research Ltd. 
suggest that the negative output gap (expressed as a proportion of trend 
output) is currently about 6 per cent. This figure is not far from the OECD’s 
estimate in its December Economic Outlook that the UK’s negative output 
gap in the fourth quarter of 1992 was 6.9 per cent. The excess of trend 
output over actual output at present is probably the largest in the post-war 
period12.
What the existence of a large ‘negative output gap’ means (for Congdon) is that the 
economy may grow at an above trend rate for several years (i.e. until actual output 
equals trend output) before the trade-off between growth and inflation becomes adverse. 
Of course, once the negative output gap has been closed, then growth must remain at or 
about the trend level unless productivity improves dramatically. However, given the 
size of the output gap, even with GDP growth of 3.5 to 4 per cent it would be 3-4 years 
before inflationary pressures would be a significant problem. In fact, according to 
Congdon, the price level may actually fall unless the government acts to ensure 
economic growth, so strong are the deflationary forces acting upon the economy.
Interestingly, and unlike Britton and Currie, Congdon believes that ‘it is still 
rather early to assess the effects of the large fall in interest rates since Britain’s departure 
from the European exchange rate mechanism on 16 September [1992].’13 Thus, in sharp 
contrast to the National Institute, which feels confident enough about the effects of the 
devaluation to use it as the basis for their forecast, things are not so clear cut for other 
economists.
The other monetarist on the Panel is Patrick Minford but he has a rather different 
view to that of Congdon. Like Congdon, Minford believes that the economy is now a 
long way beneath trend and is likely to stay there unless prompt action is taken to ensure 
recovery. Because of this he, like Congdon, believes that inflationary pressures are 
weak and that above trend growth will not be inflationary. However, Minford believes 
that the reductions in interest rates following the devaluation are not enough to ensure 
recovery. Consequently:
Minford The latest Liverpool forecast is for very weak growth in 1993 in the UK, 
relying on further falls in interest rates to the 5-6 per cent range14.
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However, Minford’s reasons for believing this are slightly different from 
Congdon’s. As shown above, Congdon uses the negative output gap to assess the 
inflationary pressure, or lack of it, in the economy. Minford’s analysis, on the other 
hand, is based on the difference between the level of unemployment and its ‘natural 
rate’. Minford believes that, because unemployment is above the ‘natural rate’ 
inflationary pressure are weak. Clearly however the ideas are linked - as economy 
grows, the negative output gap is closed and the rate of unemployment falls towards its 
natural rate - and when the output gap is closed then the level of unemployment is (by 
definition) at the natural rate.15 The most important (shared) idea is thus that of 
movements away from an equilibrium generating powerful forces which tend to restore 
that equilibrium.
Unlike Britton and Currie, who based their analysis on the past responses of the 
UK economy, Minford’s reference points come from the contemporary economic cycle. 
Particularly important in Minford’s argument is the United States economy where debts 
were very high, balance sheets very weak and where interest rates had to be cut to very 
low levels in order to get any kind of recovery going. Taking this as his guide to the 
UK experience, Minford therefore argues that the Chancellor should cut rates further in 
'  order to ensure that the recovery is sustained.
Minford In the absence of US-style monetary policy this weakness will continue-, 
with the downside risk ever-present. The argument is now shifting to fiscal 
policy where some are arguing for a rise in taxes. However, this would be a 
mistake. It is the weakness of the economy mainly that has destroyed the 
Governments finances. The appropriate remedy is to maintain tax rates and 
to proceed with medium term plans to reduce public spending - focusing, as 
argued below, on benefits and charges for public services16.
The remaining two economists, Gavyn Davies and Andrew Sentance, offer forecasts 
which draw on and combine several of these threads. For example, Davies agrees with 
Minford that the US experience suggests that interest rates should be cut further in order 
to ensure that the recovery does not stall prematurely. However, Davies’s argument is 
based on a rather more pragmatic ‘balancing of risks’:
Davies Policy in the next few months must be guided by an assessment of the 
relative risks facing the economy. In my opinion, by far the most serious 
risk, taking account of its consequences for the labour force, the capital 
stock and the government accounts, would be a prolongation of recession.
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This would be much more serious than a pick-up in inflation which would 
probably be minor, temporary and easily controlled17.
However, like the mainstream forecasters, Davies also believes that some acceleration in 
inflation, albeit unlikely, is possible. Part of the reason for this is that the negative 
output gap, which according to Congdon is perhaps the largest since the end of the War, 
might actually be much smaller than Congdon believes.
Davies The economy is now clearly working some way below capacity. A simple 
extrapolation of a 2 per cent growth rate since the second half of 1990 
suggests that GDP in 1993 will be some 7 per below trend. However, it is 
possible that there has been an erosion of plant capacity in the course of the 
recession; Goldman Sachs’ very rough estimates, based on CBI Survey data 
and other sources, suggests that the “output gap” may in fact be no more 
than 3-4 per cent18.
If this estimate is correct then it is clear that inflationary pressures are not nearly as 
weak as Congdon argues. It also implies that the natural rate of unemployment is much 
higher than Minford (who believes the economy may be as much as 10 per cent below 
trend) has claimed. Thus, like mainstream forecasters Davies sees the continued high 
unemployment as a real possibility in the long term and as requiring significant chances 
in policy.
Sentance, like mainstream forecasters emphasises the beneficial effects of the 
exchange rate in boosting exports and hence economic growth.
Sentance The positive contribution of net trade to growth in 1993 and 1994 contrasts 
strongly with the situation in 1992 when net trade depressed GDP by 1.0 per 
cent. This turnaround reflects the impact of the more competitive exchange 
rate established since sterling left the ERM. The proportion of companies 
reporting prices as a constraint On exports in the CBI Industrial Trends 
Survey is now at its lowest level since the late 1970s. The pound is forecast 
to remain around current levels during 1993, averaging 78.2 on the effective 
exchange rate index (1985=100). Though sterling is expected to appreciate 
against other European currencies as interest rates in Europe come down 
and recovery is more apparent in the UK, the effective exchange rate in the 
final quarter of 1994 is still expected to be 10 per cent below its level in 
mid-199219.
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However, unlike Britton, but like Congdon, Sentance believes that it is still too early to 
be sure of the implications of the devaluation:
Sentance ... there has been a very significant relaxation of domestic economic policy 
over the last six months, the consequences of which are still unclear20.
Finally, like Godley, Sentance believes that the balance of payments position is a cause 
for concern (a position emphatically rejected by Congdon, as we shall see later) and that 
investment will need to be boosted relative to consumption if the economic recovery is 
to be sustained over the longer term.
Sentance One consequence of this imbalance [between consumption and investment] 
is that, despite the significant cuts in investment over the course of the 
recession, the UK ran a balance of payments deficit on current account in 
1992 of 2 per cent of GDP. Even with a very modest recovery, the deficit is 
forecast to grow to 2.5-3.0 per cent of GDP in 1993 and 1994. Such a 
balance of payments deficit does not impose an absolute constraint on 
growth. But it does imply that if growth in the 1990s is to be sustained, it 
will need to be less dependent on consumer spending than in the previous 
decade and more reliant on investment and exports21.
Summary
In this section I have outlined the main arguments put forward by the Panel oT 
Forecasters in their first meeting. Britton and Currie argued that, on the basis of past 
experience, the devaluation should ensure recovery started. Congdon argued that it was 
too early to assess the effects of the devaluation, but that the negative output gap was 
very large and that this would ensure that above trend growth was compatible with low 
inflation for several years. Minford and Davies both believed that the reduction in 
interest rates since September were insufficient to ensure recovery and that further 
measures were needed. Minford however was significantly more optimistic about the 
medium term than Davies. Sentance and Godley were both worried about the balance 
of payments position and the overly high share of consumption relative to investment in 
GDP.
The remaining sections in this chapter set out each of the forecasters’ views in 
more detail. The following chapters then show how these positions change and are 
modified, challenged and defended as the year progresses.
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(Domestic) Demand
Forecasts for GDP growth in the economy can be thought of as being made up of two 
components. Firstly, there is the growth which takes place in the domestic economy 
and secondly there are the events in the world economy. This section deals with 
demand in the domestic economy, which is made up mainly of consumers’ expenditure 
but also includes government spending and business investment. This latter component 
is particularly volatile and is thus especially difficult to forecast.
However, in 1993 there was an additional problem: how to deal with the 
unprecedented levels of household debt and the effect that this would have on 
consumers’ expenditure. The following extract, from Gavyn Davies’s submission, gives 
an idea of how uncertain economic forecasters were in February 1993. The passage, 
which mentions over a dozen separate indicators, also gives some idea of the things 
which economists look at when forming their judgements about the economy.
Davies It is possible that output stopped falling sometime in the first half of 1992, 
since when manufacturing output has been roughly flat, and retail sales 
volumes have been rising at an annual rate of about 1.5 per cent p.a. 
Goldman Sachs’ latest estimates suggest that non-oil GDP was 
approximately unchanged during 1992Q4, while overall GDP probably 
increased by 0.2-0.5 per cent. However, it would certainly be premature to 
claim with any confidence that the economy is now embarked on a clear 
cyclical upswing. The recent strength of MO growth (a much more reliable 
indicator of near term trends in nominal GDP than M4 growth), and the 
recovery in new car sales, are admittedly encouraging. On the other hand, 
the brief burst of activity in the High Street around the time of the January 
sales already seems to have petered out, and consumer confidence remains 
worryingly depressed. Elsewhere, there is plenty of evidence that the 
housing market (with the possible exception of a few straws in the wind), 
and the labour market, are still weakening. Meanwhile, business surveys 
suggest strongly rising confidence, but this has been misleading in the past, 
and hard evidence on the recent trend in orders and output suggest little or 
no improvement. An honest appraisal of this mixed picture is that the
evidence could either be consistent with the early stages of a weak recovery,
22or with continued stagnation .
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Interestingly David Currie also refers to survey evidence in his submission. However, 
unlike Davies, he appears to take the rise in confidence suggested by the surveys at face 
value and the conclusions he draws are thus rather different:
Currie The latest monthly indicators, including surveys of confidence, suggest that 
the economy is slowly turning the comer, and that a patchy recovery is 
underway. Our forecast is that this recovery will slowly gather pace so that, 
by the end of the year, output will be growing at around its average 
underlying growth rate of 2.5 per cent. This gives a year-on-year growth 
rate this year of just over 1 per cent and around 3 per cent next year, 
averaging around 2.5 per cent into the medium term23.
Note that Currie is rather more certain that recovery is underway - indeed he 
believes-that by the end of the year GDP growth will have reached its trend rate. Of 
course, this is not entirely unexpected. In the previous section it was pointed out that 
Davies, together with Minford, was something of an outlier in that he felt that not 
enough had been done to ensure recovery. The complexity of his world view, illustrated 
in the passage quoted above, shows why he could not be sure the recovery would be 
sustained without further policy action. That his forecast for domestic demand was in 
_ fact relatively optimistic is due to the fact that he assumed the government would take 
action (i.e. reduce interest rates) in order to ensure that growth did occur. Currie on the 
other hand makes no such assumption. Without this assumption, Davies’s forecast 
would have been much more pessimistic, as he himself makes clear.
Davies Using our “main case” forecast for base rates [i.e. base rates fall to 5 per 
cent by mid 1993 and 4.5 by the end of the year], the GDP growth rate from 
1992Q4 to 1993Q4 would be just over 2 per cent, implying calendar year 
growth in real GDP of about 1.5 per cent. Some further acceleration in 
output growth would be likely in 1994. This is currently our central 
forecast, though I must emphasise that it is based on the assumption of 
further reductions in base rates soon24.
In other words, despite the numerical similarity of their forecasts for GDP growth (1.4 
and 1.5 per cent for Currie and Davies respectively) their diagnosis of the current 
situation was very different indeed.
The most optimistic assessment of domestic demand was provided by Andrew 
Britton. In his submission, Britton emphasises that (based on past experience) one 
would have expected there to be an economic recovery at this time. The cuts in interest
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rates since September continue a series of previous interest rate cuts stretching back 
over two years and should therefore add strength to the nascent recovery.
Britton Normally we would not expect cuts in interest rates to act at all quickly to
stimulate domestic demand, either from consumers or business. If there is 
indeed the beginnings of a revival in the housing market and some sectors of 
consumer spending this is now long overdue in view of the cuts in interest
rates (from 15 per cent to 10.5 per cent) made between 1990 and 1991. The 
effects of the more recent reduction (from 10 per cent to 6 per cent) should 
be reinforcing recovery throughout this year and beyond25.
However, this assertion, that the cut in interest rates will boost domestic demand, is 
contested by several of the others. Unlike Britton, whose forecasts rely heavily on the 
model (see Chapter 4), those forecasters which pay more attention to the peculiarities of 
the moment, rather than the regularities of the general case, are at pains to point out that 
the current debt levels mean that it is possible that consumption may remain low for the 
rest of the year. For example, Wynne Godley argues that it is likely that both household 
consumption and business investment will remain flat for the rest of the year. In both 
cases, unusually weak balance sheets mean that, until debt levels are reduced (or asset 
values rise), expenditure will be restrained. Thus:
Godley House prices have continued to fall in real terms and little recovery is in 
prospect in view of the stock of unsold, often repossessed, houses still on 
the market. As houses provided so much of the collateral for household 
indebtedness, the fall in prices will act as an additional bromide on 
borrowing, while having a negative wealth effect26 on personal 
consumption27.
Similarly:
Godley There is an overhang of excessive commercial building - a legacy of the 
property boom of the late eighties - which will act as a deterrent to new 
investment. In addition corporations are over indebted and banks still have 
weak balance sheets as a result of bad debts acquired during the eighties 
boom which makes borrowing for business investment in fixed and working 
capital unusually difficult28.
As a result of these considerations Godley does not ‘expect any significant growth in 
GDP this year (perhaps 0.5 per cent year-on-year) [and] little acceleration in 1994.’29 
However, it is entirely possible that it is Godley’s pessimism which is unwarranted and
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not the optimism of Andrew Britton. The unprecedented nature of the situation means 
that forecasting is particularly difficult. The essence of the problem, as Andrew 
Sentance makes clear, is that there are two conflicting forces present in the economy, 
and past experience gives no guide as to which will prove the stronger:
Sentance ... trends in consumer spending have been notoriously difficult to predict in 
recent years with traditional forecasting methods underestimating both the 
strength of the consumer boom in the late 1980s and the weakness of 
consumer spending in the recession. Consumer spending decisions are 
currently the subject of two conflicting influences. High consumer 
indebtedness, coupled with the weakness of the housing market is acting to 
inhibit spending while the historically low level of interest rates now 
established should encourage higher spending. As this combination of 
circumstances has not occurred before, its outcome is particularly difficult 
to predict30.
Gavyn Davies, who expresses similar concerns, argues that despite low base rates 
savings might remain higher, and expenditure therefore lower, than an econometric 
equation might suggest:
Davies The continuing decline in base rates, along with low inflation, should - 
according to our model [which consistently underpredicted the continued 
rise in the savings ratio in 1991-92, see para 17] exert downward pressure 
on the savings ratio throughout the next two years, provided that house 
prices stabilise. However, while the recent rise in retail sales can be taken 
as a good sign, and while the full effect of the recent base rate cuts have still 
to come through, it is difficult to be confident that the savings ratio will in 
fact soon start to fall. The overhang of private sector debt remains as great 
as ever (though debt servicing is now more comfortable), and this may have 
a continuing depressing effect on consumers’ expenditure, relative to 
predictions derived" from econometric equations. It would therefore be 
absurd to rule out the risk that the economy might stagnate for another
31year .
Despite expressing similar concerns about the difficulty of correctly forecasting 
domestic demand, Sentance and Davies eventually produce very different forecasts for 
1993. Davies, as noted above, makes the fairly optimistic forecast that domestic 
demand will increase by around 1.4 per cent, although this is based on the assumption 
that the government cuts interest rates still further. Sentance on the other hand forecasts
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that domestic demand will hardly grow at all in 1993. The principal difference between 
their forecasts thus seems to be their treatment of government policy. Davies assumes 
that the government will act so as to bring about the recovery, Sentance on the other 
hand makes no such assumption and, with interest rates remaining 6 per cent throughout 
1993, is significantly less optimistic about consumers’ expenditure growth .
Congdon, like Sentance and Godley is also fairly pessimistic about domestic 
demand during 1993, although his reasons are rather different. Congdon’s argument is 
that, although the economy is a long way below trend and a recovery is possible, it is 
being held back by government policy and may even be destroyed by it. However, if 
policy were to change, as he assumes it will, then the recovery will indeed get 
underway. In Congdon’s version of events, the problems are that exports (see the next 
section) are likely to be weak and that the growth of the money supply is too slow to 
ensure any real growth in GDP.
Congdon The very low rate of broad money growth now being recorded, combined 
with the weak outlook for the world economy, argues that the current weak 
revival in demand will not be sustained. In practice, policy will probably 
change by enough to ensure that the economy does start a genuine recovery. 
(The latest cut in interest rates - to 6 per cent - was announced while this 
submission was being written.)33
Finally, Minford is deeply pessimistic about domestic demand, forecasting that it will 
contract by just over 1 per cent during 1993. The reason is that although he believes 
that, as in America, interest rates will have to fall to around 3 per cent in order to ensure 
that recovery gets under way, he does not think this will happen. Although his forecast 
assumes a fall in interest rates to 4.9 per cent this is not enough, in his view, to ensure 
recovery. He remains unconvinced by the positive indications and his forecast is 
therefore for continued weakness:
Minford The latest Liverpool forecast is for very weak growth in 1993 in the UK, 
relying on further falls in interest rates to the 5-6 per cent range. We have 
seen some activity in the housing markets and the “sales” have been 
remarkable, as have December car sales (also connected with low prices, 
before the January notional marking up). But this activity is consistent with 
general weakness: sales are being displaced to low price items and times 
(the house market is similarly low priced)34.
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Summary
This section has looked at forecasts for domestic demand produced by the Panel of 
Forecasters. The most optimistic forecasts for domestic demand were produced by 
Andrew Britton and David Currie. Gavyn Davies was also relatively optimistic, but this 
was conditional on some further policy action by the government. On the same interest 
rate assumptions as Britton and Currie, Davies’s forecast would have been significantly 
lower. Numerically, Tim Congdon, Wynne Godley and Andrew Sentance produced 
fairly similar forecasts for domestic demand, although Congdon’s, like Davies’s 
assumed some policy action to ensure growth took place. However, the numerical 
similarity is deceptive. Congdon’s position is essentially an optimistic one as he 
believes that once the recovery is established the negative output gap means that it will 
be sustained for several years. Godley and Sentance on the other hand see the 
constraints being imposed on growth as a result of the balance of payments deficit and 
the share of consumption in GDP. Consequently, they see the future growth being 
dependent on achieving higher investment levels and an improved export performance. 
However, it should be noted that these problems are much more severe in Godley’s 
analysis than they are in Sentance’s. Finally, Patrick Minford believes that the 
economy, as a result of high interest rates combined with a prolonged recession, is now 
in a very poor state. Recovery will take place eventually, but at the prevailing rates of 
interest it will be very slow, much like that experienced in America. Minford believes" 
that if demand is to grow interest rates will need to be cut to about 3 per cent. However, 
he does not think this will happen and his forecast is therefore deeply pessimistic.
Net Trade / Balance of Payments
The forecasts for net trade produced by the Panel of Forecasters are all informed by very 
similar considerations. Firstly, there are the effects of the devaluation on the UK’s 
competitiveness and secondly, there are the markets in which the UK must sell its 
exports. Taking first the effects of the devaluation, these are not disputed and, in fact 
are hardly mentioned at all in the report. The mainstream view, from which no-one 
seems to dissent is given as follows
Currie The 15 per cent devaluation provides an important impetus, boosting export 
volumes and holding back imports35.
Britton As on previous occasions when sterling has fallen sharply, we expect the 
gain in relative cost competitiveness to result in improved profit margins for 
exporters as well as a substantial gain in export volume ... Devaluation also
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provides an incentive for import substitution. It is encouraging therefore 
that import volumes (on a balance of payments basis) fell in the fourth
, 3 6quarter .
The second factor in determining the strength of UK exports and the extent to which the 
gain in competitiveness can be transformed into economic growth is the state of the 
world markets. Although the world economy is growing, which implies that the export 
market is expanding, the European economies, into which the majority of UK exports 
are sold, are expected to be very weak in 1993. This means that the demand for UK 
exports may not be as strong as might be expected. The situation is summed up by 
Andrew Sentance as follows:
Sentance ... growth in the OECD area - which dominates world trade - is subject to 
two conflicting pressures. Growth in the US appears to be gathering 
momentum while some key European economies - notably Germany - are 
sliding into recession with little sign yet of any significant reduction in 
German interest rates. The pace of growth in UK export markets depends 
crucially on which of these two influences dominates37.
With two exceptions (Minford, who forecasts a positive contribution to GDP of 1.3 per 
cent and Congdon who forecasts a positive contribution to GDP of 0.7 per cent) all the 
forecasts for net trade lie in the range -0.1 to 0.3 per cent. Thus the consensus of the 
Panel is that the weakness of European markets will tend to more or less cancel out the 
gains from increasing exports to the rest of the world. In other words, net trade is 
generally expected to make no more than a small contribution to GDP growth during 
1993. This is made clear in the following comments:
Godley Although the recent devaluation of sterling will assist British exports, the 
developing recession in Europe will depress the demand for UK exports - 
probably by more than the recovery in US growth will boost it38.
Sentance ... Net trade is expected to make a positive contribution to growth over the 
next two years, adding 0.3 per cent to GDP in 1993 and 0.7 per cent in 1994. 
Exports of goods and services are forecast to grow by 4.4 per cent in 1993 
and 5.7 per cent in 1994, compared with import growth of 3.1 per cent and 
3.5 per cent respectively. In 1993, the growth of exports will be held back 
by sluggish European markets - especially Germany - which will reduce the 
growth of world trade despite signs of a strengthening recovery in the 
United States39.
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Britton Slow growth in the world economy this year will moderate the pace at 
which UK exports can expand40.
Related to net trade is the deficit on the current account of the balance of 
payments. The balance of payments accounts give a record of all the UK’s international 
transactions. There are two parts to the balance of payments accounts - there is the 
current account and there are the transactions in external assets and liabilities. The 
balance of payments forecasts given by the Panel of Forecasters refer to the current 
account, which includes
• exports of goods and services
• imports of goods and services
• property income from abroad and paid abroad
• current transfers from abroad and paid abroad
Thus what happens to the balance of payments reflects changes in several different sets 
of transactions as well as changes in the exchange rates at which the transactions take 
place. For example, although exports will rise in volume terms as a result of the 
devaluation, their value may actually fall as a result of the lower exchange rate. 
Similarly, although there will be less imports, they will cost more under the new 
exchange rate. The net effect in the short term might therefore "be to actually make the
deficit on the current account of the balance of payments worse as the increasing cost of
imports exceeds the increased revenue from cheaper exports. In the slightly longer term 
however the effect of the devaluation should be to reduce the deficit.41 This is in fact 
the conclusion draw by several of the Panel members as shown below:
Currie The current account deficit is expected to worsen this year, rising to about 
£20 billion. This is partly a consequence of the J-curve effect resulting from 
the fall in sterling, partly a result of renewed growth. In 1994, the beneficial
effects of the devaluation should work through to check any further
deterioration during 1994 due to growth, and we see a small improvement in 
1995, helped also by inward direct investment to the UK. But the current 
account deficit will remain stuck at about 2.5-3 per cent of GDP in the 
longer run. There are technical reasons for thinking that the true deficit is 
overstated, but nonetheless it is of concern42.
163
Davies The current account of the balance of payments is likely to worsen this year 
to around £18 billion as the J-curve effects of the devaluation work through. 
However, on our exchange rate forecast, this may narrow slightly in 199443.
Godley While exports should pick up as a result of the devaluation, the deficit in the 
balance of payments on the current account will probably increase further in 
the influence of European recession and the “J-curve effect”, reaching 2.5-3 
per cent of GDP in 1993 and 199444.
Sentance The deficit on the current account of the balance of payments is expected to 
widen to £16.7 billion (2,7 per cent of GDP) in 1993, as import prices offset 
the favourable volume movements, before narrowing slightly in 199345.
However, these arguments are not accepted by everyone. As noted above, the two 
monetarist economists, Minford and Congdon, are relatively optimistic about the 
prospects for net trade and this is reflected in their forecasts for the current account 
deficit, which show some reduction in 1993. Minford is the most optimistic as he 
believes that export prices will rise almost as much as import prices during 1993.
In several of the passages quoted above it was suggested that the deficit on the 
current account of the balance of payments may turn out to be a ‘problem’ in the 
medium term if it is not reduced. The reason for this is that if the current account is in 
deficit then the transactions in external assets and liabilities must show a surplus, and it 
is this point which is at the heart of the dispute over whether or not a deficit in the 
balance of payments on the current account matters. Godley is probably the economist 
who places the greatest emphasis on the current account although several of the Panel 
share his views to a lesser extent, as is shown below:
Currie ... the current account deficit will remain stuck at about 2.5-3 per cent of 
GDP in the longer run. There are technical reasons for thinking that the true 
deficit is overstated, but nonetheless it is of concern46.
Sentance Even with a very modest recovery, the deficit is forecast to grow to 2.5-3.0 
per cent of GDP in 1993 and 1994. Such a balance of payments deficit does 
not impose an absolute constraint on growth. But it does imply that if 
growth in the 1990s is to be sustained, it will need to be less dependent on 
consumer spending than in the previous decade and more reliant on 
investment and exports47.
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The reason Godley believes the deficit matters is that a persistent deficit implies 
that the UK must be reducing its assets or increasing its liabilities, and this is a process 
which cannot proceed indefinitely. However, not all the Panel agree with this analysis. 
In particular, Tim Congdon does not believe that a deficit on the current account of the 
balance of payments is necessarily a problem at all. For Congdon, so long as the 
government’s own finances are in order then it does not matter if the recovery is 
accompanied by an increasing current account deficit. A detailed exposition of why 
Congdon believes that the issue is not a serious one was given at the October 1993 
conference ‘The State of the Economy’ organised by the Institute for Economic
48Affairs . It is however this ‘problem’ which he is dismissing in the following remarks:
Congdon If the Budget were indeed roughly balanced on a cyclically-adjusted basis, 
the Government should not be concerned about the behaviour of the current 
account of the balance of payments. The recovery, when it finally emerges, 
may be accompanied by a widening of the current account deficit. But, if 
that widening were to reflect the free decisions of private-sector agents, it 
would not necessarily be a problem for public policy49.
Summary
In this section I have outlined the forecasts for net trade and the deficit on the current 
account of the balance of payments. The view of the majority of the Panel was that net_ 
trade would add little to GDP in 1993 and that, as a result of the devaluation, the deficit 
on the current account of the balance of payments would increase during the year. 
However, in 1994 the deficit would reduce, but only to about 2.5 to 3 per cent of GDP. 
Several of the Panel members considered this to be a problem, although it was only a 
critical one for Wynne Godley. Minford and Congdon on the other hand interpreted 
developments rather differently. Both forecast net trade making a positive contribution 
to GDP, with Minford forecasting that net trade would add 1.3 per cent to GDP. 
Congdon was less ebullient but still forecast a contribution of 0.7 per cent, more that 
two times anyone else’s forecast.
These forecasts for net trade are also reflected in the Panel’s forecasts for the 
current account deficit. For Congdon, who forecast a sharp fall in the rate of increase of 
imports relative to exports, the balance of payments deficit does improve during 1993, 
albeit slightly. Minford, who does not forecast exports and imports separately, is also 
very optimistic about the deficit and forecasts that it will fall sharply. The rest of the 
Panel see imports increasing less rapidly than exports, but the difference is not enough
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to offset the change in the exchange rate. Consequently their forecast is for the deficit 
to increase from £11.8 bn in 1992 to anywhere between £16.7 and £20.2 bn in 1993 (i.e. 
an increase of 40 to 70 per cent).
Inflation
Although, as shown in the previous sections, there are differences between the Panel on 
almost all issues, it is the forecasts for inflation which show the greatest differences. 
The monetarist members of the Panel, Minford and Congdon, can be termed ‘inflation 
optimists’ whilst the rest of the Panel are ‘inflation pessimists’. When discussing the 
general theoretical views which informed the Panel’s forecasts, it was noted that 
Congdon’s estimate of the negative output gap was comparatively large. This, 
combined with the high level of unemployment, leads Congdon to the following 
conclusions:
Congdon The large excess of trend output over actual output and the high level of 
unemployment therefore argue that the downward pressures on inflation are 
unusually strong. It is a matter for econometric testing whether the change 
in the inflation rate is a function of the rate of change in output (relative to 
trend) or the level of output (relative to trend). An inflation equation used at 
Lombard Street Research suggests that the level of output relative to trend is 
likely to be far more significant than the rate of change of output, for any 
plausible values of these variables. (This result is of course consistent with 
the model of wage determination developed in Friedman’s 1967 presidential 
address to the American Economic Association and the subsequent 
literature). If the equation and the large negative output gap are considered 
together, the implication is that above-trend growth can be reconciled for 
several years with low inflation50.
Congdon’s argument is thus based on a theoretical analysis backed by empirical 
econometrics. The theory is also important when it comes to weighing up other 
evidence. Note that in the following discussion, the positive indications from other 
sources are subordinate to the effects due to the negative output gap:
Congdon However, the January CBI survey (with a positive balance of companies on 
the “output expectations” question) and the December Building Societies 
Association press release (with a sharp increase in seasonally-adjusted 
mortgage commitments) point to a resumption of growth in the first half of 
1993, although at a beneath-trend rate. Although the pound may fall further
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and the devaluation will have an impact effect on the price level, the 
negative output gap will continue to increase again and underlying 
inflationary pressures will continue to weaken51.
Thus, despite growth in the economy, the negative output gap will continue to increase 
throughout 1993, albeit at a slower rate, and inflation is therefore expected to remain 
low and to fall further (to just 1 per cent) during 1994. Minford’s analysis is basically 
similar, relying on the pressure of high unemployment and tight public spending, 
although he is not as optimistic as Congdon. Nevertheless, although he does not 
forecast inflation to be as low as Congdon projects, Minford is still classed as 
optimistic. The reasons for this are as follows: although his forecast is for underlying 
inflation to reach 3.8 per cent in 1993 is only just below the average of 3.9 per cent, his 
submission does not identify inflation as being a problem. Indeed, Minford’s major 
anxiety is not that inflation will take off but that the economy will fall back into 
recession if  growth does not resume soon, so weak are the inflationary pressures. It is in 
this sense that Minford is optimistic about inflation.
The rest of the Panel are distinctly less optimistic, although some are more 
worried than others. However, the reason why the group as a whole is pessimistic is 
that they do not see any great improvement in the economic situation before inflation 
becomes a problem. In other words, for this group, the growth-inflation trade-off is 
much more adverse than for Minford and Congdon, leading to forecasts of inflation 
remaining above 3 per cent, combined with continued high unemployment.
The most pessimistic forecast for inflation in 1993 was produced by Wynne 
Godley, who forecast that inflation would rise to 4.8 per cent by the end of the year. 
However, it should be noted that this mainly reflects the devaluation and the rise is 
temporary.
Godley As the effect of the devaluation comes through, price inflation (excluding 
mortgage interest payments) will probably rise to nearly 5 per cent but this 
increase is likely to be transitory and should not, therefore, dilute the effect 
of devaluation on British competitiveness. The size of wage settlements is 
falling fast and with high and rising unemployment there seems little danger 
of an acceleration in domestic costs in the immediate future52.
In 1994, Godley’s forecast for inflation falls to around 4 per cent, which is closer to the 
average of 3.6 per cent. However, it should be noted that this is in the context of below-
167
trend growth and rising unemployment. Taking the forecast as a whole, Godley is 
therefore deeply pessimistic.
If we look at the trend of the inflation forecasts rather than their numerical value, 
then the most pessimistic inflation forecasts are those of Britton and Currie. Both 
Britton and Currie offer a very similar analysis, based on a predicted rise in wage 
demands following the devaluation, and both see temporary breaches of the official 
inflation target of 1-4 per cent as likely. Currie’s forecasts are as follows:
Currie ... we see inflation remaining low Over the next year, but then picking up as
a consequence of devaluation. Headline RPI inflation averages about 2.5 
per cent this year, partly as a result of cuts in mortgage rates, but then picks 
up. The Chancellor’s target indicator, RPI excluding MIPs, remains at the 
top end of the target range during 1993, but then rises above it in 199453.
The predicted rise in wages, which leads to the relatively high inflation forecast is 
described as follows, with heavy emphasis on the ‘typical’ as opposed to the 
‘particular’:
Currie ... If higher inflation feeds into higher wages, there is the danger that the 
competitive advantage of a lower pound is eroded in a wage/price spiral:
this occurred in the three years after the 1967 devaluation, and is the
characteristic response of the British economy. Over the next year, with 
unemployment high and rising, we see no such danger. But in 1994 and 
beyond, with unemployment stabilising and growth at its trend rate, we see 
earnings responding to higher inflation, and higher interest rates are needed 
to stem rising inflation54.
Thus, Currie is clearly pessimistic about the ability of the economy to expand without 
increases in inflation which result in deflationary policies, and this is the reason for the 
‘inflation pessimist’ label. Of the other mainstream forecasters, Andrew Britton’s 
forecast is slightly higher than Currie’s for 1993 but lower in 1994. However, like 
Currie, Britton forecasts headline inflation of above 5 per cent in 1994. Their forecasts 
of underlying inflation are also the highest. Again, it is interesting to note the 
prominence given to the 1967 devaluation in the National Institute’s forecast, although 
some allowance is made for the exceptionally high unemployment in 1993:
Britton Devaluation has already raised import prices by 9 per cent in the fourth 
quarter. That in turn must add to wage pressure, although not necessarily
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straight away. After the 1967 devaluation wages were held back for a year 
or so by a successful episode of incomes policy, but there was a sharp 
rebound in 1970. By the end of 1971 the whole of the devaluation gain in 
competitiveness had been reversed. The conditions of 1993 are of course 
very different, not least because unemployment is so much higher. Even so 
we would expect to see wage settlements beginning to rise again in the 
course of this year, provided that the output recovery is significant and 
sustained. This is the reasoning behind our forecast that the target band for 
inflation may well be exceeded55.
The rest of the Panel forecast inflation somewhat lower than Britton and Currie, but do 
not take the effect of the negative output gap to be as pronounced as Congdon. 
Sentance ultimately gives the edge to high unemployment, assessing the two opposing 
forces as follows:
Sentance The pace of growth anticipated over the next two years is insufficient to 
reduce unemployment, though the total is expected to rise more slowly, 
reaching 3.2 million by the end of 1994. With the labour market so slack, 
low earnings growth and rising productivity should offset the impact of the 
depreciation on import prices, keeping down inflation. The latest 
deceleration in manufacturing pay settlements - to 3.1 per cent in the three 
months to November - is entirely consistent with this view. Underlying 
inflation (measured by the RPI excluding mortgage interest) is expected to 
fall gradually to 3.1 per cent by the end of 1993. Though there may be some 
upward pressure of prices in 1994 as the economy recovers, underlying 
inflation is expected to remain within the Chancellor’s target range of 1-4 
per cent averaging 3.5 per cent in the final quarter56.
Davies on the other hand seems to give slightly more weight to the effect of the 
devaluation:
Davies On inflation, leading indicator and structural models suggest that the 
underlying rate may remain close to the, or perhaps slightly above, the top 
end of the 1-4 per cent target band for much of 1993, before declining again 
next year. The adverse effects of the sterling devaluation on inflation are 
quite large, but are offset by the lagged effects of the recession, especially 
on service prices. We expect unit labour costs in the whole economy to be 
unchanged both this year and next, in which case the underlying inflation 
rate may fall back modestly in 199457.
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Summary
In this section I have drawn a distinction between ‘inflation optimists’ and ‘inflation 
pessimists’. The inflation optimists were those forecasters who predicted that inflation 
would fall or, at the very least, that inflation would not rise as economic activity 
increased. The pessimists either predicted that inflation would rise significantly over 
the year and into 1994 or that if inflation did not get worse then nothing else would get 
much better. The labels thus referred not just to the numerical values forecast for 
inflation, but also to the economic context within which those forecasts for inflation 
were embedded.
According to this division, Congdon was the most optimistic for inflation, 
although Minford also foresaw ‘reasonable’ medium term prospects coupled with falling 
unemployment and above-trend growth. Of the rest of the Panel, Britton and Currie 
forecast that inflation was on a rising trend and were, numerically, the most pessimistic. 
However, Godley also forecast inflation of 4 per cent in 1994 and, when viewed in the 
light of his forecasts for an extremely weak expansion of demand, it is clear that Godley 
is also very pessimistic. In Godley’s case however, the pessimism is unmodified by 
reference to anything in particular - Godley just is pessimistic.
Finally, Sentance and Davies, see both the optimists’ and pessimists’ points as 
worthy but find themselves unable to side wholeheartedly with either positions. Their 
forecasts and their analysis lie therefore somewhere in between the more extreme views.
Unemployment / Wages
The forecasts for unemployment are basically very similar at the start of the year. 
Britton, Currie, Davies and Sentance all predict that unemployment will increase 
slightly from 2.9 million at the end to 1992 to about 3.2 million by the end of 1993. In 
1994, they forecast that unemployment will fall back slightly but will remain at or above 
3 million. The reason why unemployment does not fall, despite increasing economic 
activity is that any expansion of demand sufficient to reduce unemployment will 
increase inflation to such an extent that deflationary policies will be required. However, 
deflating the economy to reduce inflation will increase unemployment. It is therefore, 
as David Currie observes, an ‘intractable’ policy problem:
Currie Unemployment is likely to rise to 3.25 million this year and to decline only 
slowly thereafter, dipping only marginally below 3 million in 1996. This is 
an intractable policy problem. The danger is that the policy response will be
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to go for growth to bring unemployment down, raising inflation and pushing 
the UK into another inflationary boom/bust cycle58.
The remainder of this consensus group offer very similar forecasts to Currie, and for 
very similar reasons. Thus:
Britton The worst news since our [i.e. the NTs] last Review was the sharp rise in
unemployment in the fourth quarter. This follows from the sharp fall in 
employment now recorded for the third quarter of last year, a time when 
business confidence was at its low point. The same surveys which now 
indicate hope of a recovery in output predict further job losses this year. We 
have therefore raised our forecast of unemployment, with the peak now 
predicted at around 3.2 million [in] the first quarter of 199459.
Davies Such a profile for output [1992Q4 to 1993Q4 = 2 per cent, annual rate =1.5
per cent] would lead to unemployment rising to about 3.2 million by the end 
of 1993, possibly flattening next year60.
Sentance The pace of growth anticipated over the next two years is insufficient to
reduce unemployment, though the total is expected to rise more slowly, 
reaching 3.2 million by the end of 199461.
Congdon’s forecasts for unemployment are slightly higher than those of this mainstream 
group. However, the reasons for this are difficult to judge because he literally does not- 
mention unemployment in his Submissions (apart from the remarks already cited in 
which the existence of high unemployment is used to buttress the conclusion that 
inflationary pressures are very weak). This is slightly unusual in that unemployment is 
usually one of the ‘Big four’ variables economic forecasters are expected to forecast 
accurately. However, its relative neglect as a policy topic in Congdon’s Submission 
reflects not so much its minor role in his own analysis but its unimportance, in his view,
as a matter for public policy. Put simply, Congdon does not believe that ensuring full
62employment is part of the responsibility of governments. With this in mind, it is 
perhaps understandable that unemployment is not mentioned in his policy submission.
If Britton, Congdon, Currie, Davies and Sentance represent the central tendency 
of the group, then Wynne Godley and Patrick Minford are the outliers. Godley’s is the 
highest forecast for unemployment and is entirely consistent with his bleak forecasts for 
activity:
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Godley If output rises I per cent or less during 1993 and 1994, unemployment (in 
the absence of any special new employment measures or changes of 
definition) is likely to go on rising fast, perhaps approaching 3.5 million by 
the end of this year with further increases thereafter. Even if output were to 
rise rather more than 1.5 per cent per annum, unemployment could go on 
rising for several years. (It may be recalled that unemployment rose by a 
million between 1981 and 1986 although the average growth of GDP during 
that period was just over 3 per cent per annum.)63
Minford on the other hand represents the more optimistic view of unemployment. In the 
short term, he thinks that unemployment will continue to rise as the economy is weak 
and growth is likely to be sluggish in the absence of interest rate cuts:
Minford Unemployment is rising rapidly still, and companies are cutting costs 
sharply, having finally given up on any sort of rapid recovery64.
However, in the longer term, once the recovery has started, Minford is much more 
optimistic about unemployment. This optimism is based on Minford’s view of the UK 
labour market and the effect of the recession. Minford believes that the economy may be 
as much as 10 per cent below trend in terms of output.65 Similarly he believes that the 
‘natural rate’ of unemployment, i.e. the level below which inflationary pressures will 
begin to assert themselves, is much lower than the consensus view. Thus he writes:
Minford It is usual in recessions - and the worse they are, the more it is done - to 
mark down estimates of “potential output” and mark up those of the “natural 
rate” of unemployment. These estimates are however generally little better 
than extrapolations of recent trends66.
However, even those economists who do analyse the labour market differ about how 
competitive it really is, and thus about the natural rate of unemployment. As Minford 
makes clear, despite their different starting points, both types of analysis reach the 
conclusion that the natural rate of unemployment is determined by the same sorts of 
things:
Minford There are two available types of analysis of this [i.e. the labour] market.
One (as in my own work) assumes that at least in a significant part of the 
labour market there is a competitive supply and demand for labour: there are 
other parts that are either monopolised by unions or monopolised by firms, 
but anyone failing to find work in those must look for it in the competitive 
part. The other type of analysis (pursued in many papers by Professors
Steve Nickell of Oxford and Richard Layard of LSE) assumes that 
throughout the labour market firms bargain with unions or other worker 
groups for wages and set prices in response67.
Minford Both types produce similar conclusions: that unemployment benefit (its rate 
and availability), taxes and union power are the principal determinants of 
unemployment68.
What sets Minford apart from the rest of the Panel, who more or less follow the Layard- 
Nickell line on unemployment, is the effectiveness of government policies in changing 
the labour market in the UK. The rest of the Panel (with the possible exception of 
Congdon) believe that previous labour market policies have not had much effect and 
that, for a variety of reasons, the natural rate of unemployment is around 2 to 3 million. 
This, o f  course, is perfectly consistent with their view that any upturn in activity will 
quickly lead to inflation. Minford, on the other hand, draws very different conclusions:
Minford Applying this sort of thinking to the UK one is struck by how massively the 
labour market environment in this sense has changed since 1979, when both 
approaches suggested that the UK natural rate of unemployment would be 
high - up to 3 million or 11 per cent. Cuts in benefit rates relative to 
productivity-linked wages, tougher eligibility for benefit including the 
renewed Beveridge “worktest” as in the “Restart” scheme, union laws, cuts 
in marginal tax rates, and so on. The Liverpool estimate of the natural rate 
that results from applying these ideas is down to around 1 million - 
approximately 3.5 per cent of today’s labour force69.
It is on the basis of this estimate that Minford’s optimistic projections for demand, 
inflation and unemployment rest. Put simply the economy is well below trend and, as 
the output gap is to be closed, unemployment will fall. Inflation will not be a major 
problem however because of the strong competitive forces in world markets and the 
much increased efficiency (insecurity?) of the domestic labour market.
Summary
This section has focused on unemployment. The majority of the Panel forecast a slight 
rise in unemployment in 1993 and little change in 1994. In addition, for those that see 
unemployment as a policy problem, it has to be said that they see it as a very difficult 
one to resolve. The difficulty stems from belief that the natural rate of unemployment is 
very high (i.e. close to the prevailing level of unemployment) and that any above trend 
growth which reduces this unemployment will quickly lead to inflation and deflationary
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policies. Godley, who forecasts less growth than this group, is the most pessimistic, and 
forecasts unemployment rising to above 3.5 million
Minford, on the other hand, uses a very different form of analysis to the ‘Layard- 
Nickell’ model adopted by the rest of the Panel. His model, which is based on the 
assumption of strong competition in the labour market, leads him to the conclusion that 
the natural rate of unemployment is as low as 1 million. Given this, it is clear that the 
economy is a long, long way below trend and that unemployment can fall substantially 
before any inflationary problems are encountered. Indeed, it follows from this estimate 
of unemployment that the economy may be as much as 10 per cent below trend, and this 
is why Minford argues that interest rates need to be cut.
PSBR
The Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) is the amount by which the gross 
government debt increases during the financial year. The PSBR is related to the deficit 
or surplus (i.e. income less expenditure) of the government but not in a mechanical way. 
The relationship is made complicated because, in addition to buying goods and services, 
the government also makes loans and sells assets (although the latter are also presented 
separately). Thus during the year some assets might be sold or privatised, a number of 
new loans made and some of the existing ones repaid. The size of the PSBR matters 
because a large PSBR implies an increasing government debt. As this debt increases so 
the interest payments which have to be made on it also increase and, as the debt 
becomes large, they can increase explosively. In addition, a ratio of debt to GDP of less 
than 60% was one of the criteria for monetary convergence set by the European Union. 
For Gavyn Davies, despite the events of the previous summer, these criteria remain 
important (or at least useful) as guidelines for assessing policy:
Davies On the growth and inflation assumptions [growth 3 per cent, inflation 3-4 
per cent] just mentioned, the PSBR seems likely to rise to about £55-60 
billion in 1995-6, falling back to perhaps £50 billion by 1997-98. This 
would result in the ratio of government debt to GDP rising to over 60 
percent by 1995-9670.
Finally, the increase in public spending which had brought about the large PSBR 
was an expansionary policy. Whilst such a policy was wholly appropriate during the 
recession, it was now, with recovery underway, a cause for concern:
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Currie There are distinct dangers with this large overhang of government 
borrowing. First, there is the worry that high government borrowing 
coupled with low interest rates will prove unduly expansionary and 
inflationary in the medium to longer run71
Insofar as the debate about economic policy is concerned, what matters about the 
PSBR, which in February 1993 was rather large, is the extent to which it will be reduced 
by the increase in economic activity. If, for example, the large PSBR, which all agree 
was created at least in part by the recession, is wiped out as the economy expands then 
clearly the PSBR is not a problem for policy - it will go away all by itself. If  this is 
indeed the case then the PSBR is said to be ‘cyclical’ as it is purely a product of the 
economic cycle. On the other hand, it is possible that despite renewed economic 
growth,-the PSBR will remain at its current level. If this is the case, then the PSBR is a 
problem for policy. If this is the case then the PSBR is said to be ‘structural’. As noted 
in the previous paragraph, a large deficit which does not go away can lead to other
problems. The concerns of the majority of the Panel members are most clearly
expressed by David Currie:
Currie Although part of the PSBR is indeed cyclical, perhaps as much as 2-3 per 
cent [of GDP], the structural deficit is as much as 4-5 per cent [of GDP]. 
On unchanged budgetary policies, the PSBR remains stuck at around £50
billion despite revenues rising with recovery: this is because at this level of
borrowing, interest payments rise rapidly72.
O f course, the distinction between the structural and cyclical components of the 
PSBR has to be judged in the context of the overall economic recovery. For example, 
for those that forecast a relatively slow recovery (e.g. Sentance and Godley) then the 
tendency for growth to reduce the deficit will be muted and the deficit will appear 
mostly structural. If growth were to be faster the reduction would be greater and the 
deficit appear more cyclical. On the other hand, even if  recovery is not strong then the 
PSBR could still come down if taxes were increased and/or public expenditure 
restrained or even reduced. If these policies are applied with sufficient determination 
(as for example Minford assumes) then the PSBR can be virtually eliminated with only 
a fairly modest expansion in output. The PSBR can thus become either cyclical or 
structural as a result of policy; it is not entirely predetermined. It is thus a matter for 
judgement on the part of the forecaster as to how the economy will grow, how the 
government will act, and how these interact with each other.
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Sentance  ... the high level of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, which is 
expected to reach £45.2 billion in 1993-94 and £50.4 billion in 1994-95, 
implies a continued restraint on public spending. Government consumption 
is forecast to rise by just 0.5 per cent in 1993 and by the same amount in 
1994. No significant tax increases are assumed in the forecast but they are 
clearly a possib ility73.
In practice nobody held the view that the PSBR was purely structural, although 
Patrick Minford did argue that it was (could be made to be?) almost purely cyclical. 
The reasoning, as can be seen from the passage quoted below, is based on his estimate 
of the natural rate of unemployment and a ‘negative output gap’ of 10 per cent.
However, it is also worth noting that Minford also assumes a fall (of 3 per cent) in
government consumption in 1993-94. When all these factors are combined, we get a 
‘back of the envelope’ calculation of the PSBR as follows:
M inford  These figures [i.e. natural rate of unemployment» 1 million, output can rise 
by approx. 10 per cent from 1993 level] can also be translated into some 
estimates of PSBR impact: £30-40 billion of the projected 1993 PSBR is 
due to the recession. The marginal tax rate paid on the wages of the average 
worker today (including VAT, all National Insurance and direct tax) is about 
47 per cent. On top of this, for every £100 million lost in wage bill, there is 
probably another £10 million lost in corporation tax (since the Lawson 
reforms, a highly geared tax), as trading profits fall £50 million: national 
income basically splits one third trading profits, two thirds wage bill. 
Finally, there are unemployment benefits, costing the Treasury another £20 
million per £100 million loss in wage bill. Hence, every £150 million 
reduction in national income costs the Exchequer about £77 million, or just 
over 50 per cent (the Treasury in a recent Bulletin has put it even higher at 
70 per cent - this is entirely possible, given the difficulties of assessing 
precisely how recent tax changes have affected PSBR “gearing” to the 
economy). National income in 1993 looks like being some 10 per cent 
lower than its potential, implying an Exchequer loss of £30-40 billion - even 
more on the Treasury’s estimates of the PSBR’s gearing to national 
income74.
Consequently, the PSBR is mostly cyclical and no special measures (apart from the 
assumed restraint in government consumption and investment) are necessary to 
eliminate it. However, as noted in previous sections, many of the Panel believed that (a)
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the output gap was smaller than Minford’s estimates and (b) that the natural rate of 
unemployment was higher. Thus, most of the Panel believed that the PSBR was only 
partly cyclical and that although the increase in economic activity would reduce it, it 
would not eliminate it. There was thus a significant structural component in the PSBR 
which the majority of the Panel thought would remain despite the increase in activity.
Currie In framing his March and December Budgets, the Chancellor has to steer 
between the problems of a tentative recovery and rising unemployment and 
the problems posed by the PSBR heading towards £50 billion, or 7 per cent 
of GDP, in 1993-94 and 1994-95. We reject the view that most of this 
public sector deficit is a cyclical phenomenon that will disappear with 
recovery75.
Because of this most of the Panel recommended that taxes should be increased. 
With the sole exception of Congdon, all those advocating tax increases wanted them to 
be deferred until the recovery was clearly underway. Others felt that the recovery was
still too uncertain to risk increasing taxes and thereby stalling economic growth. The
problem is that both households and business have very weak balance sheets due to 
large debts. They are therefore extremely reluctant to spend and are saving a significant 
- proportion of their income. As the economy expands this unusually high propensity to 
save might well come down. However, if taxes are increased too soon then the capacity 
of the private sector to spend will be reduced still further and this is a most undesirable 
outcome at such an early stage of the recovery. The strongest and most consistent 
statement of this argument was given by Wynne Godley:
Godley Recent forecasts of a ballooning PSBR during the nineties are all based on 
the assumption that the exceptionally large private sector surplus in 1992 
will be repeated in 1993 and increased further in the years to come. This 
has to be the case because the sectoral balances must, by identity, sum to 
zero. A PSBR equal to 9 per cent of GDP logically implies, since no-one 
expects the balance of payments deficit to be more than 5 per cent, that there 
will be a private sector surplus equal to 5 per cent or more. But private 
financial surpluses of this size have only been approached in the past in 
periods of very high inflation such as the seventies and the only reason for 
expecting them now (when inflation is low) is that, in the aftermath of the 
(collapsed) credit and property boom, corporate and personal saving will for 
several years, but not indefinitely, remain exceptionally high relative to
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investment. It would be perverse in the extreme to respond to this 
exceptionally low private spending relative to income by fiscal restriction76.
However, it should be noted that one reason why Godley can hold this position so 
forcefully is that his own theoretical approach leads him to very different conclusions 
about the urgency with which the PSBR must be reduced. Thus, unlike the rest of the 
Panel who, as noted above, regard the large PSBR as a problem which requires 
attention, Godley argues that:
Godley It is a major contention of this memorandum that the mere existence of a 
large PSBR generates no requirement whatever to raise taxes (or cut public 
expenditure) additional to what is needed as a result of some supply
constraint such as the balance of payments, accelerating inflation or
shortage of capacity or labour77.
The reasoning behind this argument is outlined below. Probably the most important 
point to notice is that the argument only applies if the economy is entirely demand 
constrained. Clearly Godley believes that it is, and will remain so for some time.
Godley If an economy is entirely demand constrained, it will tend, following an
increase in public expenditure, towards a stable equilibrium, with no 
explosion of interest payments, whatever the initial state of the 
government’s finances might be. The intuition is that so long as there is no 
supply constraint of any kind an addition to public expenditure will 
eventually add enough to national output to generate enough tax revenue - at 
given tax rates - to cover not only the initial addition to public expenditure 
but also the interest payments which have been generated by the additional 
public sector debt ... there is no reason (arising from public sector 
indebtedness) why the government should not run a large deficit at one time
78and raise taxes to reduce it at another, later, time .
There is some doubt as to how far the other Panel members would agree with this 
diagnosis. However, as Godley himself pointed out no-one actually disputed the point 
at the time.79
Summary
The forecasts for the PSBR are some of the most complicated to understand because 
they are the result of several different judgements. Firstly, an assessment is necessary as 
to how far from equilibrium (a concept with which Godley would probably disagree) i.e.
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from potential output and natural rate of unemployment the economy is. As we have 
seen, when made explicit these estimates range from a 3 to 10 per cent gap on output, 
and from 1 to 2.5 million for the natural rate of unemployment. Linked to these is the 
expected growth in the economy. As the economy expands and the output gap is closed 
so unemployment falls, tax revenue rises and state expenditure can fall. In addition, tax 
rates and spending plans may also be changed, but this depends on what is politically 
feasible. Forecasting the PSBR requires all these factors to be taken into account and 
weighed up before a final judgement is made.
In general terms, the consensus view of the Panel was that the deficit was a 
problem. More specifically, the deficit was a problem that would not go away (i.e. it 
was not cyclical) and that additional tax revenue would be needed to reduce it. 
However, it was also believed that this increase in taxes should be delayed until the 
recovery was clearly under way. In addition to this consensus view there were two 
significant outlying positions. Firstly, Minford argued that the deficit was not a 
problem because the economy was so far beneath trend that it would be eliminated 
automatically as the output gap closed (assuming a tight squeeze on public expenditure 
also took place at the same time). Finally, Godley also believed that the PSBR was not 
a problem in the sense that action was required to reduce it.
Budget / Policy (Fiscal)
Despite the variety of forecasts and analyses outlined above, the Panel reached a 
reasonably clear consensus on what the appropriate policy responses were. Although I 
have split the discussion into fiscal and monetary policy it is important to remember (as 
was made clear in Chapter 2) that they are actually determined with respect to each 
other. The tightening of fiscal policy implies a loosening of monetary policy if the 
overall effect is not to be deflationary, for example. Amongst the Panel there was a 
consensus that fiscal policy would need to be tightened over the next few years. This 
tightening might take the form of increased taxation, reduced spending or a mixture of 
both. However, there were differences as to when this tightening of policy should take 
place and why it was actually needed.
Taking first the timing, Congdon believed that, because the longer any tax 
increase is delayed the larger it has to be, it was better to raise taxes immediately. 
However, the rest of the Panel disagreed, arguing that there was a risk that deflationary 
policy measures might bring the recovery to a halt. Clearly such an outcome would be
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very bad for the economy and so the majority argued that any tightening should not take 
place until the recovery was more securely established:
Currie All th[e] arguments point to the need to get public borrowing down. But it 
is argued that higher taxes now will stall recovery. I am a little doubtful of 
this in view of the major shift in policy since September, but the Chancellor 
can avoid this risk while still addressing in this Budget the problem of 
excessive government borrowing. Since a structural deficit of some 2 per 
cent of GDP is acceptable, the Chancellor should aim at a fiscal adjustment 
of some 2-3 per cent of GDP over the next few years80.
Congdon Th[e] easing of monetary policy should be accompanied by a tightening of 
fiscal policy, because the present level of the public sector borrowing 
requirement carries long run dangers of excessive debt accumulation and a 
rising burden of debt interest payments. If public expenditure cannot be 
reduced, an increase in taxation equivalent to 2 per cent of GDP should be 
announced in the March Budget to take effect over the next year or two81.
Davies Th[e] monetary easing should set the stage for an explicit and significant 
tightening in the fiscal stance. This should not actually take effect this year 
(indeed, there should be an urgent package of measures to help the long 
term unemployed), but measures should be spelled out in the forthcoming 
Budget to tighten fiscal policy by at least 2 per cent of GDP, and preferably 
more, over the next 3 years. In the absence of large-scale expenditure cuts, 
the overall aim should be to introduce tax increases which are anyway 
desirable from the perspective of tax reform (e.g. a wider VAT base, petrol 
and tobacco taxes, environmental taxes, the phasing out of mortgage relief 
etc.) In the optimistic case that the PSBR drops faster than expected, these 
changes could be offset by income tax cuts, in which case a desirable tax 
reform would have taken place. However, if a coherent plan of this sort is 
not spelled out this year, this will only invite wild media speculation about
future tax rises. The outcome for activity could be worse than saying
82nothing about tax increases in the Budget .
Sentance While there is still considerable uncertainty surrounding the way in which 
consumers will respond and the prospects for recovery are so uncertain, it 
would be wrong to raise taxes in the forthcoming Budget. This would give 
the wrong signal at a time when confidence is still fragile ... Only when it is
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clear that an increase in spending is firmly established should the 
Government consider tax changes to reduce public borrowing83.
In addition, Wynne Godley who, as we saw in the previous section, argued strongly that 
the existence of a large PSBR was not, in itself, cause for raising taxes also argued that 
tax increases in the next few years would be desirable. Godley’s recommendations are 
based on his belief that ‘domestic demand must be substantially reduced as a share of 
GDP’. The following passages outline why this is so:
Godley Investment and some kinds of public expenditure (for instance on education 
and school maintenance) should be increased relative to consumption as a 
share of domestic demand. Such a shift is needed to make the economy 
more competitive; it would also reduce the import content of demand as a 
whole, thereby generating a higher level of employment corresponding to a 
zero (or any given) balance of payments84.
Godley But policies to improve net export demand, while necessary are not 
sufficient to bring about the needed structural changes. Such policies can 
only be successful if domestic demand is substantially reduced as a share of 
GDP. For this reason - nothing to do with the PSBR as such - 1 am in full 
agreement with those who think that a substantial “fiscal adjustment” of a 
restrictive kind will be necessary at some stage in the medium term although 
the difference of analysis may lead to differences, of view about scale and 
timing. If my forecast for flat consumption this year is correct it would be 
unnecessary, and indeed quite wrong, to raise taxes immediately since this 
would have a damaging effect both on employment and on business 
confidence. It is not yet clear whether there will even be any need to raise 
taxes a year from now85.
This line of reasoning was also used by Andrew Sentance:
Sentance ... consumer spending will need to grow much more slowly in the 1990s - at 
or below the 2 per cent per annum trend rate of growth the economy 
sustained in the 1980s. There are two ways in which this might be achieved. 
The first is through the natural caution of consumers as they seek to run 
down the high levels of debt built up during the 1980s and during the 
recession. This is likely to be more pronounced in the early stages of the 
recovery, particularly if unemployment continues to rise. But if consumers 
are less cautious - which is likely if the recovery becomes strongly 
established - tax increases may be needed to contain consumer spending to
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avoid pushing up interest rates significantly and damaging investment
, 86prospects .
Finally, there were also a minority of economists on the Panel who called for the 
government to adopt policies designed to reinforce the recovery. As shown above, 
Gavyn Davies argued that ‘there should be an urgent package of measures to help the 
long term unemployed’. In addition, Wynne Godley and Andrew Britton also made 
similar recommendations, although only Wynne Godley calls for an increase in 
expenditure:
Britton The balance of risks points to a neutral Budget in March. I would especially 
advise against increases in indirect taxes at that time, because they would 
have a relatively quick effect on consumer spending and because they would 
increase prices. Within that neutral Budget more could be done (and should 
have been done some time ago) to ease the severity of the employment 
situation. Central and local government, and public corporations, should be 
delaying any measures which involve laying off workers until the recovery 
is well established, whilst bringing forward measures which involve taking 
on extra staff87.
Godley For the same reason that there is a case against raising taxes at once there is, 
in my view, a strong case for adding immediately to certain kinds of public 
expenditure, particularly on construction, in order to reinforce the recovery. 
If ever we achieve a “rebalanced” economy, with the various sectors in 
desirable and sustainable relationships to one another, the building industry 
will be enjoying a much higher level of activity than at present. There is, 
accordingly, no valid reason for delaying the recovery in demand for 
building and construction as this vital sector remains dangerously 
depressed88.
Summary
This section has outlined some the major fiscal policy recommendations of the Panel of 
Forecasters. Despite the range of analyses and forecasts there was a reasonably clear 
consensus that some form of fiscal tightening should take place over the next two to 
three years. On balance it was felt that the risk to the recovery was too great to justify 
tightening policy right away. Of the two economists who did not explicitly call for a 
further tightening of policy it is worth noting that Minford actually assumed such a 
tightening would take place. Finally, Andrew Britton, who called for a neutral Budget
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in his submission, remained agnostic about the need for further fiscal tightening, 
arguing that if the tax increases were to take place in the following financial year, then
89the current Budget was not the appropriate time to announce them.
Budget / Policy (Monetary)
As was pointed out in the previous section, the counterpart of fiscal policy is monetary 
policy. The obvious implication of the restrictive fiscal policies outlined above is that 
monetary policy should be relaxed if deflationary effects are to be avoided. However, 
the evidence suggests that changes in monetary policy may take 1 or 2 years before their 
effects are fully felt. Given that interest rates have fallen from 10 to 6 per cent in the 
previous six months and that the exchange rate has depreciated by 10-15 per cent, there 
is already a considerable monetary relaxation ‘in the pipeline’, the effects of which will 
be felt during 1993-94. Consequently, it is not at all clear whether interest rates should 
be raised, lowered or left where they were.
The monetarist members of the Panel, Minford and Congdon, are both 
reasonably clear that monetary policy needs to be relaxed, although the measure of 
monetary policy they use differs. For Minford, the appropriate measure is the real 
interest rate, for Congdon it is the growth of the money supply. Nevertheless, both are 
clear that monetary policy needs to be more expansionary:
Congdon The implied recommendation is that the authorities should raise monetary 
growth in the next year to 18 months, in order to halt the recession, but they 
should then gradually reduce monetary growth thereafter. The right figures 
are a matter of judgement, but broad money growth approaching 10 per cent 
over the next year would not carry any early inflationary risks90.
Minford At present [monetary] growth is too low: MO has recovered very recently 
but M4 remains exceedingly weak. In the US narrow money supply 
measures have been buoyant for many months but M2, the broader 
aggregate, has failed to respond and has been an accurate guide to the 
weakness of the economy in this period of high indebtedness and property 
market collapse. Recent UK experience is as unprecedented as in the US - 
the closest and most disturbing parallels are with the 1930s - and we should 
observe US behaviour closely for guides to our own responses. It suggests 
that money supply growth here is too weak to sustain recovery. US rates, it 
must be stressed, had to fall to 3 per cent to obtain signs of growth in M2 
and get a weak recovery going ... I welcome the drop in interest rates to 6
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per cent. However it is insufficient given the weakness of the money supply 
indicators. It is desirable to move decisively to stimulate these by dropping 
rates to around 3 per cent as in the US and Japan91.
Other members of the Panel also felt that some relaxation in monetary policy might be 
appropriate. For example:
Davies ... I would err in the direction of easing monetary policy too much rather 
than too little. At this stage I would favour making two more one point cuts 
in base rates in the next few months - though this should occur in the
92context of medium term budget consolidation .
Sentance If signs of recovery remain elusive during 1993, with inflationary pressures 
subdued, it should be safe to encourage growth by cutting interest rates 
further. Lower interest rates would ease business cashflows and encourage 
capital spending directly as well as assisting the process of reducing 
personal indebtedness. However, in the light of the very substantial 
relaxation in monetary policy that has already taken place, the case for 
lower interest rates should be judged against the evidence from the real 
economy - including survey data - as it emerges over the course of the
93year .
Finally, Wynne Godley also argued for a further relaxation of monetary policy, in terms 
of a lower exchange rate. However, given the very weak state of the economy he
foresaw no need to reduce interest rates to achieve this.
Godley Present circumstances are unusually favourable for a devaluation to be 
successful as there is a lot of spare capacity while unemployment is so high, 
and rising so fast, that a response in the form of much higher money wages 
is rather unlikely. At the time of writing, there has been a devaluation of 
about 16 per cent compared with mid-1992. While a devaluation of this 
size, particularly under the especially favourable circumstances of 1993, 
will greatly help net export demand, I doubt whether it will be enough to do 
the trick. There is room for disagreement about the size of the change 
required and I do not want to be too emphatic about this. My guess is that a 
further devaluation of about 10 per cent might be about right and I 
recommend that policy should now be directed towards achieving this 
result. I emphasise, however, that it is not at all clear to me that any further
reduction in nominal interest rates will be needed; any need for further
change will become apparent in due course. The real mortgage rate of
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interest (particularly the post tax real rate) has already fallen to an extremely 
low level94.
This view contrasts quite sharply with that of Andrew Britton, who considers only the 
case of an exchange rate appreciation:
Britton Policy measures may also be needed in response to exchange rate
movements. If sterling appreciates the opportunity should be taken to cut 
interest rates again. There is no merit in going back to an over-valued 
exchange rate, now that the link with the ERM has been broken95.
However, there were others who saw the benefits of lower interest rates but felt 
that the relaxation of policy which had already occurred was such that any cut might 
have to be reversed96. Thus:
Currie ... the Chancellor should be cautious about further policy relaxation if he is
to avoid a replay of the early 1970s. Interest rates should be cut further in 
the March Budget only if there is a willingness to raise them again later, 
possibly quite soon, and only with a firm commitment to bring down public 
borrowing in the medium term. Further cuts in interest rates now may mean 
sharper rises later97.
The problem is that the devaluation may lead to inflation which will eventually undo the 
competitive advantage gained. However, if interest rates are raised to combat inflation” 
then the exchange rate will rise and the advantage of the devaluation will be lost 
anyway. What is needed therefore is a restrictive fiscal policy to keep inflation under 
control, and low interest rates to keep the exchange rate competitive. Thus:
Sentance Just as a high real exchange rate and high interest rates squeezed investment 
and exports [in the 1980s], so a lower exchange rate and lower interest rates 
can achieve the reverse. The shift in policy seen since the middle of last 
year is therefore in-the right direction. However, at the same time, the 
growth in public and private consumption will need to be contained to 
release resources for investment and exports and avoid a build-up of 
inflationary pressures98.
However, it should be noted that the National Institute’s forecast was that the 
relaxation of monetary policy which had already taken place may be enough to ensure 
recovery. Thus, for Andrew Britton it was likely that the next move in interest rates will 
be up rather than down.
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Britton If the economy develops as our central forecasts predict, then we must 
expect increases in interest rates by this time next year [i.e. by Feb. 1994]. 
The medium term prospects for public sector borrowing, discussed below, 
may also necessitate tax increases in the December Budget this year - but 
we need to be sure first that the recovery has actually begun".
Summary
This section has outlined the recommendations for monetary policy made by the Panel. 
It is apparent that there was less consensus on this issue than on the matter of fiscal 
policy. Although some of the Panel (Congdon, Minford and Davies) favoured a 
deliberate policy decision to relax monetary policy in order to ensure recovery the rest 
of the Panel favoured a more wait-and-see approach. Godley thought that a further 
depreciation in sterling was likely without any further action on the government’s part, 
but Britton thought that action might have to be taken to stop it appreciating.
Conclusions
This chapter has examined the forecasts for the main economic variables made by the 
Panel of Independent Forecasters in February 1993. Each section has considered one 
aspect of the forecast and shown how the forecasters thought that part of the economy 
would develop during 1993. Of course the economy is not made up of discrete, isolated 
components and the connections between the various parts of the forecasts have been 
pointed out. In particular, the trade-off between growth and inflation, and the (assumed) 
links between wages and prices and between inflation (and hence growth) and interest 
rates have been highlighted
To try and summarise what has been said so far, we can say that the Panel was 
divided over whether the future for the UK economy was good or bad. The most 
optimistic was probably Tim Congdon, although Patrick Minford was also fairly 
optimistic about the longer term future. The reservations both economists expressed 
about the pace of growth reflected their beliefs, particularly Minford’s, that the 
government would not take the necessary policy decisions to ensure recovery. The rest 
of the Panel were basically pessimistic. Although Britton, Currie and Davies all 
forecast growth of between 1.5 and 2.0 per cent it is important to remember that this is 
still beneath trend, and therefore that the output gap would still be increasing. However, 
this is not why the group was pessimistic. Like Sentance and Godley, who forecast 
weak growth in 1993, this group did not believe that the recovery could continue for
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long without inflation rising. The reasons for this pessimism varied slightly but centred 
on either the ‘natural rate of unemployment’ or the high proportion of consumption in 
GDP.
We can also note that the Panel differed on how much they emphasised the 
importance of taking account of particular features of the 1992-93 economic situation, 
and on how much they were prepared to base their analysis on what had happened in 
previous devaluations. Britton and Currie, who probably have the largest econometric 
models, were the ones who paid the most attention to historical precedent. Godley on 
the other hand was the one who paid most attention to what made 1993 a unique 
moment in time. How this difference in emphasis maps on to forecasting is difficult to 
assess. However it does seem as if placing a heavy emphasis on precedent has the effect 
o f increasing the feeling of inevitability about the economic future. Focusing on the 
here and now, on the contingent, has the opposite effect. Forecasters, like Godley, who 
emphasise the importance of the present situation are thus more receptive to the idea 
that the economic outturn is something which can be influenced (just) through 
appropriate policy action. These distinctions are sometimes rather difficult to spot as 
they underpin the forecasts rather than feature in them explicitly.
Despite these differences in approach and theory, the Panel did manage to come 
to a fairly clear consensus when it came to practical action, even if it was, in effect, that 
the Chancellor should ‘wait and see’. In particular it was felt by five out of the seven 
that there would have to be a significant weakening of the economic situation before a 
further relaxation of monetary policy would be justified. The other two (Davies and 
Minford) both argued that the recovery was precarious and that a further cut in interest 
rates would have been appropriate. Similarly, six out of the seven felt that fiscal policy 
should not be tightened in 1993, and only Congdon was prepared to advocate tax 
increases in the March Budget. Thus, although the rest of the Panel believed that 
recovery was more or less underway, they did not believe the economy was growing 
sufficiently strongly for taxes to be increased.
The following chapters examine how these forecasts and policy 
recommendations were modified as the year progressed.
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Chapter 6
This chapter examines three main themes. The first of these is the forecasts produced 
by the Panel of Independent Forecasters in July 1993. The chapter therefore begins by 
discussing the changes which have been made to the forecasts since February (i.e. the 
ways in which things have not turned out quite as expected) and the differences which 
remain between the forecasters despite the fact that 1993 is now half over. This part of 
the chapter thus further explores the variability of the economic data and the 
contingency of economic forecasting.
The second theme discussed is the explanations given for the falls in unemployment 
which occurred during the early months of 1993; the third is the extent to which the 
PSBR is structural or cyclical (i.e. the extent to which it is a problem for policy or 
something which will correct itself). The analysis of these two debates is used to 
highlight a pair of related issues. The case of unemployment shows how economic 
forecasters must rely on all sorts of non-econometric theories and evidence in order to 
explain important parts of the economy. The case of the PSBR’s sustainability shows 
 ^how the same data set can support radically different interpretations of economic events. 
The chapter begins by examining the changes which have occurred since February.
July 1993 Report
Introduction
In July 1993 the Panel of Independent Forecasters met for the second time. Since 4 
months had passed since their first meeting in February, and 1993 was now half over, 
the July meeting gave the forecasters a chance to discuss how well their original 
assessments were matching up to the unfolding economic events. The first point they 
make is that, since February, it has become clear that the recovery in the UK economy is 
now underway, and that positive GDP growth has now officially been recorded. In 
addition, inflation has not risen as much as some had expected and unemployment, 
rather surprisingly, has fallen:
When we last met in February most of felt that there were prospects of at 
least a modest recovery in 1993. But we had little in the way of firm 
evidence to support that view. Since then non-oil GDP has recorded its first 
significant rise in three years, manufacturing output has risen strongly and
191
there have been four consecutive monthly falls in unemployment. These are 
welcome figures. Nevertheless, the pace of recovery remains uncertain and 
growth will be held back this year by the downturn else where in Europe. 
The likelihood of inflation exceeding the Government’s target range in the 
short term has receded somewhat, though for most of us it is still well 
within the realms of possibility. And while we do not know quite what to 
make of recent labour market statistics, we all believe that, in the short term 
at least, unemployment has either passed its peak or is close to it1.
Taken together these figures imply a rather better outturn for the first half of the 
year than was generally expected in February. However, despite their increasing 
certainty that some sort of recovery has begun, some of the Panel remain concerned 
about its robustness. This uncertainty about the strength of the recovery is reflected in 
their policy recommendations. One the one hand, the recovery is sufficiently on course 
for further increases in public spending to be unnecessary. On the other hand, policy 
should not be tightened just yet:
Although we do not agree on specifics, we are clear that fiscal policy should 
not be loosened - and for most of us a further tightening will at some stage 
be required. We also caution against a tightening in monetary policy at 
present, indeed in current circumstances if fiscal policy were to be tightened 
further than already announced, we would all recommend a loosening in 
monetary policy2.
The recommendations are thus that the overall mix of fiscal and monetary policy should 
not be changed at present. If however, fiscal policy were to be tightened then interest 
rates should be cut in order to offset its effects on growth. The maxim at work seems to 
be ‘When in doubt, do nowt’. The following sections outline the views of each of the 
forecasters in more detail. However, for brevity and to avoid undue repetition, the 
emphasis will be on forecasts for demand and inflation and, in particular, the changes 
made since February. Where no mention is made of a particular forecaster or forecast, 
the reason is that his position has not changed significantly from that outlined in the 
previous chapter.
GDP Growth and Demand
One of the things which is most noticeable about the July forecasts, as compared to the 
February ones, is that they are much more optimistic about the recovery in GDP. For 
example, forecasts for GDP growth for 1993 made in February ranged from 0.2 per cent
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to 2.0 per cent, with an average of 1.1 per cent. In July, the forecasts ranged from 1.25 
per cent to 2.0 per cent, the average being 1.5 per cent. The range of outcomes has thus 
halved in the 4 months since February and the average has also shifted upwards, 
reflecting the increased certainty that recovery is under way. Thus:
The rise in GDP in the first quarter was a bit stronger than most of us were 
expecting when we last met. While those of us who were anticipating 
weaker first quarter have revised up our forecasts for 1993 as a whole, the 
outturn has not affected our views on the pace of forecasts from now on. 
Our forecasts for growth in 1993 range from 1.25 to 2 per cent with an 
average of 1.5 per cent. Apart from Godley we all see growth prospects 
improving significantly in 19943.
This increase in optimism is a feature of all the forecasts, the sole exception being 
Andrew Britton who, as discussed in Chapter 5, was already more optimistic than the 
average. For Britton, things were turning out pretty much as expected - the domestic 
recovery was slightly stronger, the European recession slightly weaker but no significant 
changes were felt to be necessary:
Britton The evidence of a recovery in economic activity is very much in line with 
our forecasts since “Black Wednesday”. We have therefore left our growth 
forecast for this year unchanged at 2.0 per cent. We have therefore [sic] 
revised up our forecast of domestic demand a little, but this is offset by a 
rather less optimistic view of exports as activity in Europe weakens.4
For the other forecasters, however, it is clear that the growth in the economy, 
particularly the domestic economy, was stronger than they were expecting, mainly as a 
result of the change in policy since September 1992. Thus, for example, Tim Congdon 
writes:
Congdon Domestic demand has also responded positively to the change in economic 
policy since sterling’s departure form the European exchange rate 
mechanism on 16th September last year. The drop in the clearing banks’ 
base rates from 10 per cent to 6 per cent has stimulated worthwhile 
increases in mortgage commitments, sales of consumer durables and car 
registrations, which are good leading indicators of demand. The increase in 
exports and higher spending on such big-ticket items as houses and cars 
have already turned output around.5
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As a result of these ‘items of news’, Congdon raised his forecast of GDP growth from 
1.1 per cent to 1.5 per cent. Although his colleagues also increased their forecasts for 
GDP growth, many did so with reservations that Congdon did not appear to express. 
For example, although David Currie recognised that the increase in domestic demand 
was better than expected, this good news was tempered by other factors, particularly the 
deepening of the recession in Europe. Thus:
Currie Our view about growth prospects is broadly similar to that which we took 
in February. Although the world, and especially the European, outlook now 
appears even weaker than in February, so that the prospect for exports is 
less favourable, domestic spending appears correspondingly more robust. In 
consequence, our forecast for growth is at around 1.5 per cent this year and 
2.75 per cent in 19946.
The forecast for 1.5 per cent GDP growth is just 0.1 per cent more than the February 
forecast and, interestingly, is exactly the same as Congdon’s. However, this numerical 
similarity at the aggregate level is quite misleading, as the forecasts are actually based 
on very different analyses of the economy. Congdon sees the growth as being more or 
less equally driven by domestic demand and net trade - domestic demand increases GDP 
by 0.8 per cent, net trade by 0.7 per cent. Currie on the other hand believes that the only 
source of growth in the economy will be domestic demand, which will increase by 2.4 
per cent, and that net trade will actually reduce GDP by 0.8 per cent. In other words, 
despite starting from the same data and reaching the same aggregate forecasts, the kinds 
of recovery being predicted by Currie and Congdon are very different.
In fact, Currie and Congdon represent the two extreme views on the composition 
of the recovery, with the rest of the Panel somewhere in-between and nobody 
forecasting an entirely export-led recovery. Given the theoretical orientations outlined 
in Chapters 1 and 4, the positions of the other forecasters relative to Congdon and 
Currie are not hard to predict. The closest forecast to Congdon’s is that of fellow 
monetarist Patrick Minford, whose forecast for GDP growth of 1.5 per cent (i.e. the 
same as Congdon’s and Currie’s) includes a positive contribution from net trade of 0.6 
per cent.
Closest to Currie, in terms of the composition of his forecasts, is Gavyn Davies 
whose forecast is the only one, other than Currie’s, which predicts that net trade will 
reduce GDP. The rest of the Panel are somewhere in the middle. Britton and Godley 
project that net trade will contribute nothing to GDP growth and that any increase in
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activity will come solely from domestic demand. Sentance, on the other hand, projects 
a small positive contribution to GDP from net trade and is thus slightly closer to the 
Congdon-Minford pole than the rest of his mainstream colleagues.
In addition to the variation in the forecasts for the composition of the growth in 
aggregate demand (i.e. the split between net trade and domestic demand), each of these 
two components was also forecast differently by different members of the Panel. For 
example, when discussing net trade the Panel write:
While on average we expect no contribution to GDP growth from net trade 
in either 1993 or 1994, this conceals a wide range of views. For 1993 we all 
expect UK exporters to do relatively well against a weak world background, 
but we disagree on import growth, where our forecasts range from 2.25 to 7 
per cent. In part this reflects different projections of domestic demand but 
while we all expect a rise in import penetration, we differ as to its extent7.
Because the difference in net trade is, in part, due to the differences in forecasts for 
domestic demand, these will be examined in slightly more detail first. One interesting 
thing to note, and which is a change from the situation in February, is that the forecasts 
for consumers’ expenditure (an important part of domestic demand) are now much more
o
consensual, averaging an increase of around 1.5 per cent during 1993 . In each case, as 
in February, the forecast is the difference between two opposing effects. However, 
unlike in February, in each case the judgement is now fairly similar9. Thus:
Our forecasts for consumers’ expenditure are broadly similar and are each 
informed by much the same considerations: on the one hand the lagged 
effect of the easing of monetary policy since last September; on the other 
slow growth of personal incomes and the high level of personal sector debt. 
Falls in the savings ratio over the next two years are features of all our 
forecasts10.
The variation in their forecasts for domestic demand thus relate almost entirely to their 
forecasts for investment which, as the Panel point out, vary widely:
Congdon, Godley and Sentance expect a continuing poor construction 
performance, particularly in light of the oversupply of commercial property, 
and a fall in North Sea investment. The rest o f us are more optimistic, 
expecting high profitability to encourage investment despite continuing 
spare capacity11.
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The interesting thing about this bifurcation of investment forecasts is that all parties 
acknowledge the same influences - it is just that the weighting in the final mix is 
different. For example, the investment optimists (Andrew Britton, David Currie and 
Gavyn Davies) stress the manufacturing part of the total investment picture, but 
discount the construction part, and thus come to a fairly positive conclusion. The 
pessimists, on the other hand, minimise the importance of manufacturing and emphasise 
the weak state of the construction industry. Both positions are illustrated in the 
quotations below.
The ‘investment optimists’ make their case as follows:
Britton ... we really are saying that the surveys have been too pessimistic and that
when they filled those [CBI] surveys in, the firms didn’t realise the extent of 
the recovery that was coming along. I suppose basically it reinforces our 
optimism about the economy as a whole and that with a relatively buoyant 
outlook for exports and certainly much better profits this year, with that 
goes the expectation of more company investment ... I think that the 
construction sector has been particularly hard hit in the recession and that 
there was over-investment in the 80s, particularly concentrated in 
commercial property, so that it may turn out to be the sector which lags 
behind ... [but] I don’t think that the problem with commercial property 
need hold back the other sectors.12
Currie Maybe we are too optimistic, but we do see the corporate sector as largely
retrenched ... Profitability is not bad, and there is the prospect of growth. 
And against that background, and against the background of really quite 
intense international competition, we think companies will be investing. 
Now the objection to that of course is that they have got lots of spare 
capacity hanging over them from the past. I mean that is fine, except that 
quite a lot of investment may be done by different firms. Companies use 
new investment as a strategic weapon, and so you can get investment even 
when there is a significant element of spare capacity, and it is on those sort 
of views that we have based our forecasts ... Construction is in a bad way 
... [but] there is also the question of how you factor [it] in .. .The question 
is, is it going to go back to the old capital-output ratio, or have these sectors 
become more capital intensive, [and] therefore, will they be, in steady state, 
investing more than they were in the past? We’ve got an element of that 
second story in there, so the process levels out a bit earlier than it might 
otherwise have done.13
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On the other hand, the investment pessimists make their case as follows:
Sentance I think those of us who expect a weak investment growth, are looking at it 
from a point of view of building up the investment picture. I mean it is 
tempting to say that manufacturing is more competitive, manufacturing 
should be encouraged to invest as a result of that as the economy grows and 
so on, but manufacturing is only 20 per cent of the total investment picture, 
if we’re talking about total fixed investment. Now in terms of the total 
fixed investment, we have a large part in the construction sector, the 
property sector, [and] there is a massive overhang in property, which is 
going to dampen down that sector ... So although we expected some 
recovery in investment, we expected it to be muted14.
Thus, the reasons given are mirror images of one another. For the optimists, 
manufacturing dominates construction, for pessimists, construction dominates 
manufacturing. Finally, it is worth comparing the views of Andrew Britton and Andrew 
Sentance on the importance of survey data. Britton it will be recalled, believed that 
survey returns were inaccurate guides to investment because firms had underestimated 
the strength of the recovery.15 Andrew Sentance (who works for the CBI) however took 
a rather different view. When asked why he did not think that the increasing confidence 
of manufacturing firms would be enough to turn the total investment total around, it was 
survey evidence which he cited:
Sentance But you are going to have to get a very big increase in manufacturing 
investment, but we are not seeing them in our surveys yet ... The last time 
we did a survey of investment intentions in April, there was still more 
manufacturers planning to cut investment than increase it. So I would want 
to see more evidence from our surveys to convince me that investment was 
about to rise.16
Contrast this with David Currie:
Currie Even though surveys suggest that companies are at present operating below 
capacity, our view is that new investment will be profitable and will go 
ahead on this basis. We are forecasting a rise in whole economy investment 
next year of as much as 7 per cent17.
Leading indicator models and new data
Before moving on to the forecasts for inflation, there is one other point which comes out 
o f the changes made to the forecasts for demand between February and July, and this is
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the effect of new data. The example given below is taken from Gavyn Davies’s 
submission, and focuses on the use of leading indicator VAR models which are used by 
Goldman Sachs as a check on other forecasting methods.
As pointed out in Chapter 5, Gavyn Davies was initially one of the more 
pessimistic forecasters on the Panel. Although his February forecast for GDP growth 
was 1.5 per cent, and therefore above the average, it was based an assumed reduction in 
base rates to 4.5 per cent by the end of the year. Without this change in policy, ‘the
short and medium term outlook for the economy would be a good deal more
18pessimistic’ . In July his forecast was for GDP growth of 1.7 per cent. Superficially 
then very little has changed, with the forecast increasing just by 0.2 per cent. However, 
a closer examination reveals that several very significant changes have been made, as 
will be shown below.
Firstly, as was the case for many of his colleagues in July, Davies had to 
concede that ‘the recovery in demand in the early part of this year ha[d] been stronger 
than expected’19. However, this is not what is particularly interesting about Gavyn 
Davies’s forecasts. Rather what is interesting is his open and frank discussion about the 
use of leading indicator models in forecasting. Many other forecasters also use leading 
indicator models in their work and so the experiences described are no doubt familiar to 
several of his colleagues.
A leading indicator model is basically a regression model of data series which 
have, in the past, tended to precede the economic cycle. The actual list of variables used 
varies between forecasters and may be determined by theory or by empiricism. In his
submission, Tim Congdon identified ‘mortgage commitments, sales of consumer
20durables and car registrations’ as ‘good leading indicators of demand’ . The leading 
indicator model used by Gavyn Davies draws on a different set of variables but the 
principle is similar. The following discussion examines the interplay of leading 
indicator models, econometrics and judgement in the forecasts produced in July.
It has already been pointed out that Davies’s forecast for July was numerically 
slightly more optimistic than his February forecast. The question is, what are the 
sources of the extra growth? Like everyone else, Davies is attentive to the recent 
statistics. Thus he notes that:
D avies When my last brief for the Panel was prepared on 12 February, it appeared 
that output in the economy had stabilised, but there was still no unequivocal
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sign that a recovery had started. It now appears more certain that the trough 
of the downturn was reached in early 1992, initially followed by a period of 
flat activity. In the last four months, the balance of evidence has suggested 
that a clear recovery has now started, and that it proceeded at a rapid pace in 
the early part of this year. In the latest 3 months, manufacturing output has 
risen by 2.2 per cent on the previous quarter, and retail sales volume is up 
by 0.8 per cent. This evidence of strong growth has substantiated the earlier 
evidence of business surveys, which had turned up late last year. 
Furthermore, there have been definite signs of improvement in both the 
labour and housing markets, which had previously acted as severe 
constraints on consumer sentiment21.
It is interesting to note that the surveys which now reinforce Davies’s optimism are the 
ones he'discounted as ‘unreliable’ in his February Submission (see Chapter 5). In 
addition to the new data, another influence on Gavyn Davies’s forecasts is a leading 
indicator model. The model, which is a VAR model incorporating, amongst other 
things, business optimism, the exchange rate and interest rates, is used by Davies as a 
sort of consistency check on his forecasts. What the leading indicator model provides is 
a straightforward extrapolation based on past data. Although its output is not accepted 
- uncritically, forecasts which are significantly different from what would be expected 
based on past experience call for greater thought and explanation. Thus
Davies ... the main forecasting system has broken down at times in the past and if I 
get very, very different forecasts from what is essentially just a statistical 
forecasting framework, then I think about what I want to show in the main 
forecast ... [I]f I deviate a lot from a statistical forecast, from a VAR 
forecast, I want to know why.22
It is in this sense that the VAR model provides a consistency check.
The interesting thing to note_about the VAR model in July is that it is much 
more optimistic than it was in February. As Gavyn Davies explains:
Davies At the time of the Panel’s last report th[e VAR model] suggested that GDP 
growth in calendar 1993 could be around 1.5 per cent, accelerating to 3 per 
cent in 1994, assuming that base rates were cut to 4.5 per cent by the end of 
this year ... The model now predicts that GDP will grow by 4.4 per cent 
from 1993Q2 to 1994Q2 on the assumption that base rates rise to 7per cent 
by mid 199423.
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The significant point here is not simply that the forecast has doubled in 4 months, but 
rather the fact that it has increased at all given the change in assumptions which have 
been made. In February, the model was forecasting beneath trend growth in an 
increasingly relaxed policy environment - in particular interest rates were assumed to 
fall by 2 per cent. In contrast, the July forecast, which is for above trend growth, takes 
place in an increasingly deflationary policy environment which would, all other things 
being equal, be expected to reduce the forecast for GDP.
In other words, in the VAR model ‘favourable moves in several crucial 
variables, including business optimism, the corporate default spread, and lagged values 
of the real exchange rate, short term interest rates and the reverse dividend gap’24 mean, 
in the space of 4 months, that the setting of policy could change from being reflationary 
to being deflationary. With models as sensitive to the data as this it is no wonder that 
they are interpreted with considerable caution and, despite the model, Davies’s 
optimism remains tempered:
Davies The recovery in demand in the early part of this year has been stronger than 
expected, and leading indicator models suggest that GDP growth in the next 
12-18 months might be at an annualised rate of over 3 per cent... However, 
personal debt ratios remain high and consumers remain extremely resistant 
to any signs of higher inflation. The stop / start pattern which has been 
observed in the US recovery may happen here too, but it would be quite 
surprising, on current policy settings, if the recovery petered out 
altogether25.
Similarly, Davies remains unconvinced that his February policy recommendations were 
inappropriate:
Davies As noted above, it is not clear if leading indicator models based on past 
behaviour make sufficient allowance for the impact of the fiscal tightening, 
or indeed for the continuing overhang of personal sector debt. As US 
experience clearly demonstrates, it is possible that the consumer might be 
subject to setback as the growth in real disposable income begins to slow, as 
the growth in real personal disposable income begins to slow, and reliance is 
placed on a decline in the savings ratio. This adds to the case for interest 
rates to remain low over the next two years26.
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Inflation
Unlike the forecasts for GDP growth, the forecasts for inflation made in July were 
virtually unchanged from those made in February. In February the forecasts for 
underlying inflation at the end of 1993 ranged from 1.0 to 4.9 per cent (average = 3.5 
per cent); in July the range was 1.0 to 4.1 per cent (average = 3.3 per cent). 
Nevertheless, the forecasts were generally a bit lower (with the exception of Congdon, 
whose forecast was already lowest) and so the Panel could write:
Prospects for inflation in the very short term have improved since February. 
Now only Britton and Currie forecast that underlying RPI inflation will 
exceed 4 per cent in the next year, though this outcome would be within the 
margins of error for most of the rest of us. But we agree that any breach of 
the Government’s 1-4 per cent target range will be small.27
However, there is an important sense in which the unchanged inflation forecasts do 
represent a very important change. In Chapter 5, the idea of a growth-inflation trade off 
was introduced, the idea being that the benefit of extra growth comes with the cost of 
extra inflation. However, in this case we appear to be having the benefit of extra growth 
(remember that the GDP forecasts had generally been revised up) without the cost of 
- any additional inflation (if anything the inflation was even less that expected). What 
this points to then is not a change in the inflation forecast, but a change in the growth- 
inflation trade off - a change in one of the most fundamental features of the economy.
Given that the growth-inflation trade off is not the same as it used to be, the 
question now is: ‘What has changed?’ It is clear that prices have not risen as much as 
expected but, because a price index contains many different prices, it is still important to 
know which prices have stayed particularly low, thus keeping the increase in the overall 
index down. One possible explanation is that wages have not risen as much as might 
have been expected. In Chapter 5, it was shown that the inflation pessimists drew clear 
lessons from past experience, in particular the tendency for UK wages to rise following 
devaluation, and thus cancel out the competitive advantage gained from the lower 
exchange rate. Given that something in the economy has changed, might wage 
behaviour be the thing?
From David Currie and Andrew Sentance’s submissions it is clear the rate of 
increase in wages has remained very low and that this has helped to counter the 
inflationary effect of the devaluations:
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Currie While the devaluation of the pound has had an immediate impact on import 
prices and on producer input prices, the effect on final prices has been offset 
by falling wage settlements and a decline in unit labour costs in 
manufacturing.28
Sentance Though higher import prices following sterling’s depreciation last year and 
the planned increases in indirect taxation will exert some upward pressure 
on inflation, this is expected to be offset by the downward trend in unit 
labour costs.29
Gavyn Davies makes a similar point when he writes:
Davies Inflation pressures have remained extremely subdued, with labour cost 
inflation in the whole economy falling to 25 year lows. This has almost 
entirely offset the early effects of the sterling devaluation on domestic
30pnces.
However, despite the unusually low levels of wage inflation highlighted by all the 
economists, this exceptional state of affairs is not unexpected and does not, therefore, 
represent a break with the past relationships:
Davies The Goldman model of the wages and prices sector of the economy has not 
broken down during the recession, which suggests that there is nothing
inexplicable in the recent decline in labour cost inflation, given the
behaviour of the rest of the economy.31
Similarly, Andrew Britton, another inflation pessimist writes:
Britton Wage settlements remain low, but not lower than one would expect given 
the slack in the labour market and the headline figures for the RPI.32
The answer to the question what has changed is thus to be found elsewhere. However,
there is no clear consensus as to why inflation is lower than the pessimists expected and,
interestingly, most of the Panel would say that nothing much has changed at all. The 
reason is that although the rise in wage inflation has not happened yet it is still expected 
sooner or later.
Britton There remains a serious risk that underlying inflation will rise to over 4 per 
cent by the end of this year or early next year. With unemployment no 
longer rising, and with profits increasing sharply, wage claims are very 
likely to increase. The rise in import prices still implies higher prices 
sooner or later for a wide range of goods and services. But the more
202
protracted the adjustment the less the effect on inflation, at least in the short
33term .
Currie Underlying inflation (RPI exc. mips) should be within the target range this 
year but for much of next year we see it in the 4-5 per cent range, 
disappointing to the Government but a reasonable post-devaluation outturn. 
The critical variable is the earnings response - which is the cause of our 
pessimism. We expect earnings growth to pick up from 4 per cent this year 
to 6 per cent in the more buoyant conditions of 1994.34
In other words, there is nothing particularly troubling for the inflation pessimists about 
the lower than expected inflation figures. In particular, they do not force a re-evaluation 
of the econometric relationships involved, nor do they force a significant reassessment 
of the longer term outlook. The significance of the July report is that it gives the Panel 
an opportunity to compare events with their expectations. We have already seen that the 
pessimists interpret the figures as being consistent with their expectations, now it is the 
turn of the optimists.
For the inflation optimists the low inflation figures simply vindicate their theory. 
Of course, they also indicate that the pessimists are wrong, particularly about the longer 
term trend for inflation, which they said will be up towards 5 per cent. The optimists, 
who it should be remembered are in the minority, are forecasting that inflation will get 
lower and stay low for several years. However, it is worth looking at why the optimists 
think that inflation will be low, as their reasons are very different. For Congdon, it is a 
matter of theory - he has the right one; the others don’t. Thus he writes:
Congdon What is the crux of the difference between the consensus view [i.e. that 
inflation will on an upward trend from mid 1993, reaching 5 per cent by 
end-1994] and the position taken here? The answer is that the majority of 
economists believe that above-trend growth of output causes an acceleration 
in inflation, whereas- our view relies on the idea that the level of output 
(relative to its trend level) is the dominant determinant of the direction of 
inflation. The relative importance of the rate of change and or the level of 
output (and unemployment) in the inflationary process is an empirical 
matter which can be assessed by looking at past data. Lombard Street 
Research’s Submission to the Panel in February included an equation, based 
on data since 1963, in which the level of output, not the rate of change, was 
a powerful influence on inflation. Further work has not required any 
significant reassessment35.
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For Minford, the other inflation optimist, additional factors are at work. Like Congdon, 
he believes that the unemployment and spare capacity produced by the recession will 
have an effect. However, this is only a ‘temporary effect lasting as long as the recession 
i ts e lf .36 The other factor which influences inflation, particularly over the longer term is 
inflation expectations:
Minford If people expect inflation this very fact produces wage demands and price 
rises which then produce inflation on cue. Inflation is a self-sustaining
process through this mechanism. Once embedded in an economy it
continues, assuming no recession interrupts it, of its own momentum. 
Hence expectations are the cause of inflation, whereas boom and slump 
merely have temporary effects on it37.
The principal cause of Minford’s optimism is thus his belief that attitudes towards 
inflation in the UK economy have changed significantly in recent years. Somewhat
sociologically, and rather uneconometrically, Minford interprets recent events as
indicating a change in norms and values. Of particular significance in Minford’s story 
is the Conservative party’s victory at the previous general election which he attributes to 
this change in popular opinion. In a section of his submission entitled ‘The Death of 
Inflation’, Minford writes
M inford The Tories were re-elected [because they had been tough on inflation and 
prudent on public finances38], defying (apparently logical) predictions of a 
hung Parliament or worse. I believe we have evidence here of a new 
attitude to inflation among the British floating voters, no doubt dating from 
the late 1970s. Even now, astonishingly considering the seriousness of the 
recession, one finds that advice to cut interest rates is often opposed in 
popular discussion by those worrying about re-igniting inflation. That too 
suggests a quite new concern about inflation. Discussions in the 1970s were 
not in this mould39.
In summary then, the unchanging inflation forecasts seemed to imply two possibilities. 
The first was that the growth-inflation trade-off in the economy had changed and that 
more growth was now possible for a given amount of inflation. If true then this would 
represent an important development in macroeconomic reality. The other possibility 
was that nothing much had changed between February and July. The position taken by 
the Panel of Forecasters was, almost universally, the latter, that nothing had changed - 
the lower inflation figures were a temporary phenomenon, the result of firms having to
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keep prices down because of the depressed state of both the world and domestic 
markets. Thus the pessimists stuck to their original stories and, as a consequence, 
remained doubtful of the economy’s ability to grow significantly before inflation 
became a problem once again.
For the optimists things were different. For Congdon it was pretty much 
business as usual, as evidenced by his reference to an econometric equation. Of course, 
Congdon interpreted events as supporting his view that inflation was on a downward 
trend rather than an upward trend, but nevertheless, nowhere does he mention that 
anything fundamentally new is happening in the economy. Minford on the other hand 
does see the low inflation figures as portending something rather special. The point is 
not that Minford, on seeing the inflation numbers, suddenly realised that something new 
was afoot. He did not. Rather the point is that, in interpreting the numbers, Minford 
sees support for a position which does recognise that major changes have occurred.
M inford Whether the extraordinary wage figures of today simply mirror sharp 
recession we will not know for sure until the recession is over and they have 
stayed down on a new lower plateau. But my suggestion here is that they 
are taking on board the new political realities as they concern inflation. I 
note that there is little demand for stimulative policies. This cannot have 
escaped firms and workers engaged in wage bargaining. We have had a sea- 
change brought about by a huge deflation whose effects have basically been 
accepted by popular opinion.40
The potential for social change to undermine econometric models was discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4 and here we have an example of how difficult that judgement can be 
to make. In July 1993, growth was higher and inflation simultaneously lower than was 
expected. Does this imply that something in the underlying relationships had changed. 
For six of the seven it did not, for one it did. We shall have to wait until Chapter 8 and 
the final outturns to see who, if any, will admit to error.
Unemployment
As was discussed in the Chapter 5, all the Panel expected unemployment to remain at its 
current level for the whole of 1993, and for the majority, a further increase in the 
number of people out of work was likely. However, in early 1993 unemployment fell 
quite dramatically for four months running (for example, in both February and March 
the claimant count fell by 26,000). Both the timing and the scale of the falls were
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completely unexpected and, as such, they can be seen as something of an ‘anomaly’. 
Because of this, their interpretation was far from straightforward.
The problem faced by the forecasters was how to relate the falls in 
unemployment to what was happening in the rest of the economy. In other words, what 
did the unexpected decrease in the number of people out of work imply for the future? 
Had the UK economy come out of recession more quickly than was expected or were 
they a statistical aberration? Would the falls continue or would unemployment rise 
again? The difficulty of the situation is reflected in Gavyn Davies’s submission to the 
Panel:
D avies Considerable uncertainty surrounds the immediate outlook for 
unemployment. The declines of 26,000 per month in February and March 
may have been partly due to seasonal adjustment problems, but there have 
been some confirmatory signals of an improving labour market in other 
information, including business surveys, and the further fall o f 26,000 in 
May is obviously significant.41
By examining the ways in which these unemployment figures are explained I will make 
two points. The first is to illustrate the range of interpretations of the unemployment 
situation on offer at that time. The second is to illustrate how, as a result o f this 
inconclusiveness, economic forecasters must rely on all sorts of non-econometric 
theories and evidence in order to explain important parts of the economy. I begin by 
outlining the basic theories of unemployment used by the Panel members.
The Mainstream View
Amongst the Panel of Forecasters, and perhaps amongst economists more generally, 
there are two basic stories about unemployment. One remains true to the tradition of the 
Classical economists and focuses on the adjustment of wages, which is in turn 
influenced by institutional factors such as the power of trade unions, labour mobility 
and the benefit system. The other theory, which is of a much more recent origin, 
supplements this story with an additional factor known as ‘hysteresis’. The main 
distinction therefore is between those who believe in the idea of ‘hysteresis’ and those 
who do not.
Although the relative newcomer, it is the hysteresis model, developed by 
Professors Steve Nickell and Richard Layard42, which is the mainstream representation 
of the labour market. It is often referred to as the ‘Layard-Nickell’ model. The theory is
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based on the observation that after there has been a recession, unemployment does not 
fall back to the level it was before, but appears to remain ‘stuck’ at a new higher level. 
The basic ideas behind the model can be summed up as follows:
Britton If you look at the course of unemployment, it goes up in steps, and it never 
falls back to the extent it did before. This is perhaps due to the problems in 
the labour market or possibly the economy more generally. Hysteresis may 
not simply be a matter of people losing their ability, or their acceptability, or 
something in the labour force. But it may also be to do with the loss of 
opportunities for innovation, loss of investment and so on. So that you can’t 
simply assume that the capacity is in some sense ‘there’ to make up after the 
recession.43
The idea-of hysteresis is used slightly differently by the different members of the Panel, 
but the majority (Britton, Currie, Davies and Sentance) would all subscribe to 
something like the following ideas, expressed by Andrew Sentance:
Sentance Basically, my line of argument is that the genuine natural rate is probably 1 
to 1.5 million ... but overlaid on that you have this hysteresis effect which 
makes it appear that you can’t get unemployment down below 2 to 2.5 
million without inflation picking up.44
This situation arises because what hysteresis does, in effect, is reduce the 
available supply of employable people to a subset of the total number of unemployed. 
There are a variety of reasons why the unemployed might become unemployable, most 
of which are nothing to do with economics. Nevertheless, if a number of people are 
excluded from the labour force then the supply of available labour is reduced. It is basic 
economics that if the supply of something is restricted then its price will rise. However, 
it is equally basic to economics that a rise in the price of something will simultaneously 
act to reduce demand for it. What hysteresis does therefore is to create a new 
equilibrium in the labour market at which the price of labour will be higher, and the 
demand for labour lower. Of course, the unemployable labour force do not go away45, 
and so another effect of hysteresis is that the natural rate of unemployment, (i.e. the rate 
at which wages and prices are stable) appears to be raised. In other words, for the 
majority of the Panel, the total number of people unemployed is made up of two 
components. There are those who remain out of work because of the institutional and 
other features of the economy (i.e. the ‘natural rate’) and those who remain out of work
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simply because they are unemployed. These causes are quite separate and require 
different sorts of policies to tackle them, as is made clear by Andrew Sentance:
Sentance [It is important] not to confuse a sort of long run natural rate of 
unemployment with the effect of this hysteresis. I think the hysteresis effect 
can be tackled with the right labour policies and sensible macro 
management. The long-term natural rate may be the product of fairly deep 
structural things, the bargaining structure, union membership and so on, 
which can’t readily be changed by economic policy and may be very 
difficult to shift altogether.
To sum up, the idea of hysteresis is important for macroeconomic policy because 
it implies that being unemployed, particularly long-term unemployed, effectively
renders people unemploya£/e for the future unless special training programs are created.
Given the implications of perpetual unemployment for the public finances (not to 
mention the lives of those consigned to life on benefits) economists who accept the idea 
of hysteresis tend to favour fairly active labour market policies. The following 
sentiments are more or less typical:
Britton My interest [in unemployment] has been involved by wider social 
considerations - what is wrong with the state of the nation seems to me to 
have a lot to do with a sustained period of high unemployment, so that my 
interest in trying to think how full employment could be restored is not just 
a question of trying to make the economy grow faster and have more real 
wealth to distribute, but also feeling that socially it is divisive to have so 
many people unemployed and that they ought to be able to have a role to 
contribute to society beyond simply claiming their dole. Not just so many 
mouths to feed, but actually somebody with a useful contribution to make.46
Currie First of all, you don’t [reduce unemployment] through a big, rapid boom in 
demand because that will hit the buffers and you will jack up inflation. I 
think a steady increase in demand may well be helpful, because if there are 
people who are long-term unemployed, I mean you have these hysteresis- 
type effects in the labour market, you have a greater chance of correcting 
those against a background of steady growth. So maintaining a reasonable 
steady rate of growth in demand would be sensible. But I think it also 
requires fairly active measures, putting emphasis on labour mobility, putting 
more emphasis on training and skills, and possibly even with the tax scheme
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that Lamont introduced experimentally in the Budget [in which you can] use 
part of your benefit as a subsidy for your wage for a period of time.47
Sentance [You would need] things like better training programs for the long-term 
unemployed. I would actually have an employment program for the long­
term unemployed and link this very closely into the benefit system. You 
know, a report of this type doesn’t really give you [a] chance to expand all 
your ideas on this. These are my personal ideas, I’m not sure of the extent 
to which they are robust, but my notion is that you have to break into this 
cycle where people apparently appear to drop out of the labour market and 
come to exist on benefits for a long period of time ... [I think you need to ] 
have a set of macroeconomic policies which should enable you to have 
above trend growth and that you then have a sort of supply-push side policy 
in the labour market whereby you have active training for the long-term 
unemployed.48
The Classical View
The alternative to the mainstream account is that of the Classical economists. This is 
the basis of the approach favoured by Minford and Congdon. According to this view, 
hysteresis simply does not exist and the high levels of unemployment seen in the UK are 
the result of policy mistakes. However, as there are some differences between the 
importance which Minford and Congdon attach to the labour market, they are discussed 
separately.
Congdon’s theory of the labour market is fairly simple and reflects his own 
personal and political priorities. As noted in Chapter 5, it is Congdon’s belief that the 
responsibilities of government do not include the maintenance of ‘full employment’. 
Thus, Congdon seems to think about the labour market only to the extent that it affects 
his forecasts for other variables. In this analysis he relies heavily on the concept of the 
‘natural rate’ (defined, as before, as the rate of unemployment at which prices would be 
stable).
Like the most of the rest of Panel, Congdon believes that, at 2.9 million, 
unemployment in the UK was above the natural or equilibrium rate49. From this it 
follows that the competition for jobs must be strong and that the pressure on wages, and 
hence on prices, is correspondingly weak. This is all perfectly consistent with basic 
monetarist theories and so, to the extent that he discusses the labour market at all, 
Congdon’s story is fairly straightforward:
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Congdon Following the argument of Friedman’s 1967 presidential address to the 
American Economic Association and the associated literature, 
unemployment above the natural rate should cause a progressive 
amelioration in the unemployment/inflation trade-off as inflation 
expectations decline. It is this amelioration, combined with the scope for 
above trend growth because of high unemployment and abundant spare 
capacity, which justifies optimism about the medium-term outlook50.
However, it is worth noting that Congdon does not forecast a particularly significant fall 
in unemployment - in fact his forecast is for virtually no change at all. The important 
point about Congdon’s analysis is that he does not use the idea of hysteresis and 
consequently believes that inflation will remain low.
Patrick Minford is the only other economist on the Panel who uses this 
‘Classical’ sort of framework. Minford’s interpretation of the unemployment prospect 
is very different from Congdon’s in several respects. In particular, Minford sees no 
reason why unemployment cannot fall substantially (provided, of course, that the right 
monetary policies are pursued):
M inford  If unemployment can fall to 3 per cent or so from its projected 1993 rate of 
11 per cent, then output can rise approximately 10 per cent from its 
depressed 1993 rate: the reasons lie not merely in the greater employment 
but also in the likely ratio of output to employment which tends to rise in 
the upswing as productivity increases51.
Minford likes to think about the labour market in much the same as he thinks 
about any other market - the price varies so as to equilibrate supply with demand. In the 
case of the labour market, the price is the wage and the supply is the number of people 
available for work. At the equilibrium rate of unemployment, the price of labour is such 
that there is neither excess demand for, nor supply of, labour. Consequently wages 
remain stable. If there is no hysteresis then the economy will always return to this level 
of unemployment and, assuming no changes in productivity etc. the same level of 
output. These equilibrium levels of unemployment and output are the so-called ‘natural 
rates’.
For Minford, this is more or less all there is to the labour market - it is a process 
by which wages adjust and individuals price themselves into (or out of) work. The goal 
of economic policy is to create the conditions in which this adjustment can take place as 
efficiently as possible. What this means in practice is stable economic growth and
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social policies to reduce the potency of the factors which adversely affect this 
adjustment, principally state benefits and union power. Thus, in this respect, Minford’s 
story is not dissimilar to that of Tim Congdon - unemployment can fall and will not be 
impeded in doing so by inflationary pressures caused by hysteresis effects restricting the 
supply of labour. The difference between the Minford and Congdon is really in the 
speed with which these adjustments can occur. As noted in Chapters 1 and 4, Minford 
favours a new classical, rational expectations approach in which adjustment lags are 
very short, Congdon favours an adaptive framework within which inertia is typically 
much greater.
Another difference between Minford and Congdon is the importance they attach 
to labour market reform and the amount of effort they devote to thinking about it. Here 
Minford is much more active than Congdon, and has devoted a considerable amount of
52time to thinking and writing about it. Minford has very strong views on labour market 
policies and believes that the sort of active labour policies favoured by the mainstream 
Panellists are mistaken. In particular, he does not accept that the long-term unemployed 
are excluded from the labour market or that government training programs are necessary 
to provide the skills needed. Such intervention is unnecessary, he believes, because 
market forces will, as they have done in the past, ensure that appropriate training 
programs are provided:
M inford ... whenever we have had skills problems in the past, in the 80s, when there 
have been skills shortages they have turned out to be very short lived ... I 
mean, one famous skills shortage was computer software writers. Well they 
simply raised the wages and people came into software writing just like 
there was no tomorrow. And now of course there is a glut of computer 
software writers, which is fair enough, I mean that is the way markets work. 
So I am extremely sceptical of all this stuff, because it is economics without 
markets in my opinion. I mean training is very important, [but] it responds 
to market forces, like anything else does.
Thus, in Minford’s world, unemployment will automatically fall to the natural rate fairly 
quickly but can be held back by government or trade union intervention. In addition, 
employers and employees can be relied upon to arrange the appropriate training for their 
needs.
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The evidence for hysteresis
The preceding section outlined the most important elements of the labour market 
theories used by the Panel of Forecasters. The majority use a theory in which the rate of 
unemployment at which wages and prices will be stable (i.e. the NAIRU) is given by the 
equation:
NAIRU = Natural Rate + Hysteresis
Minford and Congdon, on the other hand, believe that the hysteresis component is zero 
and so their theory can be summarised as:
NAIRU = Natural Rate
Finally, Minford believes that unemployment could fall to the natural rate fairly quickly 
if the right policies are pursued. Congdon is less clear on the speed at which this 
adjustment will occur, but as long as unemployment remains above the natural rate, 
inflationary pressures would remain weak. My aim in this section is to outline some of 
the ways in which the existence of hysteresis is affirmed or denied and to show how the 
different theories are made compatible with the same data
The controversy in question here is the existence of hysteresis. Some 
economists think it exists, others do not. One way of answering the question might be 
to examine the relationship between unemployment and inflation. Given that the Panel 
are more or less agreed on what the natural rate of unemployment is (typically 1 - 1 . 5  
million) then, if hysteresis does not exist, inflation pressures should be weak at 
unemployment rates above this figure. If, on the other hand, hysteresis effects are 
significant, then inflationary pressures will be strong at unemployment rates around 1- 
1.5 million and only weaken at higher unemployment rates, say in excess of 2 million. 
In other words, this would seem to be a testable proposition which offers some way of 
deciding between Classical and Hysteresis theories.
In fact, the relationship between unemployment and inflation is used by those 
who believe in hysteresis to explain the behaviour of inflation in the UK in the 1980s. 
For example Andrew Sentance, who acknowledges that the natural rate hypothesis 
might have been adequate for explaining inflation in the 1960s and 1970s, describes the 
experience of the 1980s as follows:
Sentance In the 1980s, however, the forces that had contributed to this wage pressure 
were on the wane. Union membership and influence declined.
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Unemployment benefits also became less generous in relation to incomes in 
work. These factors should have pushed down the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. But their influence was offset by a rising total of labour 
market “outsiders”: long-term unemployment rose steadily, with the number 
out of work for over a year accounting for almost half the total. As a result, 
unemployment of over 3 million exerted little downward pressure on 
inflation, which settled at an underlying rate of 5 per cent in the mid- 
1980s53.
David Currie makes a similar point about the late 1980s:
Currie ... what I don’t understand is how [Patrick Minford] explains why inflation
rose as it did in the 87-88 boom, when unemployment was 1.6 million.
Evans Why? Because it was over the natural rate, you think it should have been 
pushing inflation down?
Currie Well, that’s the story, that’s the way it normally works ... I mean my 
observation is that it seems to me that the natural rate of unemployment was
above 1.6, 1.7 million, probably 2 million plus and I don’t really see any
good reason why that has changed, indeed if anything it may have 
deteriorated and may have risen, for hysteresis-type reasons, so the Non- 
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment may well be higher.
The case made therefore is that inflation has not been stable at unemployment levels 
beneath 2 million for the last 10 to 15 years. This then is taken as evidence for one of 
two things: either, the natural rate of unemployment is about 2 million or, the natural 
rate is lower, but overlaid on this is additional unemployment due to hysteresis. 
Clearly, the majority of the Panel favour the latter interpretation, but either way, the 
argument is that unemployment below 2 million has always been accompanied by rising 
inflation.
Minford is, of course, aware of these arguments and devotes much of his 
submission to a detailed rebuttal of them. Put simply, his argument is that the inflation 
and unemployment figures should not be interpreted out of context. Firstly, he argues 
that it is not at all clear that wage behaviour was particularly aggressive in the late 
1980s, given the headline inflation figures of that time:
Minford According to our story [the acceleration of average earnings growth from 8 
to 10 per cent] reflected rising inflationary expectations in the monetary 
context of 1987-90. It is actually remarkable how little wage settlements
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reacted to a sharp rise in inflation (from 5 per cent to 10 per cent on the RPI 
and around 8 per cent on ‘underlying’ measures); we explain this by our 
view that unemployment was above not below the natural rate. For all this 
period real wages were growing by substantially less than the 4.7 per cent 
1980s average growth in manufacturing (let alone still higher general 
industrial) productivity. The behaviour of expected real wages remained 
moderate even when unemployment had fallen to 1.6 million; this is 
inconsistent with a natural rate of 2.5 million and above54.
However, it remains the case that unemployment and prices both rose in the late 1980s 
and did so at unemployment levels well in excess of the ‘natural rate’. If hysteresis is 
not the reason then what is? It is Minford’s contention that the economic policies of the 
1980’s, particularly the decisions to raise interest rates to keep the UK exchange rate 
fixed to the German Deutchemark were to blame. In typically flamboyant prose he 
describes the policies of the 1980s as a violent assault on the UK economy:
Minford ... why did unemployment drop only to 1.6 million and why has it risen to 3
million-plus. Our answer is that owing to our tragic errors in monetary 
policy we had to hit on the head an economy which otherwise could have 
remained on a sustained growth path of some 3 per cent. After we had so 
hit it on the head we joined the ERM proper and continued raining blows on 
its prostrate body. The resulting deep recession has produced an 
unemployment ‘excess’ (over the natural rate) of over 2 million. In short it 
is recession, not the trends of a poorly-performing labour market, that has 
delivered us this apparent ratchet55.
Finally, Minford turns the spotlight back onto hysteresis. One of the most controversial 
claims of the hysteresis school is that the very fact of being unemployed can make 
individuals unemployable. According to the mainstream view:
Sentance ... rises in unemployment create a pool of labour market “outsiders” who
exert little influence on the process of setting wages and hence on inflation. 
They also become unattractive to employers as their skills degenerate and as 
their motivation to work ebbs away. After the deflationary shock has worn 
off, high unemployment therefore ceases to exert any further downward 
pressure on inflation56.
Minford flatly denies that this is the case. Minford’s objections to hysteresis are based 
on two main factors. The first is that there is no convincing (at least to him) 
econometric proof:
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Minford There’s no evidence for hysteresis. I mean people have tried to find it and 
this is what’s so pathetic. All the evidence on hysteresis suggests that the 
most you can find in the unemployment series is a root of 0.7 or something 
like that, I mean there is adjustment, there is slow adjustment, but there is 
not a unit root. When unemployment goes up it does not stay up, it slowly 
declines. The sort of equations that people have been quite clearly of this 
form
u = a  uM + ....
where a  is less than 1. It is only if a  is equal to one that you get the strong 
sort of hysteresis. And no-one can find it - it is just not there - there are 
exhaustive studies by Steve Nickell and Co. on this issue and they have said, 
basically, that there is slow adjustment. Well I’ve got slow adjustment in 
my model, its no big deal. I mean it might include hysteresis reasons, it 
could well be, although we don’t see it like that, its perfectly true. We don’t 
think that the adjustment of real wages, which is what lies behind our 
adjustment is anything to do with hysteresis. But it could be, it could be. 
There’s lots of reasons for adjustment in the labour market and this could be 
one ... but the key point is that it has not got a unit root. Its just a fairly 
long drawn out adjustment, so what’s new.57
As Minford is prepared to concede, the econometric evidence about hysteresis is not 
entirely conclusive, and it is possible that a weak form of hysteresis might be one of the 
reasons why adjustment in the labour market is slow. However, this is not the way that 
Minford likes to think about it. In fact, Minford has his own theory about why this 
adjustment is slow, which he explains as follows:
Minford I’m not saying that all the long-term unemployed will get back to work. My 
whole theory of the labour market, which I published in the middle of the 
80s in my Unemployment: Cause and Cure book, focuses on the idea that 
people get caught in the unemployment trap, don’t get back to work and stay 
long-term unemployed because their potential real wage is less than their 
reservation wage, influenced by benefits. So its no news to me that some 
long-term unemployed don’t go back to work. I’m simply saying that there 
is no reason to believe that just the fact of being long-term unemployed 
makes you permanently unemployable. I mean, that position is 
intellectually indefensible because it has been contradicted by the data. 
According to that theory the long-term unemployed should have stayed at 
1.3 million and all the reduction should have come in the short term
unemployed - those guys should have stayed out of work because they were 
all disillusioned, deskilled, demoralised blah blah blah - its bollocks, 
demonstrable bollocks.
Thus, the crucial test for strong hysteresis is to look at what happens to the long-term 
unemployed. According to the hysteresis argument, being unemployed, particularly 
long-term unemployed, makes individuals unemployable. According to Minford, this is 
not what has happened and the long-term unemployed are far more active in the labour 
market than the mainstream economists acknowledge:
Minford Then we must query the lack of pressure from ‘outsiders’, in the form of
long-term unemployed. Those unemployed more than a year had dropped 
by end -1990 to 0.5 million from 1.3 million in 1987. Furthermore the 
turnover rate in the labour market has risen to around 0.3 million per month, 
approximately 14 per cent of the labour force per year (against 9 per cent in 
1988). Hence some 50 per cent of the labour force may have ‘quit’ jobs and 
experienced a spell of unemployment in the last four years; even allowing 
for double and even more frequent spells among these this high rate of 
activity suggests a wide experience of unemployment in the labour force. 
This is not a picture of supine labour market behaviour by the unemployed, 
not even those with the misfortune to become ‘long-term’ unemployed. Nor 
would supinity be consistent with the other evidence we have on benefits 
(now exceedingly low relative to the wages of all but the lowest paid), on 
the greater vigour with which worktesting (plus job- and re-start 
programmes) is being applied, and finally the weakness of the traditionally
5 8militant unions .
What this means to Minford is that:
Minford There is no evidence that once people are out of work they stay out of work
for ever. Indeed there is positively contradictory evidence. I mean if you 
believe in anything remotely Popperian, you cannot sustain the view that 
long-term unemployed do not get jobs, because it is flatly contradicted by 
one important event - they did get jobs and they stopped being long-term 
unemployed. End of story, it seems to me, end of story. I mean you can’t 
even say that they might have not got a job, because they did get a job.59
However, despite what Minford says, this is not the end of the story at all. The 
hysteresis economists focus on those amongst the long-term unemployed who did not 
get jobs. As Minford would be quick to point out, this is a retreat from the strong form
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of hysteresis in which all the long-term unemployed remain out of work. Of course, 
given that the econometric evidence produced by Nickell and his colleagues suggests 
only slow adjustment, it is entirely possible that the strong form of hysteresis is a straw 
man erected for Minford’s rhetorical convenience. Either way, by focusing attention on 
the group which do not get work, the hysteresis economists maintain a space within 
which special measures to combat long-term unemployment are needed. The reason is 
that according to the hysteresis argument, the long-term unemployed are simply not 
competitive in the labour market. If these people could be brought back into the job 
market, then the supply of employable labour would be increased and its price held 
down (i.e. inflation would be stable at lower levels of unemployment). Thus, David
Currie argues that a scheme introduced as a pilot in the previous Budget, in which the
long-term unemployed can use their benefit to subsidise their employment should be 
widened:
Currie The usual objection to th[is sort of scheme] is ‘displacement’: you price 
yourself into a job, but you price somebody else out of a job ... but it seems 
to me that even if displacement is 100 per cent there is a benefit, because 
although you have moved somebody into work and somebody else out of 
work, the person you have moved out of the unemployed into work was, in 
the long-term, unemployable, and you have given them job experience. So 
there is some benefit even if there is total displacement, because it is-
undoubtabley the case, and there is a lot of empirical evidence, that if the
unemployed were all short term unemployed, then the sustainable level of 
unemployment without inflation would be lower.60
To summarise what has been said in this section, hysteresis is a controversial topic in 
labour market economics. The majority of the Panel believe that it exists and that 
simply being long-term unemployed will render some people (though not all) 
unemployable. As evidence for this, the hysteresis economists point to the behaviour of 
unemployment and inflation over the past 10 to 15 years and conclude that 
unemployment cannot fall much below 2 million without wage pressure leading to a 
surge in inflation. Consequently this group recommends that measures be introduced to 
increase the ‘turnover’ in the labour market and to minimise the number of long-term 
unemployed. In this way the supply of employable labour will increase, and the stable 
inflation level of unemployment will fall. Without such measures the future is bleak.
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In opposition to this, Minford argues that there is no such thing as hysteresis. 
The apparent ratchet-like rise in unemployment is, on his account, the product of policy 
mistakes destroying growth and creating recession. The long-term unemployed are not 
unemployable, as evidenced by the fact they do get jobs. In Minford’s world, the 
solution is to reduce benefits (and the marginal tax rates faced by those coming off
benefits) so that it is actually worth working. In fact, Minford believes that the labour
market policies already enacted have made most of the necessary changes, and he 
therefore believes that, in 1993, the natural rate of unemployment was below 1 million. 
The future is therefore potentially very promising for Minford, provided that the right 
polices are followed. The contrast between the two views is nicely summarised by 
Minford as follows:
Minford They are saying that the labour market will heat up very rapidly the moment 
the slightest [let-up occurs] and I believe that we are going to see some sort 
of slow recovery, that’s true, unemployment probably falling again, and that 
we are going to see wages going on plunging ... They are saying that the 
labour market rigidity and the natural rate are very high, because of insider- 
power or whatever it might be and so they are taking this view, and I don’t 
believe there’s a shred of evidence for it, but that’s what they’re sticking to. 
So I am looking forward to that one, because I think the evidence is going to 
be very strong.61
However, this discussion focuses very much on what unemployment is likely to do over 
the next few years. Also of pressing concern to the Panel was what it had been doing 
over the preceding few months, in which unemployment had fallen rather unexpectedly. 
As the remarks by Gavyn Davies made clear, the uncertainty over the current situation 
made forecasting very difficult. Thus, whatever the theoretical orientations of the 
economists, it is important that they know where they are forecasting from. It is this 
discussion which I examine in the next section.
Clutching at straws?
The aim in this section is to show how economic forecasters deal with unexpected 
events. Throughout this thesis a distinction has been drawn between the general case 
and the particular instance. It has been argued that econometrics is most useful in those 
circumstances where the present and the future follow the patterns set down in the past. 
In Chapter 5, which discussed the forecasts made in February, it was clear that none of 
the economists forecast a significant fall in unemployment during 1993. Thereafter
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their forecasts were for unemployment to stay more or less flat or fall slightly. Only 
Patrick Minford expected unemployment to fall by more than a quarter of a million by 
the end of 1994. These forecasts were all based on what had happened to 
unemployment in previous economic cycles. Typically, unemployment lags the 
economic cycle, and continues to rise even after economic growth picks up. For 
example, after the 1981 recession, unemployment continued to rise for a further 2-3 
years, In general, therefore, unemployment would not be expected to fall so soon after 
output stopped contracting. However, this was not what happened in 1993. After rising 
quite sharply at the end of 1992, unemployment fell in the early months of 1993. As the 
Panel’s report makes clear, the fall in unemployment is a clear deviation from past 
trends:
The falls in unemployment in the last four months have come as a surprise 
to all of us. They have come at a much earlier stage in the cycle than would 
have been expected in the light of past experience, and the turnaround from 
the rises at the end of last year was unprecendentedly large.62
The problem for the forecasters is thus to adduce specific reasons as to why 1993 is 
different from similar stages in previous economic cycles. In other words, what needs 
'  to be established are the particular features of 1993; the features which, when 
acknowledged, will both preserve their general model (be it hysteresis or classical) and 
also account for the discrepancy between that model and the- economy. The report 
contains several hypotheses and these are discussed in more detail below. The least 
controversial of all the explanations put forward is that the falls represent a correction in 
the labour market:
At least part of the reason for the falls in unemployment is that firms took a 
very gloomy view in the second half of last year [i.e. 1992] and laid off 
more workers than the subsequent conditions dictated.63
Thus, it is suggested that the anomaly is not the fall in unemployment, but the rise 
which took place at the end of 1992. This rise is then explained as being a collective 
misjudgement on the part of employers who were unnecessarily pessimistic about the 
recovery prospect and consequently laid off too many workers. One implication is that 
if only firms had had a better understanding of the economy, they would have behaved 
differently. At the very least, if this is the case, then the falls represent a move towards, 
and not away from , a more normal state of affairs.
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This sort of equilibrium story is no doubt appealing to many economists, but, as 
the passage quoted above concedes, it is not sufficient to explain all the fall in 
unemployment. The reason why the ‘labour-market correction’ explanation is 
unsatisfactory is that it quite clearly implies that the number of people in work, i.e. the 
employed total ought to be rising (because unemployment is falling as people get jobs). 
However, the increase in employment is not sufficient to match the fall in 
unemployment; hence the use of the qualifier ‘At least part of the reason . . . ’ in the 
passage quoted above. Additional reasons (i.e. apart from the changing sentiments of 
employers) are therefore needed to establish the particularities of 1993. The ideas 
suggested include lay sociology, demographic changes and economics, and they are 
explained in the Panel’s report as follows:
Other possible explanations [for the falls in unemployment] include:
-  the claimant count may overstate the underlying fall, for 
example if benefit offices are finding it easier to prove that 
applicants are ‘not actively seeking work’ now that the 
economy has turned the comer and there are more jobs around;
-  with unemployment rates more evenly distributed across 
regions, unemployment may react more quickly to increases in 
employment opportunities, and thus could fall at a lower level 
of vacancies than in past episodes;
-  the fall in employment might reflect an increase in firms’
desired employment levels due to falling real unit labour
*  64 costs .
Of these three reasons, the first is the most interesting. Advanced by Andrew Britton it 
is revealing for the amount of lay sociological theory which economists can put into 
explaining the actions of economic actors.
According to Britton there are two possible interpretations of the unemployment 
figures. One is that there has been a significant change in the way the labour market 
responds to the economic cycle; the other is that nothing much has happened at all. 
Britton seems to favour the latter view, arguing that what we are seeing is a change in 
the claimant count (i.e. a change in the output of a particular administrative institution) 
and not a change in economic conditions:
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Britton Although we were expecting a rise in the first quarter, we were surprised 
(like everyone else) by the fall in unemployment. Other labour market 
indicators do not suggest such a rapid turnaround. Part of the explanation 
may well be that the relationship between claimant and non-claimant job­
seekers changes with the prospects for recovery, as it appeared to do also in 
the late 1980s. We have therefore revised down our forecast for the 
claimant count, without substantially changing our view of the real slack in 
the labour market.65
In other words, Andrew Britton is arguing that the fall in the claimant count represents 
just that - a change in the number of people eligible for a particular state benefit. 
According to this view, a fall in the claimant count need not reflect the change in the 
total number of people actually out of work.66 As a way of justifying this, Andrew 
Britton refers to the different ways in which the various data for the number of people in 
or out of work are collected. His interpretation is based on the fact that the ILO Labour 
Force Survey, which is where the employed total comes from, also includes a figure for 
unemployment. However, the Labour Force Survey includes as unemployed anybody 
who has looked for work in the previous month (regardless of their eligibility for 
unemployment benefit). On this (arguably more inclusive) measure, unemployment has 
not fallen so dramatically, and is therefore expected to match up with the estimated 
increase in employment more closely:
Britton ... the first reason given in the main body of the report ... is to the effect 
that this is a change in the claimant count, which is probably not reflected in 
what will become the ILO measure, which is the survey based one. 
Probably you will find that the fall in unemployment on that measure has 
not been so great.
However, the claimant count has definitely fallen significantly and so there remains a 
discrepancy which needs to be accounted for - where have the people gone who stopped 
claiming unemployment benefit, and do not appear in other measures of unemployment 
but did not enter employment either. One possible explanation is that these ‘missing’ 
people have left the labour force altogether and are thus neither ‘employed’ nor 
‘unemployed’:
Britton We know that there have been a lot of people leaving the measured labour 
force over a period of a year or two and that these are particularly men 
approaching retirement age and also people staying on in education or 
training for longer, so that they are not either employed or unemployed.
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This is the point that was made in the [National Institute] Review, and is 
backed up by the Labour Force Survey, which runs up to the early months of 
this year.
However, as Britton admits, it is unlikely that ‘the number of claimants, suddenly 
started dropping [because] a whole lot of people sort of voluntarily left the labour
67market all in a rush in February, March, April and May’. Rather, he suggests, what 
may have happened is that a change in administrative procedures within the Department 
of Employment has resulted in a greater than usual success rate in getting ‘getting some 
of the people they had coached in how to do job interviews and so on, in getting them to 
the front of the queue’. This could happen without increasing the overall size of the 
labour force (however measured) because
Britton ... they would have got the jobs that were going, in preference to the people 
who might have come in from outside the labour force. What normally 
happens in previous upturns has been that a lot of the jobs at the beginning 
go to, say, married women looking for part-time work ... The other 
possibility is that they got a bit tougher on the availability of work test, and 
it is a bit easier to enforce that test when there are jobs to point people to. 
As long as there is no work to be had, there is no way of disproving that 
somebody says they are looking work, [but] if  they start refusing offers of 
employment then they may lose their benefit.
Thus, in order to explain the unemployment, economists resort to a sociological account 
of how benefit agencies will react under certain social and political pressures. In this 
way, the peculiarities of 1993 are explained in terms of an administrative change which 
does not threaten the general model nor have any great implications for the forecasts for 
other economic variables. In particular, although the claimant count is falling, 
employment is not rising unusually fast and so neither economic growth nor inflation 
are likely to pick up much. All that has happened is that the jobs which were going 
were taken by a different group of people than would have previously been the case.
This is an interesting and quite subtle explanation from an economist who has
68actually worked for the Department of Social Security. However, it is does not seem 
to be one which was widely supported by the other Panel members. For example David 
Currie commented that the ‘argument that [Andrew Britton] was trying to advance, the 
argument that the number of people on the claimants register was falling ... didn’t get 
much support in discussion.’69
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A similar lack widespread support can be found for the other ideas. For example, 
the second alternative put forward in the report was that unemployment was less 
concentrated in any one particular region than had been the case in previous recessions 
and that this meant that new vacancies were more likely to be filled. Unlike the 
‘claimant count’ explanation, which was based on the premise that nothing much had 
changed, the demographic explanation is the clear assertion of particular features which 
differentiate the 1990 recession from previous ones. The distinction being made is that 
previously unemployment blackspots have been geographically separated from areas of 
new employment (e.g. the North-South divide). This has meant that new job vacancies 
have appeared in areas of relatively high employment, and expanded the workforce in 
certain regions, but done very little to reduce the unemployment in other regions. The 
claim being made for the 1990s is that this polarisation is much less severe and so 
unemployed workers and employment opportunities are spatially better matched. 
However, at least some of the Panel doubt that such generalisation reflect the local 
picture
Britton ... if you look at actual localities, you still have the blackspots, and people 
don’t seem to travel to work that much. You can get neighbouring areas 
which have very high and very low unemployment, so that wasn’t 
particularly my idea, it seemed to me quite an original stab at an 
explanation, but not one that I would particularly want to back.70
Although many of the Panel did not talk about forecasts for unemployment in great 
detail, preferring silence to speculation, it is clear from their forecasts that the falls in 
unemployment were interpreted as a temporary blip. This is evidenced by the fact that:
Britton ... the group as a whole are not particularly optimistic about unemployment.
After having thought of all these explanations, the overall opinion was still 
that unemployment was unlikely to fall very much more this year. And 
several of the forecasts actually show it going up again
The implication of this is that the labour force is not responding more quickly, for 
whatever reasons, to the growth in output than it has done in the past. In other words, 
the general case remains applicable. The attitudes of David Currie and Gavyn Davies 
are more or less typical:
Currie I don’t feel any strong view on it, so we tended to run with the view that 
there was an excess shake-out in the autumn and then a correction, a bit, and 
then we may see some falls and perhaps even a rise. Since we don’t really
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know what is going on it is very hard to forecast. Its clear that 
unemployment will be falling by probably autumn, but that is what you 
would expect anyway.71
Davies Considerable uncertainty surrounds the immediate outlook for 
unemployment. The declines of 26,000 per month in February and March 
may have been partly due to seasonal adjustment problems, but there have 
been some confirmatory signals of an improving labour market in other 
information, including business surveys, and the further fall o f 26,000 in 
May is obviously significant. Although recent figures may have been 
favourably affected by the fact that too many jobs were shed by many firms 
last autumn, I assume that the trend has now genuinely turned, and my 
forecast shows the claimant count falling to 2.9 million at the end of 1993 
and to 2.7 million a year later72.
Finally there was the explanation drawn from economics, according to which the 
falls in unemployment were the counterpart of a rise in employment. According to this 
story, falling real wages mean that firms can take on more workers, hence bringing 
down unemployment. The economist who propounded this view most forcefully was 
Patrick Minford. His view of flexible labour markets naturally lends itself to this sort of 
story in which wages adjust quite rapidly to move the economy back towards its 
equilibrium path.
Minford ... I’m very encouraged actually by what you might call the supply side 
developments, which seem to be good. The fact that unemployment’s fallen 
... I think it is people pricing themselves into jobs, in the sense that they are 
so desperate to get work. They are saying to firms, ‘For God’s sake, you 
know, anything you say.’73
This ‘economics’ based account is particularly interesting as it is based on exactly the 
same evidence as the ‘sociological’ account, but reaches completely the opposite 
conclusions. In particular, Patrick Minford was not at all troubled by the discrepancy 
between the fall in the claimant count and the rise in employment. According to 
Minford, because the two sets of figures are collected differently they should not be 
expected to match up exactly:
Minford ... in the first quarter [employment] went up by about 19 000
Evans B[ut not by] the same amount as the unemployment went down?
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Minford Not by the same amount no, but then you see, one is a sample and the other 
is a claimant count, so you wouldn’t expect that. But there was a definite 
rise. One went down and one went up, the exact numbers are not the same. 
I think the unemployment’s gone down by 40 000 or something, and the 
employment’s gone up by 19 000 ... I don’t think that that is inconsistent.
In other words, an inconsistency which demands explanation in the National Institute is 
not an inconsistency at all in Liverpool. Moreover, the implications of these two views 
are quite different. In the more sociological economics of the National Institute, the 
patterns of the past are expected to be repeated, and so unemployment falls only slowly. 
In the flexible economy of the Liverpool model, the falls in unemployment are caused 
by growth in the economy and reflect the increased flexibility of the UK labour force - 
there is-therefore every reason to expect that the falls will continue. But, Andrew 
Britton points out:
Britton If that is the interpretation, that the people who are unemployed now are 
more flexible, then the outlook for getting unemployment down over the 
next year or so would also be better. It is not just an explanation of the first 
few months, but it would be a reason for optimism [more generally]. But 
the group as a whole are not particularly optimistic about unemployment.74
Minford, as we have seen, however is confident that, with falling real wages, output can 
grow and unemployment fall without inflationary pressures:
M inford There is definitely a rise in employment in the first quarter, so I think these 
people are just going to be proved to be much too pessimistic about the 
operation of the labour market75
Conclusions
The preceding section have outlined some of the main features of the economic debates 
over employment and unemployment. The discussion has included both theoretical and 
practical issues highlighted by economists. From a theoretical perspective, the 
controversy over the importance of hysteresis was discussed and it was shown how 
neither side can convince the others. For example, the allegedly powerful relationship 
between unemployment and inflation was deconstructed by Minford and shown to be 
the product of poor policy making. Similarly, econometric evidence was also shown to 
be less than convincing.
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On a more practical front, some of the problems associated with forecasting 
unemployment were discussed. It was shown how the general propositions about 
unemployment were maintained in the light of contradictory experiences and how novel 
strategies, drawing on a range of non-economic evidence were developed in order to 
account for these. In addition, the same data was also consistent with two different 
explanations, and some of the implications of the differing views were highlighted.
The PSBR, Trade Deficit and Fiscal Policy in the Medium Term
The other important topic discussed at the July meeting was the medium term outlook 
for the UK economy. This was a topic over which there was considerable disagreement 
and which exposed the fragile nature of the consensus reached in the February meeting, 
(at which 6 out of the 7 had agreed that fiscal policy should not be tightened during 
1993). Although the debate was ostensibly about what would happen to the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) over the next few years, it also touched on other 
important issues, including the rationale for macroeconomic policy itself. The debate is 
interesting because it highlights very clearly how different policy and ideological 
priorities can colour interpretations of the same data. This section begins with a brief 
summary of the PSBR position in mid-1993 and highlights some important links 
between the PSBR and unemployment and net trade, both of which influence its future 
path.
As discussed in Chapter 5, public spending in the UK had increased relative to 
the revenue from tax receipts during the recession. As a result, the government had 
been forced to increase its level of borrowing in order to meet its expenditures. The 
PSBR for the year 1993-94 was forecast by the Panel to be between £41 bn and £52 bn. 
However, this, in itself, was not really the problem. As Andrew Britton remarked in his 
submission to the Report ‘a large borrowing requirement is the correct response to a
76long and deep recession.’ In addition, with the recession now over, the expectation 
would be that the PSBR would fall as the economy picks up. This process is very much 
part of the general pattern of economic events and, as such, was anticipated by all the 
forecasters:
Public finances lag the cycle. Thus, despite the evidence that the recovery is 
underway and that employment prospects may be improving, we all expect a 
worsening of the PSBR in 1993-93. However, the average of our forecasts 
is below the Government’s projection of £50 billion. Cyclical
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improvement, coupled with the tax changes already announced, mean that 
we all forecast a reduction in the PSBR in 1994-95, but only Minford 
expects a dramatic change. His forecast is conditioned by an assumed 
reduction in public spending in 1993-94 followed by severe restraint77.
The reduction in the PSBR should come from several sources, the most important of 
which were identified by Andrew Britton as follows:
Britton At this stage in the cycle, the finances of the public sector should improve 
quite sharply, because company sector taxation, which is the most cyclical 
part, actually lags behind because they pay so much in arrears and, in a year 
or so’s time, there ought to be a substantial increase in corporation tax 
coming from the improved profits which are earned this year. And that is a 
very important component of the cyclical part of the borrowing. And 
similarly with unemployment. Normally unemployment wouldn’t be falling 
until the recovery is well underway, but as soon as unemployment starts 
falling that is a significant saving on expenditure. It is actually not only 
unemployment benefit but when the labour market picks up, you know all 
this discussion about invalidity benefit and one parent benefit, there are jobs 
for people and they come off a number of benefits, as well as 
unemployment benefit. Or people who are essentially out of work get put 
on invalidity benefit rather than unemployment benefit, because they are 
slightly ill, but when there is a boom in jobs, their disability will not actually 
prevent them from working. So it is really a matter of social security 
generally being very highly geared to the state of the cycle. So if  we have 
got any perceptible recovery at all, we ought to get the public sector 
finances improving in the next couple of years.
A similar point by Patrick Minford was highlighted in Chapter 5 in which the PSBR 
was also discussed and Andrew Sentance has also suggested that for every 1 per cent
growth in GDP, the PSBR should be reduced by half a per cent of GDP.78 In other
words, this proposition is not at all controversial.
At the February meeting, the discussion of the PSBR was concerned mostly with 
policy implications of the large PSBR. At that time, the debate centred on the issue of 
how much of the deficit was cyclical and how much was structural. The consensus then 
was that there were elements of both and that taxes would have to rise in the future, 
although only Currie and Davies wanted the measures to be spelt out in advance.
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In July, after the Chancellors March Budget in which the sort of post-dated tax 
increases favoured by some of the Panel had in fact been implemented, the Panel 
returned to the topic of the PSBR once again. In the July meeting the focus was slightly 
different from February. Although there was some discussion as to whether or not the 
tax increases announced were sufficient to ensure an appropriate deficit in 3 to 4 years 
time (an almost impossible question to answer) the Panel also wanted to connect the 
PSBR to other problems in the economy, in particular to the so-called ‘twin-deficit’ 
problem. By doing this, questions of fiscal policy, which had previously been related 
solely to the need to reduce PSBR, become enmeshed in other debates about the future 
development of the UK economy.
Has Enough Been Done?
In their February Report, 6 out of the 7 Panel members agreed that fiscal policy ought 
not to be tightened in 1993, but that some policy response would probably be required 
later. It should be noted that Patrick Minford actually thought that the PSBR was 
cyclical and would therefore disappear without any special measures. Nevertheless he 
actually assumes that there will be a fall in real public expenditure 1993-94 followed by 
severe restraint in subsequent years, and so he does, implicitly, forecast a tightening of 
fiscal policy. The only dissenter over fiscal policy in the February Report was Tim 
Congdon, who agreed that tax increases were necessary, but wanted the process to start 
straight away.
In making recommendations about the future direction of policy, one important 
consideration is the assessment of what has already been announced. In the March 
Budget, the Chancellor announced what were generally regarded as fairly tough 
spending limits, together with a series of tax raising measures, including the widening of 
the VAT base to include fuels. In line with the Panel’s recommendation, none of the 
fiscal measures were to be implemented in 1993. How then did the Panel react to the 
Budget?
In general, the Panel did not think that the measures proposed by the Chancellor 
had done enough to ensure an adequate reduction in the public deficit and four out of the 
seven called for additional fiscal tightening
Congdon, Currie, Davies and Sentance all advocate further discretionary 
tightening in policy to reduce the deficit by 1-1.5 per cent of GDP. This 
would provide greater certainty that the debt position will become
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sustainable. For some of this group, the measures should be phased in 
gradually79.
Of the remaining three, Britton is also somewhat sympathetic towards this view. His 
view, which is consistent with his reluctance to pre-announce policies in February, is 
that there may be reasons why the government would prefer to take such decisions in 
1993 (e.g. rather than in the run-up to an election), but that such policies are not really 
necessary yet.
Britton the natural buoyancy of the revenue in the recovery, even if it is not a very 
long recovery, should get us back to the position where we are still 
borrowing, but not borrowing at an explosive rate. So I’m not pressing for 
further tax increases ... I am quite prepared to accept that the government 
may prefer to put up taxes. I don’t feel that they have to, but they may
prefer to up taxes, in which case it is very important that they should
accompany that with a cut in interest rates in order to maintain the strength 
of the recovery.
Similarly, those members of the Panel who do advocate further fiscal tightening 
recognise that it is not clear that the policies can be justified simply in terms of the
- Budget deficit. For example, Gavyn Davies writes:
D avies On my central projections for GDP growth, the PSBR would ‘automatically’ 
fall to about 4 per cent of GDP by 1997/98 - not far from a reasonable 
medium term target, which I suggest should be around 3 per cent of GDP 
(with a debt/GDP ratio of 60 per cent). This suggests that the need for 
further fiscal action to reduce the PSBR may be rather small, and is 
certainly swamped by the huge uncertainty in the forecast ... I argued in 
my last Panel report that a risk-averse Chancellor would introduce now 
measures to limit the PSBR in later years ... If these measures eventually 
proved unnecessary to control the PSBR, they could be offset by income tax 
cuts later, in which case a desirable economic reform would have taken 
place.80
Thus, attempts are made to minimise the importance of the uncertainty which surrounds 
forecasting the PSBR 4 years in advance and to articulate other reasons why fiscal 
measures which could help to ensure sustainablity of the public finances will not prove 
to be detrimental for other reasons.
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Of the other two economists, Minford remained adamantly opposed to tax 
increases in the future, arguing that the deficit was cyclical. By extending the horizon 
of the discussions beyond the Budget, the July report exposed the rather contrived 
nature of the consensus produced at the previous meeting:
M inford [Last time we were fairly unanimous] about not having taxes this year, but 
having them next year, although I didn’t want them next year. We at least 
agreed we shouldn’t have them this year which is what seemed relevant at 
the time, with the Budget coming up. But this time [i.e. July 1993] we were 
in next year, as it were, and so obviously could not patch over that one any 
more, and it came right out of the woodwork. Some people were in favour 
of big tax increases; others saying no, what’s done is enough; others saying 
no, you shouldn’t increase taxes at all, you should cut spending over a 
reasonable period of time.81
Finally, Wynne Godley also opposed tax increases, but for very different reasons. 
Godley’s position, as outlined in Chapter 4, was that the UK economy was constrained 
by its inability to successfully export. In addition, domestic demand was very weak 
because consumers were saving and paying off debts. Given this, Godley, argued that 
reducing the disposable income of consumers through increases in taxation would only 
further weaken demand, thereby threatening an already precarious recovery. Godley’s 
view was that measures to improve export performance were vital, so that the economy 
could grow sustainably, and that fiscal policy would have to be tightened at the point 
where consumers’ increased expenditure began to increase imports. He warns, rather 
bleakly, that this process could lead to very large increases in taxation:
Godley thinks the problem is more intractable than suggested by the other 
Panel members. The PSBR has become largely structural because Britain’s 
foreign trade performance is unlikely to warrant growth fast enough to have 
much impact on the public finances. However, taxes should not be put up 
while the present unusual excess of private income over expenditure 
persists. When the private sector surplus does fall, fiscal policy will have 
to be tightened if a larger balance of payments deficit is threatened. The 
eventual scale of this tightening might have to be very large indeed82.
This link between the trade deficit and the budget deficit was also made by several of 
the other forecasters and is referred to as the ‘twin deficit’ problem. As might be 
expected, the Panel differed over the importance of the two deficits, but several were 
concerned. The ways in which the trade deficit was discussed is analysed below.
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The Twin Deficits
This third issue was probably the most contentious of all the public finance related 
debates. As shown above, if tax increases were simply for the PSBR, then they could 
also be offset if the deficit disappeared more quickly than expected. The problem 
identified by Godley, and backed by several of the others, was much more serious in 
terms of the time and resources it would take to put right, but also in terms of how easy 
it would be to undo.
The proponents of twin deficit problem essentially argued that, if  past patterns 
were repeated, then increases in GDP sufficient to bring down unemployment much 
below 2 million would either push up inflation (thus requiring deflationary polices) or 
increase imports, and hence the trade deficit, to such an extent that interest rates have to 
rise to prevent a ‘sterling crisis’. On the other hand, if  GDP growth (and thus imports) 
were to be restricted such that the trade deficit did not become a problem, then growth 
would be so slow that unemployment would not fall at all. As a result of this continued 
high unemployment the PSBR would continue to grow and thus further tax increases 
would be needed.
The issue of the twin-deficit problem was important in the July meeting because 
it is closely connected with the forecasts for unemployment and for the growth in 
output. In the discussion of unemployment and the importance (or not) of hysteresis, it 
was shown that the majority of the Panel thought that growth in output would be limited 
because of the inflation which would occur as unemployment dropped below 2 million. 
It is a corollary of this that if  unemployment remains high, then so must the PSBR. On 
the other hand, for those who believed that unemployment could fall to around 1 million 
without inflation picking up, then the deficit problem did not exist. As Andrew Britton 
remarked:
Britton The question about how far [the public sector finances] will improve is of 
course entirely bound up with how far you think the recovery can go ... the 
optimists on the natural rate of unemployment are also optimists on public 
borrowing; the pessimists on sustainable growth are pessimists on public 
borrowing.
Thus, Patrick Minford is the least impressed with this argument. He believes that its 
basic premise, that labour market rigidities are such that unemployment cannot fall 
significantly without inflation rising, is simply incorrect:
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Minford I mean the sorts of factors that David Currie and Andrew Britton are talking 
about, the labour market being difficult, I believe that in the next six months 
we are going to see that that’s completely wrong.83
Similarly, on the question of net trade, he sees no reason why the UK can not compete 
effectively in world markets. Although he forecasts a stable rather than a decreasing 
current account deficit, this is in the context of sustained and non-inflationary economic 
growth. The difference between Minford’s views and the rest of the Panel is difficult to 
analyse in terms of exports-vs.-imports as he does not forecast them separately, but only 
as a joint function. Nevertheless, the important point is that he does not believe, as do 
the majority of the Panel, that above trend growth will result in increased imports. 
Minford summarises his position as follows:
Minford ... our forecast for the current account is running at levels not dissimilar 
from the present levels against a background of quite sustained growth, you 
know 3.5 per cent, for a long long time to come. This obviously reflects 
import penetration as the economy recovers. And the reason the economy is 
growing, is that it is driven by potential output and the natural rate [of 
unemployment] being lower than the actual rate. So people are getting back 
to work and producing.84
The other optimist on the balance of payments is Tim Congdon. Like Minford his story 
is based on the belief that the UK is a long way below potential output and above the 
natural rate of unemployment. The growth/inflation combination figures he forecasts 
reflect this. However, Congdon’s forecasts for the balance of trade are also low, 
principally due to a fall in imports which the more pessimistic members of the Panel do 
not foresee. For example, Wynne Godley notes that for Minford and Congdon’s
forecasts to be consistent they ‘are (must be) assuming a growth in net export demand
85far in excess of anything that has ever occurred in the last fifteen years’.
In addition, Congdon is also on record (see Chapter 5) as saying that the Balance
of Trade Deficit ought not to be a matter for government concern, so long as its own
finances are in order. It is Congdon’s belief that the trade deficit represents the actions
of free economic agents and should not therefore be subject to political interference.
However, it is exactly this point with which the pessimists disagree. Not only do they
forecast a widening trade deficit, asserting that the general patterns of the past will be
repeated, they also believe, pace Congdon, that this is a problem. Godley and Davies,
86the two strongest proponents of this view articulate their concerns as follows.
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Godley Whether or not a balance of payments deficit ‘matters’ seems, 
unfortunately, to still be a vexed question. To my eye it is obvious that it 
does matter if only because no country can get into debt to an unlimited 
degree.87
Davies ‘Automatic’ financing [of the trade deficit] will only occur for as long as 
foreigners are content to accumulate UK assets ... However, as soon as 
growth falters, or inflation threatens to rise, the existence of a large trade 
gap becomes quite menacing for the economy. Suddenly the flow of 
foreigners willing to acquire UK assets, and lend to British citizens can dry 
up. Sterling can then fall sharply, forcing up interest rates. Or the sudden 
unavailability of foreign lending can lead to a severe dislocation as domestic 
spending has to be curtailed. Either way, the correction of the trade deficit 
involves a recession.88
However, Godley is also quick to point out that the current balance of trade figures are 
also important for other reasons. The argument he advances is that, if  the PSBR is small 
(which it should be) and consumer expenditure conforms to normal patterns, then the 
balance of trade is given by the following identity:
Balance of Payments = Budget Deficit - Private Sector Surplus
In other words a large balance of payments deficit implies either a large budget deficit 
or an excess of borrowing by the private sector. Since neither of these option is 
sustainable, it follows that the Balance of Payment is important. In fact, in Godley’s 
economics, the balance of payments is more than important, it is absolutely crucial and 
is given a key causal role. His policy advice is that ‘the government should attach
• • 89extremely high priority to achieving a rapid expansion in net export demand.’ This 
follows from the identity given above: if net trade improves, then the economy can grow 
and there will be no need for any fiscal tightening - if the Balance of Payments deficit is 
small, then the Budget Deficit is also “small90. However, the weak state of the European 
economies means that the export market is very weak and so any growth in exports is 
also likely to be weak. In such a situation the PSBR remains high and can only be 
brought down with a substantial increase in taxation.
Like Godley, the mainstream economists on the Panel believe that a poor export 
performance and a high propensity to import is a serious weakness in the UK economy. 
Similarly they agree that it is something which governments ought to (and could do) 
something about. However, they differ in that they do not give the same priority to net
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trade performance as Godley. The concept the mainstream economists use to frame the 
issue is that of the ‘balance of the economy’. The ‘balance of the economy’ is based 
upon a slicing-the-cake metaphor: if one person has too much then there is not enough 
left for everyone else. In the case of the UK economy, the ‘greedy-guts’ is consumption 
and the losers are net exports and investment. The policy solution therefore, which is 
quite independent from the sustainablity of the PSBR, is that reducing consumption as a 
proportion of GDP increases the portion of the national cake available for exports and 
investment.
In fact, five out of the seven Panel members thought that this imbalance between 
consumption and investment was important and they suggested a variety ways of 
addressing it. They all focused on three points:
• policies are needed to retrain the long-term unemployed, reduce long-term 
unemployment (and hence hysteresis) and restrain wages;
• training and skill levels in the rest of the economy need to be improved to 
increase productivity in the economy as a whole;
• the spending and taxation priorities need to be changed so that the first two 
points can be achieved.
As might be expected the specific policies advocated varied, both in the amount of extra 
taxation required and in the mechanism through which the policies would bring about 
the goals realised. However, the one thing which all shared was that these were long­
term policies which required a change in the political culture if  they were to succeed.
The two economists who have been most involved with these policy issues are 
probably Andrew Britton of the National Institute and Andrew Sentance of the CBI91. 
Interestingly both argued that increases in taxation were not necessary to bring about the 
desired changes:
Britton At this stage I would not argue for tax increases beyond those already 
announced, or spending cuts beyond those necessary to keep within the 
totals already agreed. What is required however is a change in the structure 
of both spending and taxation to encourage growth of output and especially 
of employment. Other objectives might have to be sacrificed if  that aim is 
given priority.92
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Sentance I think that if we want more [Research and Development or investment], we 
can’t just say that the overall scale of government activity has to increase 
further in order to do it. I think there has to be some re-orientation of 
priorities within existing government programs. Now I think many of the,
some of the members of the group take it as a sort of given that it is very
difficult to restrain government spending, and you can’t do that, but I just 
don’t take that view.93
Despite the similarity if  their views, Britton and Sentance do differ on the mechanism 
involved. Andrew Sentance sums up the differences as follows:
Sentance [Andrew Britton] obviously believes in more government activity in the 
economy in general, because he obviously believes that the money flows 
into taxes and then via the government into investment ... I would say that 
if the government tightens its fiscal tax, i.e. narrows the gap between 
government spending or government consumption and taxation, then that 
will allow it to reduce interest rates, which should enable private 
investment. He seems to think that it all takes place within the government
. 94sector.
Gavyn Davies and David Currie tend to follow Sentance and Godley by arguing that the
aim should be to keep interest rates low and restrain demand with fiscal policy.
However, unlike Sentance, David Currie and Gavyn Davies, take the view that 
additional taxation would be necessary. Currie is the more moderate o f  the two, 
justifying a fiscal tightening o f 1.5 per cent o f  GDP as follows:
Currie ... total consumption, counting both private and public is at too high a level
... With so much of GDP devoted to consumption, there is insufficient room 
for investment and net exports. For last September’s devaluation to be 
made to work, in terms of channelling more resources to the balance of 
payments to reduce the external deficit, total consumption needs to be held 
back to make room for net exports. This may be done by cutting public 
consumption or curtailing private consumption by tax increases ... Public 
spending cuts are a natural choice, but the danger is that they can be 
indiscriminate, cutting into areas of spending that are important for
promoting longer term growth, for example, spending on education and
training, R&D, and infrastructure. Indeed, it can be argued that in these 
areas there is a need for increased spending to promote the international 
competitiveness of UK industry ... Because of this, the Chancellor may 
have to consider increases in direct taxes, along with other measures.95
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Davies on the other hand foresees the need for a fiscal tightening of ‘at least 2-3 per cent 
of GDP’, one half going to reduce the PSBR and the other to fund special employment 
training and other infrastructure programs.
Davies It is now extremely well known that the trade deficit is unusually large for 
the present stage of the economic cycle ... The share of personal 
consumption in GDP is correspondingly large - around 66 per cent, 
compared with a long-term average prior to 1985 of about 60 per cent. 
There is a similar “excess” of real personal disposable income in GDP at the 
present time ... Ideally, we need to shift resources out of short term 
consumption (public as well as private), and into both exports and 
investment ... Since the government has recently re-affirmed its medium 
term spending targets at unchanged levels, higher taxation would need to 
bear the brunt of this action.96
Thus, we can see that five of the seven Panel members felt that net exports were weak 
and that some remedial action was necessary. In addition, four out of the seven felt that 
not enough had been done to secure the sustainabilty of the PSBR. Godley was agnostic 
on this latter point as it is, in his analysis, a subset of the trade problem. Nevertheless, it 
was his ‘opinion that ... the growth of net export demand over the next few years will 
not, on present policies, be any faster in the future than in the past and hence it will not 
be possible to achieve sustainable growth fast enough to reduce unemployment by any
97significant amount over the next four to five years.’
There was therefore a fairly clear majority for policies to improve 
competitiveness and hence net exports (increased training etc. for most, increased 
demand for Godley). In addition, there was a weaker majority for a further tightening of 
fiscal policy, with Andrew Britton agreeing that it would be understandable if taxes 
were to be increased.
Conclusion
Three separate strands of argument have been identified in the debate about the public 
finances. The first is that there is not a problem at all and that low unemployment, a 
balanced budget and acceptable trade figures are to be expected. The second strand is 
that the fiscal tightening proposed in the Budget was not sufficient to ensure the 
sustainability of the PSBR and that additional measures were needed. The third strand 
of argument was that, even if the PSBR situation had been adequately dealt with, there
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were other reasons why further tax increases were desirable. These sets of arguments 
about fiscal policy, together with their proponents, are summarised in the Table below:
Table 1: Views on Fiscal Policy






The table is particularly interesting if it is compared with the policies eventually adopted 
by the government. It is fair to say that none of the concerns raised by the Panel were 
high on_the public agenda at the time - the question is therefore did they become more 
important as a result of the Report. The answer to this seems to be yes and no. In some 
respects policy later moved in the opposite direction with some of the tax increases 
proposed in the March Budget being voted off the statute books before they even 
became law (e.g. the increase of VAT on fuels from 8 to 17.5 per cent). On the other 
hand, as will be discussed in the next chapter, further action was taken to ensure that the 
PSBR was reduced. A detailed analysis would require following the developments in 
net trade, GDP, unemployment and the PSBR for several years to see if these have in 
fact developed in such a way as to prove the pessimists wrong and to negate the need for 
the policies they recommended. Although it has not been possible to do this in any 
detail, the figures for the UK can be derived from the forecasts contained in the Panel’s 
Reports, and these are displayed in Table 2, overleaf.
From the Table it can be seen that the Balance of Payments, the PSBR and 
unemployment have all come down faster than the majority of the Panel expected and
98that the twin-deficit problem was (perhaps) not really a problem after all . In the case 
of the PSBR this is a result of poliey, but the same cannot be said of the Balance of 
Trade deficit. However, there was no way of knowing this in advance and the policy 
non-decisions of the government can not be justified by a whiggish appeal to what later 
turned out to be the case. So why did the government not act on the recommendations 
of advisors which it itself had appointed and attempt to shift the balance of demand?
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Table 2: July 1993 Forecasts and Outturns fo r  key economic variables
Forecaster Forecasts in GDP Unemploy­ PSBR (% o f Current Ac.
July 93 for: Growth (%) ment (m) GDP) (% o f GDP)
1993(-94) 2.0 2.96 7.2 -3.3
Britton 1994(-95) 2.8 2.89 6.2 -2.9
1995(-96) 2.7 2.78 4.9 -2.7
1993(-94) 1.5 3.03 8.2 -3.0
Currie 1994(-95) 2.8 3.03 6.3 -3.0
1995(-96) 2.7 2.91 5.0 -2.8
1993(-94) 1.7 2.86 7.6 -3.0
Davies 1994(-95) 3.2 2.71 5.8 -2.6
1995(-96) 3.0 2.47 4.7 -2.2
1993(-94) 1.2 3.00 6.8 -2.9
Godley 1994(-95) 1.3 3.00 6.4 -2.7
1995C-96) 1.5 3.10 5.2 -2.1
1993(-94) 1.5 2.90 6.7 -1.8
Minford 1994(-95) 2.8 2.50 3.3 -1.9
1995(-96) 3.1 2.20 1.7 -2.1
1993(-94) 1.6 2.90 7.6 -3.0
Sentance 1994(-95) 2.6 2.90 6.3 -2.6
1995(-96) 3.0 2.80 5.3 -2.8
1993(-94) 1.9 2.9 7.1 -1.7
Outcomes 1994(-95) 3.9 2.6 5.3 -0.3
1995(-96)x 2.7 2.3 3.8 -0.9
Forecasts 1998(-99) 2.8 1.8 1.6 -0.7
O utturns derived from  forecasts p roduced  in N ovem ber 1995
One explanation is that the long-term view taken by the Panel was simply 
incompatible with the short-term outlook so vital in ‘soundbite’ politics. For example, 
with an election due in the next few years, such a major change o f policy was always 
going to be difficult to sell. In addition, the implications for future tax rates (at least on 
the analyses o f Currie and Davies) would have been ideologically unacceptable to a 
Conservative government, especially one with a small majority. However, the trouble 
with all these sorts o f explanations is that they tend to put the ‘blame’ on the 
government - it is the needs o f the political cycle, their ideological baggage and so on 
which have prevented the scientific advice o f its experts from being followed.
But what if  the advice offered to the government was not judged to be sound 
enough for such momentous decisions? An alternative and surely plausible account is 
that the government made a ‘rational’ decision to delay acting upon the advice until it 
was clearer that such major, and potentially unpopular policies, would be accepted. 
This process is not well described as political machiavellianism - it was on the advice o f  
economists, amongst others, that the UK joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism. It is 
therefore entirely plausible that the credibility o f the forecasters was too low for their
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advice to taken seriously. In other words, the expertise of the experts was not, anymore, 
sound enough for them to be trusted. However, if this is the case, what purpose does the 
Panel serve? From this perspective, the role of the Panel is not to restore credibility to 
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This chapter outlines some of the issues raised when the Panel of Forecasters met for the 
third time, in October 1993. The meeting was important for several reasons. Firstly, it 
was the last chance for the Panel members to revise their forecasts for the rapidly 
approaching ‘day of judgement’ at the end of the year. With only about 12 weeks to go 
before 1993 became 1994, it was clear that some of the more bleak forecasts made in 
February were in need of revision. Less kindly, it could be said that they were wrong.
The October meeting was also important because it preceded the UK’s first ever 
‘Unified’ Budget, in which the Chancellor would be announcing both his tax and 
spending plans simultaneously.1 In other words, the future direction of economic policy 
was once again the topic of debate and, for the second time since the exit from the 
ERM, the Panel were being called upon to give policy advice to the Chancellor.
There was also a third way in which the October meeting was unusual. In 
September 1993, the Central Statistic Office had issued a revised set of economic data 
for the UK. The new dataset incorporated several changes: all data was now expressed 
in terms of 1990 prices, rather than 1985 prices; the trade figures were now calculated 
on the basis of VAT receipts, rather than figures provided by H.M. Customs and Excise; 
and the profile of several data series, including GDP, had been altered. These changes- 
caused some problems for the Panel. Not only had economic history literally been re­
written, but their forecasts now started from a different place. On the other hand, it 
should be noted that, viewed another way, the revised data also ‘explained’ why their 
February forecasts were generally too low - they had been based on inaccurate 
information.
Using the October meeting this chapter examines three main themes. The first 
theme is the October Report itself_and the changes which have been made to the 
forecasts since July. A particularly important part of this discussion is the way in which 
the data revisions are used by the members of the Panel.
The data revisions are also important in the second theme to be discussed, 
namely the naturalisation/normalisation of ambiguity through consensual accounts. In 
the July Report, the unemployment figures were something of an anomaly and Chapter 
6 examined the range of explanations which were on offer. By October, data from other 
parts of the economy had allowed the majority of the Panel to converge on an
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explanation in which the unexpected falls were understood as a rapid rehiring of 
workers, itself made necessary by excessive job-shedding in late 1992.
However, as one uncertainty is resolved, so a new one invariably emerges - in 
this case the interpretation of the monetary indicators, the cornerstone of monetarist 
economics. In contrast to the discussion of unemployment, about which some sort of 
closure appears to be occurring, the discussion of monetary indicators illustrates the 
difficulty of resolving one of the longer running debates in recent macroeconomics.
Finally, the chapter examines the policy recommendations made by the Panel 
and compares them with the policies subsequently announced by the Chancellor at the 
end of November. The effectiveness of the Panel in influencing policy was discussed 
briefly at the end of Chapter 6. In that chapter the discussion focused on the medium 
term development of economic policy. In this chapter, the focus of the analysis is on 
the short term and examines two main issues. Firstly, it examines the nature of the 
consensus on policy which the Panel appeared to reach despite their different theories, 
models and forecasts. It is suggested that the consensus is, at least in part, due to the 
efforts of some of the Panel members to be seen to achieve it. A second factor is the 
relatively non-doctrinaire nature of the problem. The second part of the analysis focuses 
on the way in which the economically non-controversial reasons used by the Panel to 
support their recommendations are at odds with the political calculations the Chancellor 
must make. In conclusion, it is suggested that one reason why the economists, like 
many other scientific advisers, are not particularly good at setting the policy agenda is 
that their analysis does not address the problems as they are perceived by the politicians.
October 1993 Report
Introduction
The Panel of Independent Forecasters met for the third time in October 1993. As the 
year was nearly over, an increasingly clear consensus was beginning to emerge about 
what the final outturns for 1993 would be. This is not particularly surprising, after all, 
there were only 10-12 weeks left to go and most of the year’s economic activity was 
already ‘in the bag’, so to speak. Nevertheless, differences did remain between the 
Panel over what to make of events so far. In particular, those most pessimistic at the 
beginning of the year, still tended to see the recovery as weak and fragile, while those 
initially optimistic, saw it as basically assured. As ever then, the consensus on the 
surface hid a range of views underneath. The rest of this section outlines the main
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features of this consensus, together with the uncertainties and assumptions which 
underpin it and the range of views available.
The Panel introduced their October Report as follows:
The UK economy has been growing for the last year and a half, according to 
the latest data. But the weak private sector balance sheet position and the 
European recession mean that we have yet to see growth above the trend 
rate of 2-2.5 per cent. While all of us expect higher growth in 1994, this 
rests on an assumed cut in interest rates, a projected fall in the savings ratio, 
and a strong turn-around in stockbuilding. None of these is guaranteed.2
The Panel’s verdict on the economy in 1993 was not therefore particularly encouraging. 
Although positive economic growth had been recorded during 1993, the rate of growth 
had yet to reach, let alone exceed, the trend level of about 2.5 per cent per annum3. In 
addition, the future economic growth which the Panel had forecast was conditional on 
several important changes in economic policy and behaviour - none of which might 
actually happen.
As a result of this likelihood that economic growth would remain weak, and 
might actually get weaker, the Panel was concerned that the fiscal tightening introduced 
in the March Budget might not be sufficient to bring the PSBR under control 
sufficiently quickly. The policy problem, as they saw it, was how to raise revenues (of 
reduce expenditure) without killing off what little recovery there was. On a more 
positive note (for the government, if not for those that remained under- or un­
employed), the weakness of demand implied that inflationary pressures would remain 
weak and that their inflation target was unlikely to be breached.
Forecasts for GDP and Demand
In October the consensus view of the Panel was that, according to the revised data (of 
which, more later) economic growth had turned positive in the second quarter of 1992 
(i.e. before the exit from the ERM which had led to the inauguration of the Panel) and 
that the recovery was thus about 18 months old. In addition to putting the start of the 
recovery back to 1992, the GDP growth figures for the first half of 1993 had also been 
revised upwards and the composition of demand changed. In particular, the trade data, 
which were now collected under a new VAT-based system showed big falls in the levels 
of both import and exports. However, net trade (the difference between the exports and 
imports) had been revised upwards quite dramatically. Finally, manufacturing output
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had been revised downwards, thus resolving one of the anomalies from July when the 
figures seemed rather high. As a result, the composition of demand was now much 
more like the export-led growth forecast by Congdon and Minford in February than the 
domestic-led growth the rest of the Panel had forecast at the same time.
Data revisions are by no means unusual in economics. However, what made 
these ones particularly difficult to interpret in the short time between the release of the 
data in September and the Panel’s meeting in October was that they combined several 
different sorts of change simultaneously. David Currie explained the differences 
between the data available in July and that released in September, together with the 
difficulties the changes posed, as follows:
Currie The latest data includes not just the change in the base year and the base 
weights but also revisions to the data which would have occurred if the data 
were still at 1985 prices. For example, manufacturing output has been 
revised down because the CSO has deflated part of manufacturing output 
(that destined for exports) by the export price deflator. This has risen by 
more than domestic prices in the last year following the devaluation so that 
overall manufacturing is less buoyant than before. The fact that the latest 
data encompasses two distinct revision procedures creates additional 
difficulties for our 1985-price based forecast.4
Currie also provided a table which illustrated the differences between the two data sets:
Table 1: Differences between 1985 based data and 1990 based data5
annual per cent change
































As can be seen from Table 1, the effect of the changes was to increase recorded GDP 
growth in the first half 1993 by about 0.5%. Although not clear from the Table, the 
source of this extra growth must be from improved net trade as most of the other 
categories of expenditure have been revised downwards from their previously recorded 
values. For example, consumption growth is about 0.3% lower, investment 1.3 % lower
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by the end of the second quarter. The growth areas are government consumption (in the 
sense that it has not been reduced by as much as was previously thought) and the 
unspecified net trade (for which comparisons are impossible due to the revised data 
collection methodology).
As a result of these changes, the majority of the Panel had revised their July 
forecasts up. For example, Tim Congdon wrote:
Congdon GDP now seems likely to grow in 1993 by between 1.5 and 2 per cent. This 
figure is rather higher than forecast in Lombard Street Research’s February 
and July Submissions. However, the growth of output during 1993 itself has 
not been much different from that envisaged in those two Submissions. The 
previous two forecasts were too low largely because the official statisticians 
have altered the quarterly profile of growth in 1992. (The effect of 
changing the profile was to alter the relationship between the level of output 
in 1992 on average and in the fourth quarter. Since output in 1993 starts 
from 1992’s fourth quarter, the relationship between the average of 1992 
and the average of 1993 is affected.)6
One thing to note about this interpretation is the way in which it maintains the validity 
and integrity of Congdon’s theoretical framework and forecasting skills - the mistake is 
with the data collectors, not the model or the modeller. Several other panel members 
make essentially similar points. However, there is a notable exception to the general 
upward revision of demand forecasts, and that is Andrew Britton. In Chapter 5 it was 
pointed out that the National Institute’s forecast for GDP growth of 2% in 1993 was 
initially an outlier, being more optimistic than the rest. Since February, the other 
forecasts had drifted upwards towards the National Institute figure. However, the 2.0% 
growth forecast by the National Institute was produced using the original 1985 based 
data for GDP growth in 1992. All other things being equal, one might expect that the 
National Institute forecast would have increased with the new data (for the reasons 
given in the extract from Congdon’s submission quoted above). However, Andrew 
Britton interprets the data revisions in a rather different way to Congdon.
Britton The numbers attached to this submission make use of the new 1990-based
National Accounts data, but they should be regarded as a ‘provisional’ 
update, as we have not yet had time to rebase the whole model. The level of 
GDP in the first half of the year now appears a trifle higher than we thought 
when we prepared our forecast for the July report of the Panel ... So far as
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this year is concerned we are standing by our forecast of 2 per cent growth, 
noting with satisfaction the way in which revisions to the data confirm our 
judgement of the strength of the recovery earlier this year. Several other 
forecasts have been revised up towards that figure, so we no longer appear 
an outlier.7
There are several interesting points to note here. The first is that the data revisions are 
not particularly significant - GDP in the first half of 1993 is ‘a trifle higher’ than 
previously thought. Whether Britton is referring to difference between the National 
Institute’s estimates for GDP in the first half of the year or the provisional data released 
by the authorities is unclear. Nevertheless, the clear implication is that the changes to 
the data are not significant enough to warrant a change of forecast. In other words, the 
step change perceived by Congdon and the rest of the Panel is not recognised as such by 
Britton. Rather, it is as if a fog has lifted and the statisticians can now see the economic 
growth the National Institute had divined 12 months previously.
However, the fact that the National Institute’s forecast has not changed surely 
implies that something else - their model, their theory or their judgement - has changed. 
The inputs to the model (i.e. the data for 1992) have changed and yet the output (i.e. the 
forecast for 1993) has remained the same. In other words, what we seem to be here 
seeing is a downward revision to the National Institute forecast towards the new 
consensus value of about 2%. One implication of this is that the model was incorrectly 
‘calibrated’ at the end of 1992, and forecast a bigger impact from the devaluation than 
was eventually recorded.
Finally, a third reaction to the data revisions is also possible and that is simply 
not to trust them. For example, Gavyn Davies forecast that economic growth would be 
subdued principally because net trade would remain weak due to too-high UK interest 
rates (in February he recommended that they should be cut, although he had changed his 
mind on this by July) and because of low economic growth in Europe. Davies focuses 
his discussion on the data relating to net trade and stockbuilding which he finds rather 
implausible. The result is that although his October forecast for GDP growth looks 
pretty much the same as the one produced in July, its composition has changed to 
something which Davies cannot quite bring himself to trust:
Davies The rebased GDP statistics suggest that stocks have continued to decline at 
a pace equivalent to about 1 per cent of GDP per quarter, which is more than 
I expected in July. Mainly as a result of this, the current forecast shows
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domestic demand rising by only 1 per cent in 1993, as against 2 per cent last 
time. However, the impact of this on GDP is more than offset by the 
surprising weakness in import volume, which the GDP statistics suggest 
dropped by 2.4 per cent in the first half of this year. As a result of this drop 
in imports, net trade is significantly more robust than expected last time, and 
this produces a modest upward revision in the GDP forecast for this year 
from 1.7 per cent to 2.0 per cent.
Davies In general, I would say that the GDP figures for the first half of 1993 look a 
little odd, and it would not be surprising to see subsequent revisions 
showing more stocks and more imports. Therefore, the expenditure 
components in the forecast are subject to this uncertainty.
Like Congdon, Davies recognises that the new numbers are significantly different from 
the ones they superseded. However, he does not accept, as Congdon appears to do, that 
the numbers are actually reliable. In essence, Davies asserts that his analysis remains 
correct and although, it is not currently supported by the data, it will be in due course. 
As noted above, the new figures do change the composition of demand to make it much 
more like that forecast by Congdon, and rather different from that expected by Davies. 
Thus, for Congdon, the data revisions affirm what he expected, whereas for Davies they 
challenge his forecast and need to be neutralised if the integrity of his own analysis is to 
be maintained. Although not disregarding the figures completely, Davies clearly feels' 
that he would like to see a bit more evidence before he can accept the new data 
unreservedly.
More generally, it can be noted that the changes to the domestic data do not 
really affect the interpretation of the world economy. As a result of this, and despite the 
increases in domestic GDP, the majority of the Panel continue to hold their original 
views about the prospects for growth in the short and medium terms. This is implicit in 
the extract from Congdon quoted above: ‘the growth of output during 1993 itself has not
o
been much different from that envisaged’ . The same point is made by David Currie: 
‘The prospects for short term growth have changed rather little since our last report in 
June.’9 and Andrew Sentance: ‘Since the Panel’s last report, the evidence from official 




The forecasts for inflation are generally little changed from their July levels, with the 
average being 3.2 per cent. The highest forecast for the government’s target measure, 
RPIX was produced by Andrew Britton (3.6 per cent), the lowest by Tim Congdon (2.8 
per cent). Of course, as pointed in out in Chapter 6, the fact that the inflation forecasts 
have not changed even though the GDP growth forecasts have does imply that, once 
again, the output-inflation trade off has changed. In October, the UK can now get even 
more growth for the same (perhaps less) inflation than it could in July or February. This 
aspect of the apparent non-change in inflation forecasts was discussed in Chapter 6 and 
the arguments will not be repeated here.
There is however one interesting thing about the inflation forecasts in October 
and that is that just over a year has passed since the devaluation and exit from the ERM. 
If past economic patterns repeat themselves, inflationary pressures should, according to 
the mainstream view, be increasing as a result of the increases in import prices. 
However, this does not appear to have happened yet and there remains a clear 
bifurcation of future views over this issue. On the one hand there is the majority of the 
Panel which expects inflationary pressures to pick up as the recovery gains pace. On the 
other, there are those who think that inflation will fall still further and remain low.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the Panel members who are predicting that inflation 
is likely to rise are basically arguing that the economic experiences of the past will 
repeat themselves. They are thus arguing that the current situation can be understood as 
a ‘typical’ devaluation in which the gain in competitiveness due to the lower exchange 
rate is eroded as domestic prices rise.11 Of course, things are not quite that simple as 
history never repeats itself exactly. In the context of 1993, this means that those 
economists who are arguing for the ‘typicality’ of the devaluation need to explain why, 
in fact, inflation has fallen throughout 1993. To do this they must adduce additional 
‘special’ factors which can be inserted into the ‘typical’ devaluation story in order to 
explain how the general case applies to this specific instance.
The highest forecast for inflation, in both 1993 and 1994 comes from Andrew 
Britton and the National Institute. Although the National Institute’s forecast has been 
reduced from 4.0% in July to 3.5% in October, Britton is keen to minimise the change, 
again attempting to emphasise how the outturn remains consistent with the original 
forecast. In this case, the apparent significance of the forecast revision is attributed to 
the essentially arbitrary inflation target chosen by the government - the July forecast
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was above the target, the October one is below. In other words, although politically 
significant, the change is economically unimportant.
Nevertheless, the revised figure for inflation is lower than the National 
Institute’s analysis of the 1967 devaluation had led them to forecast in February. What 
then are the special factors which have intervened in order to bring about lower than 
expected inflation? According to the National Institute one of the reasons for the recent 
low inflation figures is the large discounts being offered in the ‘summer sales’. Clearly 
this effect is temporary (unless repeated as Autumn and then January sales) and the 
typical pattern of rising growth leading to increasing inflationary pressure is set to 
reassert itself during 1994, with additional pressure coming from the indirect taxes 
announced in the March Budget (itself perhaps another unusual or atypical event).
Britton The latest inflation figures confirm that price cutting at the time of the 
summer sales was an important factor in some of the very low figures 
recorded earlier this year. The trend of the series from now onwards is 
likely to be gently upwards if the recovery of output continues as we expect. 
This gradual inching upwards will be continued next year, reinforced by the 
effect of increases in indirect taxation. Allowing for the average margin of 
error the underlying rate of inflation at the end of next year will probably be 
in the range 3 to 6 per cent.12
The other mainstream economists on the Panel also told a similar story for the future - 
rising inflationary pressures in the year ahead - although they used somewhat different 
factors to explain why the general case had manifested itself in a rather unusual fashion 
on this particular instance. For example, David Currie attributes the unexpected low 
inflation to external events in the world economy. However, Currie’s central story 
remains that, as the devaluation and tax increases work through, inflation will increase 
in the coming years:
Currie Recent favourable trends, including subdued world inflation and continued 
falls in manufacturing unit costs, make us more optimistic about inflation 
than we were in June: we see the Government’s preferred inflation target 
(RPI ex mips) averaging just over 3.5 per cent next year and in 1995. But 
we think that it is quite likely that inflation will breach the 4 per cent ceiling 
during the next year, as the impact of last September’s devaluation and 
higher indirect taxes feed through to prices.13
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Gavyn Davies tells an essentially similar story in which price rises due to the 
devaluation should soon be reflected in the inflation figures. Like Britton, he identifies 
rises in goods prices as a key upward influence, but notes also that wage and service 
inflation are low. However, Davies seems to see the devaluation as working more or 
less normally. Goods and food prices have risen sharply, but the expected increases in 
the aggregate indices have been minimal due to the unusually low rate of wage inflation 
which has offset the rises in other prices:
Davies It is true that services inflation is continuing to drop, and that wage 
pressures remain notable by their absence, but food and other goods price 
inflation has been rising sharply since last year’s devaluation. Provided that 
the exchange rate remains broadly stable in the next 6-12 months, these 
devaluation effects should be fully reflected in retail prices reasonably soon, 
and the Goldman Sachs inflation model continues to see core inflation - 
excluding mortgages and all tax effects - falling from about 3.5 per cent 
now to about 3 per cent by the end of next year. This, however, would be 
consistent with the headline inflation rate rising from 1.7 per cent now to 
about 3.7 per cent next spring as mortgage rate cuts pass through the index. 
In addition, the government’s chosen target variable (the RPI excluding 
mortgages) may temporarily breach the 4 per cent target ceiling next spring 
before dropping back to about 3.6 per cent at the year end.14
Thus, Davies interprets the data in terms of a ‘typical’ devaluation story and sees the 
unusually low levels of wage and service inflation as partly offsetting the expected 
inflationary consequences. However, on balance, Davies is not as concerned about 
inflation as Britton. In contrast, David Currie identifies the current low level of wage 
inflation as a source of concern for the future. An important part of the traditional 
devaluation-leads-to-inflation story, is the notion of the wage-price spiral, which refers 
to the tendency of wages to rise in response to inflation, thus increasing prices still 
further.15 This has yet to happen in the year since the devaluation. If the general 
devaluation explanation is to maintained this omission will have to be corrected 
eventually. Thus:
Currie There is also the danger that the inevitable sharp rise in headline RPI 
inflation numbers next year from their current very low levels (with the 
lowest point already past) will combine with falling employment to push 
wage settlements higher.16
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Britton and Davies to a lesser extent, although not highlighting this specifically in their 
reports, probably also share these concerns. However, not all the economists subscribe 
to this point of view. In particular the monetarist members of the Panel see the 
influence of the high unemployment rate exerting a significant downward pressure on 
inflation for some time to come. For Congdon, this is very much a business-as-usual 
interpretation in which unemployment above the natural rate (combined with a large and 
negative output gap) is associated with weak inflation.
Congdon There has indeed been a strong impact from the devaluation on profitability 
and relative prices. But underlying inflation pressures have remained weak, 
largely because of high unemployment and abundant spare capacity. The 
GDP deflator went up by a mere 0.75 per cent (i.e. an annualised rate of 1.5 
per cent) between the fourth quarter of 1992 and the second quarter of 
1993.17
Unlike the mainstream forecasters Congdon does not need to introduce any special 
factors in order to justify his analytic framework. For him the current situation is a clear 
example of the more general case: ‘high-unemployment-plus-large-negative-output-gap- 
equals-weak-inflation’. In addition to making clear the way in which the outturn is 
- perfectly consistent with his theory, Congdon further reinforces his point by introducing 
survey results which show that decision makers in the real world are acting in ways 
consistent with his analysis.
Congdon Particularly good news has emerged in the August and September CBI 
surveys, both of which reported more companies expecting to cut prices in 
the next few months than to raise them. Since the CBI survey relates to 
manufacturing and manufacturing output ought to respond to devaluation 
sooner than other sectors, the message seems to be that the inflationary 
impact of devaluation has been largely transmitted to the price level. This 
should not be a surprise, because - by common consent - the devaluation 
occurred from an exchange rate which significantly over-valued the 
pound.18
Like the rest of the Panel, Minford also sees that low inflation has come about due to the 
rises in some prices being offset by falling wage costs. In fact, this much seems to be 
shared by everyone.
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Minford Some facts are now clear. Inflation has fallen and remained low (in spite of 
August’s wobble), with the effect of rising traded goods prices more than 
offset by falling wage costs.19
The differences between the Panel are not therefore due to different data, but to different 
interpretations of the same data. The most radical interpretation of this data comes from 
Minford who sees in the current economic climate a gestalt switch into a completely 
different world. In this new, competitive world environment inflation is not just down 
for a few years (or however long it takes) until unemployment falls to the natural rate or 
growth accelerates - inflation is down and out for good:
Minford It is hard to escape the conclusion that, in an as yet slow, quiet, but still 
steady way, the same forces that transferred people in their millions off the 
land in 18th and 19th century Britain are affecting the fortunes of the 
world’s richest nations: the OECD. Competition is growing inexorably and 
increasingly rapidly for the products in which they have had a commanding 
lead - manufacturing and other sophisticated industrial products. Under the 
influence of the computer and information industry revolution, technologies 
which once took decades to transfer to poorer countries can now be instantly 
transferred through multinationals or even, though more rarely, mere 
imitation by local companies. Poor, often ill-educated workforces can be 
harnessed to producing their products by use of computer-driven procedures 
which eliminate human error. Imported, those products displace their 
equivalents produced under hugely higher labour costs in the richer 
countries, just as the more cheaply produced and increasingly cheaply 
transported food from the empire and elsewhere displaced British-grown 
food after the repeal of the Com Laws.20
The quotation is interesting for several reasons, not least of which is the social theories 
of knowledge and skill so casually imported. In Minford’s world view, skills are 
unproblematically black boxed into technologies which are then taken to wherever the 
labour is cheapest - the story therefore is of technology de-skilling the labour force and 
of an inevitable techno-economic determinism. In terms of the Panel’s brief however 
what matters are the implications of this industrial and manufacturing trend for the UK’s 
economy and policy. Minford’s view, as ever, is clear and concise:
Minford The policy implications for a small open economy like the UK are similarly 
blunt. This is an [international] environment so competitive that provided 
control of the money supply is exercised - a cliche today - inflation is dead
254
(given the fast growth of quality this may well mean 2 per cent inflation as 
measured); this is quite consistent with inflation remaining for a time over 3 
per cent as traded goods prices reflect the fall in the pound.21
Of course, this view is not shared by everyone. For example, David Currie, one of the 
inflation pessimists on the Panel, flatly disagrees with the idea inflation is no longer an 
issue for economic policy:
Currie In this view, we differ from those who argue that the UK is heading for zero 
or very low inflation that will be sustained in the medium term. The sources 
of this difference are twofold: first, we are sceptical about the supposed 
greater flexibility of the UK labour market; and second, we are less 
optimistic than others about the durability of the recent remarkable 
productivity performance in UK industry.22
However, what is interesting about Minford’s analysis is not that it is controversial but 
that, unlike the others on the Panel, Minford sees in the data on world growth (which is 
slow, especially for the traditionally powerful OECD nations) an emerging ‘new’ world 
order. Minford is thus saying that the changes in the world economy are such that 
economic activity in 1993 is different from the economic activity in the past and that the 
old patterns will not repeat themselves. The key factors lying behind this change are, 
internationally, the increasing mobility of global capital and, domestically, the changes 
in the UK economy which occurred during the 1980s.
Minford Ironically, but of course logically, the only countries which may be able to 
except themselves from this general OECD slowdown are those which have
much technological catching-up to do, whose wages are low and whose
environments are favourable to capitalism through deregulation: examples 
are Britain, New Zealand and possibly Australia, all of which recently 
emerged from a protected and inefficient past with resulting low wages and 
are resolved to reduce regulation in a bid to attract new investment.23
Thus, Minford can argue that although the UK has a low wage economy, high 
unemployment and a greatly reduced indigenous manufacturing base this, in the current 
context, is a good thing - the reason being that the UK is now able to be like the
successful and fast growing economies of Asia and Latin America. In other words, the
implicit social order, in which ‘developing’ countries and the Third World are assumed 
to want to be like the Western nations, is turned on its head. In Minford’s world, if the 
OECD nations want to maintain their economies then they will have to adopt the
255
policies of the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’ like Taiwan and Korea. Consequently, it is the 
OECD nations who have undone the most post-war social legislation which have the 
best chances. This puts the UK in a good position relative to its European neighbours 
and competitors:
Minford There are many more players now who have cottoned on to how to be an 
emerging market economy. It used to be just Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, but now they are all playing the game - Indonesia, Thailand, India - 
it is just astounding what is happening. The whole of Latin America seems 
to be getting in on the act. Everybody has cottoned on to how [to be] 
attractive ... It just so happens that because we have been so backward, our 
real wages are quite low, and that means that if we can get to state of the art 
productivity ... we [can be] competitive relative to Europe for a whole lot of 
industries which have to be in Europe for the moment. I think that is a key 
window for us.24
Most of the Panel accept the theory of Comparative Advantage which lies behind 
Minford’s argument. Comparative Advantage is a basic economic concept found in all 
textbook discussions of international trade and which states that nations will tend to 
concentrate their resources in the producing things which they make the best and not 
waste resources producing goods they can import more cheaply from elsewhere. In 
Minford’s world the things which the UK is particularly good at making are cars and 
their associated components as well as consumer electronics like computers:
Minford For example, we have got a tremendous opportunity in the car industry. It’s
clear that, largely because of a history of protectionism, there is going to be 
a European car industry for some time to come. But, with the entry of new 
techniques and the Japanese entry behind the European barrier, the shape of
25it is going to be drastically changed, and changed in our favour.
Although Minford’s basic point, that comparative advantage means that transferable 
technologies and industries will tend to move out of the OECD countries, is accepted by 
the Panel, his conclusions about the speed and size of the effects are more contentious. 
In particular, the rest of the Panel doubt that it is a widely or as clearly applicable as he 
claims. For example, Gavyn Davies says:
Davies I’m not sure I go the whole hog with Patrick. I think he may have put his
finger on an interesting idea, but I don’t feel that I have thought about the 
magnitude of these flows sufficiently to know how important it is ... I think,
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in principle, Britain does have a slightly more flexible labour market than 
Germany, France, Spain and Italy, and I think that in responding to shocks 
there may be some advantage in having such a flexible labour market. But 
it is not obvious.26
Similarly, Andrew Sentance can see the economic forces to which Minford is referring 
and, whilst acknowledging the quality of the question, is not so sure that Minford’s 
answer is correct:
Sentance I feel that he always sort of overdoes this optimistic [interpretation]. I mean 
you could present it in a different way. Another implication of what Patrick 
is saying is that Europe is going to have a pretty tough time in the 90s and 
that that is going to drag us down. I would go some way along that 
argument with him, but I would say that it is not all beneficial for the UK.27
Thus, Sentance sees that Britain might be unable to exploit what comparative advantage 
it may have because the European economies, as a result of their more global 
comparative ^advantage, remain too weak to import UK goods, even if  they are 
competitively priced. Moreover, Sentance disagrees with the conclusions which 
Minford draws for policy. Minford, as can be seen from the quotation given above, 
" believes that there is a recipe for success in the current economic environment - Hong 
Kong and Taiwan had it first, but now Indonesia, Thailand, India and the whole of Latin 
America have ‘cottoned on’ to how to do it. Minford’s policy prescription is thus that 
European economies must adopt the same sorts of economic policies as those found in 
the emerging economies. However, it is not at all clear that this necessarily follows 
from the analysis. The appropriate policy response, as Sentance explains, is therefore a 
difficult and important question:
Sentance If you accept Patrick’s story, that there is some sort of revolution going on 
which is creating growth elsewhere in the world to which we have to 
respond, what is the appropriate economic policy response? Does it mean, 
for example, that we are going to have a continued deflationary pressure on 
our economy because of all this cheap competition, and therefore monetary 
policy needs to remain pretty relaxed? ... Or is the main implication that we 
have got to be more like these other economies in terms of the size of our 
public sector taxes? [That] is one implication that Patrick draws ... [but] if 
you talk to people on Continental Europe about this, the sort of conclusion 
that Patrick draws is anathema to them ... They say that we [Europe] can’t 
compete with these countries in the Third World. There is no way.
Therefore, we have to move onto the next stage in terms of more
technological sophistication and so on and so forth.28
To sum up this discussion on comparative advantage and inflation, we can see that the 
middle view is that the slow growth of the OECD economies, particularly the European 
ones means that the UK’s main export market is likely to be weak and that exports will 
have to remain competitively priced if they are to sell. As a result of this inflation is 
likely to remain low (but so will growth, and big falls in unemployment are unlikely). 
Those who forecast higher inflation tend to minimise the differences between the 
previous experiences of the devaluation and the current one, attributing the current 
unexpectedly low inflation to unusually aggressive summer sales and surprisingly weak 
wage inflation. These temporary factors delay the inflationary impact of the 
devaluation, but eventually, the typical pattern will re-assert itself as growth and 
employment pick up leading to increasing wage and hence inflationary pressures. 
Congdon is also in this camp, although his theoretical background is different and his 
forecasts for inflation lower. Nevertheless, his analysis implies that nothing significant 
has changed in either the world or domestic economies. Finally Minford sees the 
potential for a dramatic improvement in economic output. Unshackled from the 
inefficient past of its indigenous industries and with low wages and plenty of 
unemployed workers, Britain is Europe’s best place to invest. Moreover, because, in 
Minford’s world, international competition is so tough, inflation is simply not possible 
anymore.
Unemployment
Unemployment was discussed extensively in the July meeting and this discussion 
formed a substantial part of Chapter 6. In July, the falling unemployment figures 
recorded in the early months of 1993 had caused come difficulties for the Panel and a 
variety of explanations for them were on offer. By the October meeting, the falls in 
unemployment had stopped and the Panel were all forecasting that unemployment levels 
would remains fairly stable for the rest of the year before falling slightly during 1994. 
In addition to the levelling off of the unemployment figures, the passage of time had 
also brought about a closure of the debate over the causes of unexpected falls in 
unemployment which occurred in the first half of 1993. The collective view of the 
Panel over the cause of these falls was as follows:
Developments in the labour market now look much less odd than they did in
July. Then we saw fairly large falls in unemployment virtually coincident
258
with the upturn in activity in the first quarter of 1993. But unemployment 
has since levelled off, and the profile of non-oil GDP has been revised to 
show it rising steadily from three quarters earlier than before.29
As can be seen from this quotation, the unemployment data, which were so puzzling in 
July are, by October, well understood, with a consensually accepted explanation. Part 
of the solution to the controversy lies in the new statistics. In Chapter 6, it was pointed 
out that part of what made the interpretation of the unemployment figures difficult was 
that the falls had occurred much earlier in the economic cycle than would usually have 
been the case. In terms of the analytic categories deployed here, the difficulty was how 
to explain the current situation as an example of the general case. With the new data, 
the start of the economic recovery has been moved further back in time, and the falls in 
unemployment now occur later in the economic cycle. In this way the particular case is 
now more easily understood in terms of the general pattern.
However, there is a slight complication. Although falls in unemployment are 
now to be expected in the early part of 1993 (as a result of the recovery) the rapidity of 
these falls still needs to be explained. It turns out that the explanation for this event, 
which does not fit the general pattern, still requires some special or unusual factor to 
explain it. The reason for the rapid falls in unemployment which the Panel endorses is 
that the falls were not the aberration. Rather, the aberration was the rise in 
unemployment which took place in the months before Christmas 1992. During this 
period, when it must be remembered there were no economic data to suggest recovery, 
the Panel believes that there was:
... a collective loss of business confidence ... which resulted in many firms 
either bringing forward labour shedding or delaying hiring. This lead to 
fewer redundancies, and more hirings, in early 1993, and consequently a fall 
in unemployment.30
Thus, the changes in the economic data enable the economists to normalise the puzzling 
unemployment data by re-asserting the link between the economic cycle and the 
unemployment data. However, the rapidity of the early falls needs to be accounted for, 
and this is done by attributing the deviation from the general case to a loss of confidence 
in the business community. This then causes unemployment to rise above what it 
should ‘really’ be. In 1993 the ‘mistake’ is then corrected and the unemployment data is 
returned to its more usual relationship with output.
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As a result of the changes in the data, and the subsequent naturalisation of 
unemployment, those economists who had introduced special factors like the behaviour 
of the DSS into their analysis had to re-assess these ideas. For those who did not agree 
with this proposed explanation, the new data clearly reinforce their original scepticism 
and confirm that the others were simply wrong. For example, Gavyn Davies clearly 
highlights the way in which the data are now perfectly consistent with the general story 
and that nothing else is needed:
Davies The Panel debated the unemployment statistics at length last time. Since 
July, the Labour Force Survey has been published and this confirmed that 
there was a drop in unemployment on the ILO definition of 61,000 between 
Winter 1992 and Spring 1993. Over the same period there was a rise in 
employment of 151,000, so the relationship between the change in 
employment and unemployment was not particularly unusual. This does not 
lend support to those who believed that the drop in unemployment earlier 
this year was due to administrative changes.31
As can be seen, the unemployment data is now uncontroversial and alternative accounts 
are marginalised. The extent of the marginalisation of alternative accounts can be seen 
in the Submission of Andrew Britton. Britton was one of those most clearly associated 
with the idea that the falls were the outcome of the administrative processes, rather than 
economic activity. By October he rejects this hypothesis but does so in a casual 
reference to the Spring Labour Force Survey, in a paragraph ostensibly dealing with the 
revisions to the National Accounts and the outlook for demand:
Britton One indicator that we find particularly encouraging is the Spring Labour 
Force Survey, which confirmed that the fall in unemployment was not 
confined to benefit claimants. It also indicated a substantial rise in 
employment, suggesting that activity may have been increasing quite 
substantially at the time.32
Of course, Britton was not wrong in any significant or pejorative sense - in July 
no-one knew what was happening to the unemployment data. He simply recognised 
that something odd was going on and offered an explanation. Now, 3 months later, 
what was originally odd no longer appears so, his hypothesis is no longer needed, and 
the economic orthodoxy is restored. The majority of the Panel seem to accept this 
explanation, but there are some outliers. Ever the mavericks, Wynne Godley and 
Patrick Minford disagree both with the mainstream and each other.
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Firstly, Wynne Godley is keen to stress that the current situation is perfectly 
consistent with his own theoretical view point according to which the UK’s economic 
problems stem from a long-term decline in net exports. In fact, Godley claims that the 
1993 situation is ‘well in line with the strategic predictions which [he] was making, with 
Cambridge colleagues, throughout the seventies and early eighties, although the violent 
fluctuations which have occurred have tended to distract attention from the underlying 
trends’. With regard to the unemployment figures, Godley, like the others, sees the 
rise in unemployment in the Autumn of 1992 as an ‘aberration’ which has been, to some 
extent corrected. However, unlike the others, Godley does not accept that the 
contribution of the administration of benefits to the claimant count measure of 
unemployment can be dismissed so lightly.
Godley [One explanation for the fall in claimant count unemployment] derives from 
the fact that the claimant count is, in the words on the Employment Gazette, 
‘a by-product of the administrative system used for paying benefits’. It 
seems clear that people who cease to be employed may find themselves 
inside or outside the categories which make them eligible for arbitrary 
reasons ... there are reasonable grounds for supposing that, of those people 
who have lost their jobs over the last three years (including many self- 
employed), a greater proportion than normal have left the labour force and 
therefore that unemployment, properly understood (that is, the number of 
people who are not employed and are seeking jobs) is higher than the 
number successfully claiming unemployment benefit. This picture is 
confirmed by the fact that employment has fallen rapidly over the last year 
and has hardly increased at all during the last few months, while the 
population of working age has continued to increase.34
Unlike Davies and Britton, Godley does not interpret the data in such a way as to 
reject the idea that the benefit system has no effect on the level of claimant count 
unemployment. Also, and again unlike Britton, Godley is unimpressed by the increases 
in employment recorded in the Spring Labour Force Survey. Godley’s approach is to 
increase the complexity of the analysis and thus to deconstruct the simple relationships 
between unemployment and employment which economists like Davies aimed to 
restore. For example, ‘unemployment’ is problematised by Godley to include all those 
‘not employed and seeking work’ whilst the background assumptions about the size of 
the labour force are also highlighted. These points are not addressed by the other Panel 
members in their Submissions, so Godley’s arguments remain marginalised. This
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situation is no doubt reinforced by the willingness of Britton to drop the idea he 
originally backed.
Finally, Patrick Minford also doubts that everything is quite as normal as the 
mainstream Panel members make out. Minford believes that unemployment has ‘fallen 
rather earlier in the cycle than in previous upturns’, and interprets this as an indication 
that ‘labour market behaviour is changing’35. As discussed extensively in the previous 
section, Minford believes that the economic climate in the 1990s is very different to 
previous economic cycles. In addition, Minford ardently believes that the UK labour 
market is now much more flexible than in previous economic cycles and so he might 
well expect unemployment to fall more quickly.
In Minford’s frame of reference, this change in labour market behaviour is not a 
peculiarity which needs to be explained away, but rather an indication that policies have 
worked, i.e. it is something to be celebrated. Indeed, the falls in unemployment form 
one of an agglomeration of facts which Minford introduces to show how the economy 
has confounded the ‘Supply-Side Pessimists’ who think its plight is caused by structural 
factors like the inflexibility of markets and the poor competitiveness of industry. In 
other words, for Minford’s general analysis to hold, labour market behaviour ought to 
have changed (or at least be changing). This is different from the mainstream 
economists, who generally doubt the efficacy of the policies Minford has championed, 
and for whom the past patterns ought to recur if  their general case is to be supported.
To sum up, we can see that there has been a general move to normalise the 
previously problematic data. In particular the debate has closed around a consensus 
view according to which the unusual event was a collective loss of business confidence 
in the Autumn of 1992. This led to more redundancies and less employment than was 
appropriate. In the early months of 1993, the ‘mistakes’ of 1992 were corrected and 
unemployment returned to roughly where it ought to have been and the Panel members 
returned to their general stories and forecasts. However, in the background there 
remains Wynne Godley questioning the definition of unemployment around which the 
debate took place and thus highlighting one of the taken-for-granted assumptions of the 
rest of the Panel.
At this stage in the upswing of the economic cycle it is really too early to assess 
which how the debate about unemployment in the longer term will work out. In 
October 1993 all parties to the debate could see something in the data to support their
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views. The rest of this section uses a discussion of monetary indicators to show how it 
is unlikely that the simple accumulation of more data will enable the economists to 
agree on a theory of unemployment.
Monetary Indicators
The importance of monetary indicators for understanding the economy has a long and 
controversial history in economics. The aim of this section is not to rehearse the 
arguments of the past36, but simply to show that they are still going on. The focus of the 
analysis in this section is as follows: in October 1993, money supply growth figures in 
the UK, if you believed them, were sending quite different signals depending on which 
definition of the money supply you used37. ‘Narrow’ money (MO) was growing at about 
5 per cent, which implied GDP growth in the range of 2-3 per cent and no urgent need 
to relax monetary policy in order to boost economic growth. On the other hand, ‘Broad’ 
money (M4) was growing at about 3 per cent, implying virtually no growth in GDP at 
all, and consequently suggesting that the authorities needed to act in order to ensure the 
recovery was sustained.
The question I put to the economists was as follows: ‘How would you interpret 
- the figures recorded for money supply growth, if indeed you pay any attention to them 
at all?’ In other words, what, if anything, does the growth of the money supply tell us 
about the economic future?
Narrow Money
It is probably most convenient to begin by outlining the views held by the mainstream 
members of the Panel. Generally speaking, economists who are not ‘monetarists’ do not 
see money as causing economic activity, but rather as reflecting it (although this is not 
as clearcut for M4 as it is for MO). If we consider MO, the view of mainstream non­
monetarist economists is neatly expressed by Andrew Britton:
Britton We don’t see it as being a factor causing consumers’ expenditure though, 
because essentially the banks provide the people with the cash they want.38
Interestingly, ‘Broad Money Monetarists’ like Tim Congdon are even more sceptical of 
its utility39:
Congdon Well I basically don’t take any notice of MO and narrow money40
Given this, you might be forgiven for wondering why anybody bothered to collect 
information on MO at all. One reason for its usefulness is that it is widely regarded as a
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contemporaneous indicator of economic activity. Thus, Andrew Britton, whilst not 
seeing MO as causing consumers expenditure, does include MO amongst the list of 
economic data worth watching because it gives a ‘useful guide to what is happening in 
the shops’41. However, MO is not regarded as a leading indicator in the sense that 
knowing what the growth in MO is will enable you to forecast, say, consumers’ 
expenditure any better. Rather, the ‘advantage of it as an indicator is that you can get 
figures on it which are quite up to date, more up to date than for the value of retail 
sales.’42 Similarly Gavyn Davies summarises his position as:
Davies Well my view is that you shouldn’t rely on either of them [MO or M4]. But
MO over many years has been a better contemporaneous indicator of activity 
than broad money. It may not give you a very substantial amount of lead 
time - 1 think MO gives you a little bit of lead time, but not a hell of a lot of 
lead time - M4 doesn’t give you any.43
Sticking with narrow money, Tim Congdon questions even the usefulness of this 
contemporaneous information:
Congdon Well, yes, it is [a contemporaneous indicator] but you have got lots of other 
data, so why bother? And the things that it is indicative of are things that 
aren’t actually very interesting. Retail sales are a function of income - they 
don’t cause fluctuations in income.
It is one of the most basic messages of Keynes’ economics - income is a 
multiple of investment. It is not consumption is a function of income. If 
you want to understand fluctuations in economic activity, you don’t look at 
retail sales, you look at things which really swing around like stockbuilding 
and capital spending.44
However, the mainstream economists view remains that:
Sentance MO has tended to have a fairly reliable relationship with the consumer
spending side of the economy as a sort of contemporaneous indicator45
and Andrew Britton can thus conclude that it is ‘giving a signal which is quite 
consistent with what we think is happening’46. In other words, the growth of MO was 
consistent with consumers expenditure growing by 1.8 per cent in 1993.
However, the interpretation of MO is not mechanical. Although the relationship 
is ‘fairly reliable’ it can, does and has changed over time. For example:
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Sentance the velocity of [MO], the ratio we’re spending appears to have shifted. It 
used to grow at roughly, I think, 4 per cent slower than the value of cash 
transactions, but it is growing much more in line with the value of cash 
transactions now.47
Thus, at all times the economists have to think about how the current circumstances 
affect the general relationship. From the example given by Andrew Sentance, we can 
see that the velocity of MO has changed over time and now grows at the same rate as the 
value of cash transactions. This change implies that there is now a faster growth in the 
quantity of narrow money for a given growth in consumers’ expenditure (and perhaps 
GDP) than would have been the case in the past. The task for the economists is how to 
explain these particular events as cases of their more general theories. In the case of 
narrow money this is only a problem for Patrick Minford, as he is the one Panel member 
to attach any great importance to MO - for the rest, the instability of the relationship is 
the general story.
For Patrick Minford, the key thing which makes interpreting growth on MO 
difficult is that the economic situation in 1993 is actually rather unusual and so it is not 
particularly surprising that the MO relationship might have changed. In fact, Minford 
identifies two reasons why one would not expect MO growth rates to conform to typical 
patterns. The first factor is that interest rates in 1993 were unusually low. Thus:
Minford I think that the MO figures are consistent with a little lifting in consumer 
spending, but the difficulty with MO of course, when you have got a period 
of low interest rates is ... the reliability of the relationship. Most of the 
estimated period has been when there have been quite high interest rates, 
and there’s a modest interest elasticity.48
This is really just an argument from basic economic theory - as interest rates rise, so the 
opportunity cost of holding cash relative to holding it in interest bearing accounts 
increases and the amount of cash held should decline. When interest rates fall, so does 
the opportunity cost, and hence the amount of cash in circulation increases as a result of 
the desire to finance transactions speedily and conveniently. This argument thus implies 
that money supply growth would be higher at low interest rates.49 However, this 
relationship between narrow money and consumers’ expenditure is complicated by a 
further factor, identified first by the National Institute:
Minford ... there is a cumulative technological trend which seems to be quite heavily 
influenced by the accumulation of interest rates. In other words, you get [a]
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faster technological [move] away from notes and coins when the interest 
rate is high, and it is irreversible. So what happens is that suppose you have 
two years of 15 per cent interest rates, that creates two steps in the 
technological shift away from MO and once they have occurred they cannot 
be reversed
Evans So as interest rates become high [and] people want less cash, technology is 
developed which facilitates these kinds of [cashless] transactions?
Minford That’s right, the technology comes along when interest rates are high to 
facilitate people not using cash, as it were, once and for all. That creates a 
shift downwards in the demand for cash, and then even if interest rates from 
then on fell off, it wouldn’t go back. So its like a trend term. If one thinks 
of there being a normal growth of MO demand due to growth in inflation, 
and thinks of this technological substitution as occurring steadily at high 
interest rates but not occurring at all at low interest rates, you could well get 
a different velocity trend when interest rates are low.50
The conclusions Minford draws from thus are that, at low interest rates, the growth in 
MO will therefore be higher than at higher interest rates (for a given rate of growth and 
inflation) because:
Minford you’ve got to make an adjustment for the fact that there is now probably a 
faster trend growth of demand for MO, given that interest rates are low. 
[Plus], you’ve not just got the fact that interest rates are low increasing the 
demand for MO once and for all, you’ve [also] got a steady tendency now 
for it grow faster, for a given level of inflation and growth, because before 
you had this steady technological substitution occurring at high interest rates 
and now you haven’t got it.51
Thus, any mechanical reading of money supply growth figures will lead to mistakes:
Minford I think that for MO, one has probably got to think of the target range as 
being systematically too low at low interest rates. So while I think the MO 
figures are consistent with modest growth of domestic demand, which is 
welcome, it is certainly not consistent with the sort of rapid growth in 




From the above passages we can see how the controversy over the meaning of the 
quantity of narrow money can have continued for so long. For the mainstream 
economists, the quantity of narrow money reflects consumers’ expenditure decisions 
and the aspects of economic activity related to them, such as retail sales. Cash is not 
seen to cause demand in any significant way, but the amount of cash held does provide 
some information which is useful, principally because it arrives promptly. MO is 
therefore something which can be used to give an indication of what is happening 
currently and thus corroborates the stories, forecasts and expectations of the economists 
in a fairly general way. However, because it is not central to the economic story told by 
the mainstream economists a certain laxity prevails in the exactitude required of the 
relationship. Put another way, most economists think that they have more important 
things to worry about.
On the other hand, for a monetarist economist like Minford the same data series 
provides the basis for a complete story of economic action. In Minford’s economics, 
‘monetary influences are key.’53 and he skilfully weaves together a wide range of data, 
some of it generated by non-monetarist economists, in such a way as to understand the 
- world as one in which the demand for money is systematically related to other aspects 
of the economy, particularly interest rates, prices and GDP growth. Clearly this 
intellectual work is put in by Minford because his economics requires that the 
relationship between the demand for money and other economic data be fully explained. 
However, Minford’s economics is complex and subtle and incorporates a wide range of 
other, factors in its analysis. Thus, although the core belief is clearly that monetary 
aggregates are important is clear in all Minford’s economics, the exact monetary 
indicator used can vary and its interpretation is frequently a matter of skill and 
judgement. Thus, at the end of 1993, when, as noted above, the monetary indicators 
might have been seen as unreliable, Minford was prepared to concede the point, but not 
the theory:
Minford Well I think that unfortunately the monetary indicators have become quite 
difficult to read just at the moment. I think that they do have some 
information, but the adjustment factor that has got to be applied to both [MO 
and M4] is really quite difficult to judge. So you are really forced back onto 
other measures like real interest rates, savings ratio, the state of the 
economy ... I think that we were right to stress monetary aggregates, 
relative to the ERM, but of course now we have come out of the ERM,
monetary aggregates are giving ambiguous signals ... it is just a period in 
which the thermometer is a bit wonky, but it will come back. The basic 
principle of using domestic indicators, and monetary indicators in particular, 
to guide monetary policy, I think is correct. It is simply at the moment that 
the monetary indicators have to be supplemented.54
As noted above, this is a concern not particularly felt by the rest of the Panel. That said 
however, the vast majority of the Panel did think about and pay some attention to 
growth in MO. Thus, although they do not see MO as causing anything or as being as 
important in the same way that Minford does, the Panel generally regard MO as giving 
some kind of information about the economy.
In this way, quite unlike the debates over unemployment which are still quite 
controversial, the debate over narrow money seems to bubble along gently with no-one 
relying solely on MO and virtually no-one saying it is of no use. The exception is Tim 
Congdon. Like Minford, Congdon is a monetarist economist, but unlike Minford, who 
as we saw draws on a wide variety of monetary data, Congdon sees the sole monetary 
influence as being the broad money measure (M4). It is this reliance on a single 
indicator which gives Congdon his distinctive position. It is also what makes his 
economics harder for many of the other Panellists to accept.
Broad Money
In many respects the mainstream economists view M4 in much the same way as they 
view MO - it reflects activity rather than causing it, although the relationship is not as 
clear. However, unlike narrow money, which, as we saw above, most economists would 
concede has a fairly reliable relationship with activity, and may even lead slightly, this 
is not seen as the case for M4. Thus for example, Gavyn Davies says:
Davies [MO] may not give you a very substantial amount of lead time - 1 think MO 
gives you a little bit of lead time, but not a hell of a lot of lead time - M4 
doesn’t give you any.55
Of course, this is most emphatically not the view of Tim Congdon, whose whole 
forecasting operation is based upon the premise that:
Congdon movements in real broad money today give a lead to demand and output in 
the period six to 18 months away.’56
One thing which is interesting about this is the similarity in the backgrounds of the two 
economists which hold such different views. Congdon began his career as an
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economics writer in The Times, and was influential in economic policy circles in the late 
1970s and early years of the Thatcher administration. After this he worked as an 
economist in City firms before establishing his own economic forecasting consultancy, 
Lombard Street Research. Davies on the other hand has worked in both the Downing 
Street Policy Unit (from 1974 to 1979: the time when broad money targets first became 
important parts of UK economic policy) and three firms in the City of London (he is 
currently a Director of Goldman Sachs). However, the contrast between them could not 
be starker. Gavyn Davies describes his experiences, and the view to which they lead, as 
follows:
Davies I have spent 20 years trying to fit equations which would explain price 
inflation or nominal GDP using broad money indicators and I’ve never 
found broad money helpful at all. I think it might be a climate indicator, but 
it is certainly not a weather forecasting indicator. It doesn’t tell you about
57tomorrow’s weather forecast.
In other words, two views almost completely at odds with each other from two highly 
successful City economists - clearly 10 years economic data has done little to resolve 
the debates which were so prominent in the 1980s. But what are the sources of the 
'  difference?
It is clear that the source of Davies’s disaffection is that the relationship between- 
the monetary aggregate and economic activity does not produce a respectable regression 
equation - in other words, there is not a stable relationship between the two, unlike with 
narrow money. However, it is just this use of ‘stability’ as a criterion which Congdon 
objects to:
Congdon It doesn’t have to be stable. I mean, it could be unstable. It is a pity in a 
way that these words have become the arbiters of the whole thing. The 
demand to hold money balances can be very unstable. My point is simply 
that if the amount of money goes up by 50 per cent, or 10 per cent or 20 per 
cent, then whether [the demand to hold] it is stable or unstable, there will be
5 8profound effects on behaviour.
Congdon’s story is thus as much analytical as it is empirical. In fact in his very first 
Submission to the Panel he writes that ‘changes in asset prices are, of course, related to - 
though not mechanically determined by - changes in broad money growth’59 He 
explains the link between the quantity of money and economic activity as follows:
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Congdon If the amount of money in the economy is increased by [government policy] 
it could have effects on personal sector money balances but, in fact, 
personal sector money balances are relatively stable, so it goes straight 
through into the corporate sector or the financial sector - and then you get 
the effects. In the case of the corporate sector on investment and 
stockbuilding. In the case of the financial sector, in the first instance on 
asset prices and, later on, on investment and stockbuilding [and] possibly on 
the exchange rate because they have too much money and they want to get it 
into foreign currency. At any rate, because of the change in the amount of 
money in the economy, you get powerful effects on asset prices and the 
volatile elements of GDP. That is the link between funding policy [i.e. 
quantity of broad money] and the economy.60
However, despite their different causal stories about broad money growth all the 
economists on the Panel track its progress. For Congdon, however, it is the key 
instrument of economic policy:
Congdon The question is, how do you define monetary policy? As far as I am 
concerned any monetarist has to define monetary policy in terms of the 
quantity of money. Now you then get on to the debate about whether the 
relevant aggregate is a narrow on or a broad one. I don’t see how anyone 
can sensibly believe that narrow money causes everything, so the only thing 
that can be relevant from the point of view of determining behaviour is a 
broad monetary aggregate. So I, in all my work, would define monetary 
policy largely in terms of the behaviour of broad money. Well, the question 
then is, how is broad money affected by policy ... Well, as far as I am 
concerned it is largely banks’ decisions and their customers’ decisions about 
how much they wish to expand their balance sheets, particularly how much 
they want to lend. The two key influences are then how much banks can 
add to their claims on the private sector, i.e. lending to the private sector, 
and how much they can add to claims on the government, which obviously 
depends on their [i.e. the government’s] monetary policy.61
For the rest of the Panel the story is not so simple - in fact it is extremely complex - and
it is something which the Panel devote some considerable effort to resolving:
Britton when we [the NI] do our forecasts we don’t actually make a forecast for M4,
but along with a of number indicators we look at it and puzzle over its
significance. And certainly in the discussions with the Panel, we spend a 
fair bit of time offering different explanations for what is happening.62
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Thus broad money is used as an indicator of sorts by the mainstream members of the 
Panel. Like Congdon they do not use it in any mechanical way, but unlike Congdon, 
they are reluctant to draw any firm conclusions from broad money alone. Thus, when 
Gavyn Davies referred to broad money as a climate indicator, rather then a weather 
forecasting instrument, he meant that broad money movements give some idea of the 
general trend in the economy, but not in sufficient detail to be particularly useful - it is a 
bit like knowing that summer has begun but really wanting to know when is going to be 
the best time to book your holidays! More economically, Davies explains the role of 
broad money in his own theoretical framework as follows:
Davies It impacts on my thinking about the climate because [the current low rate of 
M4 growth] is clearly telling you that there is not a substantial amount of 
willingness to borrow in the system at the moment. But it isn’t a sufficient 
weight in my thinking to obliterate everything else, as it would be for Tim 
Congdon.63
The reasons that it does not ‘obliterate’ everything else are threefold. One is the 
traditional view of broad money growth which is that banks will lend whatever is asked 
of them. It is in this sense that the demand for broad money is held to reflect rather than 
cause activity. The second reason why broad money is less important for the rest of the 
Panel is that they believe that there are a variety of other ways in which companies can 
raise money which do not show up in M4 at all. Finally, the rest of the Panel question 
Congdon’s belief that the government, through its policies, can actually control the 
quantity of money in any meaningful way.
Taking first the traditional view, that banks lend what is asked. If the banks are 
purely responsive, in that they grant whatever loans are required, then understanding the 
banking sector is not particularly important. What is important is understanding the 
factors behind demand and activity in the economy. Thus, as was shown in Chapter 1 
the early National Institute model did not include broad money. In fact, it still does not. 
Andrew Britton explains why, using the example of the decline in credit at the recession 
which had ended:
Britton You see if the decline in credit in the recession was simply due to firms 
deciding to cut back on investment because they didn’t want to borrow any 
more, then it doesn’t matter terribly if you’re not monitoring credit very 
much.64
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However, as was noted in Chapter 4, the so-called ‘Credit Crunch’ might actually have 
been caused in part by the behaviour of banks (e.g. attempting to reduce their liabilities 
and making borrowing tougher). If that is the case ‘then if you ignore the bank’s 
balance sheet position you are actually missing out one of the causative factors’. Britton 
describes the Institute’s position on this issue as ‘agnostic’ but it is worth noting that:
Britton We [the NI] have actually got a project going at the Institute now which is 
concerned with the role of the banking sector in the recent recession and the 
recovery. That is an element of behaviour that our model doesn’t capture 
very well and we want to make sure we are not missing something 
fundamental ... when you get on to the late 80s, the credit base was 
expanded very rapidly and that was helping to stimulate expenditure, at least 
in the permissive sense of allowing expenditure to grow. It might even have 
been helping to push it up because there is no doubt that banks at that stage 
were very aggressively trying to sell credit. So that there may be an element 
of explanation which we are missing there, and perhaps the project we are 
just starting will help us to understand that better.65
Thus, there is a recognition, at least by the National Institute, that the behaviour of the 
banks may be important in determining the quantity of broad money. However, like just 
about everyone else, they are keen to distinguish their approach from that of Tim 
Congdon’s:
Britton It’s a project in its own right and will actually involve going to talk to 
banks. That is the approach we are taking, rather than saying that this is the 
money supply and the money supply drives the price level as say Tim 
Congdon might.66
However, the very existence of the research project clearly acknowledges that there are 
now questions to be asked about the banks’ role in the economy and that they may not 
be passive as may once have been the case. Thus it is recognised that:
Britton Banks are an important part of the economy and some of the information 
you can get from looking at broad aggregates ... tells you about the 
behaviour of banks.67
In this way broad money is useful. However, it is only part of the story because there 
other ways for businesses to raise money and different ones may be favoured at different 
times. Because of this factor, the behaviour of banks and businesses is more difficult to 
analyse because there are now more options to consider. In particular, although the
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current rate of broad money growth is low compared to what has been recorded in the 
past, it might not be particularly low in the context of the current economic situation.
This point is not explicitly recognised by Tim Congdon, who appears to see no
significant changes in the relationship between broad money and growth. He regards 
the recorded value of 3.9% as too low and has revised his growth forecasts down as a 
result. On the other hand, the rest of the Panel see in the M4 data the suggestion that 
the current situation is not just another instance of the general case. In other words, new 
and specific factors condition the interpretation of M4 at this particular time.
Britton Just to answer your question about the current situation, it is as always very 
difficult to know what to make of M4. It slowed down very sharply during 
the recession and is still growing slowly but that’s slow relative to the 
growth during the 1980s. I mean it is rising at a rate which may in fact now 
be consistent with a reasonable recovery. We know that disintermediation 
is now going on, you know the opposite of the transferring of business to 
banks, it is now being transferred back. Firms are now doing dealings off 
balance sheet.68
Thus as a result of some quite specific factors, both businesses and banks might be 
behaving in different ways to the past and thus the interpretation of broad money needs 
to reflect this. The importance of disintermediation is highlighted by both Andrew 
Britton (in the passage above) and also Patrick Minford:69
Minford The issue is really one of how the wholesale market in money is working - 
are the banks being bypassed? The banks are having a very difficult time 
rebuilding their balance sheets, they have a lot of bad loans, and therefore 
have been very reluctant to lend. They have increased the threshold in 
terms of which they will lend, in terms of riskiness. They have been 
tougher with small businesses. All that sort of thing. Now what that has 
meant is that many businesses have gone direct to the wholesale markets, 
either borrowing on the wholesale market if they are big enough by issuing 
their own debentures, or else issuing equity. There have been a lot of rights 
issues, a lot of equity issues as the stock market has tended to improve and 
firms have been tapping it. So there seems to have been quite a lot of 
shifting away from the banks as the intermediary of finance.70
The conclusions that both Minford and Britton draw from this are surprisingly similar 
(for such different theoretical viewpoints). Both believe, unlike Congdon, that the low 
growth of broad money is not necessarily indicative of a problem:
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Minford And so the M4 figures could really be distorted downwards I think. I think 
that they are telling a story, but again it may be an exaggerated story. If you 
look at the United States, you find the same sort of thing, very sluggish 
growth in M2, but the economy is growing faster than we expected and 
that’s the result of this disintermediation.71
Britton It is quite possible that there is no real shortage of money and we’ll find that 
the trend growth of M4 actually settles down into something in the range 0- 
5 [percent].72
Summary and conclusions
From the above discussion we can see that the case of broad money is somewhat
different to the case of narrow money. In the case of MO it was the monetarist
economist Patrick Minford who had to put in most of the intellectual work explaining 
the relationships between MO, technological change, interest rates and economic 
activity. For the rest of the Panel it was simply a ‘fairly reliable’ indicator. Minford on 
the other hand had to explain what made the present situation unique and different from 
the past such that 5% MO growth in 1993 was consistent with sluggish growth and weak 
recovery, as opposed to the strong, even runaway, economic growth the same money 
supply figures would have heralded in the 1980s.
In the case of broad money however Tim Congdon sees the current situation as 
absolutely typical, with weak broad money supply growth meaning weak economic 
growth and a consequent downward revision of his forecasts for 1994. The majority of 
the Panel however feel it necessary to explain why there has been a change and the ways 
in which the low broad money figures do not represent cause for concern. Thus, the 
non-monetarists join Patrick Minford in highlighting the role of the banking sector in 
the economy. In particular, it is the behaviour of the banking sector which constitutes 
the atypical event which explains the difference between 1993 and the general case. 
Thus, the unusual lending spree of the banks in the 1980 has resulted in banks’ balance 
sheets now being in unusually poor shape. As a result banks are unwilling to lend on 
the same terms as before and business is also keen to exploit new ways of raising 
finance. Consequently, although low by historical standards, it is quite possible that the 
recorded money supply figures are consistent with trend economic growth.
As Tim Congdon remarked:
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Congdon Well, it is an interesting situation - we will see who is right and who is
73wrong...
Economic Policy: Consensus and Effectiveness
This final section examines the policy recommendations made by the Panel and then 
compares them with the policies subsequently announced by the Chancellor. The focus 
is twofold. Firstly it examines the nature of the consensus on policy which the Panel 
appeared to reach despite their different theories, models and forecasts. It is suggested 
that the consensus is, at least in part, due to the relatively non-doctrinaire nature of the 
problem. However, a second and more sociologically important factor is the efforts of 
some the Panel members to be seen to achieve it.
The second part of the analysis focuses on the way in which the economically 
non-controversial reasons used by the Panel to support their recommendations are at 
odds with the political calculations the Chancellor must make - what makes sense as 
economics is not always good politics (as the previous Chancellor discovered!). In 
conclusion, it is suggested that one reason why the economists, like many other 
scientific advisers, are not particularly good at setting the policy agenda is that their 
analysis does not usually address the problems as they are perceived by the politicians.
Consensus
With the first Unified Budget due at the end of November (6 weeks after the publication 
of the October report), a major part of the Panel’s Report focused on recommendations 
for economic policy. In February, when the Panel also focused on policy 
recommendations for the Budget, the extent to which they could sign up to a coherent 
and agreed set of economic policy recommendations was important for many 
commentators in assessing their worth. The same criteria were also important in 
October and, as we shall see, were consciously oriented to by several of the Panel 
members as they took part in the discussions and drafted the report.
The opening part of this section is concerned with the policy recommendations 
themselves and examines the extent to which the consensus can be said to be more than 
skin-deep. The latter part examines the social processes which lie behind the consensus. 
In particular, the analysis looks at the extent to which the consensus was made to 
happen by the Panel members themselves.
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Unlike in Chapter 6, where the focus was on the medium term context for policy 
making and the different economic reasons for raising tax to reduce the PSBR, the focus 
in this Chapter is on the short term. In particular, given the range of forecasts for the 
medium term, and the quite genuine uncertainty about what would happen to the 
economy, what should the Chancellor do now in order keep as many options open as 
possible whilst, at the same time, neither damaging the recovery nor taking risks with 
the public finances.
Why the Chancellor Can’t Leave the PSBR to Chance
The starting point for the Panel’s policy recommendations is their diagnosis of the 
current situation and their agreement that ‘the overriding imperative of policy is to 
ensure a sustainable fiscal position’74. However, as noted earlier in this Chapter (in the 
section which discussed the forecasts for demand), the Panel are by no means certain 
that economic growth is assured. Thus, there is no guarantee that growth will be 
sufficient to bring about an increase in tax revenues large enough to reduce the PSBR to 
an appropriate level. Because of this:
[They] would therefore all support the announcement of tax or spending 
reforms, desirable in their own right, which would secure a net reduction in 
the PSBR. If it subsequently becomes clear that the PSBR will fall by more 
than is required, taxes can then be cut or public investment increased.75
The consensus view was thus that the ‘public finances are probably just about on
76or within the border of sustainablity’ but that inaction now would be harder to correct 
later on. In other words, the consensus was not that some form of fiscal tightening was 
going to be needed. In fact, as the Report makes clear, ‘there is no consensus whether
77further fiscal tightening will be necessary in practice’ . Rather the consensus is that the 
Panel:
would all support further fiscal tightening over the next three to four years if
78it became necessary to ensure sustainablity
When put like this, the consensus seems to be little more than a statement of the 
economically obvious - an unsustainable budget deficit is surely a bad thing in just 
about any school of economics and what economist could recommend an unsustainable 
policy? Consequently, it might be argued that a consensus on such an issue is relatively 
meaningless: ‘How could they have thought otherwise and still made sense as 
economists’ is the cynic’s response.
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In fact there is an element of this in the agreement:
Britton I think it is true that, just from the arithmetic of the budget and what is a 
sustainable deficit and what is not, [this] is a non-doctrinaire sort of issue. 
There was never a problem over that.79
However, this is not strictly true and part of the reason that there was not a problem was 
that Wynne Godley was unable to attend the meeting. As Britton explains this is not a 
personal comment on Godley, but rather that, because of his absence, certain 
(potentially controversial) issues were not discussed:
Britton I think if Wynne had been there, there might have been more debate as to 
whether this was a sensible question to ask. In an earlier stage in the 
discussion he was concerned to move away from the questions of long term 
budget stability and say “Well what difference is the fiscal position going to 
make to the level of output and therefore because it changes the level of 
output, what difference does it make in turn to taxes.” In other words, to 
treat it as a simultaneous system. So I think we might have had more 
argument of that sort if he had been there. I think because we were all using 
models which we felt took account of this interaction anyway, there wasn’t 
actually a great deal of disagreement as to the way in which the question of 
sustainability should be addressed, and that gave us a few paragraphs we 
could all sign up on straight away.80
However, to say that this is all there is to it is rather unfair and clearly overlooks what 
the Panel did achieve in their meetings. As Gavyn Davies pointed out, although there 
are some ‘motherhood-and-apple-pie’ statements in the report about the importance of
fiscal sustainabililty, ‘you would not have got most Keynesians to write that down ten
81years ago’ Thus, in just agreeing that the size of PSBR is a problem which cannot be 
ignored the Panel have come close to making economic history. Moreover, even if their 
analysis is not much more than an IS-LM story, in which increases in tax or reductions 
in public spending are offset by a relaxation of monetary policy, the issues addressed 
remain very important. As Gavyn Davies put it:
Davies There are big issues about what you want the overall stance of macro- 
economic policy to be. Do you want it to tighten or not to tighten. Usually 
you will not get economists to agree on that kind of thing ... I noticed in the 
public response to the last report, some people have said “You could only 
agree about the obvious”. Well, that may be true. But I still think that there
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is a hell of a debate going on in Britain at the moment about whether the 
Chancellor should put up taxes in the Budget or not. This Panel has gone 
away and thought about it and come up with an answer.82
Certainly the aim in this section is not to repeat the ill-founded criticism that the Panel 
agreed in nothing of substance. Rather the aim is to explain the rationale behind the 
policy statement and to show how its production depended on the reasonableness of the 
Panel members and their own efforts to achieve it. In order to show just how much the 
Panel had to converge in order to produce the agreed statement, I will begin by outlining 
the range of views on offer. In other words, by outlining the ‘gaps’ which had to be 
closed, or at least papered over, if consensus was to be reached.
As noted above the recommendation put forward by the Panel was that, in the 
December Budget, a ‘prudent’ Chancellor would ‘introduce a package of tax and 
spending reforms, desirable in themselves, which would reduce the PSBR over a 
number of years’ The Panel also went further than this and specified the sorts of 
reforms they would like to see and when they ought to be implemented. It is at this 
more detailed level that the consensus starts to break down. For example, on fiscal 
policy, Tim Congdon thought the tax increases should be implemented straightaway, 
whereas most of the others argued that, although the policies should be announced in 
1993, the effect ought to be delayed until 95-96. On the other hand, Andrew Britton 
thought that if  the taxes were not to take effect until 95-96, then decisions about them 
could safely be postponed until that time. Finally Minford thought that tax increases 
were completely unnecessary in terms of the PSBR, but did not object to them because 
they would create space for the kind of tax reform he favours. In terms of monetary 
policy, Sentance and Minford advocated easing monetary policy by different amounts, 
whilst the rest of the Panel favoured no change, or a relaxation only in the context of a 
deflationary Budget. The rest of this section outlines how, despite this range of views, 
theories and diagnosises, a single policy recommendation was nevertheless made to the 
Chancellor. It thus focuses more closely on the forecasts and analysis of the individual 
Panel members.
The majority of the Panel recommend that some sort of fiscal tightening be 
announced in the Budget. The most straightforward exposition of this view comes from 
Tim Congdon who states that ‘there is no doubt that public sector borrowing is
84unsustainably high and that steps must be taken to reduce it’ . Thus, although tax 
increases have already been announced in the March Budget, it is Congdon’s belief that
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the ‘structural Budget deficit probably remains at over 3 per cent of GDP (i.e. roughly
85£20 billion)’ . In terms of the necessary policy response, Congdon states that ‘3 years
* 86is surely quite long enough’ to reduce this to zero. Several of the other Panel members 
also take a similar view about the future size of the PSBR, but differ in that, unlike 
Congdon, they would prefer the measures to be ‘phased in to avoid undue impact on
87[the] recovery during 1994’ . For example, David Currie writes that:
Currie There is a need in the Budget to curb the PSBR, which we estimate at just
under £50 billion this financial year ... we see the PSBR next year at £38 
billion, still some 6 per cent of GDP ... At this level of borrowing, the 
interest paid on new borrowing cumulates rapidly, leaving a heavy burden 
of debt interest to be financed in the future.88
Apart from the high level of future interest payments, Currie also identifies further risks 
from such a policy:
Currie High borrowing leaves interest rates more vulnerable to shifts in sentiment
in financial markets, and may make it more difficult for the authorities to 
avoid an interest rate rise, particularly if the inflation background
89deteriorates.
As a result, Currie thus argues for a shift in the balance of macroeconomic policy in 
order to place more of the restriction on fiscal policy, this enabling lower interest rates 
and hence a better exchange rate
Currie Loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy make it more difficult to
maintain a competitive level of the pound without inflationary pressures 
emerging, impeding adjustment of the external current account deficit.90
Currie’s view is thus more complex than that of Congdon who sees the question simply 
in terms of reducing the PSBR as quickly as practical. This difference stems from the 
different views of net trade - Congdon is optimistic about exports, whereas, as discussed 
in previous chapters, for Currie (and the rest of the mainstream economists) it remains a 
problem area. In terms of practical actions, Currie recommends ‘Budget measures to 
curb borrowing amounting to some £3-4bn over and above [those] announced by the 
previous Chancellor’91. Like Congdon, Currie recognises that these measures could 
take the form of additional tax revenues or reduced spending and identifies several ways 
in which the reduction in borrowing could be achieved. For example:
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Currie One option for the Chancellor is [to] take full advantage of the new 
integrated Budget to lower the public expenditure Control Total set by the 
Cabinet in July, to reflect lower inflation and the continued policy of tight 
control on public sector pay. This could cut public borrowing by some 
£2bn, requiring only modest additional action to raise revenues.92
However, Currie is concerned that such a policy (which Congdon doubts the
93government has the ‘political will to implement’ ) fails to address the long-run 
problems in the British economy (discussed in Chapter 6). Thus, he continues:
Currie A preferable alternative would be to maintain the Control Total and 
redeploy resources within the total from public consumption to public 
investment. This would allow support of those areas of public spending that 
help strengthen the longer run supply side performance of the UK economy, 
including education, training and R&D. In that case, he will need greater 
action on the revenue side. What should be avoided on the expenditure side 
is cuts in public investment to maintain public consumption.94
Andrew Sentance also provides a very similar analysis. Like Currie he believes ‘that 
the medium term outlook for public borrowing is too high’95. Also like Currie he 
identifies the opportunity created by lower than expected inflation to reduce public 
expenditure:
Sentance Just as higher than expected inflation created overruns in spending in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, it would seem appropriate to try and take 
advantage of a lower inflation climate to claw back some of these increases 
in the years ahead.96
Thus, unlike Currie, Sentance regards the option of reducing public expenditure in this 
way as a reasonable policy choice.
As noted in Chapter 6, Sentance was one of the economists who believes that the 
UK economy devotes too large a share of its output to consumption. It is not therefore 
surprising to find that, like Currie, he argues that ‘a further fiscal tightening is [needed] 
to change the balance of fiscal and monetary policy in a way which is favourable to
97sustaining a higher level of investment and net exports.’
This analysis is also important for Gavyn Davies who likewise argues that ‘a 
further shift in the fiscal/monetary [mix] looks desirable in order to control 
consumption, boost investment and maintain a competitive real exchange rate’.98 In
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terms of practical action, Davies suggests (as he did in July) that the Chancellor should 
introduce ‘consumption-reducing measures [which] should probably build up to at least 
2-3 per cent of GDP over the next 4 years’."  However, unlike Currie Sentance and 
particularly Congdon, Davies believes that there is only a ‘modest case’ for these 
measures in terms of the sustainablity of the PSBR alone, writing:
Davies On central economic forecasts, the PSBR should fall to 3.6 per cent of GDP 
by 1997/98. This compares with an appropriate target of about 2.5-3 per
cent of GDP ... Given the immense uncertainty in all projections of this
type, there is obviously no compelling case from a PSBR/financing point of 
view for further fiscal tightening.100
This aspect of Davies’s argument is, in fact, supported by Andrew Britton who is one of 
the few Panel members who thinks that changes to fiscal policy should not be
announced in the Budget. As noted above economic growth has been more or less
consistent with the National Institute’s forecasts (although inflation has been lower than 
expected) and, on the basis of these forecasts, Britton argues that
Britton Our projections of the public sector financial position do not suggest the
need for any further tax increases in the November Budget. The level of 
debt and borrowing implied for the medium term - in so far as this can be 
calculated with any degree of accuracy - does not appear imprudent.101
In interview, Britton argues against immediate action as follows:
Britton Instead of going soon, you should wait because the recovery may stall and 
you already have a big tax increase coming along in the early months of 
next year. In the case of our particular forecast there is also a bit of anxiety 
about the effect of that on the price level. We could go over the top on the
price level simply because of the indirect taxes [and] that would ruin your
102plans for reducing interest rates.
However, in the Report itself Britton does not dissent from the view that it would be 
‘prudent’ for the Chancellor to announce tax and spending reforms in the forthcoming 
Budget. The reasons he gives for this are as follows:
Britton In the Panel meetings themselves, there was a lot of discussion about the 
relative risk. It wasn’t so much a question of whether you have to, but 
whether perhaps you nevertheless ought to ... Should you, in some sense, 
try and play safe - would you feel safer if you had a bit of tax increase under 
your belt and you could always give it away again? Well I certainly accept
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that argument ... I wouldn’t mind so much if he’s pencilled in something 
for later years, because I regard this pencilling in as a rather abstract 
exercise which can always be undone at the next budget if you don’t like it 
... [But] if you have got firm plans - you know that you want to widen the 
VAT base as soon as possible or you want to abolish mortgage interest relief 
- there is no great harm in announcing those plans. It might even reassure 
the markets that you have got the situation under control.103
Thus, even though announcing tax and spending plans in advance is not something that 
Britton would personally recommend, he is prepared to concede that this could still be a 
reasonable strategy for the Chancellor to follow. Finally, Patrick Minford’s contribution 
to the debate is also very interesting because his forecast for economic growth is very 
different. As noted in previous chapters, Minford believes that, if  the PSBR is almost 
entirely cyclical, then:
Minford first the public borrowing we see would melt away [and] secondly there 
would be no need for the public spending programmes allegedly needed to 
boost competitiveness. Thirdly, interest rates, currently at around 4 per cent 
adjusted for inflation, could come down without risk in order to underpin 
the still fragile recovery104
Minford then goes further and disputes the claim that ‘even if  that were all true, keeping 
policy as it is would not matter because the economy would in time recover anyway 
[and] taxes could then be cut’.105 In response to this claim, Minford argues that:
Minford reversing damaging tax and spending decisions is not easy, because they 
create vested interests in the continuation; spending ministries always find 
good ways of spending tax revenues and spending programmes acquire lives 
of their own. Even if reversal could be guaranteed there is still the loss of 
output meanwhile, as stagnation is unnecessarily prolonged.106
Thus, to sum up, behind the consensus that a prudent Chancellor ‘would introduce a 
package of tax and spending reforms’ to ensure control of the PSBR we have the 
following views:
• Tim Congdon arguing that the PSBR is unsustainable and that fiscal reform 
should start straight away
• David Currie and Andrew Sentance arguing that the PSBR is unsustainable 
and that measures to correct this need to be phased in.
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Gavyn Davies arguing that the PSBR is probably OK, but that the balance of 
policy needs to shift to boost exports (an argument also supported by Currie 
and Sentance)
• Andrew Britton arguing that no policy announcement is needed at the 
moment because the PSBR is probably already under control
• Patrick Minford arguing that the PSBR was not the problem - it was ensuring 
the recovery which mattered.
The question which I want to address in the final paragraphs of this section is how did 
the Panel get from this disparate starting point to a single policy recommendation. 
There is no reason why this had to happen, and at least one of the Panel disputes the 
suggestion that they should try to reach consensus recommendations:
Congdon I don’t think the purpose of the Panel is to be consensual, and that certainly 
isn’t what we were told. That certainly isn’t my understanding of its 
purpose. It is to bring together these individuals so that they can express 
their views. It may happen that on some things they agree, but it isn’t the 
purpose to reach consensus ... there is nothing of that kind at all. I mean it 
may be that other Panellists think that there is [but] nothing of that kind has 
been conveyed to me as part of the purpose of the Panel. I certainly don’t 
see the Panel in those terms, and if I don’t agree with what the rest of the 
Panel is saying I will indicate that I don’t agree with it ... but there can 
hardly be any disagreement with the point that in the end, the growth of the 
public debt must be brought under control.107
Thus, for some, as noted at the beginning of this section, the reason for the consensus in 
the non-doctrinaire nature of the problem. Patrick Minford also remarked:
Minford On this occasion, the disagreements between the Panel about what exactly 
the policy would be were not very great in fact ... I think most people 
assumed that they would cut interest rates in response to a fairly weak 
economy, and most people also assumed that they would take some steps to 
tighten fiscal policy one way or another.108
However, this remark (which focuses more on the assumptions than the 
recommendations) downplays the significance of Minford’s own reasonableness in the 
meetings. As one of the outliers, including Minford’s stance (which was the ‘most 
different’109) was crucial to producing the consensus. For example, Andrew Britton
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commented, reaching agreement was not simply because the Panel had started off with 
very similar views:
Britton Patrick ... who had the very optimistic projection of the borrowing 
requirement, was quite prepared to concede that there was a serious risk and 
that the whole question of sustainability ought to be discussed. Even 
though, in his projection, it was a problem that disappeared almost 
immediately he was quite prepared to use other people’s forecasts as a basis 
for discussion.110
Similarly, Andrew Sentance noted that Minford’s reasons for endorsing the policy 
recommendation were rather different reasons to the rest of the Panel:
iSentance Patrick believes that, later in this Parliament, the Chancellor, assuming he 
follows our advice, will have a lot of scope for reducing taxes in the way 
that Patrick would like to see. So he is relaxed about it. He doesn’t see this 
as being necessary for fiscal tightening means - he sees that other people 
want it for fiscal tightening means, but that’s not why he’s wanting it, 
although he has agreed to put his name to it.111
Congdon may not feel these pressures but the majority of the Panel do. For example, in 
a previous interview Minford commented that one of the ‘interesting things’ about the 
Panel’s first ever meeting was that:
Minford we were all trying to be nice I think, apart from Tim who was all at arms
length, [and] to communicate as economists, as part of this [scientific]
community
Evans You felt you had to make an effort?
Minford Yes, make an effort [for] our community of economists, and the community
at large ... there was that sort of spirit about it, which was quite
interesting.112
Minford’s view is that if the group is to survive and become truly useful it must develop 
its own ‘group dynamic where people are willing to actually confront evidence and 
modify their positions over time ... Otherwise it is simply going to be a bunch of people
113who disagree the whole time’. As a result of this, Minford believes that:
Minford the only way it will be successful is if it develops a group ethos. At the 
moment it hasn’t ... but in a way that doesn’t matter because it can still 
develop over time ... I think that we have all got different views but, at the
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end of the day, there are important public interest issues to be settled here 
and we can’t afford to let our vanity or whatever it is get in the way of a 
sensible discussion.114
Certainly Minford’s own efforts in this direction have not gone unnoticed by his 
colleagues with Andrew Britton noting that ‘he is certainly being very reasonable 
himself - which is not the reputation he once had’115. Interestingly, by October, Gavyn 
Davies can see that progress is being made in developing this group ethos:
Davies I do think the Panel is showing some signs of developing in ways which are 
separate from simply the three meetings per annum cycle. I think we are 
going to have additional meetings about different subjects, more subject 
related than forecast related. So those three meetings will exist but I think 
in addition there will be other things, which I would think is going to be 
good ... I still think we are kind of groping our way towards a role, but I 
think that the last set of meetings were actually pretty good. I think they 
were good meetings in themselves and I think there was more of a corporate 
spirit... people are getting to know each other, and feeling part of the same 
operation as opposed to just visitors to a meeting. I think more of us are 
buying into the idea that we want to make this thing work.116
To conclude we can see that there were several different views on offer at the 
October meeting and there was no obvious way how they reduce to a single policy. 
Nevertheless there was also a feeling, at least amongst some, that if  the Panel was going 
to be judged useful, then it was important that they at least minimised their differences 
and agree a single strategy for the forthcoming Budget. That they did is not entirely 
attributable to the nature of the problem. As we saw, they came to the meeting with a 
range of different views. Thus, the consensus is also due, in part, to the Panel’s efforts 
to make it so.
Several of the mainstream members actually made this point quite explicitly in 
interview, although each stressed slightly different reasons for wanting consensus. For 
example, Andrew Britton highlighted the role of press and public opinion, saying:
Britton I think you are right about seeking consensus. We felt, particularly after the 
July Report, which got rather a bad press, that people found the arguing in 
public a bit tedious and that they would prefer to emphasise the agreements 
rather than the disagreements.117
285
On the other hand, Andrew Sentance agreed that there was an effort towards reaching
1 1 Ragreement, but ‘not to placate the media’ . Rather:
Sentance there was a feeling that here was a man we were supposed to be reporting to 
- the Chancellor of the Exchequer - and he was going to have to take some 
tough decisions in the Budget. He was going to look at this report and he 
was going to say ‘What is this Report telling me about what I should do in 
the Budget?’ And if we couldn’t come to some sort of strategy that really 
came out of the views of the Panel then I think, quite legitimately, he would 
say ‘This is all very well, but it is not helping me a great deal’. [So] it was 
an attempt by us to do our job - which is to advise the Chancellor.119
The effort towards convergence was also noted by Gavyn Davies, who said:
Davies I think there was more agreement coming out of that meeting than there was 
going into it, which suggested that there was a willingness to compromise in 
order to reach a common objective ... I do think there was a genuine 
tendency for people to see each other’s point of view and amend their own 
position as a result of the discussion. I don’t want to overstate this. I don’t 
think there was that much disagreement going in, and I don’t think there 
was 100 per cent agreement coming out, but I think there was a tendency to
move towards agreement, which I don’t think was there in the previous two
meetings.120
The important point to draw from this is that the Panel actively worked to bring about 
consensus and hence closure of the debate. The reasons for this, in various ways, 
related to the perception of others - the media, the Chancellor, other economists and so 
on. As Gavyn Davies pointed out:
Davies I think that the Treasury has given us a massive opportunity, both as 
individuals and as representatives of economics outside the Treasury.121
It seems that this responsibility is one taken seriously by the Panel and one of the key
factors in explaining why, in October, they were able to find ways of working around
their differences and speaking to the Chancellor (and the public) with a single voice. 




This, the final section of this chapter, briefly examines the effectiveness of the Panel in 
shaping economic policy. The measure of effectiveness used is simply the extent to 
which the Chancellor can be seen to heed the advice given to him by his advisors. The 
previous section outlined in some detail the policy recommendation the Panel made to 
the Chancellor. This section thus begins by briefly outlining the policies adopted by the 
Chancellor.
Chancellor Kenneth Clarke’s maiden Budget, which was preceded the week 
before by a 0.5 per cent cut in interest rates, was widely hailed as a success by both his 
fellow Conservative MP’s and by City economists. The Chancellor began his Budget 
by saying that:
My first priority has been to sustain the economic recovery now underway 
and to create the right climate for growth and jobs. I have been determined 
to take no risks with inflation. To achieve these objectives, the task of my 
first Budget has been to set the government’s finances on a sustainable path 
for the rest of the decade.122
Before looking at the detail of the Budget, it is obvious that the Panel appear to have 
been successful in setting the policy agenda. The similarity between the task the 
Chancellor set himself and the Panel’s advice ‘that the overriding imperative of policy is
1 97to ensure a sustainable fiscal position’ is clear enough. The suggestion that the 
Chancellor did follow the Panel’s advice is also reflected in the warm reception they 
gave the Budget. For example, The Independent reports the Panel as having ‘applauded 
[it as] “brave”, “skilful” and “an appropriate start.’” 124
However, it would not be fair to say that the Budget wholly reflected the Panel’s 
priorities, although it clearly did in some respects. For example, direct tax rates were not 
raised. However, the levels of most allowances were frozen and Mortgage Interest 
Relief was reduced to 15 per cent. In addition the tax base was widened to include new 
taxes on air travel and insurance. These tax raising measures were however offset by 
increased expenditures and, of the £5.5bn reduction in the PSBR announced (far bigger 
than anything the Panel considered necessary or even possible) only £1.75bn of this 
saving came from the changes to the tax and benefit system. The vast majority of the 
saving (about £3.5bn) came from a reduction in the ‘contingency reserve’ which was 
halved from £7bn to £3.5bn. Nevertheless, a Budget which reduced the PSBR was
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definitely what the Panel wanted and so to that extent they can be said to have been 
influential.
However, when the Budget measures are looked at in more detail it is apparent 
that several issues identified as important by a number of the Panel are not addressed in 
the Budget. For example, in their Report the Panel listed as ‘an important caveat’ that 
they would ‘caution against anything more that a modest further tightening of the fiscal 
position for 1994-95 because of the large tax rises already in place’. Clearly the 
Chancellor did not accept this concern and, as a result, several of the Panel were 
concerned about the effect of the Budget on the recovery - fearing that it may slow 
growth. For example, Andrew Britton was concerned about the effect of the Budget on 
growth saying that:
Britton By raising taxes, he has reduced the amount people can afford to spend ...
The measures he has announced could clearly cause hardship unless the
125economy expands more rapidly that we are forecast.
As a result of this deflationary impact some of the Panel reasserted their 
recommendation that ‘any further tightening of fiscal policy should be offset with lower 
interest rates’ . Gavyn Davies was relatively sanguine and felt that the Budget could 
justify a further 1 per cent cut in interest rates over the following 6 months. Wynne 
Godley on the other hand, whilst accepting that the Chancellor was right to take a tough- 
line in the Budget, was more concerned, warning that:
Godley I do think that it will cause a very severe check to the expansion, which in
127any case is not very robust... Interest rates ought to be cut again.
Finally, Patrick Minford felt that interest rates could be lowered as a result of the 
Budget, although for different reasons. He had no worries about the growth rate and felt
that, by ensuring that the PSBR was firmly under control the last ‘fiscal excuse’ for not
128cutting interest rates was now removed.
Thus, we can see that although the Panel were influential in terms of the basic 
Budget judgement (i.e. ensure fiscal sustainablity) they were not so influential on 
monetary policy. There were also other ways in which the Panel’s priorities were not 
fully reflected in the Chancellor’s speech. One thing that the Panel were almost 
unanimous on was that the PSBR should be reduced through increases in taxation. 
However, in the Budget most of the reduction in the PSBR came about through 
reductions in public expenditure.
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Although Tim Congdon’s recommendation for tax increases was based on the 
assumption that there was not the political will to implement public spending cuts on a 
sufficient scale, other members of the Panel had argued that increases in expenditure 
were needed in order to improve economic performance, in particular with regard to net 
exports and the Balance of Trade. For example, Gavyn Davies recommended that taxes 
be increases and half the extra revenue be used to ‘boost public investment, education
129and training.’ A similar economic priority is to be found in David Currie’s 
submission. In addition, whilst correctly anticipating that the lower than expected 
inflation could be used by the Chancellor to reduce public expenditure, Currie actually 
counselled against this, saying:
Currie A preferable alternative would be to maintain the Control Total and 
redeploy resources within the total from public consumption to public 
investment. This would allow support of those areas of public spending that 
help strengthen the long run supply side performance of the UK economy, 
including education, training and R&D.130
A similar concern was also expressed by Wynne Godley who wrote that:
Godley neither tax increases or public expenditure cuts are needed at the moment 
and that to implement them immediately would be unnecessarily 
destructive. Indeed there remains a case ... for actually increasing public 
investment.131
There was therefore within the Panel, as noted in Chapter 6 which discussed the ‘twin 
deficit problem’ in more detail, a series of arguments made by the Panel members that 
fiscal reform was needed for two reasons. One was that the PSBR was just too big to be 
reduced by economic growth alone. This set of arguments which was backed by 
Congdon, Currie, Davies and Sentance was more or less adopted by the Chancellor.
On the other hand, there was a second set of arguments (backed by Britton, 
Currie, Godley, Davies and Sentance), which centred around the need to improve the 
Supply-Side of the economy, reduce consumption and increase investment and exports 
which did not make it through to the political agenda. The rest of this section suggests 
some reason why this might be.
One important reason why the Panel were influential in setting the ‘Budget 
judgement’ was that they spoke with one voice. As noted above, some of the Panel felt 
that they made a deliberate effort to do this, others that it just happened due to the nature
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of the question. Nevertheless, it remains the case that, as in March, the Panel are more 
effective when they are seen to produce some sort of closure. The contrast between the 
case of the PSBR and the trade deficit is thus one between a consensus and a contest - 
the sustainability of the PSBR is (made to be) a consensually agreed problem, the trade 
deficit has not reached that point yet.
However, it has to be noted that, despite the closure achieved by the Panel on the 
issue of the PSBR the Chancellor deviated from their recommendations is several 
important ways. In particular, he did impose a significant tightening of fiscal policy in 
the first year, he did this by reducing expenditure rather than raising taxes and he did not 
offset the deflationary impact of the fiscal measure with monetary policy. Why then did 
the Chancellor, after accepting the basic premise of the Report, ignore so much of the 
detail. 1 would argue that part of the reason was that the majority of the Panel’s 
arguments were concerned solely with the economic reasons for a particular policy. 
This is of course how it should be - they are professional economists and it is in this 
capacity that they advise the Chancellor. However, the Chancellor is lobbied by many 
different interest groups. This is of course recognised by the Panel who frequently 
observe that their assumptions about what the Chancellor will do differ from their 
- recommendations as to what he should do.
In the case of the Budget Deficit, the Panel present an economic argument for (a) 
reducing the Deficit and (b) not doing it straightaway. The economic balancing of risks 
they performed is summarised in the Table overleaf. However, it is clear that the 
political cycle does not figure predominantly in the Panel’s thinking although it is 
implicit in the final recommendation which is that:
[The Panel] would therefore all support the announcement of tax or 
spending reforms, desirable in their own right, which would secure a net 
reduction in the PSBR. If it subsequently becomes clear that the PSBR will 
fall by more than is required, taxes can then be cut of public investment 
increased.132
The implicit political lollipop here is that if the taxes are announced now then there is a 
chance that the Chancellor will be able to assist his party’s electoral chances later in the 
Parliament by undoing them in a tax cutting pre-election Budget designed to win votes. 
However, it is apparent from the Budget that this is not enough to sway the Chancellor 
who bases his Budget as much on political calculation as he does economic calculation.
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For example, an important part of the December Budget was the decision to increase the 
benefit payments to compensate pensioners affected by the imposition of VAT on fuel 
by his predecessor. Indeed it is instructive to compare the two Budgets in this regard.
Figure 1: Summary of Arguments For and Against Further Fiscal Tightening
For Against
A position which does no more than ensure 
sustainability may lead to an inappropriately 
high debt stock.
There is already a considerable fiscal 
tightening in place for next year.
If a further tightening of policy may be 
required at some time, it is better on economic 
grounds to act sooner rather than later and 
taxes can always be cut later.
The recovery remains relatively fragile. 
Although the effect of the increases and / or 
spending cuts on the economy could be offset 
by lower interest rates, it would be impossible 
to ‘fine tune’ the result.
The slow pace at which the PSBR is projected 
to fall over the medium term in the absence of 
further measures could limit the room for 
manoeuvre - for example, if faced with an 
economic downturn in later years.
Tax increases or cuts in public investment 
might damage the supply performance of the 
economy.
A tighter fiscal stance would facilitate lower 
interest rates which would help to maintain a 
competitive exchange rate.
The cost of waiting a year or so to take any 
action might not be great.
Norman Lamont’s March Budget, although economically so successful that 
Kenneth Clarke’s December one amounts to little more than a ‘fine-tuning the Lamont
133approach’ , was politically disastrous. Clarke’s Budget, on the other hand, which ‘did 
nothing for the economy’134 apart from reassure it, is hailed as a great success. The 
point to make here is not that economists should become politicians. Rather it is that 
problems which the Panel diagnosed as important for the future of large numbers of 
their fellow citizens were simply not addressed in the Budget. Consequently the 
structural problems they identified still remain, potentially holding back economic 
growth in the UK and prolonging the waste of human lives.
The conclusion I draw from this is that if the Panel want to make their expertise 
and professionalism count, they clearly need to find ways of communicating it which 
make sense to their putative audience - in this case the politicians. Of course this does 
not mean sacrificing their science - after all it is their science which has allowed them to
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make the diagnosis in the first place. The problem really is more akin to doctor trying 
to persuade patients to give up smoking. There is no doubt that doctors believe smoking 
to be dangerous as a result of scientific medical research which they find credible. 
Thus, the first step is always achieving closure. However, even after this, the patients 
still have to be persuaded to change their ways - the science is thus only the beginning 
of the process, converting it to action is equally important. It may be argued that this is 
not science, but if scientists cannot make the case for their own science then who can? 
The alternative, as demonstrated by the mainstream members of the Panel, is at best 
only a minor influence and at worst irrelevance.
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Chapter 8
This, the final chapter, summarises the analysis of the previous chapters and draws some 
conclusions about its implications. It is divided into three main sections. The first 
section, recounts the forecasts made during 1993 and highlights how the economists 
integrated the particular features of the moment with the more general stories they 
wanted to tell. In so doing I set out more clearly the theoretical framework which I have 
developed during this thesis - that of the tension between the ‘general’ and the 
‘particular’. The discussion thus continues one of the key questions of science studies: 
‘What does it mean for two things to be the same?’
The second section continues this theme but focuses on how the Panel of 
Forecasters understand the events of 1994 when they too look at them as ‘outsiders’. 
By focusing on their own retrospective analyses of 1993,1 once again highlight the way 
in which particular instances are made into examples of a more general case. This 
section also draws on the uncertainty of econometrics and the importance of expertise in 
economic modelling. Finally, the importance of consensus building in communicating 
science is discussed.
The third and final section of this chapter switches the focus from economics 
and economic modelling and back to the sociology of scientific knowledge. It thus 
returns to the issues of symmetry and neutrality raised in Chapter 1 and reappraises the 
discussion in the light of the research presented. It is argued that the sociological study 
of social science raises special problems in that the sociologist’s own expertise often 
conflicts with that of the other social scientists. In conclusion, it is argued that the 
research strategy and methodology employed in this thesis offers a workable solution 
and, potentially, opens up new fields of inquiry to science studies
February 1994 Report
This chapter begins by examining the Report of the Panel of Independent Forecasters 
published in February 1994. Although much of the Report deals with what lies ahead in 
1994 and beyond, the Report also contains a retrospective analysis of the events of 1993 
and it is this aspect of the Report which is the topic of this section. In particular, I 
compare the Panel’s forecasts with the actual outcomes and examine what they leamt 
from this. The focus is thus on the ways in which the Panel themselves interpret the 
data and judge their own performance. As we shall see, they all would admit that they
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have made mistakes and misjudgements. However, it is also true that they do not see
anything in the events of 1993 which forces them to fundamentally rethink their
underlying theoretical ideas.
When compared with the forecasts made in February 1993 (i.e. a year earlier) it 
is clear that the Panel as a whole under-predicted economic growth whilst 
simultaneously over-predicting inflation:
Preliminary figures show that GDP rose by 2 per cent in 1993 ... The mam 
contributions to growth in 1993 came from personal consumption and 
exports, the latter partly offset by import growth to give a small positive 
contribution from net trade. Investment has shown little sign of picking up 
so far. Underlying inflation fell slowly through 1993, ending the year at 2.7 
per cent. The unemployment count peaked in January 1993 and then fell by 
over 200,000 through the rest of the year. The trade picture has been 
obscured by the move to the Intrastat system for EC trade data, but overall 
the current account deficit appears to have been about the same as in 1992.1
This is feature of the forecasting is clearly illustrated in the chart below:
Figure I: Forecasts and Outturns for GDP Growth and Inflation in 1993'
GDP growth in 1993 RPI excl MIPs inflation in 1993Q42.5
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As can be seen, the Panel’s forecasts converge on GDP from below and inflation from 
above (graphically illustrating the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, where the tendency for 
the Panel to reduce forecasts for inflation whilst simultaneously increasing forecasts for 
growth was noted). There it was argued that this implied that the inflation-output trade-
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off was better in this particular post-recession period than previous experiences had
suggested was likely. This point is also acknowledged by the Panel whose
interpretation of this better than expected outcome was as follows:
Currie Looking back at the forecasts for 1993 that we made over the course of the 
year, we note that out forecasts of growth converged on the outturn almost 
entirely from below, while our forecasts of inflation converged almost
entirely from above. This points to a better short-term trade-off between
inflation and growth than we were expecting a year ago. This is supported 
by other developments: a better trade balance than most of us expected, as 
far as we can tell, and sharp falls in unemployment which none of us 
expected.3
Thus we can see that the Panel recognise that the inflation-output trade-off had turned 
out to be better than their econometric models had suggested. In addition, they also 
identified two other factors which make 1993 different from more typical post­
recession periods - one is that net trade had improved by more than most of the Panel 
expected, the other is that unemployment had fallen by more than anyone had expected. 
The question now is whether these historically-unusual events are the beginning of a 
new orthodoxy (i.e. the inauguration of a new economic pattern) or merely a particularly 
unusual instance of the previous patterns. The Panel overwhelmingly favour the later 
interpretation and thus stick with the ideas, stories and models they used for 1993 when 
forecasting 1994 and beyond. In fact, they even suggest that the outcome for 1993 was 
not so unusual after all:
The events of [1993] do not cause any of us to change our (differing) views 
of the UK economy fundamentally, and in the main have not led us to make 
substantial changes to our forecasts for 1994 and beyond. The happy 
combination of steady growth and falling inflation is not unprecedented in 
the early stages of recovery.4
In the rest of this section I examine the responses of the individual forecasters in more 
detail before, in the next section, examining some of the issues raised by them.
The ‘Devaluationists’
In Chapter 5, it was argued that the Panel’s forecasts fell into two main types - there 
were those who stressed the importance of the devaluation in forecasting the economy 
and those who relied on equilibrium concepts such as the natural rate of unemployment. 
The basis of the ‘Devaluationist’ account was that:
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Britton Without the stimulus from the devaluation of sterling and the cuts in interest 
rates, output would hardly have recovered at all last year [1993], and 
unemployment would have risen well above 3 million.5
For the Devaluationists, the problems which they had to account for in 1994 were that, 
the devaluation notwithstanding, growth in 1993 had been higher and, more 
importantly, inflation lower than they had expected. In addition, unemployment had 
fallen sooner and more rapidly than in previous economic cycles and the net trade 
figures were surprisingly good. In short, the pessimists were just too pessimistic about 
the future. This fact is readily conceded by the most pessimistic pessimist of all, Wynne 
Godley:
Godley The short term forecasts which I have provided for the Panel since its 
inception have all been too pessimistic. Output has risen rather more than I 
expected, the deficit in the balance of payments and inflation have both been 
lower; and unemployment has apparently fallen, although it is still possible 
that this may be largely a statistical illusion.6
What is important in the context of this thesis is not the actual errors made in 
forecasting the economy but the way in which they are interpreted. The issue addressed 
in the rest of this section is thus the extent to which these events force the proponents of 
the devaluation story to give up or modify their more general model. In other words, 
can 1993 be explained as merely a particularly odd instance of the devaluation cycle in 
which the combination of external events was such that the inflationary effect was 
unusually muted? If this is the case, then the factors which lay behind the longer term 
pessimism of the Devaluationists still remain.
The rest of this section thus analyses how those members of the Panel which 
used the devaluation framework to structure their forecasts explain their performance, 
the effect it has had on their models and reflect on the policies they suggested. Taking 
first the figures for growth, which the Devaluationists generally underestimated, what 
do they see as the reasons for this? In terms of the differences between the numbers 
forecast and those actually recorded, Andrew Britton is in the enviable position of 
having very little to explain:
Britton [In February,] the Institute was at the top end of the Panel range with a 
forecast of 2 per cent growth ... This forecast now appears to have been 
exactly right ... The Institute’s projections of domestic demand were also 
substantially correct, with consumer spending rising a little faster than we
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expected (despite the Panel’s worries about debt ratios) and fixed 
investment picking up a little.7
For others, however, there was more to explain. The revisions to the national economic 
data made in September were seen by several of the Panel as an important factor. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, one of the implications of this new data set was that forecasts for 
GDP growth, including that made by the National Institute, ought to be increased. 
However, due to their doubts about the trade data, the National Institute were reluctant 
to change their forecast which was, in any case, starting to look fairly accurate. Thus, 
Andrew Britton explains that, at the National Institute:
Britton What we tended to do was think that, probably, the provisional output 
figures were correct and the trade figures and stockbuilding were wrong. So 
when we got the figures with more growth in ... we put that in as a 
preliminary outturn [for net trade] because that was the published figure, but 
we offset the effect on stockbuilding so that we weren’t changing our GDP 
forecast... So when I said we hadn’t made any changes, I meant we hadn’t 
made any changes to output. But obviously we had to take on board the 
provisional figures for the first half of the year, even though we regarded
g
them with some suspicion.
On the other hand, for those with lower forecasts, the data revisions offered something 
of an explanation. For example, David Currie concedes that the London Business 
School ‘under-estimated the extent and pace of recovery during the year,’ but argues 
that:
Currie In large part, this was due to the substantial revision to the estimates for 
GDP in 1992. Instead of the weak numbers first estimated, the revised 
figures (including rebasing) show that GDP was at its lowest in the first 
quarter of 1992, and was rising slowly throughout the rest of the year. With 
that starting point for our forecasts in 1993, our view of growth during the 
year would have been more positive.9
Another important factor in understanding the London Business School original 
forecasts is the judgemental adjustments which were made. Clearly, with hindsight, 
some of these can be seen as mistakes. However, what is interesting is that Currie 
believes that these mistakes of judgement were, at least in part, due to the forecasting 
team giving too much weight to the views of the members of their Consortium Panel, in 
particular IBM, when revising their provisional forecasts.10
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In contrast to Currie, Wynne Godley does not seem to think that the data 
revisions had a significant effect on his own forecasting performance. This is perhaps 
due to the fact that he has a larger discrepancy to explain, but even so, he does not
mention them as even a contributory factor. Rather, Godley highlights the unusual way
in which export prices rose following the devaluation:
Godley It was quite out of line with past experience that export prices rose so much 
following the devaluation with the result that there was no deterioration in 
the terms of trade and therefore no J curve; this unusual change in export
prices probably improved the balance of payments by £3-4 billion. At the
same time, the rise in import prices does not seem to have fed through to 
consumer prices, and therefore did not reduce real personal disposable 
income. This is one of the reasons why my forecast of consumption was too 
low.11
In addition to these price effects, Godley also identifies two other factors which he did 
not anticipate:
Godley One thing that I did not foresee was the stock exchange boom, which I think 
was quite unexpected. [Secondly]. I didn’t really take into account the 
extent to which households in debt would be alleviated by having lower 
interest rates. So there are two factors which, had I anticipated them 
properly, then I would have got it [1993] a bit better. But I was particularly 
surprised that I was wrong.12
However, although these misjudgements have been made, the key question in this 
context is the extent to which they mean that Godley’s underlying model needs to be 
changed. In other words, how consistent are the observed events with the theoretical 
model? In the case of 1993, this task appears more complicated because the theoretical 
model was applied under very different economic circumstances to those in which it had 
been developed. However, in every year these issues will arise to a greater or lesser 
extent and form part of the basic problem of economic forecasting. In 1993, the key 
judgements related to the effects (if any) the unusually high levels of private and 
corporate debts, which had created an unprecedented financial surplus, would have on 
the way the economy responded to the devaluation? Thus:
Godley Following the slump there was an unusually large private sector surplus 
which I take to be the consequence of people having acquired debt and then 
trying to repair their balance sheets. This has happened to both the
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household sector and the corporate sector ... And therefore they had very 
low expenditure relative to their incomes. The position was quite abnormal 
- nothing like it had ever happened before - and the forecasting problem was 
to know when this financial surplus would fall.13
It is this issue of the timing of the fall in the private sector surplus which Godley 
believes that he got wrong:
Godley I took the view that it would take a year or two longer to start falling than it 
actually did. But it was always a great uncertainty to me and I was very 
unsure whether I was correct, because it might fall earlier - I just did not 
know, and I had no past experience to guide me.14
The next stage in this process of self-analysis is to reflect on what has happened, to 
compare it with what was expected and how and where mistakes were made. Again, 
Godley’s response is most candid:
Godley I am not yet sure whether or by how much I shall want to change my model 
in the light of some of the things which happened in 1993 (in particular to 
inflation and unemployment) which were surprising to me. There certainly 
seems some evidence of increased flexibility in a number of areas.15
Thus, Godley is willing to consider the possibility that the events were not just a bit of 
‘good luck’ for the UK economy and that structural relationships within the economy 
might have changed in some ways. However, it seems that what Godley is referring to 
here is the weight which should be given to certain factors and, more importantly, the 
time frame over which they now act. Thus, the changes he considers are more or less at 
the margin of his model. In terms of the ‘big story’ he remains adamant that he has got 
it right:
Godley I have always emphasised my strongly held view that the main objective of 
forecasting is not to get the short term numbers right (which is obviously 
impossible to achieve reliably) but to identify the major strategic issues 
facing the country and reach conditional conclusions about the proper policy 
response to alternative outcomes ... I have, in particular, been absolutely 
clear ever since the Panel started up that personal disposable income and 
demand were in need of ‘rebalancing’ on a large scale and that this would 
require substantial fiscal restriction at some stage ... Nothing happened in 
1993 to alter my opinion that sustained recovery depends upon achieving a 
faster growth in net export demand. So while, as I remarked a year ago in
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my first report for the panel, ‘The government is essentially on the right 
track’ there is still a very long way to go before the weaknesses of the 
economy, accentuated by so many policy errors during the last twenty years, 
are set to rights.16
Thus, Godley’s surprise is not so much over the events which have occurred, but the 
time at which they occurred - in general, consumption started to rise sooner than he had 
expected. However, although he was surprised that the rise happened so soon, this does 
not challenge anything fundamental about his understanding of the economy:
Godley I haven’t really changed my model, or my way of thinking, at least not 
about income-output determination. It is just that I didn’t get the timing of 
it right.17
A similar question obviously applies to the rest of the Devaluationists who must 
also ask themselves how much the economy has changed, and examine the extent to 
which their own models and theories are still useful representations of the world. In 
particular, they need to re-examine the ways in which prices are determined within their 
models and the extent to which labour markets have changed as a result of the 
Conservative government’s policies.
As for Godley, some the most pressing questions are those which relate to net 
trade and to prices. However, rather than accept that the trade figures reflect any 
particularly significant change in behaviour, Britton and Currie take issue with this very 
assertion. For example, by emphasising the changes in the way the trade data have been 
collected, and uncertainty which surrounds it as a result, the urgency of the problem is 
reduced. Thus, one way in which the 1992 devaluation can be distinguished from, say, 
that of 1967, is through this change. As noted in Chapters 6 and 7, one result of these 
changes is that the trade data are not considered trustworthy by several of the Panel.
In addition to the uncertain ty  introduced by the new methodology, Britton also 
emphasises the difference between the value of imports and exports and the volume:
Britton It is much more difficult to say what happened to external demand, since the 
uncertainty over the growth of exports and imports in the first half of last 
year is still to be resolved. The balance of payments has turned out much 
better than I expected, but that appears mainly to reflect a more favourable 
outcome for the terms of trade, rather than for net trade volume. The
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recorded growths of export and import volumes are both much lower than 
expected.18
This further problematises the simple assertion that the net trade figures were unusually 
good, and seems to imply that the turn-around in trade performance is, at least in part, 
artifactual. In other words, in terms of the actual goods exported, there has been less of 
an increase than might have been expected given the devaluation and that exporters have 
exported less but earned more.
The other problem which the Devaluationists had to explain in 1994 is the 
surprisingly low inflation recorded in 1993. Both Britton and Currie accept that the 
devaluation has not had the inflationary effect they had anticipated:
Britton The rate of inflation, on any measure, has turned out rather lower than 
expected. For the fourth quarter of 1993 the outturn for the retail prices 
index (excluding mortgage interest payments) was 2.7 per cent as against a 
forecast of 4.6 per cent by the Institute last February, and an average 
forecast of 3.9 per cent by the Panel as a whole.19
Currie On inflation, we substantially overestimated the extent to which the 
devaluation of sterling would raise inflationary pressures in the economy 
during 1993 and the early part of 1994.20
However, despite this neither of them feels that it is necessary to alter his views 
fundamentally. Each one can identify special or unusual features of 1993 which, when 
fully appreciated, explain why this particular instantiation of the devaluation process has 
worked out in this particular way. Britton first re-emphasises the fact that it might be 
too early to judge how the devaluation has in fact worked because of the implausibility 
of the data:
Britton For 1993 as a whole import unit values (if the figures can be believed) rose 
by about 8 per cent, but unit labour costs by only about 1 per cent.21
Later in his submission, Britton returns to the topic of inflation and argues that wage 
behaviour during the recession and also in the period following it has been rather 
unusual. Britton bases his argument on the values of the ‘residuals’ in the wage and 
prices equations in the National Institute model. In terms of the framework adopted in 
this thesis, the size of the residual (i.e. the difference between the actual value and the 
computed value) is a sort of quantitative indicator of the extent to which the particular 
instance fits the more general story. Thus, the smaller the residual the more typical the
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instance and vice versa. By examining the residuals produced by the National Institute 
model, Britton is able to construct a table of numbers which:
Britton Confirms that wage inflation in particular was, relative to our model [i.e.
general story], ‘unusually’ high in 1990 and 1991 ... By last year [i.e.
1993], however, the residuals in the wage equation ha[d] changed sign,
suggesting that the wage increase was, relative to our model [i.e. general 
story], ‘unusually’ low.22
In addition, Britton is able to identify specific events in the economy, as well as mis­
perceptions amongst the public, which explain why wage inflation in this particular 
economic cycle has differed from previous patterns. In the case of the unexpectedly 
high wage inflation of 1990 and 1991, Britton suggests that this is, in part, ‘because the 
depth and duration of the recession was not at that time fully appreciated by wage 
bargainers.’23 Later, as the economic cycle turned and the recovery was accompanied by 
lower than expected inflation, Britton argues that may have been because
Britton Weight was being given to the very low figures for the headline RPI
[inflation] figure which does not feature in our model, because of pay 
restraint in the public sector or because the labour market was slow to 
recognise the turning point in unemployment.24
Currie follows a similar line, firstly recognising the surprising absence of significant 
inflation which followed the devaluation and then identifying specific events and 
factors:
Currie The fall in inflation following devaluation has been most welcome, and has 
led us to re-examine our view of prospective inflation. In part, current low 
inflation reflects certain special factors [e.g. falling mortgage rates, 
discounts and sales in shops], the robust policy of cutting the large fiscal 
deficit, as well as low inflation in the rest of the world, reflecting the level 
of competition in global markets.25
In this way, Britton and Currie maintain their general model as an explanatory structure 
by introducing special factors into the processes which mediate economic activity e.g. 
the misguided public. However, as noted above, there is also the argument that the low 
inflation figures reflect a more fundamental shift in the economic structure and that the 
Devaluationists actually have the wrong model. Currie recognises this as a candidate 
explanation but, ultimately, restates his faith in the original analysis:
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Currie There is also the possibility that [the low inflation] reflects changes in the 
structure of the UK economy leading to improved flexibility of supply 
performance ... although we accept this explanation in part, we retain some 
scepticism as to whether this improvement will be sustained. We therefore 
see some risk of rising inflationary pressures as recovery continues.26
Thus, in conclusion we can see that, though the identification of transitory and 
contingent factors, the low inflation of 1993 is explained and accounted for, but the 
validity of the general model, and its implications for future inflation are also 
maintained:
Britton There have a been a lot of special factors that you can identify in the rate of 
inflation over the last year, particularly in food and household durables, 
where there have been a lot of price cuts, particularly in the sales. And I 
think that I am not really saying more that, perhaps, there won’t be so much 
of that in the future.27
The ‘Classical9 Economists
For the ‘Classical’ Economists things were rather different. They had been more 
optimistic about the future than the ‘Devaluationists’, forecasting that growth with low 
inflation was the most likely outcome over the next few years. Arguably this is what 
had happened and so they were able to claim that they had more or less got it right all 
along. Thus, for example, Tim Congdon argues that:
Congdon The February 1993 [Lombard Street Research] Submission [to the Panel] 
argued, on the basis of an equation using the output gap concept, that 
‘above-trend growth can be reconciled for several years with low inflation’ 
and that ‘the next few years should be good ones for the British economy’
... Much of this forecast, including its generally optimistic tenor, has proved
28correct.
However, Congdon does acknowledge that his forecast erred in three inter-related ways, 
namely:
Congdon 1. it under-estimated growth in 1993;
2. it failed to foresee the fall in unemployment which did in fact occur, and
3. it failed to forecast the acceleration in broad money growth in late 
1993.29
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Like Currie, Congdon believes a large part of the under-estimate of GDP (about half in 
his case) can be attributed to the revisions to the economic data. However, the rest of 
the error is due to a second and more ‘fundamental’ reason - the rate of growth in the 
second half of 1993 really was faster than he had expected. In this respect, Congdon is 
now in the same position as the Devaluationists were over their forecasts for inflation. 
He must now identify some particular events which explain why this was if  his general 
model is to be maintained. Thus, Congdon argues that the lower interest rates had a 
more significant effect than he had anticipated:
Congdon The failure to fully foresee the strengthening of activity in the second half 
may have been due to exaggerating the tightness of the constraint implied 
by low monetary growth. In practice, the drop in interest rates may have 
been responsible for people trying to switch out of interest-bearing deposits 
into more rewarding assets, such as equities and real assets (including 
consumer durables and cars), on a greater scale than had been anticipated.30
Of course, the idea that economic agents will try to maximise their returns is not 
controversial and so Congdon’s account maintains the general model. On the other 
hand, he does have to admit that the scale of the transfer into other assets was, in this 
- instance, unusually large.
On unemployment, Congdon argues that relatively low productivity growth in. 
1993 (itself an unusual event), when combined with the higher than expected growth, 
led to a bigger fall in unemployment than he forecast. Finally, on the under-estimation 
of monetary growth, which is a crucial part of his economics, Congdon is keen to point 
out that the mistake was not due to forecasting credit trends wrongly. Rather it is 
attributed to ‘neglect[ing] the potential capital in-flows into the non-bank sector from
31abroad’ . As a result, the mistakes actually confirm the general model:
Congdon The faster-than-expected monetary growth in late 1993 contributed to the 
improvement in balance-sheet strength across the economy and so the 
greater-than-forecast buoyancy in domestic demand and employment ... 
The message of [this] is clear ... ‘in any worthwhile discussion of the 
macroeconomic situation, we must make an attempt to relate the demand to 
hold broad money to the quantity of such balances actually in existence’.32
For the other member of the Classical camp, Patrick Minford, the situation was perhaps 
rather different. In February 1993, he was at once both a pessimist and an optimist. As 
far as 1993 was concerned, he was one of the more pessimistic economists on the Panel,
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forecasting low GDP growth and advocating large and immediate cuts in interest rates 
in order to ensure the recovery. Over the longer term, (i.e. into 1994 and beyond) he 
was one of the more optimistic Panel members, forecasting strong growth accompanied 
by low inflation and falling unemployment. Thus:
Minford At the start of 1993 we expected modest inflation for the year followed by a
decline to around 3 per cent; growth weak in 1993 rising to 3 per cent in the 
following years because of supply-side improvement (particularly greater 
labour market flexibility); and unemployment remaining high in 1993 but 
falling steadily thereafter for the same reason. Our fear, reflected in our 
forecast, was that demand weakness produced by the previous extreme 
tightness of money would delay recovery and the growth unleashed by the 
better supply side.33
Of course, this is not what happened - GDP growth in 1993 was nearly 2 per cent more 
than Minford forecast in February of that year. In his retrospective analysis, Minford 
identifies three factors which led to the unexpectedly strong recovery:
Minford There seem to have been three simultaneous and probably connected
sources of greater strength: in net exports, recruiting and in consumption. 
Our model may have underestimated the exchange rate effect on net exports 
and the real interest rate effect on consumption; and the lags in the 
unemployment relationship may have speeded up.34
However, in interviews it became clear that there was an additional reason why the 
forecast produced in February had been so low. Minford pessimistic short-term forecast 
was actually the result of his own personal pessimism. The Liverpool economic model 
had initially produced a higher forecast but Minford and his team had ‘restrained’ it. 
The reason for this adjustment was uncertainty over what to do about the unusually high 
levels of debts. In Minford’s case, this uncertainty was compounded by additional 
problems of how to interpret the ‘regime shift’ caused by moving from a policy in 
which the exchange rate was fixed to one in which it was allowed to float:
Minford Had [we] been in a floating regime all along, one would probably have let 
the model roll. The difficulty was how to interpret this post-ERM regime 
shift ... I think we felt that the sharp difficulties with balance sheets - the 
overhang of the ERM really - wouldn’t go away quickly. They are not 
explicitly in the model, these balance sheet factors, these things like 
negative equity and so forth. So we thought there was going to be
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something of that still in there ... Basically we thought that it would take 
1993 to work out of the system and we also assumed that there would need 
to be interest rate cuts during 93, quite a lot of interest rate cuts. In fact, 
they obviously worked out of the system quicker.35
Thus, like Godley, the high levels of indebtedness in the economy caused Minford and 
his colleagues difficulties. Also like Godley, they over-estimated the time period over 
which this unusual situation would have a significant effect on the economy. However, 
like his monetarist colleague Tim Congdon, Minford’s forecast for low inflation was 
proved to be more or less correct, despite the higher than expected growth and so in this 
respect he had few worries. As he observes, it was always his view that:
Minford Policy had massively deflated the economy so that the faster slowdown in 
inflation was not too surprising: we somewhat underestimated it in the 
short-term, allowing too much for the temporary exchange rate effect on 
inflation. [But] the evidence has been consistent with our view that the UK 
supply side has improved and that monetary policy has been highly 
deflationary.36
In other words, the lower than expected inflation is interpreted as proof that the more 
general story Minford wants to tell about the importance of monetary influences and the 
flexibility of markets is confirmed by the data. Thus, he sees in 1993 yet more evidence 
that the Keynesian Devaluationist story, with its rigid labour markets and high inflation 
is inadequate for the task:
Minford The claim of the people that I have been arguing with, has been that there 
will be inflation, much higher inflation - that any sort of growth would set 
off inflation. After all, we had an argument before all this about leaving the 
ERM. People like Andrew Britton and David Currie, and Gavyn Davies 
come to that, argued that it would be highly inflationary to leave the ERM. 
I mean, it is quite clear who won that argument.37
Finally, with regard to policy, even as 1993 progressed and it became evident that 
growth was going to be stronger than Minford had originally anticipated, he never 
wavered from his original view that interest rates ought to be cut. In this respect he 
differs from Gavyn Davies who, although advocating interest rate cuts in February, did 
not do so in July or October. Moreover, in February 1994, he still thought that this was 
good advice. Part of the reason for this is that the factors which combined to produce 
the better than expected growth could just have been due to chance:
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Minford These developments amy [sic] just have been random ‘errors’, the result of a 
lucky draw, a positive event influencing all three sources ... Had there been 
an unlucky draw then the recession would have been yet more prolonged, 
unnecessarily given the already savage deflation in the system which should 
have been evident from normal economic theory (instead much was wrongly 
made of the supposed ‘inflation’ stemming from a downward float) ... In 
summary the government have been fortunate that a still poor situation of
* 38delayed recovery is not worse still.
However, to say that because the government did not cut interest rates and were ‘lucky’ 
enough to get GDP growth of 2 per cent hides a more fundamental question in 
Minford’s view, namely:
Minford What you have to ask is whether you could legitimately have expected to 
have a robust recovery with those real interest rates. That is really the 
question, and I think that they were lucky to get away with it. But they 
haven’t really got away with it because it is still a very weak recovery. I 
suppose another way of putting the point is, suppose I had correctly forecast 
2 per cent growth, I would still have taken the same policy position.39
Thus Minford, even though GDP growth of 2 per cent has been recorded without the 
interest rate cuts he believed were needed, still maintains that his original diagnosis was 
correct, and moreover that events have shown it to be so.
Minford We were obviously forecasting lower growth on the grounds that there were 
depressive forces in the economy. Clearly they weren’t as depressive as we 
thought. But on the issue of inflation, it is quite clear that with growth 
coming in at what these others expected, but accompanied by very much 
lower inflationary pressure, then on that we were clearly right ... the 
significant fact has been that inflationary pressures have been very much 
lower than expected and that is why interest rates have been continuously 
cut. And that points really to there having been a significant over-estimate 
of the inflationary dangers.40
Summary
From the above discussion, we can see that neither the Devaluationists nor the Classical 
felt that the events of 1993 fundamentally challenged their basic ideas about how the 
economy worked. For nearly all the Panel, GDP growth had been higher than they had 
forecast at the beginning of the year. However, this was largely explained by two sets 
of factors. The first of these was the revisions to the data which took place in the
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Autumn. Had this data been available at the beginning of the year then their forecasts 
for growth would have been as much as 0.5 per cent higher.
The other factors identified related to the unusual nature of the economic 
situation in 1993. Thus, many of them mentioned the uncertainty created by the unusual 
set of economic circumstances which was the result of the preceding economic cycle. 
For most of the Panel, the unprecedentedly high levels of indebtedness were the 
principal source of this uncertainty. For Minford there was, in addition, the effect of the 
change in policy. In either case, however, we can see that, in those circumstances where 
there is no historical precedent, the forecasters have their biggest problems. However, 
and perhaps ironically, in this case it was Andrew Britton, the forecaster who made the 
most of historical precedent, who produced the best forecast for demand.
In addition to these shared concerns and problems, there were also explanations 
and discrepancies which related more directly to specific forecasts. For the 
Devaluationists, the problem was that inflation had been much lower than they had 
expected given the growth which had occurred. They tended to explain this as being the 
result of special factors like price-cutting in high street stores, mis-perceptions of the 
depth/duration of the recession and so on. However, they also argued that because these 
effects were temporary in nature, their underlying model, which was the basis for their 
longer term pessimism, was untouched. As a result they remained pessimistic about the- 
future despite the events of 1993.
For the classical economists, Minford and Congdon, the problems were much 
less severe as they had forecast low inflation in the first place. However, it is difficult to 
conclude from this that they had the best models. As we have already seen, the 
Devaluationists were able to identify specific events which, in this particular instance, 
mitigated the inflationary impact of the devaluation. It is only over the following years 
that the ‘real’ test of the theories emerges. On the one hand the Classical economists 
foresee persistent low inflation and above trend growth. On the other, the more 
Keynesian Devaluationists see growth constrained by inflationary pressures due to 
hysteresis in the labour market and an increasing balance of payments deficit. However, 
as we have seen throughout this thesis, these stories have to be interpreted in the context 
of the particular situation in which the economy finds itself, the policy decisions taken 
by government and the spending/saving decisions of economic actors. As a result it is
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highly unlikely that 1994 will prove any more decisive than 1993 in distinguishing 
between the good and the bad in economic theory.
Debates and Controversy
General Cases and Economic Narratives
As we saw in the previous section, analysing forecasts for economic growth in 1993 
was, in some ways, similar to the classic SSK ‘controversy story’ in which the meaning 
of empirical data is ambiguous and contested. It was accepted by everyone that the UK 
economy had been through a severe recession in the previous 2-3 years. What was not 
so clear was what would happen next. One view was that the UK economy would 
continue to grow, with inflation and unemployment falling. The other was that the 
recovery would be little more than a brief flurry of activity followed by a much longer 
period of slow and difficult growth against a background of high unemployment and the 
re-emergence of inflation. The two sides to this controversy were thus the economic 
optimists and the economic pessimists. However, it would not be fair to say that the 
two camps were homogeneous - there were differences within them as well as 
similarities between them. This section thus begins by unpacking the two sets of stories 
a little more carefully.
Both the optimists and the pessimists had a general story or theory which 
explained the current situation and provided forecasts for the future. The pessimists 
based their forecasts on the effects of the devaluation which came about after the UK’s 
exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). For the optimists, the 
picture was rather different. To start with, they tended see the ERM as having been the 
problem rather than a potential solution. Thus, having left the ERM, there was nothing 
between the UK and economic recovery. In this optimistic interpretation, the story was 
that the economy was a long way from equilibrium. As a result of the ERM, 
unemployment was too high and output was too low. Consequently, the next few years 
offered the pleasing prospect of output rising and unemployment falling, all without the 
emergence of any significant inflation.
In the devaluation story, the argument was that, in previous devaluations, the 
gains from the more competitive exchange rate were offset fairly quickly by rising 
prices. As a result of this experience they argued that the prospects for the UK economy 
after this devaluation were not especially good. In particular, inflationary pressures 
were likely to increase as a result of the devaluation itself and these would be
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compounded by hysteresis in the labour market and the increase in output itself. This in 
turn would require deflationary policies (to keep inflation down) and, as a result, 
economic growth was unlikely to be fast enough for long enough to reduce 
unemployment significantly. The pessimistic picture therefore was of an economy 
trapped between high unemployment and high inflation.
Godley’s variation on this theme was that it was the UK’s tendency to import 
more than it exports which is the problem. If growth is not warranted by net trade then 
the Balance of Payments deficit becomes a binding constraint, requiring deflationary 
policies to contain it. The result however is still the same - low growth and high 
unemployment are the most likely future.
These then are the general stories which the Panel of Forecasters told: one was a 
story about a devaluation which occurred in 1967 and its consequences; the other was 
the classic equilibrium story of an economy returning to it’s ‘natural rates’. However, 
although these stories provided the template for understanding of events, they did not 
prescribe exactly how the story will be told. Each story is made up of several parts, 
includes many different actors and the roles given to (and taken by) each varies with 
each instantiation. The skill of economic forecasting is thus in understanding the 
particularities of the current version, the way the elements of the story combine and then 
using these to predict what the outcome will be - to guess the sting in the tale! This is- 
where the expertise of the economist as a socialised member of both the economic and 
wider community is important. An econometric model is a tool which reduces and 
removes the atypical and the unique in order to identify the average and the regular. 
Like the economic narrative of ‘devaluation’ and ‘equilibrium’ it is something which 
can be used to structure the story but cannot actually tell it.
In 1993, the tensions between the ‘general’ case and the ‘particular’ instance 
manifested themselves in several different ways. For some the tensions were small - 
Andrew Britton relied extensively on the 1967 devaluation in the analysis of, and 
forecasts for, the UK economy in 1993. Thus he saw the differences between the 
general case ‘devaluation’ and this particular instance of it as being minimal. The same 
is also true for Tim Congdon, although he told an ‘equilibrium’ story rather than a 
devaluation one. For others, however, there were some differences. For example, 
Gavyn Davies, although basically backing the ‘devaluation’ story, argued that the 
economy was actually much weaker than in previous cases as a result of the high levels
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of indebtedness. Thus, interest rates could (and should) be cut still further before the 
inflationary pressures predicted by Britton and Currie would be seen. The tension is not 
over whether a devaluation has occurred - it clearly has - but whether, under the current 
circumstances, the typical effects, as exemplified in the 1967 devaluation, will be seen. 
Britton and Currie say they will, Davies argues that they will not.
This happens within both the optimist and pessimist groups. In each case we can 
find forecasts based on precedent (Britton and Currie for the pessimists, Congdon for 
the optimists) and forecasts which emphasised the unique nature of the current 
combination of events (Davies, Godley and Sentance for the pessimists, Minford for the 
optimists). Thus some of the differences between the Panel’s forecasts can be explained 
by their interpretation of the current situation. Britton and Currie, who probably have 
the largest econometric models, were the ones who paid the most attention to historical 
precedent, (i.e. previous devaluations) in grounding their forecasts. Consequently, they 
tend to minimise the importance of the things which make 1992-93 different from 
before. As a result, the positive impact of the devaluation tends to dominate the forecast 
in the short term and the inflationary effects in the longer term. This is very different 
from, say, Godley who paid much more attention to what made 1993 unique (e.g. the 
unprecedentedly high levels of private sector debts) in making his forecasts. As a result, 
he is much more sceptical that the devaluation can have a significant impact.
However, there is not a simple relationship between focusing on the poor state of 
the UK economy (i.e. the particular) and putting a more pessimistic spin onto the 
general story. In Minford’s forecast, it is precisely the features which make 1993 
different which ensure the recovery over the longer term. For example, Minford 
believes that the labour market has been transformed by policies which have reduced the 
natural rate to about 1 million, and that global competition, together with a sea-change 
in public opinion, have made inflation a thing of the past. And so on. As a result of 
this, even though the UK economy is in an exceptionally poor state in early 1993, 
provided the government does not make any more mistakes, its prospects are good.
Although the focus so far has been very much on the grand narratives which 
cover the whole economy, it can also be seen that the Forecasters saw in the current data 
different versions of the same story. Thus, how the devaluation will turn out depends on 
judgements of similarity and difference between this devaluation or recession and 
previous ones. For some it is essentially the same, and so can be forecast reliably using
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econometric models. For others, however, there are important differences between 
‘then’ and ‘now’ which colour and change the way the story unfolds. Thus, for 
example, unprecedentedly high levels of debt restrain consumers’ expenditure, thus 
muting the effect of the devaluation. Alternatively, the labour market policies enacted 
during the 1980s mean that the UK economy can recover much faster, and with lower 
inflation, than in the past. In this way, the judgement about what is similar and what is 
different feeds into the structure provided by the general case and transforms it from, 
say, a ‘devaluation-in-general’ to ‘this-devaluation-in-particular’. Of course, the general 
case is also the macro-econometric model and the use of residual and other adjustments 
is thus understood in this context as the addition of expertise to extrapolation.
Particular Instances of Economic Theories
In this section I continue to develop the idea of economic forecasting as being the 
application of generalised and/or stylised ‘cases’ to events in the world through the 
apprehension of similarity and difference. Unlike the previous section, which focused 
on what might be called the ‘big stories’ of economics, the focus here is on the more 
minor and localised controversies which emerged during the Panel’s meetings and in 
my interviews. However, like the previous section, the focus of the discussion is on 
how a particular set of data is interpreted as being an instance of a more general case 
rather than its refutation. The discussion draws on the Panel’s views on unemployment. 
Public Sector Borrowing and the usefulness of monetary indicators
Unemployment
Taking first the debate over the unemployment data. The debate was precipitated by the 
unexpected falls in the number of people claiming unemployment benefit in the first 
half of 1993. This was not anticipated by the Panel members and meant that they 
needed to identify some way in which 1993 differed from previous post-recession 
periods in order to explain why unemployment had fallen so rapidly and so soon. In 
other words, what needed to be established were the particular features of 1993; the 
features which, when acknowledged, will both preserve the general model (be it 
hysteresis or classical) and also account for the discrepancy between that model and the 
economy. As was discussed in Chapter 6, several hypotheses were put forward ranging 
from an overly-pessimistic view of economic prospects on the part of employers in the 
latter half of 1992 to the suggestion that nothing had happened at all in the economy at 
all and that the fall was the result of DSS policies. By examining these ideas, it was 
shown how, through the identification of novel events, general propositions about
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unemployment can be maintained in the light of contradictory experiences. Thus a 
range of non-economic factors were considered as possible explanations, although none 
was persuasive to every one.
In addition, the discussion in Chapter 6 also referred to the controversy over the 
importance of hysteresis which, in many ways, sets the framework within which 
typicality and particularity were assigned. After all, what you think ought to have 
happened in the first place plays an important role in framing the question of what needs 
to be explained, what is likely to effect the outcome and so on. In the case of 
unemployment, the rapid fall was less of a problem for Minford than the rest of the 
Panel as it was closer to what he had expected to happen.
By the time of the October meeting, the falls in unemployment had stopped and 
the passage of time had brought a closure of the debate over the causes o f unexpected 
falls in unemployment. Part of the solution to the controversy lies in the new statistics - 
part of the original problem was that the unemployment figures had fallen earlier in the 
economic cycle than in previous post-recession periods. In other words, the 
unemployment data did not look much like an example of the general case. However, 
the new data, moved the start of the economic recovery back in time. This means that 
the falls in unemployment occurred closer to their usual place in the cycle and this 
particular post-recession period is now more easily recognised as an example of the 
general case.
However, a slight complication remains as the rate at which unemployment fell 
was faster than is usually the case and therefore does not fit the general pattern. It turns 
out that the special or unusual factor which explains this is the rise in unemployment 
which took place in the months before Christmas 1992 when there were no economic 
data to suggest recovery. Thus, the changes in the economic data enable the economists 
to re-assert the link between the economic cycle and unemployment by attributing the 
deviation from the general case to a loss of confidence in the business community which 
caused unemployment to rise above what it should ‘really’ be. In 1993 the ‘mistake’ is 
corrected and the unemployment data are returned to their more usual relationship with 
output.
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
The second issue which was important in the Panel’s meetings was the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement and the extent to which it was cyclical (i.e. going to go away
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on its own) or structural (i.e. going to persist unless additional tax and spending plans 
were announced). As shown in Chapter 6, this debate exposed the fragile nature of the 
consensus reached in the February meeting, at which six out of the seven had agreed 
that fiscal policy should not be tightened during 1993. By moving the debate into 1994, 
those Panel members that wanted further policy action had to develop additional 
arguments to support their claim. They did so by linking the policies necessary to 
ensure a sustainable PSBR to other economic and political issues, thereby creating a 
stronger case for the policies they believed to be necessary.
In July, after the Chancellor’s March Budget had introduced the sort of post­
dated tax-raising measures some of the Panel favoured, the Panel returned to the topic of 
the PSBR again. Although the PSBR would be expected to come down in the recovery 
phase o f the economic cycle (another general story) the exact amount (i.e. the way in 
which this particular instance would turn out) was difficult to forecast. As a result, 
some o f the Panel did not believe that the tax and spending reforms announced in the 
March Budget had done enough to ensure that the PSBR would be reduced sufficiently. 
However, those Panel members that did think this tended to have to reinforce this 
argument by drawing on other economic stories and reasons. Thus, the weak case for 
~ arguing that this particular instance of the general case ‘PSBR-reduces-as-economic- 
growth-resumes’ was bolstered by arguments that policies to ensure the PSBR’s 
sustainability could simultaneously have favourable effects elsewhere. In other words, 
attempts are made to minimise the importance of the uncertainty which surrounds the 
particular value of the PSBR four years in advance and to articulate other reasons why 
fiscal measures which could help to ensure sustainability of the public finances are 
desirable.
One such example is the ‘Chancellor-cuts-taxes-and-ensures-election-victory’ 
story in which it is suggested that tough fiscal policies now can, if  proved unnecessary, 
create the space for tax cuts later. (They would also avoid the nightmare scenario 
‘Chancellor-raises-taxes-and-loses-election’ as well!). The other way in which the 
PSBR was linked to other issues was via the case of the ‘twin deficit’ problem. The 
argument here was that, if past patterns were repeated, then increases in GDP sufficient 
to bring down unemployment much below 2 million would increase imports, and hence 
the trade deficit, to such an extent that interest rates have to rise to prevent a ‘sterling 
crisis’. On the other hand, if GDP growth (and thus imports) were to restricted such that 
the trade deficit did not become a problem, then unemployment would not fall at all and
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the PSBR would continue to grow. The ‘twin deficit’ case is thus very closely related to 
the ‘devaluation’ story and also draws heavily on historical precedent. The important 
question therefore is how does the particular set of conditions which define the UK 
economy in 1993 shape this story?
Minford and Congdon, the proponents of the ‘Classical’ story see the twin 
deficit problem as something which is not really a problem at all. However, as Wynne 
Godley points out, for this to be the case they are, implicitly, making the claim that this 
particular instance of the general ‘economic-growth-creates-trade-deficit’ case will be 
very atypical. More specifically, they ‘are (must be) assuming a growth in net export 
demand far in excess of anything that has ever occurred in the last fifteen years’.41
In contrast, those who think that the general case will present itself in a much 
more usual fashion, and are thus forecasting a widening trade deficit, are asserting that 
the general patterns of the past will, more or less, be repeated. They also believe that 
this is a problem. Thus, Godley and the more mainstream economists on the Panel 
believe that a poor export performance and a high propensity to import is a serious 
weakness in the UK economy. Moreover, they agree that it is something about which 
governments ought to (and could do) something about. The problem is that the ‘balance 
of the economy’ is wrong. In particular, too large a share of resources is devoted to 
consumption with the result that net exports and investment are too weak. The policy 
solution is an increase in taxation which reduces consumption, can be used by the 
government for investment and also allows interest rates to fall, thereby boosting both 
exports and private sector investment. This is all quite independent from the 
sustainability of the PSBR, although the policy is, in many ways, the same. Of course 
the specific policies advocated varied but one thing which they all shared was that these 
were long term policies which required a change in the political culture if they were to 
succeed.
In fact, five of the seven Panel members felt that net exports were too weak and 
that some remedial action was necessary, whereas only four out of the seven felt that not 
enough had been done to secure the sustainability of the PSBR. There was therefore a 
fairly clear majority for policies to improve competitiveness and hence net exports 
(increased training etc. for most, increased demand for Godley). In addition, there was a 
weaker majority for a further tightening of fiscal policy, with Andrew Britton agreeing 
that it would be understandable if taxes were to be increases.
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In summary, three separate interpretations of the public finances were thus on 
offer in July. The first was that there is not a problem at all and that low 
unemployment, a balanced budget and acceptable trade figures are to be expected. This 
argument rested on an unusually good performance by UK exporters. The second strand 
is that the fiscal tightening proposed in the Budget was not sufficient to ensure the 
sustainability of the PSBR and that additional measures were needed. This argument 
rested on the claim (highly uncertain) that the PSBR was such that, even with the 
policies already announced, it would remain stuck above 3 per cent of GDP. The third 
strand of the argument was that, even if the PSBR situation had been adequately dealt 
with, there were other reasons why further tax increases were desirable. This last 
argument drew on the experiences of the UK economy of the preceding 10-20 years and 
argued that if  past performances were repeated then any recovery in the UK economy 
was going to be very lacklustre indeed.
Monetary Indicators
Finally, the importance of monetary indicators was also discussed, although it was not 
something the Panel’s reports actually devoted a great deal of space to.42 Once again, 
the aim of the analysis was to show how the art of economic forecasting lies in 
interpreting how the particular set of circumstances which define the present moment 
will influence the outcome of the more general case of which the present is but an 
instance.
As described in Chapter 7, UK money supply figures were sending quite 
different signals in October 1993, depending on which definition of the money supply 
you used. ‘Narrow’ money (MO) implied GDP growth in the range of 2-3 per cent (and 
thus no urgent need to relax monetary policy), whereas ‘broad’ money (M4) was 
implying virtually no growth in GDP at all (suggesting that the Chancellor needed to act 
in order to ensure the recovery). The analysis showed how, for the mainstream 
economists, MO is something which gives up-to-date information about one part of the 
economy and is used to corroborate their stories, forecasts and expectations in a fairly 
general way. However, because it is not central to the economic story told by the 
mainstream economists they are under much less pressure to account for the way in 
which the particular instance relates to the more general stories - MO is something of a 
bit-part player and most economists have more important things to worry about.
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On the other hand, a monetarist economist like Minford must explain how and 
why this particular set of money supply figures are part of a larger, more general case in 
which demand for money is systematically related to other aspects of the economy. To 
do this he weaves together a wide range of data and clearly this is intellectual work 
which Minford has to put in because his economics requires that the relationship 
between the demand for money and other economic data be fully explained.
The debate over broad money was somewhat different in that it was the 
mainstream modellers who now had to put in the extra work. They had to discount the 
demand for broad money which was, on past patterns, pointing to a very different 
economic future to the one that they were forecasting. In other words, in order to 
maintain their general story, the Panel members had to identify specific features which 
explained why the relationship between the demand for broad money and economic 
activity was going to be different in this economic cycle. Tim Congdon, on the other 
hand, was content to assert that the general analytic framework he had already 
articulated was quite adequate.
In other words, we can say that Tim Congdon sees the current situation as 
absolutely typical, with weak broad money supply growth leading weak economic 
growth. The majority of the Panel need to explain why the low broad money figures do 
not represent cause for concern, i.e. what it is that makes the current situation different 
from the general case. Thus, the non-monetarists join Patrick Minford in highlighting 
the role of the banking sector and the unusual lending spree of the 1980s which resulted 
in exceptionally weak balance sheets and massive debts. Although low by historical 
standards, they argue that, because banks are unwilling to lend and business is keen to 
exploit new ways of raising finance, it is quite possible that the money supply figures 
are consistent with continued and reasonable economic growth.
Once again, we can see how the task of economic modelling revolves around the 
interpretation of specific events as instances of more general categories. In the case of 
MO, it is the monetarist Patrick Minford which has to put in the most intellectual work 
in order to produce a coherent account of how the particular events of 1993 relate to his 
more general models. However, this is not sufficient to discredit monetarism per se, 
because when we look at broad money then it is the mainstream modellers which have 
to do the extra work.
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Implications for policy making
This final section examines how economic forecasters can advise economic policy 
makers when, as has been shown, there seems to be no way of knowing either what will 
happen next to the economy, nor even of deciding quite how what has already happened 
should be understood. In situations of such chronic uncertainty, what is the value of 
bringing a (diverse) group of seven economists together and asking them to produce 
forecasts and make policy recommendations?
As noted in Chapter 7, one benefit of the Panel was the chance it gave them, as 
representatives of the economics profession to restore some public faith in the 
discipline. Hence, for example, Gavyn Davies’s comment that:
Davies I think that the Treasury has given us a massive opportunity, both as 
individuals and as representatives of economics outside the Treasury43
However, this section is really about the effects of the Panel’s meetings on the economic 
theories of the Panel members and on the influence, if any, they have over the policy 
process. We have already seen that the economic outturns of 1993 were such that none 
of the Panel members felt that they needed to fundamentally change their ideas. In the 
rest of this chapter I want to examine how the Panel are influenced by each other and 
how, as a group, they can influence the Treasury and the Chancellor.
An important part of this is the departure of the UK from the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September 1992 which created the context in 
which the Panel was created. At the time, the exit from the ERM was widely regarded 
as an economic and political catastrophe, and was quickly dubbed ‘Black Wednesday’ 
by the m edia. As Alan Budd explained:
Budd Associated with [leaving the ERM] was the feeling that the Treasury, in 
particular, had produced appallingly bad forecasts and that this was one of 
the reasons why we had made this ERM mistake ... So what the Chancellor 
does to, if you like, appease the wrath of those people who say he ought to 
be sacked ... and also that the Treasury forecasters should be sacked ... [is 
to say] ‘Well, actually we never paid that much attention to our forecasts, 
and it isn’t the only thing we do. But, just to demonstrate the extent to 
which we do take account on outside views, I shall have this Panel of 
Independent Forecasters and I shall let them supplement what my own 
guides tell us’.44
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Of course, cynics could point out that this was simply a way of shifting attention away 
from the Treasury’s forecasts and onto other people’s forecasts, the result of which 
would just be to show that everybody gets it wrong most of the time. However, in 
practice this might not be such a bad thing - after all the Treasury forecasts were well in 
line with the majority of other economic forecasts right throughout the whole ERM 
experience. Consequently, their mistakes were also the mistakes of the economics 
profession as a whole and this is an important observation that should not be lost sight 
of.
There was also another aspect to the Panel’s meetings and that was they actually 
talked to each other and the Treasury. Thus:
Budd We didn’t just read these people’s forecasts, they would actually be here and
discuss them with us ... Between them, they have got some very sensible 
ideas and they cover a range of views and they can raise issues with us that 
we have not thought of. So it is like a bit of a supplement to the Treasury, 
which is very worth having ... Equally, while we are trying to think what 
[policy] advice to give the Chancellor, we are listening to these guys and 
hearing what they have to say. It is like having six or seven extra officials at 
the Treasury, giving us their views [and] widening the range of opinion to 
which we are exposed and therefore, if you like, the range of opinion to 
which the Chancellor is exposed. Now of course the Chancellor could 
always read what they say in the newspapers, but putting them together 
does, I think, genuinely add something.45
These then are the antecedents to the Panel of Forecasters. The questions which remain 
are how does this discussion advance economics and how does it advance economic 
policy?
In the terms of economic science, the issue is whether through the discussions at 
the meetings, together with more informal contacts outside them, the Panel are able to 
advance economic theory, or at least its debate. Perceptions on the progress made on 
this front vary. For example, in the February 1994 Report, the Panel, perhaps in 
response to the general under-prediction of inflation in 1993, devoted a special section 
to this topic. Some thought this had worked well, others did not. For example, Andrew 
Britton commented:
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Britton We actually had a good discussion of the theoretical basis on which we 
make our inflation projections which is reflected in the Report and in the 
Submissions that we did.46
On the other hand, other Panel member were less sure that anything very much had been 
achieved:
Minford The trouble was we didn’t give ourselves enough time to discuss it in the 
meeting and so it was a bit of a mess in the event. I mean I had to do quite a 
bit to the draft to get it intellectually coherent and even that is not very good 
- there are still things which did not get finally incorporated. But it was a 
good idea to do it though.47
Congdon There was, in my view, a very unsatisfactory discussion about [inflation] 
and I wrote to Alan Budd and said I thought it was so perfunctory as to be 
worthless. I mean, if this is the best that the Panel can do on their different 
views on inflation, then, for Heaven’s sake, we should be trying much 
harder.48
Nevertheless, the overall feeling seems to be that it is worthwhile for the Panel to focus 
their discussions on specific issues and try at least understand where and why they 
disagreed:
Congdon We might actually have a useful exchange of views, and I think that’s, in a 
way, what the Panel should be doing ... It may be that just over working 
together that eventually it does all materialise. You see what I don’t do, and 
what is very important for Godley, is a lot of work on ... net exports which I 
simply don’t do. But nevertheless that work is quite useful and it does force 
one back onto trying to work out the relationships between different things 
... And David Currie does a lot of work, and also Andrew Britton, on wage- 
price behaviour which is implicitly in my stuff but not played up very much. 
Gavyn Davies and Andrew Britton do a lot of work on the labour market 
which I don’t really do.49
Thus, at a personal level, the economists on the Panel benefit from learning from each 
other and, as a result, a modest shifting of positions is possible:
Budd You might find [that] people will say, you know, ‘Here is a really 
convincing story. It seems to fit, and this is how you should think about 
this’. And people might shift just a little bit, and we [i.e. the Treasury] 
would shift as well, and we would have made a little bit of progress.50
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Although nothing dramatic should be expected:
Congdon Will positions move? I don’t know that they will very much.51
Thus, it seems unlikely that the Panel will succeed where the rest of economics has not 
and bring about an empirical and theoretical convergence towards a common 
specification for their models:
Budd I think what I am more sceptical about is the empirical advances. I don’t 
think that anybody is suddenly going to have a consumption function that
works for example. I think our state of ignorance about this seems to be
more or less constant.52
Minford You would never get people to agree on every parameter, for God’s sake! It 
is a very empirical business ... you get differences in detail specification. 
You always get different parameters.53
However, even if they cannot solve the problems of economic practice, can the Panel 
solve the problems of economic policy which are, after all, their main objectives. 
Certainly by emphasising the beliefs that they share the Panel can make a strong case
for a particular policy recommendation, and this is a strategy which the Panel have
moved towards as 1993 progressed:
Minford In order to forecast you have to have your view about what causes things.
And then also, in order to make policy recommendations you have to set out 
your reasons. So, therefore, insofar as we can reach agreement about what 
causes things, that would be helpful, wouldn’t it.54
Britton Now that we have had four meetings together we have got to know each 
others points of view quite well ... and the group has come to respect each 
others’ positions rather more. If you remember last summer, there was a 
certain amount of exchange of letters in the press, which was reasonably 
friendly but was also a public criticism of each other. I think, whilst that 
could always happen again, I think at the moment the tendency is rather to 
try and find a common view, because we feel the Panel is stronger when it 
speaks with one voice.55
Budd Before the last Budget, they, to a large extent, produced a consensus report.
Now that in itself is very interesting, because they know that they are going 
to be more influential if they agree.56
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However, from the perspective of the policy makers, one important issue remains - 
despite the efforts of the Panel to reach consensus, their views about the economy and 
the future remain different in several important respects. The question is therefore how 
to incorporate these forecasts into a single economic policy? To begin with we can note 
that taking the average of all the forecasts is not necessarily the best solution:
Budd You might think that [forecasts] will be like shots at a target: [they] will
blow the middle out with a few scattered around ... [In practice] the truth is 
liable to lie at one extreme or the other. It is a very peculiar business ... 
[So] taking the average may be the best thing to do in the long run, but year 
by year it is not the right thing to do.57
This, point is in fact perfectly illustrated by the Panel of Forecasters - in 1993 it was 
Andrew Britton’s forecast for growth, initially an outlier, which turned out to be the 
most accurate. Thus, some way other way of dealing with the variation in the Panel’s 
forecasts is needed if policy is to be based on the best advice. At one extreme, the 
Treasury could minimise the variation by taking only one forecast into account, at the 
other they could maximise it by giving equal weight to all the forecasts:
Budd The Minford approach to having the Seven Wise Men would be that it is the
Treasury’s job to decide who is right ... and act accordingly. Another 
possibility is to say that any of them might be right. They can’t all be right, 
but any one of them might be. So you conduct policy, because these are all 
sensible people, on the understanding that any of them could be right. That 
is another extreme - you try to make some sort of robust policy which would 
come out best.58
In practice however, when Alan Budd himself is giving advice he favours a third 
approach which is to weight the different forecasts in some way:
Budd You already have a model of your own, you have your own a priori views
and then you also weight these individuals according to how coherent their 
view seems to be and how good their forecasting record seems to be. You 
sort of lean one way or the other, so that you have a feeling that X or Y is 
most likely to be right and you attach less weight to extreme views.59
Of course, Alan Budd is not the only person giving advice, and others may adopt 
different (and non-economic) criteria but it is clear that, in adjudging the expertise of the 
Panel, then the expertise of Treasury officials is required to break the regress of 
ambiguous econometrics. In the case of putting all the faith of policy in one forecast,
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this clearly presupposes some way of identifying the best one. Similarly, giving equal 
weighting to all the forecasts assumes some way of delineating the set of appropriate 
forecasts - boundary work in which the expertise of the Treasury Officials as economists 
in their own right is clearly important. Finally, in the third (and probably the most 
common) case, it is only Budd’s own experience and competence as an economist 
which allows him to make these kinds of distinctions at all.
In conclusion, the role of the models in policy then seems to be rather slight. 
They may help economist to organise their thoughts and present consistent forecasts but 
in terms of actually testing economic theories or providing a ‘scientific’ basis for policy 
making, they seem to contribute very little:
Budd One of the odd things about economic policy advice, among other things, is 
that people apparently give totally contradictory views year after year, 
which is very peculiar. You would think that life would select one of these 
and someone would be forced to admit that they were wrong. That, in itself 
is most peculiar ... What I have deduced [is] that if they did write down the 
conditions under which they would be wrong, then they would be conditions 
that would never occur ... They would regard an enormously wide range of 
possible outcomes as not refuting or in a weak sense consistent with what 
they are saying. So they are really making non-refutable statements, which 
to a Popperian suggests that they are not making scientific statements at all; 
they are making meta-physical statements.60
Thus, even within Her Majesty’s Treasury, we find senior economists who are deeply 
sceptical of what economics models, as science, can achieve. Nowhere is it contested 
that economic models, and the forecasts they support, are invested with the skill and 
judgement of the economists which back them. Indeed, this scepticism is perhaps 
strongest amongst the economics community as it is here, as I have tried to show in this 
thesis, that economists are daily confronted with the gaps between the world and their 
models. Unfortunately, this point does not seem to be well known outside economic 
forecasting circles, although, as Alan Budd states, it is clearly important:
Budd Although we think that Wynne Godley is very different from Patrick 
Minford, they are not really ... People should understand this. These guys 
who are being supported by one team or group or another, they are all 
saying the same thing ... They are really saying that the war will end this 
year, or maybe not. That is approximately what they are saying.61
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Conclusions
Economic models appear to have no clear implication for policy at all. Because 
economic forecasters have yet to break out of the econometrician’s regress and estimate 
an economic model that commands respect amongst economists, they have been unable 
to convince their own community of their theories. As a result, economists can only 
have a capricious and uncertain influence over economic policy. Although they can 
make coherent recommendations of their own, and their work can be used as a rhetorical 
resource in arguments for or against particular economic policies, the basis for these 
arguments does not rest on convincing empirical proofs. Rather, economic policies 
remains articles of faith rather than econometrically supported knowledge. As a result, 
economic theory and models function as a legitimisation (and quantification) of 
particular political and moral theories about the world.
This is an odd situation, and how to improve it is not obvious. For example, it is 
not clear whether we need less economists or more, but it is surely obvious that the 
nation would benefit from a better understanding of the basis for economic policy 
decision making. If the Panel of Economic Forecasters, by bringing a sense of the 
enormous range of economically legitimate views to the wider and public discussions, 
- helps to foster an appreciation of both the uncertainty which surrounds economic policy, 
and the opportunities which exist for creating a different society, then this will be an 
important achievement.
The Panel o f Forecasters and SSK
This final section reflects on the implications of the work for debates about symmetry 
and neutrality and considers the implications for this Sociology of a Social Science for 
SSK more generally. Thus far, the thesis has discussed a variety of issues arising from 
macro-economic modelling and forecasting. The aim has been to show how macro­
econometric models are made and-used. Throughout the story has been one of 
economic expertise being used to identify general patterns in historical and current 
economic data. The claim made has been that this is the most important part of the 
modelling and, particularly, the forecasting exercise.
Firstly, it is only by being socialised members of the economics community that 
economists can estimate econometric models in the first place. Secondly, it is only by 
being members of the wider community that economic forecasters have access to the 
nuances and knowledge which they need to use their models for forecasting. More
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specifically, the expertise and skills of the forecasters are those of interpretation: not 
only interpreting the current data as an instance of a general case but also recognising 
the particular features of the current instance which will condition and mediate its 
outcome. Thus the economic forecasters are experts in the true sense. Like golfers who 
know how to adjust their swing to take account of the wind, the greens and the pin, so 
economic forecasters adjust their model to take account of the exogenous conditions.
This conclusion is no doubt appealing to economists, and is also adequate as 
SSK in that it outlines the ways in which economic models, forecasts and policy are 
constituted through social processes, institutions and interactions. However, it is only 
half the story. In addition to unpacking the econometric models and explicating the 
expertise of their proprietors, some less comfortable conclusions were also drawn (and 
not just by me). For example, throughout the thesis it has been apparent that economic 
models do not test economic theories and thereby provide a ‘better’ basis for economic 
policy making than anything else. In particular, it seems that neither econometric 
testing, nor economic data, distinguish between economic theories which have different 
moral and political implications for the society in which we live. In a way this might be 
a good thing - if economic science cannot make these choices, then some other way 
ought to be found. The problem at the moment, I would argue, is that this is not 
recognised and that, as a result, orthodoxy is uncritically re-presented as truth. Thus, 
although economic forecasters may be our best experts about the economic world, it is 
not clear how the econometric models through which their expertise is constituted 
actually help or benefit the wider community.
Symmetry and Neutrality
The sort of evaluative argument presented above is problematic from a SSK perspective 
(although, paradoxically, I think it would make sense to economists) as it seems to go 
against the tenets of symmetry and neutrality. As argued in Chapter 1 the study of 
economic modelling and forecasting raised particular problems for an SSK researcher, 
committed to Bloor’s tenets, due to the ontological differences between their conception 
of the ‘social’ and that of the economic modellers.
In practice, however, the degree to which upholding the tenets of symmetry and 
neutrality is perceived or revealed as problematic depends on the level of analysis 
chosen. For example, in the chapters which discussed the Reports produced by the 
Panel of Independent Forecasters during 1993, the focus was primarily on the ways in
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which data and evidence were interpreted by different economists. These chapters were 
thus most like ‘normal’ (in the Kuhnian sense) SSK, in that they were, essentially, 
documenting interpretive flexibility and analysing closure in scientific debate. Now, 
there is nothing wrong with this - economics, and economic forecasting, is an important 
science, the consequences of which affect the daily lives of every citizen. Thus, a 
sociological study which unpacks the way in which the ‘facts’ of economic life are 
constituted is an important and interesting task.
However, as was hinted at in the previous section, at another level of analysis, 
there are more serious problems. In particular, because of the different ontological 
commitments of the sociologist, much of what makes sense to an economist does not to 
the sociologist. In particular, the idea of trying to model social action mathematically, 
as a set of asocial equations, conflicts with sociology’s emphasis on social collectivities. 
Thus, whilst the sociologist can be symmetrical about debates within economics, the 
situation is very different when it comes to debates about economics. In these 
situations, maintaining symmetry and neutrality is much more problematic. This is 
essentially the issue ducked by Ashmore et al in their study of health economics, in 
which they refuse to become embroiled in the problems of health care provision, 
preferring instead to remain curiously (un)applied analysts of expertise.
In this thesis I have tried to follow the example of Evelleen Richards who, in her
study of the controversy over Vitamin C and Cancer, has combined sociological
62 • • analysis with critique . When focusing on the debate about Vitamin C, Richards is
63clearly symmetrical and neutral. However, when the analysis shifts to questions about 
the ways in which Vitamin C, as a cancer therapy, was assessed then her commitment to 
symmetry and neutrality become more difficult. The reason is that, by virtue of the 
(symmetrical) sociological study, Richards does not believe that the randomised control 
trial was a very good way of asking the question in the first place.
In similar ways, symmetry and neutrality have never been far beneath the surface 
of the unpacking of economic modelling and forecasting presented in this thesis. The 
analysis has been at different levels in different chapters and the severity of the 
problems raised has varied accordingly. In Chapters 2 and 3, which dealt with the 
estimation and use of economic models for forecasting, the tension was probably the 
greatest as it was here that ‘paradigm clash’ was most apparent. In essence what the 
chapters present is a sociological deconstruction o f an economic model. At one level
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this analysis was symmetrical and neutral as any economic model could (and would) 
have been treated in the same way. However, on another level it was not symmetrical 
and neutral at all, as all economic models were implicated, yet the potential, reflexive 
deconstruction of my own economic model was not addressed.
In defence of this latter charge I would argue that the chapters represent a 
personal and ‘ethnographic’ account of how economic modelling is done. Part of any 
SSK methodology is socialisation into the scientific culture one wishes to write about. 
In my case this was economic modelling and coming to terms with regression analysis 
was part of that. The chapters re-present and document my surprise at what I found out 
when I began this process. Economic modelling was much more judgemental and 
contingent than I had expected. It turns out that this is a constitutive part of the subject 
and its debates. Indeed, without understanding how economic models work it is 
difficult to imagine how the controversies which characterise economics can have 
continued for so long. Thus, Chapters 2 and 3 are my attempt to convey the methods of 
econometrics.
However, there is more to economic forecasting than econometrics. Chapter 4 
conveyed something of the difficulties of theory choice within economics. Here the 
tensions created by the requirements of symmetry and neutrality were less problematic. 
As an analyst of economics, rather than an economist, I have no interest in deciding 
which economist is the ‘right’ one and a symmetrical account was a relatively 
straightforward accomplishment. However, neutrality in this context was more difficult, 
though in an unexpected way. As a result of the symmetrical deconstruction of 
econometric models as a way of falsifying economic theories, I frequently find myself 
having to account for their existence in the first place! Thus, the argument that 
econometric models function as gatekeepers to the community of economic forecasters 
is my (sociological) defence of their existence.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the least problematic in terms of symmetry and 
neutrality. Because the analysis is focused throughout on arguments within economics, 
symmetry and neutrality are again accomplished unproblematically. The same is true 
for the first part of this chapter, when the task is to examine the responses of the Panel 
to the events of 1993. This is, in effect, a re-run of the issues raised in Chapter 4, only 
with more empirical data as there is now a specific set of forecasts and outturns on 
which to focus. However, as soon as the focus moves away from economics (narrowly
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conceived) to economic policy, symmetry and neutrality once again become 
problematic.
Unlike Chapters 2 and 3, where the conflict arose because of a tension between 
the different sorts of knowledge-claims made by sociologist and economists - a sort of 
academic turf-war - the difficulty in Chapter 8 occurs because as well as being a 
sociologist I am also a citizen. The tension here is over how economic policy ought to 
be made. Taken as a whole, the thesis clearly demonstrates that economic policy (and 
economic modelling and perhaps economic science as well) is, in several important 
ways, based on shared beliefs and convictions as much as empirical econometrics.64 
The question thus arises what are the implications of such an analysis for the making of 
economic policy?
Of course, one can, at this point do what Ashmore et al do and refuse to answer 
at all.65 I do not find this a particularly satisfactory solution as I believe Ashmore et al 
miss the main point. The question is not about the actual allocation decisions made by 
health service managers, but how the decisions are made and the role of health 
economists in this process. Evelleen Richards sees this distinction and argues against 
Randomised Control Trials whilst remaining agnostic on whether or not Vitamin C 
‘cures’ cancer.66 Similarly, I do not want to legislate on economic policy, but do think 
that the research has implications for how economic policy is made.
In fact, and perhaps paradoxically, my sociologically informed conclusion is that 
the institutionalisation of the Panel of Forecasters has the potential to improve the way 
economic policy is made. Over the past two decades there has been a shift away from 
using economic models and forecasts to ‘fine tune’ economic policies in order to reach 
given policy targets. The economic climate is much less predictable and policy makers 
more cautious, with the emphasis now much more on avoiding mistakes. The advantage 
of the Panel in this context is that it has the potential to bring these uncertainties much 
more into the open. By keeping the openness of the economic future in the spotlight, 
the Panel can foster a climate in which it is respectable to admit that we really don’t 
know what will happen next year. Indeed, one of the most important things highlighted 
by the Panel meetings is the different social, political and moral theories which are 
apparently compatible with decent economic growth. The Panel of Economic 
Forecasters thus offers moral choice instead of a narrowly (mis)represented economic 
orthodoxy and has the potential to return responsibility for social welfare back to the
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political process. In other words, the Panel could re-politicise economic policy by 
legitimating the political debate of economic theories.
Conclusions
Returning to the problems of symmetry and neutrality in SSK, the study of macro- 
economic modelling and forecasting has shown than the accomplishment of these tenets 
is influenced by subject matter and analytical choices. By extending SSK to social 
rather than natural sciences, the taken-for-granteds of early SSK research are 
problematised. In particular, the notion that SSK has no relevance to the scientist at his 
or her laboratory bench raises two main issues when the scientists in question are social 
scientists making knowledge claims about the social world.
Firstly, there are the tensions raised when the SSK researcher and the scientists 
share the same subject matter. This conflict is most clearly apparent in the research over 
Al in which the subject matter - knowledge - is shared. However, the problem is not 
really ‘knowledge’, but how knowledge is understood differently by sociologists of 
science and Al researchers. Similarly, with economic modelling and forecasting, SSK 
is a social science and has its own understanding of how society can (and should) be 
understood. In the case of econometric modelling, this understanding is different from 
the conceptions and theories of the other scientists. I cannot legislate for others, but my 
own solution to this conundrum has not been to dismiss their work out of hand. Thus, 
as shown in Chapters 2 and 3 I have re-presented econometric practice in a 
sociologically consistent framework which shows how enculturation and shared beliefs 
provide the reference points which ground econometrics. Implicit in this is a critique of 
their method, but it is not something on which I have chosen to focus. The reasons are 
twofold. One is that economists are already pretty good at this sort of self-flagellation 
anyway. The other is that another, more interesting, issue is also raised.
This second issue relates to the use of economic models in the policy making 
process. Here the issues raised are much more important but also more difficult. The 
problem derives, in part, from the first one - that, as an SSK researcher, it is difficult to 
see what is gained as a result of this sort of asocial social science. However, the 
problem is made much more salient by virtue of the fact that the outputs and products of 
this science appear to be important in the making of economic policy. The issue is thus, 
if as an SSK researcher one comes to the conclusion that a particular social institution is 
not adequate for the task it is charged with, then should that point be made. I believe
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that the answer is yes, but would qualify this by saying that it has to be for the ‘right’ 
reasons if SSK is to be a resource in that argument. More specifically, SSK can and 
should be used to critique and influence policy where the arguments and reasons for 
preferring one course of action over another stem from SSK itself. Thus, SSK cannot 
decide whether or not Vitamin C cures cancer or whether hysteresis exists in the labour 
market. However, it can ask the question ‘Are the modes of knowledge production 
currently used to answer these questions appropriate?’ In cases where the answer is 
‘No’ then surely it is right to say so.
In conclusion, therefore, I would argue that this thesis has demonstrated the 
possibility of a more politically active form of SSK which takes as its subject matter 
those scientific processes within the policy making institutions. The aim of this sort of 
SSK is not to adjudicate in scientific disputes but to ask whether or not they are asking 
the right question. In the case of economics, I have demonstrated that economic 
forecasting is a more socially grounded and less mechanical exercise that I once 
thought. However, in terms of the policy debate, I remain concerned that it is artificially 
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Listing of equations used in econometric model. Numbers in parentheses and beneath 
each coefficient are the t statistic for each coefficient.
Key
G General Government Final Consumption plus Total Public Sector Fixed
investment
GDPE Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure Estimate
C Consumers Expenditure
X Non-Oil Exports
M - Non-Oil Imports 
O Oil Exports net of Oil Imports
KII Stock of Inventories
KI Stock of Fixed Capital of the Private Sector
PC Consumer Prices Index
YD Personal Disposable Income
- RLB UK Bank’s Base Rates
EER Sterling’s Effective (trade weighted) Exchange Rate
ET Employed Labour Force
WSI Index of Average Wages and Salaries
RSW World Short Term Interest Rates
WWPI World Wholesale Price Index
XWM Index of World Exports of Manufactures
POILWC Index of Oil Prices in ‘World’ Currency
WGNP Index of World GNP
MO Money Supply, MO, not-seasonally adjusted
PSBR Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
DRESV Change in Reserves
GOTVB Stock of Non-Money Government Debt
BAL Current Account Balance
OJ Private Sector Net Overseas Financial Assets
XEER Expectations of the Exchange Rate one period ahead
COMP Index of Competitiveness (i.e. Real Exchange Rate)
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PX Non-Oil Export Price Index
T Average Income Tax Rate
TREF Average Indirect Tax rate
TIME Time Trend




PCt = exp[ log(PCM) - 0.027(PCM/PCt_2)
(-0-19)




+ 0.043 log(GDPEM/PROD) - 0.467]
(1.68) (-1.52)
Estimation period from 1981Q2 to 1992Q4 
R bar2 = 0.40;
std. error of estimate = 0.005; 
Durbin-Watson = 2.32
Exchange Rate
EERt = XEERt(l + (RLBt - RSWt)/400)
Wages
WSIt = exp[ log(WSIM) + log(WSIt.1/WSIt.2)
+ 0.033 (log(WSIt_2/WSIt_3) - log(WSIt_3/WSIt_4))
(0.22)
- 1.070 (log(WSIM/( l .0057 x PCM)) - (log(WSIM/PCM)) 
(-5.05)




Estimation period from 1980Q4 to 1992Q4 
R bar2 = 0.49;




COMPt = WSIt/(PROD x WWPIt/EERt)
Export Demand
log(Xt) = exp[ 0.800 log(Xt.j) + 0.125 log(Xt_2)
(5.02) (0.81)




Estimation period from 1980Q4 to 1992Q4 
if bar2 = 0.98;
std. error of estimate = 0.025;
Durbin-Watson = 1.86
Export Prices
log(PXt) = exp[ 0.857 log(PXM) - 0.064 log(WSIt.1/PRODt)
(10.71) (-2.28)
+ 0.054 log(WWPIt j/EERj + 0.918 
(1.49) (2.55)
-Estimation period from 1981Q1 to 1992Q4 
R bar2 = 0.97;
std. error of estimate = 0.019;
Durbin-Watson = 1.64
Fixed Investment
KIt = KIm + GDPEt l exp[0.923 log((KIM - KIt_2)/GDPEt_2))
(13.99)
+ 0.040 logfKJ^/GDPEt.!) + 1.857 log(GDPEM/GDPEt_2) 
(0.44) (1.63)




Estimation period from 1980Q3 to 1992Q4 
R bar2 = 0.90;
std. error of estimate = 0.062;
Durbin-Watson = 2.29
Flow o f Gross Private Fixed Investment
IFP, = KIt - KIt., + 4610,time‘ IOO)
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Inventories
Expected Real Rate o f Interest
RREALt = 0.871 RLBM - 0.383 (400(EERt.,/( EERM -1)))
(9.16) (0.81)
+ 0.005 (400(((WWPIm x EERt_2)/(WWPIt_2 x EERM))- 1) 
(0.40)
- 0.003 (400(WSIM/WSIt_2 - 1) + 157.180 
(-0.28) (0.82)
Estimation period from 1981Q2 to 1992Q4 
R bar2 = 0.67;
std. error of estimate =1.212;
Durbin-Watson = 1.71
KIIt = exp[ log(KIIM - 0.00002 RREALt + 0.534 log (K I^ /K II^)
(-0.60) (4.37)
+ 0.00003 log(KnM/GDPEM) - 0.0002 
(0.08) (.06)
Estimation period from 1981Q2 to 1992Q4 
R bar2 = 0.27;
std. error of estimate = 0.0004;
Durbin-Watson = 2.13
Employment (whole economy)
ETt = exp[log(ETt.l) + 0.310 log(ETt_,/ETt_2) - 0.129 log(ETM x PROD/GDPEM)
(2.07) (-3.71)




Estimation period from 1984Q1 to 1992Q4 
R bar2 = 0.69;




Ct = exp[log (C,.,) + 0.0057 - 0.125 (log (C,.,/Ct.2) - 0.0057)
(-1.45)
- 0.026 log (Ct.1/(YDt.1/(PCM/100))) - 0.197 (log (PCt.,/PCt.2) - 0/0057) 
(0.93) (-1.96)
+ 0.228 (log((YDt.,/PCt.,)/(YDt.2/PCt.2)) - 0.0057)
(3.17)
- 0.0009 (RLB,_i - RLBt.2)
(-1.04)
Estimation period from 1963Q3 to 1992Q4
R bar2 = 0.15
std. error of estimate = 0.012;
Durbin-Watson = 2.23
Imports (non-oil)
Mt = exp[ 0.805 log(MM) + 0.791 log(Ct/CM)
(11.34) (2.87)
+ 20.136 log((KIIt/KIIt.l)/ (KIIM/KIIt_2))
(2.30)
+ 0.370 log(GDPEt_2) - 2.337
(2.71) (-2.61)
Estimation period from 1970Q2 to 1992Q4 
- R  bar2 = 0.98
std. error of estimate = 0.033;
Durbin-Watson = 2.08
Expenditure Measure of GDP
Adjustment to Factor Cost
F = 0.139 Ct + 0.053 IFPt - 0.005 Xt + 0.143 Gt
GDPE = Ct + IFPt + KIIt - KIIm + Gt + Xt - Mt + Ot - Ft
Financing the PSBR
Government Debt
DGGt = PSBRt - (MOt - MOm) + DRESVt 
Stock o f Government Debt 
GOVTBt = GOTVBm + DGG
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Appendix B
Data sources and references for econometric model
ESRC CENTRE IN ECONOMIC COMPUTING 
TIME SERIES DATA BANK - RELEASE DATE 94



















*** DATA RETRIEVAL ***
Periodicity : Quarterly
Sample period 46 1 TO 94 4 No. observations 196
No. series retrieved 19
TABLE QA A06 - General Govt: GDFCF: CP NSA: BPVDL: DO-9
Start Base 
YYPPP YYMM
DFDA DFDA Public Corps: GDFCF: K90 SA: BPVDL: DO-9 62 1 90 0
Seasonally adjusted
SIC : DO-9
TABLE ET 2.2 - Consumers' expenditure : Total #m CONS (1990 prices) SA
CAOO CAOO GDP(A) at constant market prices (1990 prices) 55 1 90 0
Seasonally adjusted
CAAB CAAB Consumers' expenditure : Total #m CONS (1990 prices) SA 55 1 90 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE QA A02 - General govt : taxes on expenditure
DJDG DJDG Goods and services: total exports (credits), CONSTANT PR 55 1 90 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE MD 15.1 - Food beverages and tobacco: OTS : Exports by commodity
BOCD BOCD Fuels : OTS : Exports by commodity 70 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE MD 1 . 2 -  General govt : taxes on expenditure
DJDJ DJDJ Goods and services: total imports (debits), CONSTANT PRI 55 1 90 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE MD 15.1 - Food beverages and tobacco: OTS : Exports by commodity
BODD BODD Imports Fuels : OTS 70 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
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TABLE QA X502 - COS: ICCs: TOTAL CAPITAL TRANSFERS
FMCD FMCD COS: Increase in stocks and work in progress #m NSA* 66 1 0 0
TABLE MD 1.8 - Public Corps: GDFCF: CP NSA: BPVDL: DO-9
DFEB DFEB Private Sector: GDFCF: K90 SA: BPVDL: DO-9 62 1 90 0
Seasonally adjusted
SIC : DO-9
TABLE FSC 1 - Central govt : current surplus or deficit
AIIX AIIX Consumers' expenditure: Total #m CURR SA 55 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE ET 6.1 - Official reserves outstanding : total US$M
AJHV AJHV Sterling effective exchange rate index 1985=100 75 1 85 0
TABLE MD 3.1 - Employees in employment (UK) - thousands (EG table 1.1)
BCAJ BCAJ Employees in employment (UK) - thousands (EG table 1.1) 59 2 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE ETAS 3.1 - Wages & salaries per unit of output index : whole economy
DNAA DNAA Average earnings (GB) index : whole economy (1990=100) 88 1 90 0
SIC : 0-9
TABLE FSF 1 - Central govt : current surplus or deficit
AJIB AJIB Interest on US dollar deposits in London (3 month) 63 1 0 0
TABLE FSC 1 - Central govt : current surplus or deficit
AAGE AAGE Public sector finance : notes & coin #m 63 1 0 0
TABLE ET 6.5 - General govt : financial surplus or deficit
ABFB ABFB Public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) #m (CYSA) 63 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE FSF 1 - Central govt : current surplus or deficit
AACM AACM CG : liabs: flows: Other government overseas financin 63 2 0 0
AIPA AIPA Central govt finance: official reserves #m 46 1 0 0
TABLE FSC 1 - Central govt : current surplus or deficit
AAAA AAAA Central govt : current surplus or deficit 55 1 0 0
TABLE ETAS 1.3 - General govt : taxes on expenditure
AAXP AAXP General govt : taxes on expenditure - CYSA 55 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE MD 1 . 2 -  General govt : taxes on expenditure
DJDJ DJDJ Goods and services: total imports (debits), CONSTANT PRI 55 1 90 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE MD 1.5 - Personal sector: saving #m
AIIW AIIW Personal disposable income #m 55 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE MD 3.1 - Employees in employment (UK) - thousands (EG table 1.1)
BCAJ BCAJ Employees in employment (UK) - thousands (EG table 1.1) 59 2 0 0 
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE FSF 1 - Central govt : current surplus or deficit
AJIB AJIB Interest on US dollar deposits in London (3 month) 63 1 0 0
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TABLE FSF 1 - Central govt : current surplus or deficit
AACM AACM CG : liabs: flows: Other government overseas financin 63 2 0 0
AIPA AIPA Central govt finance: official reserves #m 46 1 0 0
TABLE MD 15.1 - Food beverages and tobacco: OTS : Exports by commodity
BOCD BOCD Fuels : OTS : Exports by commodity 70 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE QA A02 - General govt : taxes on expenditure
DJAZ DJAZ Goods and services: total exports (credits), CURRENT PRI 55 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE QA A09 - Personal sector: total personal income #m
AIIU AIIU Personal sector: UK taxes on income #m 55 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE ETAS 1.6 - Personal sector: total personal income #m
AIIQ AIIQ Personal sector: total personal income #m 55 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE MD 1.2 - General govt : taxes on expenditure
AAXW AAXW General govt : subsidies - CYSA 55 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE ETAS 1.3 - General govt : taxes on expenditure
AAXP AAXP General govt : taxes on expenditure - CYSA 55 1 0 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE ETAS 1.2 - Invisibles (balance) : interest , profits & dividends #m
DIAS DIAS General govt : adjustment to factor cost @ 1990 prices - 55 1 85 0
Seasonally adjusted
TABLE BB 14.6 - Personal sector: NDFCF: dwellings #m (Annual)
EXGB EXGB Personal sector: NDFCF: all fixed assets #m 48 1 0 0
EXGC EXGC I&C companies: NDFCF: all fixed assets #m 48 1 0 0
EXGD EXGD Financial companies: NDFCF: other fixed assets #m 48 1 0 0
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Appendix C
Program Code for econometric model.
Software used was RATS 4.0; Filename = “MODEL2.PRG”.
CALENDAR 1955 1 4 
ALLOCATE 1994:4
OPEN DATA C:\ROBERT\MACROMOD\RATFILEl.WK3
DATA(FORMAT=WKS, ORG=OBS) 1955:1 1992:4 G GDPE C X M 0 KII KI PC $
YD RLB EER ET WSI RSW WWPI XWM POILWC WGNP MONEY PSBR DRESV GOVTB $ 
BAL OJ XEER COMP PX TAX TREF TIME FACTOR
TABLES
SET PROD = 1.0057**(TIME - 32)
SEASONAL Q1 1955:1 1994:4 4 1955:1
SEASONAL Q2 1955:1 1994:4 4 1955:2
SEASONAL Q3 1955:1 1994:4 4 1955:3
* PRICES
SET LOGPC = LOG(PC)
SET PCRATIO = LOGPC - LOGPC{l}
SET LOGTREF - LOG(TREF)
SET PCVAR6 = LOGPC{1} - LOG(WWPI{1}/EER{1})
SET PCVAR7 = LOG(GDPE{l}/PROD)
SET PC = EXP(PCRATIO + LOGPC{l})
* INTEREST RATES
SET MOPCRAT = LOG(MONEY/PC{1})
SET GDPEVAR = LOG(GDPE - O)
SET TIMELAG = TIME - 32
* WAGES
SET LOGWSI = LOG(WSI)
SET WSIRATIO = LOG(WSI/WSI{1})
SET WAGEVAR = WSIRATIO - WSIRATIO{l}
SET WAGEVAR2 = LOG(WSI/(1.0057*PC)) - LOG(WSI{1}/PC{1})
SET WAGEVAR3 = PCRATIO - PCRATIO{l}
SET WSI = EXP( LOGWSI{1} - 0.009703990 $
+ 0.03276270*WAGEVAR{1} - 1.070075715*WAGEVAR2{1} - 0.561039629*WAGEVAR3{1})
* EXPORT DEMAND
SET LOGX = LOG(X)
SET LOGXWM = LOG(XWM)
SET LOGCOMP = LOG(COMP)
SET X = EXP(LOGX)
* EXPORT PRICES
SET LOGPX = LOG(PX)
SET WSIVAR = LOG(WSI{1}/PROD)
SET WWPIVAR = LOG(WWPI/EER)
SET PX = EXP(LOGPX)
* FIXED INVESTMENT
SET KIVAR1 = LOG((KI - KI{1})/GDPE{1})
SET KIVAR2 = LOG(KI/GDPE)
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SET KIVAR3 = LOG (GDPE/GDPE {1})
SET KIVAR4 = LOG((WSI{1}*ET{1})/(PC{1}*(1.0057**TIME)))
SET KIFITTED = KI{1} + GDPE{1}*EXP(-0.616613709 $
+ 0.92334 9555*KIVAR1{1} + 0.035927732*KIVAR2{1} + 1.857239412*KIVAR3{1} $ 
+ 0.042422053*KIVAR4)
SET KI = KIFITTED
* VARIABLE FOR FLOW OF GROSS FIXED PRIVATE INVESTMENT
SET IFP = KIFITTED - KIFITTED{l} + 4610*1.0086**(TIME-100)
* INVENTORIES
SET RLBVAR1 = 400*(EER/(EER - 1))
SET RLBVAR2 = 400*((WWPI*EER{l})/(WWPI{l}*EER) - 1)
SET RLBVAR3 = 400*(WSI/(WSI{1} - 1))
SET RREAL = 157.1804378 + 0.8709958*RLB{1} - 0.38324 69*RLBVAR1{1} $
+ 0.0047546*RLBVAR2{l} - 0.0025148*RLBVAR3{1}
SET LOGKII = LOG(KII)
SET KIIRATIO = LOG(KII/KII{1})
SET KIIGDPE = LOG(KII/GDPE)
SET KII = EXP(KIIRATIO + LOGKIl{l})
* EMPLOYMENT
SET LOGET = LOG(ET)
SET ETDIFF = LOG(ET/ET{1})
SET ETVAR2 * LOG(ET{1}* PROD/GDPE{1})
SET ETVAR3 = LOG(TREF/PC)
SET ETVAR4 = LOG(WSI{1}/(PROD*PC{1}))
SET ET = EXP(ETDIFF + LOGET{1})
* CONSUMER SPENDING 
SET LOGC = LOG(C)
SET CDIFF = LOG((C/C{1}) - 0.0057)
SET CVAR2 = LOG(C/(YD/(PC/100)) )
SET CVAR3 = LOG((PC/PC{1}) + 0.0057)
SET CVAR4 = LOG((YD/PC)/ (YD{1}/PC{1}))
SET RLBDIFF = RLB - RLB{l}
SET C = EXP(LOGC{l} + 0.0057 - 0.125784814*CDIFF{1} $
- 0.026344580*CVAR2{l} - 0.197419823*CVAR3{1} $
+ 0.228154705*CVAR4{lj + 0.0009558958*RLBDIFF{1})
* NON-OIL IMPORTS
SET LOGM = LOG(M)
SET CDIFFM = LOG(C/C{l})
SET MVAR3 = LOG ( (KII/KH {1} ) / (KII {1}/KII { 2 }) )
SET LOGGDPE = LOG(GDPE)
SET M = EXP(LOGM)
* ADJUSTMENT TO FACTOR COST
SET FACTOR = 0.139228970*C + 0.053169319*IFP - 0.005139745*X $
+ 0.143336863*G
* VARIABLE FOR GILTS AND OTHER GOVT. DEBT 
SET DGG = PSBR - (MONEY-MONEY{1}) + DRESV
* EQUATION FOR PRICES 
EQUATION PCRATIOEQ PCRATIO
* CONSTANT PCRATIO{1} LOGTREF LOGTREF{l} LOGTREF{4} PCVAR6{l} PCVAR7 
ASSOCIATE PCRATIOEQ




# EQUATION FOR INTEREST RATES
# NOW MADE AS EXOGENOUS ASSUMPTION
♦EQUATION RLBEQ RLB
♦# CONSTANT MOPCRAT MOPCRAT{l} GDPEVAR{1} TIMELAG Q1 Q2 Q3 
♦ASSOCIATE RLBEQ
♦# -419.90231 -338.83373 269.23895 74.101853 0.6357537 $
# -25.338732 -22.119168 -18.822553
♦FRML(EQUATION=RLBEQ) RLBFM
# EQUATION FOR WAGES 
EQUATION WAGESEQ WAGEVAR
# CONSTANT WAGEVAR{1} WAGEVAR2{l} WAGEVAR3{1}
ASSOCIATE WAGESEQ
# -0.009703990 0.03276270 -1.070075715 -0.561039629 
FRML(EQUATION=WAGESEQ) WAGESFM
# EQUATION FOR EXPORT DEMAND
EQUATION LOGXEQ LOGX
# CONSTANT LOGX{1 2} LOGXWM LOGCOMP
ASSOCIATE LOGXEQ
# 0.617887884 0.795274905 0.125478551 0.061604870 -0.023141413 
FRML(EQUATION=LOGXEQ) LOGXFM
# EQUATION FOR EXPORT PRICES
EQUATION LOGPXEQ LOGPX
# CONSTANT LOGPX{1} WSIVAR WWPIVAR{l}
ASSOCIATE LOGPXEQ
# 0.918356387 0.857347125 -0.063864886 0.053945906 
FRML(EQUATION=LOGPXEQ) LOGPXFM
# EQUATION FOR FIXED INVESTMENT 
EQUATION KIEQ KIVAR1
# CONSTANT KIVAR1{1} KIVAR2{1} KIVAR3{l} KIVAR4 
ASSOCIATE KIEQ
# -0.616613709 0.923349555 0.035927732 1.857239412 0.042422053 
FRML(EQUATION=KIEQ) KIFM
# EQUATION FOR INVENTORIES
EQUATION KIIEQ KIIRATIO
# CONSTANT RREAL KIIRATIO{l} KIIGDPE{l}
ASSOCIATE KIIEQ
# 0.000093070 -0.000017713 0.533718439 0.000041711 
FRML(EQUATION=KIIEQ) KIIFM
# EQUATION FOR EMPLOYMENT(WHOLE ECONOMY)
EQUATION ETEQ ETDIFF
# CONSTANT ETDIFF{1} ETVAR2 ETVAR3 ETVAR4 
ASSOCIATE ETEQ
# -0.178353081 0.310422237 -0.128975991 -0.000454412 -0.000241498 
FRML(EQUATION=ETEQ) ETFM
# EQUATION FOR CONSUMER SPENDING 
EQUATION CEQ CDIFF
# CDIFF{l} CVAR2{1} CVAR3{l} CVAR4{1} RLBDIFF{1}
356
ASSOCIATE CEQ
* -0.125784814 -0.026344580 -0.197419823 $
0.228154705 0.000955895
FRML(EQUATION=CEQ) CFM
* EQUATION FOR IMPORTS (NON-OIL)
EQUATION MEQ LOGM
* CONSTANT LOGM{1} CDIFFM MVAR3 LOGGDPE{2}
ASSOCIATE MEQ
* -2.33695833 0.80525152 0.79118404 20.13666059 0.36989006 
FRML(EQUATION=MEQ) MFM
* IDENTITY FOR EXCHANGE RATE
FRML(IDENTITY) EERID EER = XEER*(1 + (RLB-RSW)/400)
* IDENTITY FOR COMPETITIVENESS
FRML(IDENTITY) COMPID COMP = WSI/(PROD*WWPI/EER)
* IDENTITY FOR CAPITAL ACCOUNT
FRML(IDENTITY) OJID OJ = OJ{l} + BAL - DRESV
* IDENTITY FOR EXPENDITURE MEASURE OF GDP
FRML(IDENTITY) GDPEID GDPE = C + IFP + KII - KIl{l} + G + $
X - M + O - FACTOR
* GOVT. DEBT
FRML(IDENTITY) GOVTBID GOVTB = GOVTB{l} + DGG
* IDENTITY FOR GILTS AND OTHER GOVT. DEBT
FRML(IDENTITY) DGGID DGG = PSBR -(MONEY-MONEY{1}) + DRESV
* GROUP EQUATIONS AND IDENTITIES IN MODEL
GROUP GKSMALL PCRATIOFM WAGESFM LOGXFM LOGPXFM $
KIFM KIIFM ETFM CFM MFM EERID>>EER COMPID OJID GDPEID>>GDPE $ 
GOVTBID DGGID
* PROJECTIONS FOR RLB, PSBR AND BAL
DATA(UNIT=INPUT) 1993:1 1993:4 RLB 
6.33 6.33 6.33 6.33
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=PSBREQ) PSBR
* PSBR{1 TO 3}
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=BALEQ) BAL
* BAL{1 TO 8}
* PROJECTIONS FOR EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
* G, O, YD, RSW, WWPI, XWM, POILWC, WGNP, MONEY, DRESV, TAX, TIME
* PROJECTIONS FOR G
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=GFM) G
* G{1 TO 3}
* PROJECTIONS FOR O
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=OFM) O
* 0{l TO 3}
* PROJECTIONS FOR YD
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=YDFM) YD




# RSW{1 TO 3}
* PROJECTIONS FOR WWPI
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=WWPIFM) WWPI 
# WWPI{1 TO 3}
* PROJECTIONS FOR XWM
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=XWMFM) XWM
# XWM{1 TO 3}
* PROJECTIONS FOR POILWC
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=POILWCFM) POILWC
# POILWC{1 TO 3}
* PROJECTIONS FOR WGNP
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=WGNPFM) WGNP
# WGNP{1 TO 3}
* PROJECTIONS FOR MONEY
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=MONEYFM) MONEY
# MONEY{1 TO 8}
* PROJECTIONS FOR DRESV
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=DRESVFM) DRESV
# DRESV{1 TO 8}
* PROJECTIONS FOR TREF
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=TREFFM) TREF
# TREF{1 TO 3}
* PROJECTIONS FOR TAX
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=TAXFM) TAX
# TAX{1 TO 3}
* PROJECTIONS FOR TIME
LINREG(NOPRINT, FRML=TIMEFM) TIME
# CONSTANT TIME{1}
* INPUT VALUES FOR XEER
DATA(UNIT=INPUT) 1993:1 1993:4 XEER 
79.8 79.8 79.8 79.8
* IDENTITIES FOR TRANSFORMATIONS
FRML(IDENTITY) PRODID PROD = 1.0057**(TIME - 32) 
* PRICES
FRML(IDENTITY) LOGPCID LOGPC = LOG(PC)
FRML(IDENTITY) TREFID LOGTREF = LOG(TREF)
FRML(IDENTITY) PCVAR6ID PCVAR6 = LOG(PC{1}/(WWPI{1}/EER{1}) 
FRML(IDENTITY) PCVAR7ID PCVAR7 = LOG(GDPE{1}/PROD)
FRML(IDENTITY) PCFITID PC = EXP(PCRATIO + LOGPC{l})
* INTEREST RATES
FRML(IDENTITY) MOPCVARID MOPCRAT = LOG(MONEY/PC{1})
FRML(IDENTITY) GDPEVARID GDPEVAR = LOG(GDPE - 0)
FRML(IDENTITY) TIMELAGID TIMELAG = TIME - 32
* WAGES
FRML(IDENTITY) LOGWSIID LOGWSI = LOG(WSI)
FRML(IDENTITY) WSIRATID WSIRATIO = LOG(WSI/WSI{1})
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FRML(IDENTITY) WAGEV2ID WAGEVAR2 = LOG(WSI/(1.0057*PC)) - LOG(WSI{1}/PC{1}) 
FRML(IDENTITY) WAGEV3ID WAGEVAR3 = PCRATIO - PCRATIO{l}
FRML(IDENTITY) WSIFITID WSI = EXP( LOGWSI{l} - 0.009703 990 $
+ 0.03276270*WAGEVAR{1} - 1.070075715*WAGEVAR2{1} - 0.561039629*WAGEVAR3{1})
* EQUATION FOR EXPORT DEMAND
FRML(IDENTITY) XWMID LOGXWM = LOG(XWM)
FRML(IDENTITY) LOGCOMPID LOGCOMP = LOG(COMP)
FRML(IDENTITY) XFITID X = EXP(LOGX)
* EQUATION FOR EXPORT PRICES
FRML(IDENTITY) WSIVARID WSIVAR = LOG(WSI{1}/PROD)
FRML(IDENTITY) WWPIVARID WWPIVAR = LOG(WWPI/EER)
FRML(IDENTITY) PXFITID PX = EXP(LOGPX)
* EQUATION FOR FIXED INVESTMENT
FRML(IDENTITY) KIVAR2ID KIVAR2 = LOG(KI/GDPE)
FRML(IDENTITY) KIVAR3ID KIVAR3 = LOG(GDPE/GDPE{1})
FRML(IDENTITY) KIVAR4ID KIVAR4 = LOG((WSI{1}*ET{1})/(PC{1}*(1.0057**TIME)))
FRML(IDENTITY) KIFITID KIFITTED = KIFITTED{l} + GDPE{l}*EXP(-0.616613709 $
+ 0.923349555*KIVARl{l} + 0.035927732*KIVAR2{1} + 1.857239412*KIVAR3{1} $
+ 0.042422053 *KIVAR4)
FRML(IDENTITY) KIID KI = KIFITTED
* FLOW OF GROSS PRIVATE INVESTMENT
FRML(IDENITITY) IFPID IFP = KIFITTED - KIFITTED{l} + 4610*1.0086**(TIME-100)
* EQUATION FOR INVENTORIES
FRML(IDENTITY) RLBV1ID RLBVAR1 = 400*(EER/(EER - 1))
FRML(IDENTITY) RLBV2ID RLBVAR2 = 400*((WWPI*EER{1})/(WWPI{1}*EER) - 1)
FRML(IDENTITY) RLBV3ID RLBVAR3 = 400*(WSI/(WSI{1} - 1))
FRML(IDENTITY) RREALID RREAL = 157.1804378 + 0.8709958*RLB{1} $
- 0.3832469*RLBVAR1{1} + 0.0047546*RLBVAR2{1} - 0.0025148*RLBVAR3{1}
FRML(IDENTITY) LOGKIIID LOGKII = LOG(KII)
FRML(IDENTITY) KIIGDPEID KIIGDPE = LOG(KII/GDPE)
FRML(IDENTITY) KIIFITID KII = EXP(KIIRATIO + LOGKII{l})
* EQUATION FOR EMPLOYMENT(WHOLE ECONOMY)
FRML(IDENTITY) LOGETID LOGET = LOG(ET)
FRML(IDENTITY) ETVAR2ID ETVAR2 = LOG(ET{1}*PROD/GDPE{1})
FRML(IDENTITY) ETVAR3ID ETVAR3 = LOG(TREF/PC)
FRML(IDENTITY) ETVAR4ID ETVAR4 = LOG(WSI{1}/(PROD*PC{1}))
FRML(IDENTITY) ETFITID ET = EXP(ETDIFF + LOGET{l})
* EQUATION FOR CONSUMER SPENDING 
FRML(IDENTITY) LOGCID LOGC = LOG(C)
FRML(IDENTITY) CVAR2ID CVAR2 = LOG(C/(YD/(PC/100)))
FRML(IDENTITY) CVAR3ID CVAR3 = LOG((PC/PC{1}) + 0.0057)
FRML(IDENTITY) CVAR4ID CVAR4 = LOG((YD/PC)/ (YD{1}/PC{1}))
FRML(IDENTITY) RLBDIFFID RLBDIFF = RLB - RLB{l}
FRML(IDENTITY) CFITID C = EXP(LOGC{l} + 0.0057 - 0.125784814*CDIFF{1} $
- 0.026344580*CVAR2{1} - 0.197419823*CVAR3{1} $
+ 0.228154705 *CVAR4{1} + 0.000922160*RLBDIFF{1})
* EQUATION FOR IMPORTS (NON-OIL)
FRML(IDENTITY) CDIFFMID CDIFFM = LOG(C/C{l})
FRML(IDENTITY) MVAR3ID MVAR3 = LOG((KIl/KII{1})/(KII{1}/KII{2})) 
FRML(IDENTITY) LOGGDPID LOGGDPE = LOG(GDPE)
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FRML(IDENTITY) MFITID M = EXP(LOGM)
* IDENTITY FOR ADJUSTMENT TO FACTOR COST
FRML(IDENTITY) FACTORID FACTOR = 0.139228970*C + 0.053169319*IFP $
- 0 .005139745*X + 0.143336863*G
* GROUP INTO MODEL AND FORECAST
GROUP GKBIG PCRATIOFM WAGESFM LOGXFM LOGPXFM $
KIFM KIIFM ETFM CFM MFM EERID>>EER COMPID OJID GDPEID>>GDPE $
GOVTBID DGGID $
PSBREQ>>PSBR BALEQ>>BAL $
GFM>>G 0FM>>0 YDFM RSWFM>>RSW WWPIFM>>WWPI XWMFM>>XWM POILWCFM>>POILWC $ 
WGNPFM>>WGNP MONEYFM> >MONEY DRESVFM TREFFM TAXFM TIMEFM $
PRODID LOGPCID TREFID PCVAR6ID PCVAR7ID PCFITID»PC $
MOPCVARID GDPEVARID TIMELAGID $
LOGWSIID WSIRATID WAGEV2ID WAGEV3ID WSIFITID>>WSI $
XWMID LOGCOMPID XFITID»X $
WSIVARID WWPIVARID PXFITID>>PX $
KIVAR2ID KIVAR3ID KIVAR4ID KIFITID KIID»KI IFPID»IFP $
RLBV1ID RLBV2ID RLBV3ID RREALID LOGKIIID KIIGDPEID KIIFITID>>KII $ 
LOGETID ETVAR2ID ETVAR3ID ETVAR4ID ETFITID»ET $
LOGCID CVAR2ID CVAR3ID CVAR4ID RLBDIFFID CFITID>>C $
CDIFFMID MVAR3ID LOGGDPID MFITID>>M FACTORID>>FACTOR
SMPL 1993:1 1993:4 
FORECAST(MODEL=GKBIG, PRINT)
* GRAPHS ETC. TO FOLLOW :-)
PRINT 1993:1 1993:4 GDPE BAL PC RLB PSBR
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